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Abstract
On March 21 1990, Namibia became an independent state after 70 years of being a 
mandated territory under South African control. This thesis examines the dialectical 
relationship between power politics and international law in securing this outcome. From 
the beginning when South West Africa became a pawn in the European balance of power 
in the late 19th century, its atypical nature amongst other colonial territories reflected the 
ambiguous relationship between power politics and law. The Namibia conflict was 
essentially driven by balance of power politics. As this thesis demonstrates, it was at once 
a creation, a victim and a beneficiary of power politics. Nonetheless, while power drove 
the conflict, law constrained it. Indeed, its history paradoxically demonstrated a degree of 
complementarity between the two. By itself, international law was impotent to secure 
change in opposition to the realities of power and the interests of the great powers. On the 
other hand, the Namibian question was posed within the legal framework of the 
international arrangements for the transfer of power, i. e. mandate system, trusteeship, and 
decolonization regimes. At each stage, the complex and changing relationship between 
power and law became manifest.
From the establishment of the mandate system in 1920, the ideas of self-determination and 
international accountability were ingrained in the consciousness of the metropolitan 
power. These ideas survived to influence much of the transfer of power debate. They did 
not stop power politics, but over the long term, they changed the legal framework within 
which it operated. Consequently, international law served as an institutional device for 
communicating the prevailing norms of the international community to the South African 
government and restrained South Africa from annexing Namibia. Yet international law 
alone could never create the optimal balance of incentives and costs necessary to resolve 
the Namibian issue. However, as the conflict became externalized within the Cold War, 
the United States, acting out of self-interest in containing Soviet expansionism in Southern 
Africa, discovered that a solution was an effective means of achieving this objective. Thus 
Namibia was a beneficiary of power politics, and the international community finally 
sanctioned the outcome.
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INTRODUCTION
Background to the study
The year 1990 was the annus mirabilis in the history of Namibia.1 On March 21, 1990, 
Namibia gained independence. The UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar 
presided over the formal swearing in of the SWAPO (South West African Peoples 
Organisation) president, Sam Nujoma, as the first head of state. The independence 
celebration ended 70 years when South West Africa had been a Class C mandate of the 
League of Nations and a subject of the organised international community. At the 
independence ceremony, Mr. de Cuellar described Namibia's independence struggle as 
'our struggle'.2 Mr. Nujoma echoed de Cuellar’s view. He said that, 'the primary 
gratitude of the Namibian people for reaching the most memorable moment in the 
annals of our history was to the international community for its steadfast support'.3
In a similar fashion, on 23 April 1990 when joining the United Nations as its 106th 
member state, Mr. Joseph Garba, the President of the UN General Assembly depicted 
Namibian independence as truly historic and unique. He said:
"It is a special occasion for the United Nations each time, 
a new state is admitted. However, the case of Namibia, is 
unique, since her independence is in part the brainchild of 
the United Nations. Namibia's accession to independent
1 The name, Namibia, was officially adopted by the United Nations in 1967. It replaced 
the colonial name of 'South West Africa' (SWA). For ease of reference, in this study, 
Namibia and SWA are used interchangeably.
EIU Country R eport No. 2 , 1990-N am ibia, Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland (London: The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1990), p. 16.
3 ibid.
1
nationhood and its entry to the UN, is therefore a victory 
for the international community as a whole: for the 
people of Namibia as well as for the United Nations".4
The uniqueness of Namibia amongst other newly independent states cannot be fully
understood by relying on independence and post-independence orations. Starting with
the way in which it was implicated in the European balance of power in the late 19th
century, the atypical nature of Namibia amongst other colonial territories had always
reflected the ambiguous relationship between power politics and international law.
Thus, the history of the international status of Namibia, is nothing but a study of the
centripetal and centrifugal forces of power politics.
To some, the Namibian question epitomised many of the critical problems of the post­
war period. It encompassed colonialism and self-determination; racism and human 
rights; apartheid and equality; minority rule and democracy.5 South Africa’s 
introduction of the Odendall Report in early 1960s effectively imported apartheid 
policies to Namibia and seemed to confirm this view if only because of the constant 
attempt to define Namibia as an integral part of the Union or at least, to shape the 
dispute internally. At another level, the Namibian question was akin to a general 
international crisis, which was sustained by, but then transcended idealistic imperatives. 
It was underpinned by multiple rationality stemming from both idealism and realism. It 
was an international conflict, in which the superpowers’ aspirations to outwit each other 
were embedded. This standoff between them, in turn, made room for a regional 
hegemon. South Africa accordingly used the Namibian question and its willingness to 
engage with the Western powers over it to offset its own isolation from the wider
4 See, Commonwealth Law Review, Vol. 16,1990, p. 950.
5 Slomin, Solomon. South W est Africa and the United Nations: An In ternational 
M andate in  D ispute. (London; The John Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 1.
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international community. For instance, the Namibian question illustrated how South 
Africa’s portrayal of itself as a bastion against communism in Southern Africa 
prompted the United States peace initiatives, which were an attempt to pre-empt further 
Soviet gains after the Angolan civil war.
On yet another level, the Namibian question initially revealed the account of how 
international law guided by idealistic imperatives was impotent against the realities of 
power and great power’s interests. South Africa was able to defy the consensus of 
international law for more than fifty years as it leaned on the reticence of the great 
powers that had the potential influence to make compliance possible. At the same time, 
the* Namibian question equally helped in the transformation of international law, and 
the role of the International Court of Justice within it.6 The invitation of the General 
Assembly in 1960 to ‘the legally qualified states’ to institute a legal action against 
South Africa demonstrated the ‘limited personality status’ of the United Nations itself. 
Similarly, the ICJ ruling of 1966 against Ethiopia and Liberia for a lack of material and 
personal interest in South West Africa throw light on the political difficulty of applying 
international law to self determination issues. The ruling also accounted for the call by 
African states to make the ICJ more responsive to their sense of injustice.
Furthermore, in the late 1980s the Namibian question engendered the formation of the 
so called ‘second generation’ or ‘governance-oriented’ peacekeeping missions with a 
multidimensional mandate that combined traditional peacekeeping with peace-building 
operations. The UNTAG’s functions included the creation of a climate of security
6 McWhinney, Edward. Judicial Settlement of International Disputes: Jurisdiction, 
Justiciability and Judicial Law-Making on the Contemporary International Court
(The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), p. xvii.
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between the SWAPO and South African troops, the organisation of elections and 
ushering in the birth of the new state.7 Besides, the Namibian question showed the 
tension inherent in the unanimity form of the Five Western Powers who formed 
themselves into a Contact Group to promote a political settlement, in tandem with the 
suspicion of the Communist bloc at the height of the Cold War. The Contact Group 
consisted of the United States, Britain, France, Canada and Germany. It came into 
being in 1977 to resolve the impasse between South Africa and the United Nations.
In the final analysis, as this study explains in the following chapters, the Namibian 
question exhibited the mutual exclusiveness of the balance of power and international 
law as mechanisms for understanding international relations, whilst at the same time, it 
paradoxically demonstrated a degree of complementarity between the two. The paradox 
was resolved in practice by confirming the primacy of balance of power over 
international law, so that the law had an influence but only when it suited the interests 
of the major powers. All these complexities will be examined in the course of this 
thesis. But in attempting to site the Namibian question within the centripetal and 
centrifugal forces that shaped the balance of power, one is challenged to seek a level of 
explanation that goes beyond contested meanings of the concept. It requires us to show 
how power and law combined to secure the outcome that ended the impasse on 
Namibia. At different time each played a part in resolving but also in prolonging the 
Namibian dispute. Indeed, one might query the extent to which the resolve for relative
7 Schrijver, Nico "Introducing Second-Generation PeaceKeeping: The Case of 
Namibia" A frican Jou rna l o f In ternational and C om parative Law, March 1994, 
Vol. 6. No.l. p. 1-13; See, Thornberry, Cedric The D evelopm ent o f In ternational 
Peacekeeping: LSE C entenary Lectures. (London: LSE Books, 1995), p. 19-25.
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balanced positioning amongst the great powers at different historical times impacted 
on, yet created and offered incentive towards the resolution of the Namibian question.
Statement of the Problem
The central proposition of this study is that Namibian conflict was essentially driven by 
balance of power politics. This study posits that Namibia was at once a creation, a 
victim and a beneficiary of power politics. The role of international law was a restrain 
on South Africans attempts to annex Namibia. The argument is that while power 
politics drove the Namibian conflict, law constrained it, and their ‘cohabitation’ secured 
an outcome towards its resolution
A sizeable literature has developed on Namibia’s legal position, current politics and 
economic development. Yet existing studies suffer from two major drawbacks. The 
first is that concentration on South African apartheid eclipsed scholarship on Namibia. 
In most Southern African regional studies, Namibia is discussed in a chapter or two. 
Most of the available studies overemphasise the history, politics and economic 
development of Namibia.8
Secondly, there exist fragmented studies of the role of the international community in 
the process by which power was transferred from South Africa to Namibia. A coherent 
and detailed academic work is lacking in this area. Most of the available works confine 
their studies to examining the question of Namibia as a trusteeship territory and the role
8 Saunders, C. (ed.), Perspectives on  Nam ibia: Past and P resen ts. (Cape Town: 
Centre for African Studies Occasional Paper No 4, University of Cape Town, 
1983, p.16). First, R. South W est Africa (Harmondsworth, 1963). Coker, 
Christopher. The U nited States and South A frica, 1 9 6 8 -1 9 8 5 : C onstructive 
Engagem ent and Its Critics. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1986).
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of the United Nations.9 Alternatively, they focus on a specific aspect of the conflict. 
For instance, Jabri used the third party mediation framework to explain how the 
involvement of the Contact Group, as an interested third party transformed the 
Namibian conflict from a binary form into a triad process.10 Dreyer believed that the 
complexities of Southern Africa regional interaction were important in the 
understanding of Namibia’s decolonisation. According to him, the regional dynamics of 
Namibia's decolonisation from 1945 to 1990 interacted with, and at times determined, 
both the internal dynamics of colonisation, collaboration and resistance, and the 
international dimension of United Nations diplomacy and superpower politics.11 
Dreyer’s study substantively explained the motives and factors underpinning the 
involvement of regional actors, and the constraints imposed upon them owing to their 
economic dependence on South Africa and their calculated national interests.
Amongst these studies, Dreyer’s work alone considered the importance of power 
politics but only within the regional context. The argument of this thesis is that a 
concentration on the regional power balances is insufficient to account for what 
happened. The impact of the regional actors such as the Frontline States should not be 
overvalued. Most of them were either reacting to the dynamics of action and outcomes
9 The following works focused on the role of the United Nations in Namibia. 
Goisha, Rocha, Nam ibia In  Search o f Nam ibian Independence: T he lim itations 
o f the U nited Nations. (Boulder, Colo: Western View Press, 1984); Do re, Isaac 
Ismail In ternational M andate System, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1985); and 
Slomin, Solomon. South W est Africa and the U nited Nations: An In ternational 
M andate in  D ispute. (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973).
10 Jabri, Vivienne. Mediating Conflict: Decision-making and Western Intervention in 
Namibia. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990).
n . Dreyer, R. Namibia and S outhern  Africa: Regional Dynam ics o f
D ecolonisation, 1945-1990. (London: Kegan Paul International, 1994).
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defined by the superpowers, or sought their own legitimisation in international politics, 
with decolonisation as a useful political weapon.
In the wake of the final settlement of the Namibian dispute in 1988, some exciting 
studies have appeared. The Transition to Independence in Namibia' edited by Lionel 
Cliffe (1994)12 highlighted the political events that occurred during the 1989-1990 
period. In its introduction, Cliffe noted that the authors were concerned with 
identifying the key analytical issues thrown up by these events (of 1989-1990), 
conscious that this would be only a preliminary effort but one that might at least set the 
agenda for future investigations of the transition to independence. Among the chronicle 
of events in the book were the cease-fire, the electoral processes (political campaigns 
and the actual voting), deliberations of the Constituent Assembly and the other trends 
leading to independence in March 1990.
Leys and Saul approaching the subject within the political economy tradition published 
Namibia's Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword in 1995.13 Like Cliffe, they 
insisted that they were not writing a definitive history of Namibia's independence 
struggle but a preliminary study of the way the war affected both the liberation 
movement itself and the political culture bequeathed to post-independence 
development. Their argument that the SWAPO emerged from its Thirty Years War, 
with resilient, strong, qualified and competent securocrats who are capable of 
governing the new state, is a substantive one. Yet, it is premature to conclude that the
12 Cliffe, Lionel (ed j T he T ransition to  Independence in  Namibia. (London: 
Lynne Rienner, 1994).
13 Leys, C. and Saul, ]. (eds.) Namibia's L iberation  Struggle: Two-Edged Sword. 
(London: J. Curry, 1994).
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fungi of mal-administration, weak institutions and tribal politics characteristic of other 
African states will not infect Namibia.
Finally, memoirs, and biographies account for another set of literature on Namibia. 
Most of these memoirs give insider views on the negotiations over Namibia. Cyrus 
Vance’s Hard Choices and Chester Crocker’s High Noon in Southern Africa depicted 
the Carter administration and Reagan administration’s understanding of, and 
approaches to, the Namibian question.14 The former focused on the Contact Group’s 
multilateral initiatives, while the latter brought to light the reasoning and detailed 
negotiations that led to the New York Agreement of December 31, 1988. These 
memoirs are written in the language of personal involvement. Their authors 
understandably aim to gain reputation by combining intellectual objectivity and 
individual achievement. These delicate issues of objectivity and involvement often 
erode the very ground on which a detached analysis can be built. While drawing on 
their rich materials, what I hope to add to these accounts, is a demonstration of the 
mutual exclusiveness and interface between balance of power and international law, 
and the way in which the primacy of the former over the latter is established in 
international politics.
The reasons for such limited research on Namibia, in comparison to other African 
states, are not difficult to understand. Here it will suffice to point to three reasons. First, 
the South African government that occupied Namibia barred political exiles and most
14 Vance, Cyrus. Hard Choices: Critical Years in America’s Foreign Policy. (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), and Crocker, Chester. High Noon in Southern Africa: 
Making peace in a rough neighbourhood. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992).
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western scholars, from Southern African archives15. This denial of access to 
information was not only an affront to freedom of expression; it undermined the 
richness of scholarship, which ought to have been developed on Namibia. Second, the 
pre-independence education system was racially segregated between the white 
community and the blacks, with more resources going to the former. The Academy of 
Tertiary Education was established in 1978 to provide higher education and 
matriculation courses for adults, but it was only in 1990 that the University of Namibia 
was formally instituted16. With the policy of segregation, each member of a particular 
racial group handicapped in their efforts to present a balanced view of the broad 
spectrum of ideological and racial divisions within the country. Inevitably, as a 
consequence, the interpretation and understanding of Namibia were often coloured by 
the limited experience of what the Mandatory Power wanted the citizenry and 
researchers to be aware of.
Third, there was problem concerning how materials on Namibia were catalogued. 
According to Hillebrecht, there are three frustrations confronting researchers on 
Namibia. These are the frustration of classification, the frustration of a dearth of 
literature and the frustration of incorrect title.17 The first frustration, he noted, was that 
there was no subject catalogue under the heading 'Namibia' but only on South West 
Africa or German South West Africa, as a result of a century old library classification
15 Saunder, ibid, p.17
16 EIU, Namibia: Country Profile 1989-90. (London: The Economics Intelligence 
Unit, London, 1989), p. 14.
17 Hillebrecht, Werner. "How to find what has been written about Namibia" in 
Wood, Brian, (ed.), Nam ibia 1884-1984: Readings on Nam ibia's bistory  and 
society. (London, Namibia Support Committee, 1988), p. 81.
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and cataloguing system. The second frustration, he observed, was that Namibia has 
never been a favourable topic in library accessions except during the colonial times. On 
the third frustration, there were many incorrect titles. For example, the Odendall Report 
was classified as an official South African Government document. The diversity of 
languages in Namibia was also one of the hindrances to research. Commenting on 
researching on Namibian history, Saunders observed ‘that Namibia history is under­
researched is not altogether surprising; ideally historians of Namibia would know
1 ftEnglish, Afrikaans, German, Ovambo, and Herero’. These frustrations, complexities 
and diversities of language coupled with the guerrilla war of independence discouraged 
research and scholarship. It is hoped that a sovereign, independent Namibia will 
redress most of these identified shortcomings.
In an effort to fill the existing intellectual lacunae, this thesis sets out three interrelated 
objectives: (i) to analyse the meaning or meanings associated with the balance of 
power. To highlight the nexus between balance of power and international law: their 
degree of compatibility or mutual exclusiveness for the creation of order in 
international politics. And the effectiveness of balance of power and international law 
in affecting states behaviour, in making states do what they would not otherwise have 
done, (ii) To locate and analyse the Namibian question within the context of complex 
answers generated from the problems identified above. To put it differently, the 
intermeshing of balance of power and international law is a useful template against 
which to analyse the involvement of great powers and other members of the 
international actors, including the regional actors within the southern Africa sub-region
18 Saunders, Christopher. "Towards the decolonisation of Namibian history: Notes 
on some recent works in English" in Brain Wood, ibid, p. 81
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on the Namibian question, (iii) To justify the proposition that although the choice 
between balance of power and international law is not one of a simple either or nature, 
yet international law, never had significant independent effects on states behaviour or 
was able to create the optimal incentives and costs to resolve the Namibian question.
Within the context of these questions, two underlying themes will emerge. First, that 
although modem opinion and critiques of the balance of power have been so impressed 
by its imperfections that its underlying contribution to world order is often overlooked. 
In any event, it continues to be a determining feature of international relations. If there 
is a general moderation within the international system and the acceptance of norms of 
international law, these developments were made possible by the logic and practice of 
balance of power. Frankel correctly observed that although international law 
incorporated certain principles of natural law, the history of the concept showed that it 
was formed more through state practices than through logical deduction from any such 
idealist principles.19 In essence, where balance of power has existed, it has provided the 
foundation on which other institutions such as international law or diplomacy have 
been built. The second theme is the way in which the Namibian question developed in 
line with the different phases of the practice of balance power politics. In other words, 
Namibia, in different political periods, benefited from the resolve of the great powers 
when attempting to secure a relatively balanced position with each other.
Having set out the major themes and question to which this dissertation is addressed, a 
short outline of its stmcture may prove useful. The next section is devoted to the 
theory. It focuses primarily on balance of power theory and history. This section
11
explores why and how the Namibian question arose within the balance of power 
framework. Thereafter, the discussion considers the nexus between the balance of 
power and international law: their mutual exclusiveness and complementarity. Chapter 
two tracks the origin of the Namibian question to the Anglo-German rivalry of the late 
19th century. Here, the discussion focuses on the assumption that Bismarckian colonial 
moves in South West Africa were sui generis as they were underscored by Germany’s 
attempt to forestall Britain’s expansionism.
Chapter three examines the politics and principle of the Mandate system. Emphasis is 
placed on how competing rationalities and interests between those in favour of the logic 
of balance of power and those in favour of idealism and international law led to the 
creation of the mandate system. A subsequent section focuses on the status of South 
Africa itself as a Mandatory Power in the context of its ‘quasi-state status’ within the 
classical positive international law. It also examines the legal disputes between South 
Africa and the United Nations after the demise of the League of Nations. Chapter four 
deals with the changes in both the global and regional balance(s) of power of the mid- 
1970s, and its effects on the involvement of the United States, as a mediator on 
Namibia. It is shown in this chapter that the United States, acting out of self-interest in 
containing Soviet expansionism in Southern Africa, discovered that a solution to both 
Rhodesia and Namibian conflicts was an effective means of achieving this objective; 
thus mediation came about within the context of power politics. In chapter five, the 
dynamics of the Contact Group diplomacy is examined. It seeks to explore how the 
Contact Group which intended to reflect an idealistic framework, unwittingly 
exemplified another attempt to limit the Soviets gains in Southern Africa, and raised
19 .Frankel, Joseph. International Relations in a Changing World. (Oxford: Oxford
12
some interesting questions on its own (Contact Group) relationship with the 
international law, as typified by the United Nations. Finally, chapter six assesses the 
‘end-game’ of the Namibian conflict, and in this context considers those factors and 
forces that made Namibia a beneficiary of the balance of power. The chapter ends by 
summarising the general conclusions of the study.
University Press, 1978), p. 178.
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Theoretical Analysis
1.1. Introduction
In this study, I shall argue that balance of power is an essentially a contested concept.20 
In particular, an attempt is made to examine the contending claims made on behalf of 
the balance of power and their applicability in the post-Cold War international relations. 
The other purpose of this chapter is to ask how the balance of power relates to 
international law.
The chapter opens with an examination of the multiplicity of meanings associated with 
balance of power.21 This multiplicity has been repeatedly noted, for example, in the 
works of realist scholars such as Morgenthau, Wight, Hoffman, Kissinger, and 
Kenneth Waltz. These scholars’ works have been selected as providing the most 
influential accounts of balance of power and/or international law within the realist 
tradition. They provided a benign definition of balance of power. Unlike Wight or
20 For the purpose of this study, a contested concept is a concept over which there is a 
theoretical or political debate; concepts are ‘essentially contested’ when a settled 
definition can never be developed. See, Heywood, Andrew. Politics, (London: Macmillan 
Press Limited, 1997), p. 403. For instance, when the Allied Powers in 1813 submitted 
their conditions of peace to Napoleon, they invoked the principle of balance of power. 
When Napoleon rejected these conditions, he too, invoked the “equilibrium of rights and 
interests”. See, Morgenthau, Hans. J. Politics Among Nations. (New York: Knopf, 1960), 
p. 214.
1 There is a huge literature on balance of power. For a detailed analysis of the concept, 
see, Gulick, E. V. Europe’s classical balance of power: a case history of the theory 
and practice of one of the greatest concepts of European statecraft, (Westport, Conn.: 
Greenwood Press, 1982), Cameron, N. The global balance of power, (Leeds: Leeds 
University Press, 1981) Prior, J. A balance of power, (London: Hamilton, 1986), Luard,
E. The balance of power: the system of international relations, 1648-1815, (London: 
Macmillan, 1991), Naidu, M. V. Alliances and balance of power: a search for 
conceptual clarity, (London: Macmillan, 1975), Niou, E. M. S. and Ordeshook, P. C. and 
Rose, G. F. The balance of power: stability in international system, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989) and Sked, A. Europe’s balance of power, 1815-1848, 
(London: Macmillan, 1979).
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Morgenthau,22 Waltz remains silent on the importance of international law in his 
structural theory of balance of power. This sort of silence is not a new phenomenon. 
By the 16th century, attempts to prove or disprove the existence of a relationship 
between balance of power and international law were firmly established amongst 
international jurists and scholars such as Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, Alberico 
Gentili and de Vattel. We will consider the opinions of these early scholars in the next 
section. In recent times though, Bull resolved the problem of the relationship between 
the two concepts by defining them as two of the ‘institutions’ of international society 
with concurrently conflicting and complementary objectives.23 This is essentially the 
position adopted here. What is posited, in other words, is a symbiotic relationship 
between the balance of power and international law, with each having its own 
competence in affecting the behaviour of states. The relationship is both 
complementary and conflictual. The balance of power reduces the capacity of any one 
state or alliance of states to overthrow the international order. International law 
correspondingly reduces the desire to overthrow the order; hence both jointly create 
and sustain international stability.
Two caveats need be made. First, the choice between reliance on balance of 
power or international law has never been of a simple either or nature. Indeed, as 
we shall see, it is the confluence of the contending ways in which they affect the 
behaviour of states that will emerge as the leitmotif of this study. Second, if in
22 For these scholars work on international law, see, Morgenthau, Hans. J. Politics 
Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1955), Chapter XVIII, p. 249-285; and Wight, Martin. Power Politics. Edited by Bull, 
Hedley and Holbraad, Carsteen. (London: Leceister University Press/ REA, 1995), 
Chapter 10, p. 105-112.
23 Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: 
Macmillan, 2nd edition, 1995), p. 129-130.
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the chapters that follow, more emphasis is put on the balance of power than on 
international law, this is because I believe that international law does not have 
significant independent effects on state behaviour. The paradoxical essence of 
the balance of power is that it requires moderation and vigilance for the 
protection of a system of states. This system in turn needs to be reinforced by 
international law. Without rejecting the valuable contributions of both 
international law and the United Nations to the resolution of the Namibian 
conflict, the argument of the thesis is that they were secondary rather than 
determinant factors.
Lastly, I suggest that the externalities of the balance of power, which are 
beneficial to the entire system, have often been neglected by the realists, 
although they have been partially analysed by some English school scholars.24 
The proposition here is that although the great powers act out of self-interest to 
thwart the ambition of the most powerful, embedded in the contest for balance 
are contingent opportunities for solving conflicts which are themselves 
peripheral to the contest. Historically, these externalities have included the 
deepening of diplomatic intercourse amongst the European states in the 17th and 
18th centuries; the imperative of rationality on the state’s action and the
24 The term ‘English school’ of International Relations is associated with scholars such as 
John Vincent, Hedley Bull, Martin Wight and Charles Manning. It is ‘English’ in the 
sense that most of its practitioners worked and work in England, but their background is 
diversely British. The idea of ‘international society’ remains the School’s core 
contribution to international relations discourse. Simply put, international society is 
defined as the existence of a group of states, conscious of common interests, and common 
values, which form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
set of rules in their relations with one another. For a brief analysis of the English School, 
see, Neumann, Iver. B. “John Vincent and the English School of International Relations”, 
in Neumann, Iver. B., and Weaver, Ole (eds.), The Future of International Relations: 
Masters in the making? (London: Routledge, 1 997), p. 39-64.
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development of the balance of power as a conflict-resolution medium. The study 
explores these opportunities inherent in the balance of power, in order to show 
how Namibia benefited from them.
At base, the Namibian question was a decolonisation issue. However, this study 
is not primarily concerned with the “decolonisation debate”, or with the 
influence of domestic forces on decolonisation. The questions I am asking, 
although parallel, are different: what fundamental purposes did the balance of 
power and international law serve in the context of decolonisation; and how 
effective were they in resolving the decolonization problem.
Thus, the study seeks to locate the Namibian question within the realm of power 
politics. It explores how the forces of balance of power informed and determined 
Germany’s colonial claim to South West Africa. To this end, it focuses on 
Anglo-German rivalry of the late 19th century, exploring for example, the 
political and legal interests that underlay the cable sent on February 4, 1883 by 
Chancellor Bismarck to London questioning of the nature and character of 
Britain’s authority over the Angra Penquena. It is suggested that while the cable 
provided the cover for Germany to couch its claims on South West Africa within 
the prevailing norms of international law, its main motive was the containment 
of Britain’s European supremacy and global expansionism. This Anglo-German 
rivalry arguably prompted the Great War in 1914.
In the wake of the Great War, the League of Nations legitimated, appropriated 
and engrossed South West African affairs in the realm of international law under
17
the mandate system. The mandate principle defined South West Africa as a new 
kind of international responsibility; yet its creation came about from the 
mechanics of power politics. This dual aspect of the problem as subject 
simultaneously to the force international law and power politics continued 
through the period of Cold War bipolarity.
Neither the balance of power nor international law alone is sufficient to explain 
the resolution of the Namibian question. The role of the International Court of 
Justice and the United Nations in framing the problem cannot be ignored. The 
United Nations, acting on the basis of international law, made it impossible for 
South Africa to annex Namibia and kept the Namibian question on the 
international agenda for more than three decades. More importantly, 
international law served as a quasi-authoritative means by which the African 
states communicated the prevailing international norms to the South African 
government. In addition, the involvement of most African states, especially the 
Front-line States, had both political and legal implications. Through their 
involvement they influenced the liberation movements with their provision of 
political and diplomatic access for the major powers. They also enhanced their 
own reputation and served as a part of a regional countervailing alliance to South 
Africa. In this respect, their interests and functionality was nested within the 
global balance.
1.2. Definition(s) of the balance of power
The concept of the balance of power is one of the oldest in international 
relations. It was practised amongst the ancient empires before it was given its
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modem name. According to Wight, in ancient times, what was practised was the 
pattern of power rather than the balance of power, although the two ideas come 
close to one another. Thucydides used idea of the balance of power in his 
account of the Pelopennesian War, although he did not expressly used the term. 
Machiavelli likewise explained the politics of the Italian city-states of the 15th 
century without using the concept. Some diplomatic historians have traced the 
etymology of the concept to Bernardo Rucellai, (1449-1514), the brother-in-law 
of Lorenzo de Medici; others link to Philip de Comines, a 15th century French 
diplomat and writer.26 Indeed, the term during its three hundred-year history has 
accumulated a number of meanings, some of them mutually contradictory. For 
instance, simply by consulting a good dictionary and analysing it word by word, 
Pollard concluded that there are several thousands meanings of the phrase.27 
Hass discovered eight distinct meanings; Martin Wight found nine, while 
Morgenthau made use of only four.28
The problem with the concept is twofold. First, the focus on what constitutes a 
balance or equilibrium, and how to measure it? Second, the problem that arises 
out of the frequent past practice of using a single term to describe any one or all 
of three related but distinct things: (1) the action taken in making alliances, (2) 
the driver behind such actions, and (3) its outcome. The first problem arose early
25 Wight, op cit., p. 157.
26 Fredrich, Carl. J. Foreign Policy in the Making: the Search for a new Balance of 
Power. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1983), p. 23; Gulick, Edward. Vose. The Balance of 
Power. (The Pacifist Research Bureau, 1943), p. 15. Fredrich credited Rucellai, while 
Gullick believed that it was Philippe de Comines who first coined the concept. Who first 
used the concept is less important than the meanings associated with it.
27 Pollard, A. F., “The Balance of Power”, Journal of British Institute of International 
Affairs, (now International Affairs), II (March 1923), p. 51-64.
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in the history of the concept. The imagery of balance in the natural order and 
cosmos informed those who popularised the balance of power concept. We can 
call these proponents the ‘naturalists’. The second problem is associated with 
those who could be termed the ‘experimentalists’. The two camps are not 
mutually exclusive; they are intertwined. The natural order formed the 
perspective of the former, while the latter leaned heavily on the accumulated 
evidence of state behaviour. For a while, David Hume, an 18th century 
Enlightenment thinker was a leading naturalist. He reasoned that balance of 
power is a fact of life, which is founded on ‘common sense and obvious 
reasoning’.29 Hume believed that the idea of balance arose naturally in 
considering any relationship between competing heavenly and human units, 
groups and institutions. To him, balance is the ordering principle of creation. It 
existed between God that ruled the ecclesiastical realm and Satan that the ruled 
the secular realm. Similarly, it operated between the Roman Emperor and the 
Papacy in the medieval period.
Imagery of the cosmos and the forces of modernity and enlightenment shaped the 
naturalist understanding of the idea of ‘balance’. Their mode of thought 
flourished during the Eighteenth century in the aftermath of the epistemological 
revolution initiated by the scientific discoveries of Copernicus, Bacon, Galelio, 
Newton and Descartes. It was a century when scientists and philosophers sought
28 As quoted in Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. (Reading, Mass.: 
Addisson-Wesley, 1979), p. 117.
29 Hume, David. Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects. 2 vols. (London, 1788), I, p. 
305.
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to capture the symmetry and regularity of nature.30 This obsession with balance 
and symmetry unified the major contributions to science and philosophy of the 
age. In the words of Carl J. Fredrich it was the period when ‘men were seeing 
natural balances everywhere’ and they believed in the “pre-established harmony 
of the universe”.31 The ‘balance’ is denoted symbolically by a pair of scales. 
When the weight in the scales are of equal proportion, balance results.
This ‘naturalist’ view suffers two drawbacks. First, balance as a concept is often 
taken as given in any phenomenon. Balance of power is quite often spoken of as 
if it was a force of nature. But it is not. Such view is a crude-simplification of the 
complex realities. It does not tell us how the balance came into being, and how 
the competing agents reached a state of balance. Second, the naturalists failed to 
point out the fuzziness of the meaning of a balance. As Dickson put it, a 
‘balance’ could mean equality, as of the two sides when an account is balanced.
On the other hand, it could imply inequality, as when one has a ‘balance to one’s 
credit at the bank”.32 Since the concept of balance is immeasurable, the 
formulation of balance of power could not lay claim to precision.
The experimentalists reaffirmed the imagery of balance and looked at the 
political practices amongst the early city-states in Italy and other European 
kingdoms to explain balance of power. Drawing on Thucydides, Hume who 
combined the naturalist and experimentalist perspectives described the methods
30 Knutsen, Torbjom L. A history of International Relations theory: An introduction.
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 103.
31 Fredrich, op cit., p. 119.
32 Dickson, Lowes. G. The International Anarchy, 1904-1914. (London: Allen and 
Unwin, 1926), p. 5-6.
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used by Hiero of Syracuse, who sent aid to Cathage in order to offset the 
growing might of Rome in terms of balance of power. Yet Rome’s victory at the 
Battle of the Metaurus River denied the Carthaginians the capacity to form a 
counter-balancing force. From the founding of the Eternal City in 753 BC to the 
fall of Constantinople to the armies of the Turkish Sultan Mehmet II on Tuesday 
29 1453 AD, Rome functioned as a hegemonic power.33 Pax Romana lasted for 
2,203 years. Like most other patterns of international relations, hegemonic order 
was not timelessly universal or insensitive to the context and limits of its own 
development. The erosion of Rome’s hegemonic position began with the success 
of Otto I’s campaign of 992 AD over the Byzantine Italian territories. From then 
on there were to be two empires. The dream of a Roman Empire was lost 
forever.34 The Papal Schism between 1378 to 1417 sapped the energy of Rome 
as a cohesive political formation. Consequently, there was a dearth of effective 
technical and organisation competencies to contain the challenges of the new 
princes in Europe and the internecine religious wars.
As earlier indicated, the problem of the ‘experimentalists’ arose out of the 
practice of using a single term to describe simultaneously the action, intent and 
outcome of alliance formation. This confusion was nowhere better found than in 
Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations. Morgenthau offered four different 
meanings namely: (1) as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, (2) as an 
actual state of affairs, (3) as an approximately equal distribution of power, and
33 Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)., p. 149- 
408. Chapters IV to VI deal in great detail with the rise and fall of Rome.
34 ibid.
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(4) as any distribution of power.35 He nonetheless, qualified his usage by 
preferring the second definition: that is, an actual state of affairs in which power 
is distributed among several nations with approximate equality. What often 
underpins this state of affairs is the composition of alliances formed in the 
international system. This line of reasoning assumes that the balance of power is 
a system in which either, or both of these propositions are true: (1) The 
participants have the common purpose of achieving a stable power relationship 
and restraining aggression. (2) There exists a normative form underpinning the 
balancing. That is the objective form balance rests on the belief amongst the 
statesmen that there must be one in any event.
Vattel’s exposition on balance of power exemplified the experimentalist view.
He described it as the “famous scheme of the political equilibrium of balance of 
power, by which is understood such a disposition of things as no power is able 
absolutely to predominate, or prescribe law to others”.36 Quincy Wright echoed 
VatteFs definition when he defined the balance of power as “a system designed 
to maintain a continuous conviction in every state that if it attempted aggression, 
it would encounter an invincible combination of the others”.37 To a great extent, 
it could be argued that the intent of the alliance makers is to deter an ambitious 
hegemonic power. It is however, more difficult to predict the consequences from 
making such alliances. It is the uncertainty of where to draw the line between 
imputing to the alliance makers an intent to attain power equilibrium, and the
35 Morgenthau, op cit., (1967), p. 280.
36 Vattel, E. The Laws of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law Applied to the
Conduct and to the Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns. Trans, of 1758 edition Charles 
Fenwick (Washington, D.C: Carnegie Institution, 1916)
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outcome or consequences of such as an action on international order, that made 
balance of power an essentially contested concept. No unequivocal and precise 
answer to the question of the contestable nature of the concept was forthcoming 
when it was first raised centuries ago. Nor is there an answer now. For this 
reason, the position adopted in this study, is that every balance of power, whether 
local or general-implies a power competition and a struggle for relative 
advantage. Before we operationalise the concept of balance of power in relation 
to Namibia, it will be helpful to examine the historical development of balance of 
power.
1.3. The historical development of balance of power
Chris Brown described balance of power as an ‘artefact’.38 Brown is partly 
correct to say that it is a European invention, but we can add another dimension 
to his argument. In contemporary time, balance of power now had a strong 
global outlook in practice. In medieval Europe in which religion ruled, the 
concept of balancing did not assume a political construction. It was the 
competition amongst the five major Italian city-states Venice, Milan, Florence, 
Naples and the Papal States in the 15th century that “gave rise to the balance of 
power politics in the fullest sense.39 From then onwards, the idea became a 
prevailing orthodoxy for explaining political manoeuvres amongst the princes 
and kings in Europe. Many kings appropriated, and defined their management of 
external relations in terms of balance of power.
37 Wright, Quincy. “The Balance of Power”, in Weighart, H. and Steffanson, V. (eds.), 
The Compass of the World. (New York: 1944).
38 Brown, Chris. International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches. (Hemel 
Hempstead: Temple Smith, 1992).
24
For instance, Henry VII saw his role as such, for he had as his motto, cui 
adhaero praest (whom ever I shall join will triumph). He is “reported to have 
had himself painted holding in his right hand a pair of scales in perfect balance, 
one of them occupied by France, the other by Austria, and holding in his left 
hand a weight ready to be dropped in either scale”.40 In the preamble to the 
annual Mutiny Act (from 1727 down to 1867), the function of the British army 
was described as “the preservation of the balance of power in Europe”.41 Thus, 
was established the tradition of denoting Britain symbolically as the balancer of 
Europe. The balance of power became an architectural metaphor for British 
‘splendid isolationism’ in the early modem period.
It was the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which formalised state sovereignty that 
opened up possibilities for theorising the balance of power. For instance, 
Sheehan observed that a detection of balance of power behaviour in the ancient 
Greek system did not mean that the principle was self-consciously followed or 
that it reflected a theory of international relations in which balance policies 
played a logical part.42 He also pointed out that during the period of the Italian 
state system, two elements of theory were missing from the balance of power 
idea despite its growing influence. These were: a holistic conception of 
international system and a non-ideological approach to foreign policy.43 The
39 Nelson, E. W. “The Origins of Modem Balance of Power Politics”, Medievalla et 
Humanistica. Vol. 1, (1943), p. 125.
40 Morgenthau, op cit., p. 280.
41 Wight., op cit., p. 172.
42 Sheehan, Michael. The Balance of Power: History and Theory. (London: Routledge, 
1996), p. 27. This is possibly the best historical study on balance of power in recent time.
43 ibid., p. 27.
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Treaty set out the premise on which the theory of balance of power could work 
effectively. Sheehan identified two premises namely: “the existence of a 
functioning international system in which sovereign independence is the central 
goal of state policy; and a comparative moderation in foreign policy objectives as 
a result of an absence of any ideologically based interstate bitterness”.44
Sheehan’s observations were much the same as of Kenneth Waltz, who argued 
that ‘the balance of power politics prevail wherever two and only two, 
requirements are met: that the order is anarchic, and those units wishing to 
survive populate it” 45 Plausibly, their view of international politics holds at the 
structural level. But it suffers from at least two limitations. First, it limits the 
efficiency of the balance of power to the preservation of the international order. 
Balance of power on its own does not guarantee a trouble-free international 
order, nor can its influence be limited to preservation of order. On the first count, 
international law, albeit marginally, complements the balance of power to 
preserve the stability of the international system. On the second, in the quest for 
equilibrium of power amongst the great powers, issues of interest to lesser 
powers may be resolved to their advantage. In other words, balance of power 
politics opens a range of possibilities for weaker states to gain the attention of the 
major players, obtain some leverages and thus have their concerns addressed.
Second, both Sheehan and Waltz are unable to discern the ‘non-structural’ 
effects of the balance of power. Two ‘non-structural effects’ are discernible. 
First, the effect of balance of power in changing the behaviour of states and the
44 ibid., p. 8.
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deepening of diplomatic intercourse amongst alliance member-states. For 
instance, the incessant power struggle amongst the European powers in the 
medieval period led to the emergence of diplomatic practices, whenever these 
powers needed to communicate with each other, and understand themselves 
better. Lurking in the shadow of the balance power are the forces of moderation, 
restraint and better rapport amongst the competing units.
Secondly, the impact of revolution on the balance of power should not be
underestimated. Revolutions have both creative and destructive effects on the
sustainability of the balance of power. At the height of the French Revolution in
1792, other European states united in a coalition against republican France.
These states proclaimed in unison that:
“No power interested in the maintenance of the balance of 
power in Europe could see with indifference to the 
Kingdom of France, which at one time formed so 
important a weight in this great balance, delivered any 
longer to domestic agitation and to horror of disorder and 
anarchy which, so to speak destroy her political 
existence”.46
The coalition’s fears were two fold. Individually, each feared that the 
revolutionary movement could spill over into their respective states. 
Collectively, they feared its impacts on European stability. To that end, Britain’s 
naval capabilities in conjunction with other European powers checked 
Napoleon’s hegemonic tendencies. France was tamed, but not demolished. The 
allies’ success led to the Congress of Vienna of 1815, which established a replica 
of the old balance of power structure. For better or for worse, trends are
45 Waltz, op cit., p 121.
46 Morgenthau, op cit., (1948), p. 138.
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historically established and replicated. Two hundred years after the fall of 
Bastille, the Berlin Wall fell down again. The French Revolution threatened the 
emergent European stability, the ‘second Russian Revolution of 1989” ended the 
post Second World War bipolarity between the superpowers. It is not 
unreasonable therefore, to suggest that revolutionary events that involve a great 
power have wider implications on the reconfiguration of both regional and global 
balances of power. There is a scope for understanding the impacts of a revolution 
on the balance of power, although this study will not pursue this particular line of 
enquiry any further.
The period from the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 to the final partitioning of Poland 
in 1795 has been acclaimed as the golden age of the practice of balance of 
power. And for the better part of the 18th century, the practice of balance of 
power was mainly a European affair. For instance, the framers of the American 
Constitution scorned it. They saw it as an outrage, endangered specie, a cloak 
that disguised imperialist policies, and not worth adoption in other parts of the 
world. Ironically, balance of power would be a defining characteristic of the 
American foreign policy for most part of the 20th century.47 By the early 19th 
century, the practice of balance of power could not be contained to European 
frontiers. The statement made by George Canning, the British Foreign Secretary 
before the House of Commons on December 12 1826, is the first statement 
identifying colonies as a pawn in European power politics. Canning defending
47 The transformation of the United States from isolationism to globalism reveals the 
tension between, and the complex interaction of the naturalists and the experimentalists. 
The Great War provided the United States with its first experience and the experiment on 
the balance of power; and accordingly set in motion the process of power competition,
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his refusal to resort to war following the French invasion of Spain in 1823,
contrary to the provision of the Congress of Verona of 1822. He said:
“If France occupied Spain, it was necessary, in order to avoid the 
consequence of that occupation that we blockade Cadiz? No. I 
look another way. I saw materials for compensation in another 
hemisphere. Contemplating Spain...I resolved that if France had 
Spain, it should not be Spain with the Indies. I called the New 
World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old”.48
‘The materials for compensation in another hemisphere’ were not limited to the 
New World. Africa played the same role in the late 19th century. During this 
period, Africa emerged as of essential importance to the balance of power among 
the states of Europe. South West Africa was at once a creation and product of 
European balance of power politics during this period. How South Africa 
became a victim of the European balance of power, and an object of the Anglo- 
German rivalry, during the ‘reign’ of Chancellor Bismarck, is the main theme of 
the next chapter. The following questions are raised: How did Germany lay 
claim to South West Africa? What was the status of the territory of the SWA 
within the prevailing international law? What was the response of the British 
government to the German request? To what extent did the relationship between 
the Cape Government and the British Government become a factor in Britain’s 
reply to the German Government? What were the political and legal implications 
of the German claims?
The rise of Japan in the Far East and the United States in the New World at the 
beginning of the 20th century had a significant impact on the dominant European
exemplified in bipolarity in the wake of the Second World War. In other words, America 
was an experimentalist by default, and a naturalist by interest.
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balance of power. For the first time in the history of the international system, the 
locus of power was not limited to Europe alone. The central balances in the 
European system also shifted from a multipolar to a bipolar balance. It was 
divided into two main camps namely: the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente 
with the completion of the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1907.49 If we focus 
on the relationship among states, the pre-First World War international system 
was multipolar; but if we focus on the relationship among coalitions of states, 
then a bipolar balance, with two major alliances confronting each other, was 
evident.50 By extension, the Cold War consolidated the bipolarity that emerged 
in incipient form in the aftermath of the First World War. What was significant 
during this period was that European multipolarity was no longer the centre of 
world politics around which local balances would group themselves, either in 
intimate connection or in lesser or greater autonomy. The European balance of 
power became a mere function of the global balance of power between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. The superpower rivalry between the United 
States and the Soviet Union dominated and framed the international system for 
about 50 years, between 1949-1989.
1.4. Balance of power as a policy
At the most general level, there have been always been those for whom 
preserving the balance of power was a policy in its own right. The example of
48 Speeches of the Right Honourable George Canning, 6 vols., (London, 1836), VI, p. 
109-111, cited in Palmer and Perkins, op cit., p. 322.
49 For a broader view of the structural transformation of the international system in the 
pre-First World War, see,White, John. Albert. Transition to Global Rivaliy: Alliance 
Diplomacy and the Quadruple Entente, 1895-1907. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995).
50 Lee Ray, James Lee Global Politics. (Boston: Houghton Miflin Co., 1995), p. 545.
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Henry VII earlier cited has been a reference point for generations. In the late 20th 
century, no one was so connected with the scholarship and practice of balance of 
power as Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of State during the 
Nixon/Ford administration. An academic before he entered politics, much of 
Kissinger’s work was devoted to the analysis of European power politics 
between the 17th and 19th centuries. His understanding and interpretation of the 
late 20th century Cold War bipolarity, and the American role within it, exposes 
the limits of his historical and conceptual horizons. Suffice to cite two of 
Kissinger’s arguments.
First, Kissinger believed that the functioning of balance of power system ended 
in the mid-19th century Europe. He said: “by the end of the 19th century, the 
European balance of power system returned to the principle of power politics, in 
a far more unforgiving environment. Facing down the adversary became the 
standard method of diplomacy, leading to one test of strength after another”.51 
Kissinger was thus making two strong claims: that there is a sharp distinction 
between the pattern of power politics and the balance of power; and that the 
balance of power system, as we know it, ended in the 19th century. Each of these 
claims is highly contestable.
Wight’s observation that there is a thin line between the pattern of power and 
balance of power highlights the limits of Kissinger’s argument.52 The pattern of 
power through alignments or neutrality has always provided a ‘solution’ to the
51 Kissinger, Henry. “The New World Order”, in Chester, Crocker. Et al. (eds.), 
Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), p. 176.
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power problem among states. The demise of Europe as the locus of the global 
balance of power in the aftermath of the Great War did not alter the fact that 
Europe continued to be the principle theatre of the post Second World War 
bipolar balance between the United States and Soviet Union.
Secondly, Kissinger claimed that, “during the Cold War, America was engaged 
in an ideological, political, and strategic struggle with the Soviet Union, in which 
a two-power world operated according to principles different from those of a 
balance of power system”. He is partly right to claim that the Cold War 
bipolarity was not a ‘clone’ of the dysfunctional European multipolar balance. 
Unlike the old European balance of power, which constituted a system, the Cold 
War bipolar balance was less than a system. This was so in the sense that the 
states involved did not necessarily have the common end in mind of preserving 
the independence of the rival participants. Paradoxically, the balance of terror, 
with the threat of the nuclear annihilation and the philosophy of the mutually 
assured destruction restored this system-like character to the balance, even if it 
was not intended. Many realists and neo-realists such as Morgenthau, Gulick, 
Mearsheimer and Waltz, all of whom believed that the traditional balances of 
power principles continued to operate, did not share Kissinger’s conclusion.
Whatever the difference of opinions on the nature of the Cold War, what was 
evident was that no other states than the United States firmly believed in the 
principle of balance of power: that is the avoidance of a hegemon. This belief led 
to the Cold War bipolarity between the West and the East. The Cold War, in the
52 Wight, op cit., p. 168.
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context of the relationship of the local balances to the general balance, was in 
effect, a reverse of its European precursor. In this context, Africa was no longer 
dependent on the European multipolar structure, but on the dominant American- 
Soviet rivalry.
The Cold War was more than a quest to forestall the ambition of global 
supremacy by a single power; it entailed an ideological contest. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, communism offered many in the 
industrialised democracies an alternative to the failures of pre-war capitalism. 
Anticommunist social democrats responded through the creation of a welfare 
system that underwrote security from the cradle to the grave. More significantly, 
for the purpose of this thesis, the promise of communism looked seductive to the 
newly independent states in Africa as an alternative to pre-war colonialism, as it 
did to liberation movements such as SWAPO. How the Namibian question 
became a part of the Cold War equation is examined in chapter four. It addresses 
the following concerns: What forces led to the involvement of the United States 
in the Namibian question mid-1970s? The political and diplomatic investment of 
the United States in southern African issues from this time on has been called 
Henry Africanus, since it reflected the belated discovery of the strategic 
importance of Africa, by Henry Kissinger, the US Secretary of State. What were 
the constraints and the benefits of the United States involvement? What tensions 
did the US involvement engender given the prevailing legalistic means for 
resolving the Namibian question, which was then in favour?
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1.5. Balance of power in the post-Cold W ar world?
More than half a century ago, Quincy Wright noted that, “the balance of power 
as the structure of world politics is incompatible with democracy, with free 
enterprise, with welfare economy and with peace”.53 Wright’s observation in 
1943 resonates with most of the issues concerning the validity and utility of the 
balance of power in the post-Cold war international relations. Contemporary 
political leaders pronouncements such as “the enlargement of democratic 
community”, the pursuit of ethical foreign policy”, imply a challenge to the 
balance of power. For example, during the 1992 American presidential election, 
the Democratic candidate, Bill Clinton declared that: “in a world where freedom, 
not tyranny, is on the march, the cynical calculus of power politics does not 
compute. It is ill-suited to a new era”. A few week before taking office, Anthony 
Lake, President Clinton’s national security adviser, criticised the Bush 
administration for viewing the world through a ‘classic balance of power prism’, 
whereas he and Mr. Clinton took a ‘more neo-Wilsonian view”.54
Within the academic community, the end of the Cold War has opened the age- 
old question of the relevance of balance of power in international relations. The 
end of the Cold War was like a Greek gift to the critics of the balance of power. 
Most critics, especially the neo-liberals are eager to write its obituary. Before we 
turn to their reasons, it is important to examine the views of its proponents.
53 Wright, Quincy “International Law and the Balance of Power”, The American 
Journal of International Law, XXXVII (Jan., 1943), p. 148.
54 Clinton, Bill. “American Foreign Policy and the Democratic Ideal”, Campaign Speech, 
Pabst Theatre, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, October 1,1992; Holmes, Steven. A. “Choice for
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Amongst realist scholars there are three broad perspectives on the balance of 
power after the Cold War. Some hold that there is now a unipolar world; others 
claim that we are witnessing the emergence of a multipolar balance, while a few 
authors believe that there is an altered bipolar balance. Each side of these 
perspectives is examined below.
Charles Krauthamer sets out the debate on the emerging structure of post Cold 
War international relations. To him, the immediate post-Cold War world is not 
multipolar. It is unipolar.55 The centre of world power is the unchallenged 
superpower, the United States, attended by its Western allies, with the former 
being the manager and the conductor of a unipolar world. He asserted that, “our 
best hope for safety is in American strength and will-the strength and the will to 
lead a unipolar world, unashamedly laying down the rules of world order and 
being prepared to enforce them”.56
Krauthamer’s unipolar thesis was initially elevated from a pet theory to a gospel 
by the military industrial complexes in the United States, especially the 
Pentagon. In early 1992, a 46-page Pentagon’s draft Defense Planning document 
for the Fiscal Years 1994-1995 asserted that America’s political and military 
mission after the demise of the Soviet Union should be to prevent the emergence 
of a rival superpower in Western Europe, Asia or the Soviet Republic. To this 
end, the United States ‘must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced
National Security Adviser Has a Long-Awaited Chance to Lead”, New York Times, 
January 3, 1993.
55 Krauthammer, Charles. “The Unipolar Moment”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1. 
(1991), p. 21-23.
56 ibid., p. 33.
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industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking 
to overturn the established political and economic order’.57 This document 
scorned collective internationalism, and relied on benevolent hegemony. 
However, amidst strong criticisms and opposition both within and outside the 
United States, the Pentagon has since retreated from its unipolar agenda.58 It set 
aside the view that the United States would tolerate no rivals,59 or bears the 
burden of the world alone.
The Pentagon’s retraction of its first draft underscores the end of the unipolar 
agenda, despite its seductive appeal to the military industrial complex. From a 
theoretical standpoint, it is impossible for America, or any other great power, to 
meet the three benchmarks required of a unipolar power. Schwarzenberger 
identified them as: the possession of overwhelming military superiority, an 
ideology that gives it the necessary impetus and self confidence to carry out its 
world mission; and the possession of technical means of organisation that are 
required not only to capture a world empire but also to hold it together.60 The 
United States has no patent on any of these three.
The historical trend since the demise of Pax Romana suggests that a new robust 
global hegemon is more of a possibility than a probability. Recent anecdotal 
evidence suggests that most Europeans are not ready to bandwagon, but rather
57 Tyler, Patrick. E. “U.S. Strategy Plan Call for Insuring No Rival Develop”, New York 
Times, March 8,1992, p. 1,14.
58 Patrick E. Tyler, “Pentagon Drops Goal of Blocking New Superpowers”, New York 
Times, May 24,1992, p. 1.
59 Brilmayer, Lea. American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One-Superpower
World. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 1-2.
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balance against the United States, where necessary.61 For instance, in the wake of 
the June 1997 Denver Summit of the G.8, the European states were dismayed at 
the United States’ new mood of arrogance’ in its role as the world’s only 
superpower. Prime Minister Lionel Jospin of France voiced his criticism about ‘a 
certain tendency toward hegemony’ on the part of the United States. The United 
States was accused of ignoring a majority of its allies by imposing its views of 
NATO expansion and enacting trade laws such as the Helms-Burton Act on 
trading activities in Cuba, which adversely affects European multinationals. The 
Europeans were also uneasy about the American Congress dictating to the 
United Nations, despite an arrears of about $1.3 billion to the world body.
Focusing on post-Cold War debate, Christopher Layne, Kenneth Waltz and John 
Mearsheimer rejected the ‘bandwagon’ thesis. They argued that the question is 
not whether new power will rise and balance, but when. Layne argued that the 
unipolar moment was a mere geopolitical interlude that would give way to 
multipolarity between 2000-2010.62 To him therefore, “systemic constraints: 
balancing, uneven growth rates and the sameness-effect-impel eligible states to 
become great powers”.63 Waltz believed that bipolarity endures, but in an altered
60 Schwarzenberger, Georg. Power Politics: A Study of International Society. (London: 
Stevens and Sons, 1964), p. 189.
61 See, International Herald Tribune (IHT), “Clinton’s Class in Economics Annoys 
Some”, June 24,1997, p. 6; IHT, “US Arrogance Is Unsettling Many Allies”, June 28-29, 
1997, p. 1; The Times (London), “Clever pitch needed for American to play ball”, June 
13,1997, p. 12; IHT, “European Protests Clinton’s Limit on Widening NATO”, June 13, 
1997, p. 1.
See IHT, “A UN Deal made with the wrong Republican”, June 23,1997, p. 8.
62 Layne, Christopher. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Power Will Rise", 
International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, p. 5-51.
63 ibid., p. 7.
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nature.64 He stated that bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can take 
care of itself and because no other great power has yet emerged. Nonetheless, he 
foresaw a prospect of a multipolar world consisting of European Union, China, 
and a resurrected Russia.65 In the same vein, John Mearsheimer, argued that the 
departure of the superpowers from Central Europe would transform Europe from 
a bipolar to a multipolar system consisting of Germany, France, Britain and 
perhaps, Italy assuming major power status and Russia as a major European 
power.66 What is evident from these works is that the future leans towards 
multipolarity rather than to either unipolarity or bipolarity. Yet institutionalists 
such as Keohane and Ruggie predicted that the resulting system (i.e. 
multipolarity) would suffer the problems common to multipolar systems and
• 67would therefore be more prone to instability.
1.6. The critique of the theory of balance of power
No other theory has engendered so much criticism in international relations as 
balance of power. In the 19th century, the British Manchester school of political 
economy was the foremost critic. Leading the school were John Bright and 
Richard Cobden. Liberal ideas such as laissez-faire, anti-imperialism and 
pacifism underscored their criticisms. They repeatedly condemned the balance of 
power as an almost satanic doctrine. For instance, in his Political Writings,
64 Waltz, Kenneth. “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, International 
Security, Vol. 18, No. 2. (Fall 1993), p. 52.
65 ibid., p. 55.
66 Mearsheimer, John. J. “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War”, 
International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1. (Summer 1990), p. 5-56.
67 Keohane, Robert. “The Diplomacy of Structural Change: Multilateral Institutions and 
State Strategies”, in Haftendom, Helga and Tuschhoff, Christian, (eds.) America and 
Europe in an Era of Change, (Boulder, Cols.: Westview Press, 1993), p. 53; and
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Cobden declared that, “balance of power is a chimera! It is a fallacy, a mistake, 
an imposture-it is an undescribed, indescribable, incomprehensible nothing; mere 
words, conveying minds not ideas, but sounds, a figment, which I could never 
understand”. Since Cobden, the criticisms have grown. In broad terms, the 
criticisms focus on its rationalisation of international behaviour as primarily in 
pursuit of power; its emphasis on historical generalisations; and the alleged 
obscurity or meaninglessness of the concept. Latter day critics such as Organski 
have argued against it on the grounds that it not only fails to maintain peace but 
also actually brings war.69
First, he argued not only that the balance of power grossly distorted the meaning 
of events, it was also an alien plant plucked from another discipline and forcibly 
planted in the field of international power politics. Secondly, he observed that: 
“the balance of power theory appears to owe at least part of its acceptance to a 
deep-felt desire on the part of some students of international politics to have a
Ruggie, John . “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution”, International 
Organization, Vol. 46, No. 3. (Summer 1992), p. 561.
68 Cobden, Richard. Political Writings, 2 vols. (Appleton, 1867), I, p. 258. Cobden and 
Bright objected to balance of power, in part, because it was associated with the 
preservation of the Vienna settlement, arrived at the end of the Napoleonic wars. To them, 
balance of power burdened the nations with debts, killed hundreds of thousands of 
Englishmen and ‘desolated millions of families.
69 Organski, A.F.K. World Politics, (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 273. In the light of the 
depth of Organski’s critique of balance of power, James Lee Ray termed the ensuing 
discussion between Morgenthau and Organski as the “Morgenthau-Organski debate’. Ray, 
however argued that the problematic of the Morgenthau-Organski debate focuses on the 
level of analysis confusion. He pointed out that to Organski, balance of power refers to the 
distribution of power among individual states; and that Organski assumed that balance of 
power theory stipulates that a more or less equal distribution of power among states is a 
prerequisite for peace. Ray noted that Morgenthau believed that balance of power refers 
to equal distribution of power among coalition of states. See, Lee Ray, James. Global 
Politics. 6th Edition (Boston: Houghton Miflin Company, 1995), p. 535-537.
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law of their own as other social sciences”.70 Thirdly, he attributed the popularity 
of the theory to the fact that it purports to describe processes that are automatic 
(or at least semi-automatic). Finally, he argued that the disappearance of the 
balancer, especially in the post Second World War period, poses a great 
challenge to the idea that balance of power ever worked. He queried that: “if it 
was to England’s advantage to act as balancer in the 19th century, why is it not 
to America’s advantage to act as a balancer today. If the balance of power is a 
permanent law, how can the balancer disappear?71 The answers to each of these 
criticisms are not difficult to understand. Truly, some theorists leave the 
impression that it is the natural form of international relations. In the natural 
world, equilibrium is an inherent outcome of interaction of different parts that 
constitute the whole. This is a deceptively simple understanding of the idea. The 
political world is more complex and complicated. It requires a rational and 
delicate calculation of national interests and a matrix of manoeuvring amongst 
competing states to prevent the emergence of an hegemon. It involves hard 
choices for the policymakers and statesmen, as the survival and prestige of their 
states are at stake.
As noted earlier the theory was popularised in the 18th Century, when scientists 
and philosophers were seeing natural balances everywhere. It is a mistake 
however, to dismiss the notion as meaningless or irrelevant. The fact that an idea 
is borrowed from another discipline does not itself undermine its utility, or 
relevance. Nor is the balance of power the only concept to suffer from the 
problem of ambiguity. That the theory is contestable is a testament of the
70 Organski, ibid., p. 283.
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importance of the idea it is intended to convey. The primary reason for 
maintaining a balance of power system was to prevent not war but hegemony, 
the domination of the entire system by one powerful state.
So also, it could be argued that the role of a balancer did not end with Britain’s 
abandonment of this role in the late 19th century. A balancer might be an 
endangered species at the global level, but it is not an anachronism at the local 
/regional level. A balancer is a power, through accident of strategic position or 
its capability that can contribute decisive strength to one side or the other. There 
exists scope for a balancer in a regional context to preserve stability. A balancer 
is never a neutral power, yet it possesses some degree of freedom of action in 
choosing sides. It only identifies itself with the weaker state against the stronger.
For example, Roosevelt made America played the role of balancer between 
Japan and Russia in the Far East.72 It is worth stating that a balancer works 
effectively within the multipolar environment, whereas a bipolar environment 
does not require the service of a balancer.
The last of Organski’s criticisms of the balance of power is that it is based on 
two erroneous assumptions. One, that nations are fundamentally static, so that 
power is not changed from within. Two, that nations have no permanent ties to 
each other but move freely, motivated by considerations of power. Against this 
view, Organski maintains that domestic constraints imposed by the democratic
71 Organski, ibid., p. 285.
72 Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy, (London: Simon and Schuster, 1996), and John Milton 
Cooper Jnr., Pivotal Decades: The United States, 1900-1920. (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1990), p. 103; and Blum, John. Morton. The Republican Roosevelt. (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), p. 134.
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process and the economic development affect balancing behaviour and dilute the 
effectiveness of the balance of power. Power is composed of a complex 
combination of material and non-material factors, which make its measurement 
problematic. Even though the ‘power’ of a state can change from within, i.e. in 
terms of its economic, technological and military assets, such changes are seen in 
relation to other states. Whatever, the increase or decrease in the material and 
non-material factors of power, the change in state behaviour is an adaptation to 
external constraints conditioned by changes in relative power. Furthermore, it 
could be argued that the permanence of ties amongst allies depends on whether a 
threshold of security concerns is crossed. Relationship amongst allies is not 
underpinned by considerations of equity but by a perception of a convergence of 
interests.
The latest critique of balance of power comes from the critical theorist/post- 
structuralists such as Robert Cox, Richard Ashley, James Der Derian and 
Michael Shapiro.73 Antagonism to power politics is one of the most distinct 
traits of these scholars. They question the privileged forms of representation 
through which the political world is constructed.74 To them, therefore, balance of
73 See the following as the key works applying critical theory to international relations: 
Ashley, Richard. K. “The Poverty of Realism”, International Organization, Vol. 38, 
No. 2, (Spring 1984), p. 225-285.; Cox, Robert. “Gramsci, Hegemony and International 
Relations: An Essay in Method”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 
12, No. 2, (Summer 1983), p. 162-175; and Der Derian, James, and Shapiro, Michael. J. 
Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of World Politics, (New 
York: Lexington Books, 1989). For a critique of the critical theory, see, Mearsheimer, 
John. J. “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security, Vol. 
19, No. 3, (Winter 1994/95), p. 5-49; and Davies, Norman. Europe: A History. (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 6.
74 Shapiro, Michael. J. “Textualizing Global Politics”, Der Derian, James and Shapiro, 
Michael. J. (eds.), Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Postmodern Readings of 
World Politics. (New York: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 13.
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power is nothing but a reified tradition, with a contested myth of origin derived 
from a reading of Thucydides and Machiavelli. Yet, the panacea of the critical 
theorists is further historical study with much emphasis on other forms of 
literature. It is not that the criticism of the post-structuralists is entirely 
misleading, -the external world is indeed not so securely grounded as realists 
maintain-but the alternatives such as collective security or peoples’ war suffer 
from the same weaknesses. It is for this reason that we offer an operational 
definition of balance of power for this study.
1.7. Operational definition of balance of power
It was David Baldwin who once noted that ‘one of several criteria for selecting a
7  f \taxonomy is the avoidance of unnecessary departures from common usage’. 
The definition employed in this study is closer to Bull’s than any amongst 
realists. In The Anarchical Society, Bull defined the balance of power as “a state 
of affairs such that no one power is in a position where it is preponderant and can 
lay down the law to others”.77 This study defines the balance of power as a 
pattern of interaction amongst major powers which produces a state of affairs 
that makes impracticable the domination of the international system by one state.
75 Aker Jnr., Hayward. R., Thomas J. Biersteker and Tagashi Inoguchi, “From Imperial 
Power Balancing to People’s Wars: Searching for Order in the Twentieth Century”, in 
Derian and Shapiro, ibid., p. 138.
76 Baldwin, David A. Economic Statecraft, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
1985), p. 12.
77 Bull, op cit., p. 197. Bull provides a lucid account of historical and contemporary 
relevance of balance of power to the maintenance of international order. He identifies four 
dimensions of balance of power and makes an insightful comparison between general and 
local, complex and simple, objective and subjective, as well as the fortuitous and contrived 
balance(s) of power.
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Our definition, unlike Morgenthau’s or Waltz’s implies the imperative of the 
processes and the forces, shaping the interaction. It also takes into consideration 
the outcomes of the interaction and the externalities it generate. When any state 
threatens to become dominant, its neighbours form a coalition not in pursuit of a 
theory of international relations, but out of enlightened self-interest to block the 
ambition of the dominant power. In the process, there exist opportunities for 
tradeoffs and externalities. In the resolve for power balancing, non-related issues 
may be factored in. These could be disarmament, or resolving other issues such 
as a decolonisation or civil war, when it is perceived that the potential hegemon 
is likely to benefit from the resolution of such conflicts. The outcome of this 
complex interaction amongst the states determines the nature of the international 
system at any time. In the present circumstances, it could be either multipolar or 
bipolar, but it does not look like a unipolar system.
Our definition differs from that of the neo-realists who assume that balance of 
power sufficiently guarantees international stability, or to the critical theorists 
who deny its usefulness. It is not either or it is not only these. In most cases, the 
balance of power produces a precarious stability, so we must look beyond its 
bounds for the sustenance of international order. A sub-text of our argument is 
that there is nexus between the balance of power and international law. This 
nexus is sometimes conflictual, and sometimes, mutually reinforcing.
Two caveats need be made. One is that power equilibrium works best if it is 
buttressed by an agreement on common values. The leaders of the pre-first world 
war Europe shared not only a commitment to the balance of power, but also a
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degree of cultural homogeneity such as a common system of arts, laws and 
manners and a sense of restraint. Restraint in victory was not due to altruistic 
reasons but partly to a realistic concern to preserve the vanquished state as a 
potential future ally, and partly to the leaders’ consciousness of their ‘European 
corporate identity’. Europe was seen as a societas gentium™ The second caveat 
concerns paradoxical relationship of the balance of power and law. Balance of 
power constructs the issue areas for law, which in turn provides the framework 
within which power politics is played out. The mandate system is an example of 
this paradoxical relationship. We shall explain this proposition in detail in 
chapter three.
1.8. The balance of power and international law
At this juncture, it is important to answer two questions that emerge from the 
theoretical analysis. These are:
(a) How far are balance of power and international law mutually reinforcing 
means of ensuring stability and moderation in international politics? Simply put, 
how far are they conflicting or even mutually exclusive?
(b) To the extent that balance of power and international law are conflicting, 
which is more effective in affecting states behaviour?
The case, Namibia will, it is hoped, help us to answer these questions. Thus, the 
interface of balance of power and international law is a useful template against 
which to analyse the involvement of the great powers in Namibian affairs. It is 
also useful in understanding how, through a series of legal actions before the
78 Gulick, Edward. V. Europe’s Classical Balance of Power. (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
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International Court of Justice and multiple resolutions at the United Nations, the 
members of the international community communicated the acceptable norms of 
behaviour to South Africa, the mandatory power.
The relationship between balance of power and international law is a complex 
one, sometimes conflictual, sometimes complementary. We are concerned here 
not with a detailed study of international law as such, but to learn how a 
combination of balance of power and international law helps in making states do 
what they would otherwise not have done. Therefore we shall confine our 
attention to how the advocates of balance of power see the role of international 
law. Understanding the nature of the relationship thus requires some familiarity 
with the views of 16th century’s publicists on balance of power.
To recap, we have noted that Waltz’s silence on international law is not a new 
phenomenon, as many publicists who created the corpus of international law 
were equally silent on the balance of power.79 There were those who denied the 
existence of a relationship, and others who recognised how they intersect. For 
analytical convenience, we may call the former the ‘sceptics’ and the latter, the 
enthusiasts’.
To the sceptics, the balance of power is an obstacle to the idea of an international legal 
order based on something more moral than force. They saw no relationship between 
power and law. Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), the father of the modem international law,
University Press, 1995), p. 19-20.
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was the leading sceptic of his generation. He did not even discuss the balance of power 
under that term. He argued that ‘quite untenable is the position, which has been 
maintained by some, that according to the law of nations it is right to take up arms in 
order to weaken a growing power which, if it becomes too great may be a source of 
danger’.80 Another sceptic was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Kant observed that ‘For a 
lasting universal peace on the basis of the so-called balance of power in Europe is a 
mere chimera’. The sceptics disregard for balance of power was informed by their 
absolute faith in the decision of the common will and obedience to laws. Kant in 
particular, believed that there existed in human nature a respect for law and duty that 
would tend to the ultimate success of law on the international level. Most sceptics were 
natural law thinkers, imbued with communitarian values, believed that religion could 
make a war just rather than the pursuit of power or national interest.
Alberico Gentili (1550-1608), an Italian legal scholar led the enthusiast camp. Gentili, a 
contemporary of Grotius, argued that the need to forestall the ‘planning and plotting’ of 
a universal domination by Spain justified opposition by a defense ‘which anticipates 
dangers already meditated and prepared’. Another enthusiast was Emmerich de Vattel 
(1714-1767), a Swiss, and a contemporary of Kant. He observed that "the legitimate 
growth of a nation gives no right to attack it, but if the country gives evidence of 
injustice, greed, pride and ambition or a desire of domineering over its neighbours, they 
can take warlike measures to frustrate those intentions. Failing such menacing attitudes, 
other countries can develop countervailing force through alliances and ‘gentle
79 For a useful summary of the views of early publicists on balance of power, see Alfred 
Vagts and Detlev. F. Vagts, “The Balance of Power in International Law: A History of an 
Idea”, The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 73, October 1979, p. 555-580.
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means’".81 Lassa P. Oppenheim, an English jurist pushed the enthusiasts’ view further.
He considered the balance as ‘an indispensable condition of the very existence of
International Law.”82 He said:
“a law of nations can only exist if there be an equilibrium, a 
balance of power between the members of the Family of 
Nations...As there is not, and never can be a central political 
authority above sovereign states that could enforce the rule of 
Law of Nations, a balance of power must prevent any 
member of the Family of Nations from becoming 
omnipotent”.83
Like Oppenheim, Phillipson observed an organic relationship between the balance of 
power and international law. To him, “the balance of power is not the outcome of an 
explicit positive rule of international law; it is rather an implicit principle essential to 
and underlying the existence and applicability of international law; and so it may well 
be conceived to constitute a vital element of the modem juridical system”.84
The enthusiasts saw Europe as political system in which equilibrium was crucial to 
order and stability. Unlike the sceptics, the enthusiasts were inclined towards positivism 
in international law. They set apart legal rules from moral precepts and from general 
principles of prudence and statesmanship. To them, the balance of power had two 
consequences for international law.
The first was that thinking about the balance of power has helped to shape the way 
jurists have constmcted rules of international law. For centuries, it afforded them a
80 Grotius, Hugo. On the Law of War and Peace, edition of 1646, translated by Francis 
W. Kelsey et al. (New York: Classic of International Law, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1925), p. 184.
81 Vagts and Vagts, op cit. P. 571.
82 Oppenheim, Lassa. P. International Law, edited by R. F. Roxburgh, 2 vols. (London: 
Longmans, 1920-21), I, p. 93-94.
83 ibid., p. 94.
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basis for considering the relationships of sovereign states as a system. The first 
tentative form of international institutional structure was constructed as the statesmen 
of the Concert of Europe tried to translate balance of power theory into action. The 
form of the famous Treaties, Westphalia (1648), Utrecht (1713), and Paris (1814) were 
shaped by the equilibrium principles. In essence, these treaties made it an obligation of 
states to maintain the balance of power and defined as international wrongs those 
actions that undermined the balance.
The consequence was that the practice of balance of power has an embedded normative 
value. It presupposes that while states may not be bind to preserve the equilibrium, they 
however, have the ‘right’ to conserve it. It presupposes that the great conquerors need 
to respect the limitations set by these treaties, as their violation could be a dangerous 
act. In substance, the balance of power could be a law on its own, as it limits a nation’s 
freedom to initiate a war without a rational assessment of its cost to its own existence.
As the publicists in the sceptic camp mentioned above loath balance of power, so 
also many realists have raised the question whether international law is law at all 
as there is no authority to enforce compliance. Many others however, have 
acknowledged that international law unwittingly imposes a convenant of self- 
restraint on states. Kenneth Waltz, whom we had mentioned earlier leads in 
former group. In his Theory o f International Politics, international law is never 
discussed. Waltz’s construction of his theory of international politics is based on 
his exposition of balance of power. To him, the theory of the balance of power is 
the microtheory of international politics, by analogy to the microeconomic
84 Phillipson, Coleman. International Law and the Great Power. (London: T. Fisher
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theory of the market.85 Waltz appears to believe that international law affects 
neither the structure of international politics, nor the behaviour of states. The 
latter point is in fact, could be fairly easily challenged.
Presumably, the absence of international law in Waltz’s works stems from the 
Austinian view of international law. John Austin, who dominated jurisprudential 
thinking in Great Britain during the 19th century, contributed much in the way of 
theory suggesting the frailties of international law. Austin argued that for a legal 
system to exist in fact, three indispensable elements were essential. (1) There had 
to exist a clearly identifiable superior, or sovereign, who was capable of issuing 
(2) orders or commands for managing society, and (3) there had to be punitive
o r
sanctions capable of enforcing those commands. For Austin, law was defined 
as the general command emanating from a sovereign, supported by the threat of 
real sanctions. Since international law had neither sovereign nor the requisite 
enforcement authority, Austin concluded that it was merely a “positive 
morality”.87 This view is open to challenge, however. International law may not 
have the same effect on the structure of international politics as the balance of 
power, but it is a mistake, to underestimate its influence on the behaviour of 
states; and its importance as a restraint on the excesses of belligerent states.88
Unwin Limited, 1915), p. 4.
85 Waltz, op cit., p. 118
86 Austin, John. The Province of Jurisprudence Determined and the Uses of 
Jurisprudence. (London: Weindefeld and Nicholson, 1954), p. 121.
87 Austin, ibid., p. 144.
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For a critique of Austinian view of law, see, Falk, Richard. A. The Status of Law in 
International Society. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970), and Joyner, 
Christopher. C. “The Reality and Relevance of International Law in the post-Cold War 
Era”, in Kegley Jnr., Charles. W. and Wittkopt, Eugene. R. (eds.), The Global Agenda: 
Issues and Perspectives. Fourth Edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1995), p. 211- 
224.
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International law consists of a set of norms that prescribe international 
behaviour, although those patterns may at times seem vaguely defined. It also 
furnishes a principled foundation for policy decisions, even though adherence to 
principle often becomes justifiable only if it can be shown to be practical.89 
Relatedly, reasons exist for states to obey international law; i.e. an obligatory 
basis does in fact exist to support international law’s operation in world affairs.
Coplin’s and Bull’s analyses of international law help to fill the lacunae 
identified in Waltz’s work. According to Coplin, “international law as an 
institution” expresses in a quasi-authoritative manner three assumptions about 
international politics:90 It legalises the existence of states and helps to define 
actions necessary for the preservation of each state and of the system as a whole. 
It reduces the desire to overthrow the order, and reinforces the idea that 
vigilance, moderation and flexibility are necessary for the protection of a system 
of competing states. And finally, it establishes a legalised system of political 
payoffs by providing means to register gains and losses without creating a static 
system. This study shares Coplin’s view that international law does not function 
like the balance of power as a coercive restraint on state action, or as a system of 
coercive norms controlling the action of states, but as an institutional device for 
communicating to policy makers a consensus on the nature of the international 
system, and the acceptable prerequisites of international order.
89 Joyner, ibid., p. 215.
90 Coplin, William. D. “International Law and the Assumptions about the State System”, 
World Politics, Vol. XVEI, No. 4, July 1965, p. 615-634.
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It would be difficult to resist the conclusion that Coplin’s view does not need 
some refining. It is not really convincing to suppose that international law is 
wholly. It needs to be dissected into different categories. Our discussion will then 
be confined to the relevance and applicability of a particular category of 
international law to the Namibian situation. Schwarzenberger’s sociological 
classification of the norms of international law into three: power, co-ordination 
and reciprocity is useful here.91 On this view, the international law of power 
consists of those rules that help to maintain existing political hierarchies. The 
norms ensure the independence of states and non-interference in the domestic 
affairs, and make social existence possible, with the adjustment of diverging 
interests in accordance with the relative power between the haves and the have- 
nots. Peace treaties and boundary agreements exemplify the international law of 
power. The international law of reciprocity regulates areas less vital for power- 
purposes, where states are willing to accommodate the interests of others in order 
to secure reciprocal benefits. Fairness and co-operative actions underscore the 
international law of reciprocity when it covers areas such as diplomatic 
immunities and extradition, trade and communication or the limitation of 
warfare. The international law of co-ordination has developed to satisfy the 
functional needs of international society to address transnational problems as and 
when they arise. Examples include the regulation of the slave trade in the late 
19th century, the law of the sea, which was designed to halt the continuing 
depletion of the seabed and aquatic resources.
91 Schwarzenberger, op cit.
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Of the three sets, the international law of power occupies the high ground. 
According to Frankel, “against the background of security and moderation 
ensured by the law of power, reciprocal interests gave rise to rapid development 
of treaties, especially commerce, while numerous conferences and a few 
permanent institutions began to extend to the law of community”.92 It is possible 
to detect that states’ preference for a particular set of law is often essentially 
driven by political calculations. For instance, while the great powers favour the 
law of power to maintain the status quo, the weaker states often appeal to the law 
of reciprocity in their call for justice and fairness within the system. With respect 
to Namibia, this differential pattern can be illustrated by reference to the mandate 
system. The Mandate system exhibited the tension between the law of power and 
law of co-ordination. For instance, the Allied Powers invoked the law of power 
under the Treaty of Versailles to emasculate Germany after the First World War 
by distributing Germany’s colonies amongst themselves. From the point of view 
of the weaker states, the mandate system created an opportunity for transferring 
the authority over the colonies of the Axis powers to the international 
community, by making the mandatory states accountable to the League. This 
difference in international law is examined in detail in chapters three and four. In 
these chapters, I will show that the Ethiopian and Liberian proceedings against 
South Africa before the International Court of Justice in 1966, were underpinned 
by the norms of the international law of reciprocity.
Having considered the debate on the existence of a relationship between the 
concept of the balance of power and international law, we can now turn to the
92 Frankel, op cit., p. 179.
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question of their complementarity or mutual exclusiveness as institutions of 
international society. Bull provided an insightful explanation of the symbiosis 
between balance of power and international law. He noted that, “both general 
and local balances of power, where they have existed, have provided the 
condition in which other institutions on which international order depends 
(diplomacy, war, power management and international law) have been able to 
operate”.93 These institutions assume a situation in which no one power is 
preponderant in strength; and their effectiveness as such is premised on a denial 
of a single preponderant state with the capacity to violate the rules and 
procedures of diplomatic intercourse with impunity. It could be further argued 
that given those conditions the balance of power facilitates the perfectibility of 
theories of state sovereignty, and of non-intervention. Accordingly, this leads us 
to another common feature of balance of power and international law, that is 
their dependence on a measure of self-help.
In the absence of central authority with preponderant power, some rules of 
international law are in fact upheld by measures of self-help, including the threat 
and use of force, by individual states. Similarly, the distinction that states have 
made between the justiciable and the nonjusticiable has been drawn on a basis of 
usefulness and convenience of international law to them alone, without any 
overarching authority. While necessity often dictates the adoption of the rules of 
international law, convenience shaped their form. States resort to international 
law on their own will, especially when certain of their secondary national 
interests are the subjects of dispute with another state. They also resort to balance
93 Bull, op cit., p. 102.
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of power when others threaten their primary national interests. States are not 
coerced into taking either of these options.
Despite the view expressed above that the balance of power and international law 
combine to form a perpetual motion machine that creates and sustains 
international order, their respective preconditions are not mutually reinforcing. 
On this score, there are differences. Bull observed that, “it is paradox of the 
principle of balance of power that while the existence of a balance of power is an 
essential condition of the operation of international law, the steps necessary to 
maintain the balance often involve violation of the injunctions of international 
law”.94 He reiterated that, “while international law depends for its very existence 
as an operating system of rules on the balance of power, preservation of the latter 
often requires the breaking of these rules”.95 He identified at least three points: 
(1) preventive war; (2) the use of sanctions to deter aggressive war; and (3) 
intervention. Since our aim in this study is not to rehearse Bull’s argument, but to 
use his insights in our case study, the following questions will be addressed in 
chapters five and six respectively. (1) To what extent did the formation of 
Western powers, which constituted the Contact Group in the mid-1970s illustrate 
by its mediation the conflictual relationship between balance of power and 
international law? (2) How did the Contact Group resolve this dilemma? (3) How 
did ‘linkage politics’ illustrate this conflictual relationship; and which one of the 
two, i. e. the balance of power and international law was predominant?
94 Bull, op cit., p. 104.
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1.9. Conclusion
In the preceding sections, I have shown that the balance of power is steeped in 
history. It is seen as a pattern of interactions amongst the great powers that 
produces a state of affairs that makes impracticable the domination of the 
international system by one power. It seeks to prevent a situation in which one 
state can dictate and lay down the rule of international intercourse to others. In 
its basic operation, it implies a power competition and a struggle for relative 
advantage. In its widest form, balance of power is full of peculiar ambivalence, 
but we need to endorse the ambiguity of the term. Raymon Aron warned that the 
ambiguity in ‘international relations is not to be imputed to the inadequacy of our 
concepts: it is an integral part of reality itself.96 Modem opinion on balance of 
power has been so impressed by its imperfections that it is often difficult to 
enquire into its externalities and spin-offs. With all its imperfections, it will 
continue to be a determining feature of international relations.
It is also too early to write the obituary of balance of power theory in the post- 
Cold War international relations. Historical referents have shown that where it 
has existed, the balance of power has provided the conditions for the other 
institutions on which international order depends. The divorce between balance 
of power and international law is particularly regrettable. There is no reason why 
their symbiotic relationship (whether complementary or conflictual) should not 
be a matter of interest to realist and neo-realist alike. Both are concerned, after 
all, to restrain the excesses of a potential hegemon, regulate disturbances within
95 ibid.
96 Aron, Raymon. Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations. Translated 
from the French by Annette, Richard. H. (Melabor, Fla.: Krieger, 1981), p. 8.
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the international system, preserve international order, and limit, if not prevent 
war. Each however, has its own area of competence. While balance of power 
limits states on the coercive level, international law works at the level of public 
reputation.
In the final analysis, the argument is that although international law incorporates 
certain principles of natural law, yet it has developed more through state 
practices than through logical deduction from idealist principles. Thus, 
international law is inherently linked with the balance of power system, because 
the functioning of international law is premised on moderation and stability 
created by the workings of the balance of power. Neo-liberal and institutionalist 
scholars, with their emphasis on liberalism, co-operation, free trade and pacifism 
have attempted to highlight the weaknesses of the balance of power. Yet, they 
have been unsuccessful in undermining the belief that balance of power is the 
predominant organising principle of international relations. The liberal deference 
to high ideals, morality and public opinion are still of a limited value to states in 
relation to one another.
Balance of power theory has acknowledged anomalies-for example that balances 
have broken down and led to war. Nonetheless, this is not of itself a sufficient 
reason for rejecting the theory outright, for reasons identified by Kuhn and 
Lakatos.97 Kuhn argued that a paradigm is replaced when it confronts a major
07 Kuhn, Thomas., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970) and Lakatos, Imre. The methodology of scientific research 
programmers: Philosophical Papers Yol. 1, Worral, John and Currie, Gregory, (eds.). 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
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anomaly that it cannot resolve.98 Imre Lakatos further argued that a rejection of a 
paradigm is a decision that must be made for a field as a whole. He offered some 
rules for making the decision in a rational manner. He suggested that one 
paradigm may be rejected in favour of another if the latter produces a better 
theory. Thus, theory T is falsified if and only if another theory T  has been 
proposed with the following characteristics: (1) T  has excess empirical content 
over T: that is it predicts novel facts, that is facts improbable in the light of, or 
even forbidden, by T; (2) T  explains the previous success of T, that is, all the 
unrefiited content of T is included (within the limits of observational error) in the 
content of T ;  and (3) some of the excess content of T' is corroborated.99
These criteria are weighted in favour of the theory of balance of power for three 
reasons. First, the core premise of balance of power is that nation-states are the most 
important set of actors to examine in order to account for behaviour in international 
relations. Second, no alternative theory has been developed that can explain the pattern 
of interactions amongst states in international politics as the balance of power did in the
98 Kuhn, ibid., p. 153. Kuhn’s main question here is: what is the process by which a new 
candidate for paradigm replaces its predecessor? His conclusion on ‘paradigm shift’ rests 
on the rejection of Popperian falsificationism. He noted that paradigm shift for two 
considerations: subjective and aesthetic. The subjective consideration involves the claim 
by the proponent of a new paradigm that they can solve the problems that have led the old 
one to a crisis. The aesthetic consideration presupposes the appeal to the individual’s 
sense of the appropriate: that the new theory is said to be ‘neater’, more suitable or simpler 
than the old.
99 Lakatos, ibid., p. 32. Lakatos, like Kuhn doubted the efficacy of Popperian 
falsificationism as a condition for rejecting a theory. Karl Popper argued that a theory is 
scientific if one is prepared to specify in advance a crucial explanation or observation 
which can falsify it; or it is pseudoscientific in one refuse to specify such a ‘potential 
falsifier’. Lakatos saw Popper as a dogmatic falsificationist, who believed that empirical 
counter-evidence is the one and only arbiter, which may judge a theory. In short, Lakatos 
believed that a theory could be protected from refutation by a vast protective belt of 
‘auxiliary hypotheses. This study’s defence of the preeminence of the theory of balance of
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past, given history and continuities. Third, balance of power is still a recurring pattern 
in an anarchical society, albeit it may be more evident at the regional than at the global 
level in the post-Cold War era. Thus far, we have established that the relationship 
between balance of power and international law is both conflictual and complementary. 
Understanding how this relationship works in the case under review thus requires some 
familiarity with the Anglo-German relationship of the late 19th century, in particular 
with an account of German colonial claims on South West Africa.
power borrows largely from Lakatos’s conventional justificationism. See, Lakatos, ibid., 
Chapter 1, especially, p. 8-46.
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Chapter Two 
South West Africa: A creation of balance of power.
2.1. Introduction
In the last chapter, we established the paradoxical essence of balance of power: that is, 
it shapes and defines the issue areas for law, which in turn provides the framework 
within which power politics is played out. It is necessary here to make two preliminary 
points about the presentation of the nexus between power and law. The first is the level 
of analysis used in the historical narrative. European balance of power politics of the 
late 19th century are examined to ascertain how South West Africa became at once, a 
creation and a victim of the rivalry between Germany and Britain. The second point 
concerns the analysis of the legal concept of territorium nullius. Without an 
examination of this idea, which defined the relationship between Europe and the other 
non-members of the family of nations in the late 19th century, no clear conclusion 
would emerge on the politico-legal complexities of Anglo-German rivalry. The chapter 
is divided into four main parts.
Part one focuses on the reasons and motives that underpinned German colonial moves 
in South West Africa. Was Bismarck, a reluctant colonialist responding to domestic 
pressures, or driven by the exigencies of the external environment? Part two highlights 
the nature and character of the Anglo-German relationship under Chancellor Bismarck. 
The following questions are addressed: Why was Chancellor Bismarck originally ready 
to do business with Britain, and what factors undermined the prospect of an Anglo- 
German alliance? Part three examines how Britain responded to German colonial 
moves in South West Africa. In the final part, we contextualise the prevailing
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international law on territorium nullius. This leads us to seek answers to the question: 
within the prevailing international law, what can we make of the German colonial 
moves in South West Africa? And what was the legal status of the Cape Government in 
relation to the British Empire?
Several caveats must be made before proceeding. We will make no attempt to engage 
with the whole Anglo-German relationship. Several First World War scholars have 
written on its wider aspects.100 The scope here is limited to how South West Africa 
featured in the relationship between 1870 and 1884. For this reason, there is also no 
discussion of the German colonial administration in South West Africa.
2.2. General explanations and the origin of German colonialism in Africa
A variety of explanations have been advanced to account for European colonial 
expansion in Africa, which peaked with the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. The four 
main explanations are: (1) European balance of power politics;101 (2) Imperialism: the 
quest for new and additional markets as a safety valve to a collapsing capitalist
100 For a detailed account of the Anglo-German relationships between 1870 to 1914, see 
Turner, L. C. F. Origin of the First World War. ( Edward Amorld, 1970), Ferro, M. 
The Great Powers. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), Koch, H. W. Origin 
of the First World War. (London: Macmillan, 1972), and Bartlett, C. J. The Global 
Conflict: The International Rivalry of the Great Powers. (London: Macmillan, 
1994).
101 See Taylor, A. J. P. Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-5: A move in 
Bismarck’s European Policy. (London: Oxford University Press, 1938); Taylor, A. J. 
P. The Struggle for Mastery in Europe, 1848-1914. (Oxford: OUP, 1934); and 
Langer, W. L. European Alliances and Alignments, 1870-1890. (New York: Knopff, 
2nd Edition, New York, 1950).
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system;102 (3) The imposition of a (European) higher and mature Christian culture over 
the barbarians and the infidels,103 and (4) The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 which 
proclaimed the exclusion of the Europeans from Latin America, and in turn kept the 
United States from participating in the partitioning of Africa, despite its presence at 
Berlin104 The argument of this thesis is that in the case of South West Africa, the first of 
these explanations is most convincing. To illustrate this argument, we need to examine 
the background to German colonial policy.
It is tempting to view German colonialism as a modem phenomenon. Indeed, German 
colonial enterprise did not begin with Bismarck. There were German colonial efforts as 
early as the 17th century, when the Great Elector of Brandenburg established a trading 
post on the West Coast of Africa.105 Towards the end of 1682, a fleet of four company 
ships under the captainship of von der Groeben, set out to ratify Block's Treaty, and 
establish a German colony at Cape Three Point, in present day Ghana. However, this 
enterprise was cut short when the Great Elector died in 1688, and the garrison and 
colonists, including von der Groeben were rapidly thinned by African fever. Secondly, 
the new Elector, Fredrick William of Prussia found his hands too full in Europe to be 
bothered with his predecessor's African plans. Thus, a few years later, he sold the fort
1 (Y 7 For an explicit explanation of the imperial activities of Europe in Africa, see 
Hopkins, A. G. An Economic History of West Africa. (London: Longman, 1973); 
Hobson, J. A. Imperialism: A Study. (London: A Constable, 1902).
103 Fage, T. D. A History of Africa. (London: Hutchinson, 1988). p. 333.
104 Mazrui, A. The African Conditions- A Political Diagnosis: The Reith Lectures, 
1979. (London: Heinemann Education, 1980).
105 Tilby, A. Wyatt. 'Germany as a Colonising Factor’, United Empire: The Royal 
Colonial Institute Journal, Vol. EL, No. 1., January 1912. p. 57.
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to the Dutch for the knockdown sum of 7,200 ducats in cash.106 This ended Germany's 
first attempt for colonies in Africa. 164 years later, Chancellor Bismarck revived the 
colonial enterprise in a very different European political and economic environment 
and consequently in pursuit of different interests and with a different rationale.
2.3. Bismarck’s colonial moves in South West Africa
All four reasons for the general explanation for European colonialism in Africa have 
been attributed to Germany. Ritchie argued that the German acquisition of South West 
Africa in 1884 was not an end in itself, but a single step towards an end: the control of 
the whole southern section of the African continent.107 Cana pointed out that the 
creation of a true colony in southern Africa and the acquisition of ‘plantation colonies’ 
in equatorial Africa were the main objects of German’s policy in Africa.108 Other 
explanations for German colonial expansion included the quest for new markets, and 
the imposition of a higher culture, de Vries maintained that the stream of emigrants 
who left Germany from time to time amounted to the ‘exportation of the social 
question’.109 Butler believed that as German missionary activities accelerated the 
process of German colonialism in South West Africa, the Rhenish Missionary Society
106 Hamilton, L., 'German Colonial Policy', United Empire: The Royal Colonial 
Institute Journal, Vol. IV., ( New Series) 1913., p. 157; Ritchie, Moore. The 
Unfinished War: The Drama of Anglo-German Conflict in Africa. (London: Eyre 
and Spottiswoode, 1940), p. 58.
107 Ritchie, op cit. p. 90.
1 HR Cana, F. R. 'German Aims in Africa', Journal of the African Society, Vol. LVI. 
Vol. XIV. July 1915, p. 355-265; Evans, Lewin. The Germans and Africa. (London: 
Cassell and Co., 1915).
109 de Vries, J. Lucas. Mission and Colonialism in Namibia. (Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 1978) p. 7.
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needed the protection of the German State to accomplish its civilising mission due to 
the local conflict between the Herero and Nama tribes.110
Arguably, each of these arguments misconceives the real source of Germany’s 
imperialism. Neither economic interest nor high culture is sufficient to explain German 
colonialism in South West Africa. It is also necessary to take account of the process by 
which, the German claim was advanced against other powers with similar motives. We 
also need to ask why and how Bismarck, by his own admission, a reluctant colonist, 
became embroiled in the enterprise. Was his conversion due to the demands of 
missionaries and traders alone, or were there other broader and deeper motives? In 
other words, what were the grounds for Bismarck’s colonial claims for South West 
Africa? At first sight, his opposition to colonialism would seem to contradict the 
balance of power hypothesis. We need, therefore, to examine further the causes of his 
conversion to the cause of German expansionism.
That Bismarck was opposed to colonial expansion is supported by three reasons. His 
own speeches always emphatically denied any sympathy with overseas expansion. He 
once reported that colonial possession was a two-fold liability: externally, because the 
country lacked a fleet adequate to defend them; internally, because the costs of 
administering them would widen the parliamentary parade ground by increasing the 
government’s financial dependence on the Reichstag. Secondly, some of the most 
publicized of the Chancellor’s acts provided tangible evidence for this attitude. For 
instance, in 1871, during the preliminaries of the Treaty of Frankfurt, he rejected the
110 Butler, Jeffrey. "The German Factor in Anglo-Transvaal Relations", in Gifford, 
Prosser and Roger, Wm. (eds.) Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry 
and Colonial Rule. (Louis, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). p. 181.
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French offer of colonies in Cochin China. In 1882, he announced that the political 
situation prevented the government from taking any part in the work of the Kolonial 
verein. Thirdly, given his pivotal goal of nation building, colonial acquisition seemed to 
be incongruous.
Each of these views, however, can be interpreted differently. The view of Bismarck as 
anti-expansionist is at odds with the other image of Bismarck as the Iron Chancellor. If 
Bismarck’s utterances were anti-expansionist, yet he never ruled out colonialism for all 
time. Most of his statements were in line with the practice of circumspection employed 
by European statesmen of his generation. Most European statesmen worked on the 
assumption that if they spoke the truth, they would not be believed. Consequently, they 
always said what other statesmen wanted to hear. During the formative years of 
German unification, Bismarck was also engrossed with the task of the nation building. 
He postponed, rather than rejected imperial expansion. For instance, the idea of future 
colonies for Germany was not absent from Bismarck’s mind even before the unification 
of 1871. Article IV of the Constitution for the North German Confederation, which he 
prepared, reads that the Law of the Kingdom shall be extended over Colonies and the 
settlements in the land overseas. This clause was enshrined in the Constitution of the 
Empire of 1871. Finally, Bismarck read the external environment with caution in order 
to play the power game. A politically expedient course of action for a young united 
empire, with a weak naval force, in relation to its immediate neighbours, France and 
Britain, was to take a back seat on colonial issues.
Bismarck essentially encouraged France and Britain to go “colonial”, plausibly to 
create conflict between them, and to divert the attention of France and England from
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Germany’s diplomatic and military capabilities. This reasoning goes a long way toward 
explaining the caution of the formative years: it was underpinned by domestic 
considerations. At this time, Bismarck counted on the support of the Liberal Party to 
complete the project of centralising the empire. When he was free to break out the 
alliance with the Liberal Party, he did. Perhaps, the time was ripe to take on Britain in 
the murky waters of colonialism.
Rival historical explanations have been offered for Bismarck’s colonial moves within 
the context of the famous Fischer-Kehr debate: the contest between external and the 
domestic considerations. Fisher111 argued that the external environment was the major 
determinant, while Kehr112 was a leading proponent of the domestic political 
explanation. It is not necessary to speculate at length on the reasons why the Iron 
Chancellor changed his mind in the mid-1880s. It cannot be denied, however, that 
ulterior motives of a domestic variety effected the quest for colonies. It is important 
though, not to explain every colonial move with reference to a single cause. Each 
colonial claim was sui generis. As far as South West Africa was concerned, the balance 
of possibility weighed in favour of the external considerations of which Taylor’s 
balance of power argument is the most plausible.113 Taylor observed that:
111 Fischer, F. Germany's Aims in the First World War. (London: Chatto, 1969).
112 Kehr, E. Battleship Building and Party Politics in Germany. (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1975); idem, Economic Interest, Militarism and 
Foreign Policy. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977)
113 Taylor. A. J. P. Germany's First Bid for Colonies, 1884-1885: A move in 
Bismarck’s European Policy, (London: Macmillan, 1938), p. 6. This book is, perhaps, 
still the most provocative work on anti-British sentiments as the causa belli of German 
colonialism. It is important to note that Henry Ashby Turner has challenged Taylor's 
thesis. Yet Turner conceded that Britain was a vital factor in shaping the new German 
colonial empire, and that the friction that later developed between the two powers 
resulted from Germany’s attempt to widen its role in the colonial world. See, Henry
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“It is important to discover an explanation of Bismarck’s 
colonial policy by fitting it into the structure of contemporary 
European politics. His colonial policy alone seems 
meaningless and irrational; but when the relations of England 
and Germany are added to those of Germany and France, and 
to those of France and England, Bismarck’s policy of 1884 
and 1885 becomes clearer as at any other time in his career”.
Taylor then noted that such an examination shows that Bismarck quarrelled with 
England in order to draw closer to France; and that the method of quarrel was the 
deliberately provocative claim to ownerless lands, in which the German government 
had hitherto shown no interest. Furthermore, he demonstrated that “the German colonies 
were the accidental by-product of an abortive Franco-German entente. Overseas 
imperialism, in other words, was for Bismarck only a means, the end being a 
rapprochement with France”.114
Taylor placed great weight on the psychology of the balance of power. To the German 
mind friendship with one power necessarily implies hostility against another, and 
Germany to make herself presentable to France, had to provoke a quarrel with England 
so that Franco-German friendship should have the solid foundation of Anglophobia. A 
grievance had to be created, and Bismarck turned to the colonial topic, which he had 
hitherto despised. Justifying the choice of South West Africa as the ground, Taylor 
maintained that:
“It would have been simple for Bismarck to stage a 
quarrel with the English, merely by joining the French 
opposition in regard to Egypt; but this would not have 
served his purpose, which was to convince the French
Ashby Turner, “Bismarck’s Imperialist Venture: Anti-British in Origin?”, in Gifford, 
and Roger, op cit., p. 81.
114 ibid., p. 16.
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that he had grievances of his own and therefore actually 
needed French help”.115
The first grievance that Bismarck had against Britain concerned the Fiji settlement. In 
Fiji, Britain had never responded to Bismarck’s request for the protection of the 
Germans doing business in the area in 1875. This refusal was a reminder to Bismarck 
that Germany needed its own colonies. In fact, he was more troubled by Britain’s 
territorial expansionism in the early 1880s. In 1882, Britain concluded a Colonial 
Convention with France which, called for a demarcation line between English and 
French territory north of Sierra Leone and for establishing high custom duties against 
goods from third countries. German firms in West Africa resented these duties. 
Moreover, in early 1884, England concluded the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, which 
established monopolistic control of the Congo River, in effect adding to its existing 
possessed by proxy. This treaty discriminated against Germany’s commercial interests. 
It was therefore no surprise, when on April 18, 1884, Bismarck protested to Portugal 
and refused to accept the Treaty’s terms. At the same time, he instructed his 
ambassador in Paris to approach France with the proposal to unite the commercial 
interests of France and Germany in the Congo against England. Six days later, he 
received a response wherein France promised full support. France’s co-operation in 
maintaining the principle of equality of trade in the Congo finally led to the calling of 
the famous Berlin Conference of November 15,1884.
This anti-British position was first identified by George Peris in 1914,116 and later 
developed by Taylor in 1938. To a great extent, the anti-British feeling on Germany’s
115 ibid., 23.
116 Peris, George. Herbert. Germany and the German Emperor (London: Andrew 
Melrose Ltd., 1914), p. 398.
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imperial venture had its intellectual roots in the writings and speeches of the historian
von Treitschke. On the German colonial question, he writes:
"History teaches us that nations rise and decline: 
they cannot remain stationary. Britain above all 
other nations stands across the path of expanding 
Germany. If German greatness is to come to full 
stature, Britain must sooner or later be humbled.
The power of Britain and her institutions, her 
liberty, is not attuned to this age ".117
Cana also observed that von Treitschke was the first and most influential man to focus
German eyes on southern region of Africa as suitable for colonisation.
"Treitschke held that Germany should possess colonies, 
and he believed that in South Africa circumstances were 
distinctly favourable to Teutonic ambitions. Quick to 
perceive where Britain had not succeeded in the colonial 
field he called attention to the fact the policy of England 
at the Cape, "vacillating between weakness and violence", 
had alienated the Boers. He fully recognised that if 
Germany followed an independent colonial policy in that 
quarter a collision with the interests of Britain was 
inevitable-but a collision with Britain was one of the 
things Treitschke most ardently desired."118
Despite Treitschke’s prophecy, Bismarck, still preferred an alliance with Britain
at the birth of German Unification in 1871, having just been at war with France.
To understand what led Bismarck to confront Britain over South West Africa,
we need to look in more detail at the diplomatic exchanges between the two
countries. These are not fully covered in Taylor’s sweeping account, although,
they do not rebut his general conclusion.
117 Quoted from Ritchie, ibid., p. 68.
118 Cana, op. cit., p. 255.
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2.4. South West Africa and the Anglo-German Relations, 1870-1884119
Bismarck intended to maintain a friendly attitude with Lord Salisbury's 
Government during the formative years of a unified Germany. By sending one or 
the other of his two sons, Count Herbert and Count William, on visits to England 
repeatedly, he sought to demonstrate his commitment to Anglo-German 
relations.120 To Bismarck, a rapprochement between England and Germany was a 
marriage made in heaven. He thought of England as the most natural ally, with 
few areas of divergent interests. His calculation was that an Anglo-German 
alliance would guarantee stability in Europe. However, such moves met with both 
domestic and external scepticism. In Germany, at the social level, alliance with 
Russia was of paramount importance, while relation with Britain was of a 
secondary importance. Despite the growing public opposition to an alliance with 
Britain, Bismarck was serious in pursuing this objective.
For her part, Britain did not receive Bismarck's overtures with enthusiasm. Arguably, it 
was naive of Bismarck to believe that Britain could be Germany’s natural ally. No other 
state than a unified Germany posed such a threat to the power of the British Empire. At 
the end of the 19th century, it was still the largest empire in the history of the world, 
comprising of nearly a quarter of the landmass of the earth covering about 11 million
119 On this part, I rely heavily on diplomatic evidences, especially Dugdale, E. 
T. S., German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1914 Volumes I -IV. (London: 
Menthuen and Co., Ltd., 1928).
120 Dugdale, E. T. S. German Diplomatic Documents, Vol. 1: Bismarck's 
Relations with England, 1871-1890. (London: Menthuen and Co. Ltd., 1928), 
p. vii.
70
square miles with a population totalling 372 million.121 It dominated world politics 
during this period, stretching from the Mediterranean to South East Asia with the 
largest naval fleet that controlled most of the world's shipping lanes. However, during 
the last two decades of the 19th century, Britain’s imperial spirit started to crack, with 
the loss of her manufacturing, naval and colonial monopolies, her domestic politics 
became highly factionalised in the rivalry of the two parties led Disraeli and Gladstone. 
Gradually, her energies for global domination were sapped. As her hegemonic power 
diminished; “there was one dominating question in British foreign policy: Russia and 
Germany:122 Britain understandably feared Germany, more than Russia. More than any 
power in Europe, Germany was the most aggressive and most militaristic. Unification 
in 1871 was followed by the first 'economic miracle' in history. With prosperity, came 
ambition and a strong desire to be militarily powerful, through the acquisition of a 
formidable army and navy. London’s concerns about Germany boiled down to a simple 
fear: that German ambitions did not appear to be confined to Eastern Europe; that they 
extended to western Europe and the world beyond.
With this perception of German ambitions, Britain found it difficult to engage with 
Bismarck on continental matters in the way he wanted. For example, Lord 
Beaconsfield admitted in 1879 that England alone had destroyed Bismarck’s efforts 
towards a closer understanding with England at that time. He wrote: 'that proposal (of 
an alliance with Great Britain) was not only rejected by the English Secretary of State,
121 Morris, James. Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire. (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1968). Even the Roman Empire was with 120 million people, and occupied 11 
square million mile.
122 Stone, Norman. Europe Transformed, 1878-1919. (London: Fontana Press, 1985), 
p. 159.
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but was only notified by him to his colleagues, accompanied by his opinion, that it 
could not for a moment be entertained'123
By 1880, Bismarck was himself pessimistic about his Anglo-German overtures. His 
first offer of Alliance in conversation with Lord John Russell (then Foreign Secretary) 
in 1876 over the Eastern Question failed to materialise. At this time, however, 
Bismarck contemplated an alliance with Russia, the implication of which would have 
reduced the importance of a British connection.124 Ironically, the Egyptian question 
brought Germany and Britain together against France. However, it was a double-edge 
sword for Britain, France, and Germany, and its final outcome constituted a classic 
balance of power politics.
The Egyptian question tested the resolve of the Anglo-Franco understanding and finally 
broke it. In April 1877 both England and France were in co-operation and established 
co-dominion of Egyptian finances to advance their respective colonial interests. The 
European Commission of Control that was set up to manage the precarious state of 
Egyptian finances was quickly converted into a Condominium of the two Powers. But 
in 1882, France refused to join England in coercing Alexandria; this left England in 
control of the country, and joint policies on Egypt began to fall apart.125 Their policies 
were not only incompatible; England was confronted by the determined hostility of 
France. As France could count on the support of Russia, it was important for Britain to
123 Dugdale, ibid., p. 145.
124 Dugdale, ibid., p. 144.
125 Dugdale, ibid., p. 155. 'The Egyptian Question'.
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secure the support and goodwill of Germany, to if needed could be added Italian and 
Austrian support.
By granting or refusing his support, Bismarck could facilitate or frustrate the successful 
prosecution of British policy in Egypt. German interests in the Suez Canal were small 
and purely commercial, yet it could have derailed British policy in Egypt, if it had 
supported the French. Germany maintained a political silence on the issue, and by so 
doing outmanoeuvred France. Britain appreciated Germany's neutrality. Count Herbert 
Bismarck reported that Sir William Harcourt, the British Home Secretary, had said to 
him that:
"We are uncommonly grateful to Prince 
Bismarck, for the friendly attitude of German 
policy this summer was of great service to us. Our 
being left with a free hand in Egypt we owe, when 
all is said, to Germany's goodwill. We are all 
aware that at a particular moment Prince 
Bismarck could have upset the coach if he had 
chosen to, and we realise with much thankfulness
196that he refrained from doing so".
Altruism, however, is always a scarce commodity in international diplomacy. The 
outcome of the Egyptian question altered the contour of the Anglo-German and Anglo- 
French relationship. Bismarck sensed that Britain’s defeat of France over the Egyptian 
question was a step toward the realisation of the ‘Cape to Cairo’ project propounded by 
the British industrialist, Cecil Rhodes. He also sensed that the Cape to Cairo project 
would consolidate Britain’s global expansion, and give it a sense of supremacy in 
Europe. On the other hand, Bismarck believed that he could exploit the French sense of 
wounded pride against the British. To France, the prospect of an alliance with Germany
126 Dugdale, ibid., p. 168.
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was a rearguard action to reclaim its place at the forefront of European politics. 
Bismarck’s move was least expected in London. Thus, on February 4, 1883, Bismarck 
sent a cable to London through his son, Herbert asking about the nature and character 
of Britain’s authority over the Angra Pequena-the original cartographical name for 
South West Africa- so as to make provision for the protection of German traders in the 
area. Again, on September 10, 1883, Plessen, the German charge d’affaires, enquired at 
the British Foreign Office if Britain had suzerainty at Angra Penquena and, in case the 
suzerainty exits on what ground it rests.127
To the British Government, German colonial aspirations were 'unpractical' and 
'untimely'. In a series of despatches to Count Munster in London, Bismarck criticised 
British attitudes towards the German requests. "In his despatch of May 25th 1884, he 
said:
"In view of the unexpected peremptory attitude of 
the English regarding Angra Pequena. I beg you 
to cease to mention the subject of Heligoland in 
your discussions. It would provide an excuse for 
making the justice of our African claims 
subservient to our rights regarding Heligoland. A 
desire of this kind can only be presented to a 
nation when it is in a friendly mood towards us.
This description does not apply to England of 
today, as is proved by their unrestrained claims 
against us in colonial matters. A Monroe Doctrine 
for Africa".128
In the letter, Prince Bismarck warned of the need for Germany to form an alliance with 
France, if Britain failed to budge. "If we fail to obtain justice from England across the 
ocean, we must try at any rate to gain closer touch with other sea-faring Powers, France
127.The documents concerning Angra Penquena are in F .0 .64/1101. See W. O. Aydelotte, ‘The First 
German Colony and its Diplomatic Consequences”, in Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. V. No. 3, p. 
293 for Bismarck’s instruction to Herbert Bismarck of 4 February, 1883.
128 Dugdale, ibid., p. 174.
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included. Public opinion in Germany would not endure the arrogance and selfishness of 
the English for ever".129
Similarly, in his letter of June 1st 1884, Prince Bismarck remarked that:
"If Lord Granville (the British Foreign Secretary, 1870-74,
1880-85) finds that the English Parliament’s friendly feeling 
towards us is incompatible with out pursuit of a Colonial policy, 
we should be curious to learn why the right to colonise, which 
England uses to its fullest extent, should be denied to us".130
It was at this time that the British Government gave her approval to the Cape Colony to
annex the territory. The Germans got a hint of this 'covert approval', as the letter further
illustrated. Bismarck showed his indignation, he wrote:
'Supposing it to be really our intention to establish 
colonies, how can Lord Granville contest our right to do 
so at the very moment when the British Government is 
granting an unlimited exercise of the same right to the 
Government at the Cape? This naive egoism is in itself an 
insult to our national feeling. The 'qoud licet Jovi, etc.', 
cannot be applied to Germany".131
Lord Granville’s reply implied that Britain had no intention of obstructing the 
German colonial aspirations. He wrote: "To my sincere regret we have not yet been 
able to reply because we cannot act except in agreement with the Government of the 
Colony, which has an independent Ministry and Parliament".132 Yet it was clear that 
there were some understandings between London and Cape Government to thwart 
the German ambition.
129 ibid., p. 174.
130 ibid., p. 174.
131 ibid., p. 177.
132 ibid., p. 177.
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2.5. Britain's reactions to German colonialism in South West Africa
Three interpretations have been advanced in relation to the British response to 
Bismarck’s colonial claim. One, that London was caught off guard. Two, that Britain 
wanted to adopt its own Monroe Doctrine in Africa; (3) that Britain was faced with a 
dilemma of supporting competing demands from Germany and South Africa.
The first interpretation, that the British Government was caught off guard requires one 
to be economical with the truth. Sir Bartle Frere of the Colonial Office in Cape Town 
had earlier informed London that German aims in South West Africa extended beyond 
the British protectorate there, for the annexation of the whole of South West Africa up 
to the Portuguese hold, Angola. He warned the British Government further that if any 
loophole were left, Germany would take the whole country for herself. In the event, 
however, the British Government only annexed Walvis Bay, in recognition of its 
economic viability, as a seaport; while the remaining area was described as a barren 
land-locked territory, of little or no significance. This interpretation could not stand up 
to close scrutiny for the reason that a reply note prepared by Foreign Office Permanent 
Under-Secretary, Pauncefote, was never sent to Bismarck. Pauncefote note read that: 
‘Her Majesty’s Government have no claims or jurisdiction over the mainland’. The note 
was, however, not sent because the Cape Government was not yet consulted.134
The second interpretation looks more plausible. On May 16th 1884, Lord Derby, the 
Colonial Secretary, announced to a deputation of South African merchants that even if
133 Ritchie, op cit., p.81.
134 Taylor, op cit., p. 25. Taylor’s conclusion that the British government never for one 
moment contemplated forestalling the German colonial plans is surprisingly a naive
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England was not prepared to take formal possession of Angra Pequena, she considered 
that she had the right to prevent other nations from doing so.135 As it will be shown 
later in the next section, Britain’s dilemma had legal and political implications. Its 
failure not to take the formal possession of Agra Penquena implied that the territory 
was a territorium nullius, yet Britain could not effectively pursue her policy of 
establishing a British Monroe Doctrine and anti-German sentiment at the same time. As 
Stem observed, Britain was caught between Germany and South Africa, rather than 
being primarily concerned with Germany alone.136 He argued that the British 
occupation of Egypt had mortgaged the government’s freedom of action, and that 
Britain was caught between the need to buy German support in Egypt and the last 
minute demands from South Africa to protect them from German inroads.
This leaves us with the third interpretation. This is, that having recognised the problems 
associated with the imposition of a unilateral British Monroe Doctrine in southern 
Africa, Britain decided to playoff Germany against South Africa. Thus, on May 1884, 
Sir Hercules Robinson, successor at the Cape to Sir Bartle Frere cabled to London that 
'the Ministry was to recommend to the Cape Parliament to take control of the coast line 
from the Orange River to Walvis'.137 Hence, at the instigation of the British Colonial 
Administration, the Cape Parliament decided to annex the strip of the coast to the North 
and South of Angra Pequena in May 1884. This was however, too late. With the
understanding of how bureaucratic ineptness could be used to mask the making of an 
unfavorable decision against a competing Power.
135 Dugdale, op cit., p. 175.
136 Stem, Fritz. Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichroder, and the Building of the 
German Empire. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1980) p. 411.
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knowledge that London was ready to acquiescence to the demands of the Cape 
Government, Bismarck dispatched an official proclamation to a German trader, 
Luderitz, to declare his settlement to be under the imperial protection as from April 24, 
1884. This was fourteen months after Bismarck sent the first cable to London. On 
August 7, 1884, the German flag was hoisted at Angra Pequena and the whole coastline 
between 26'S and the Portuguese boundary was declared to be a German territory. 
’’This put an end to the British claim of the right of suzerainty and jurisdiction between 
latitude 18" and the Cape frontier’,138 and simultaneously to the realisation of Rhodes’s 
Cape to Cairo route project.139 It nonetheless, marked the birth of a German South 
West Africa. It was, as we have seen a creation of the European balance of power 
politics, although South Africa continued to make a claim for South West Africa.
2.6. South Africa and its claim for South West Africa
Three main reasons explained South Africa’s desire to annex South West Africa. These 
were the Greater South Africa philosophy, the mistrust of the Germans as good 
neighbours, and the extemalisation of the anti-German sentiments. In what he termed 
as a Greater South Africa', Hyam argued that the main intention of the Cape 
Government was to complete its provincial union, throughout southern Africa and a 
programme of expansion outside the British controlled area.140 For instance, in 1908,
137 Ritchie, op cit., p. 88.
138 Hamilton, L. ‘German Colonial Policy”, United Empire: The Royal Colonial 
Institute Journal Vol. IV., (New Series), 1913, p. 161.
139 For a detailed analysis of 'Cape to Cairo scheme' see, Evans, Lewin. ‘The Cape to 
Cairo Route”, United Empire: The Royal Colonial Institute Journal. Vol. XIV., 
(New Series), No. 12. December 1923, p. 696-699.
140 Hyam, Ronald. The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-1948. (London: 
Macmillan, 1972), p. 2.
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General Smuts noted that concerning the future of South Africa, the German Empire 
was no desirable neighbour, and as of 1914, he still regarded South West Africa as 'part 
of the Afrikaner heritage'.141
The presence of Germany in South West Africa was seen as a threat to the realisation of 
the Greater South African dream. The ruling class within South Africa perceived 
Germany as a military state. For instance, Park argued that the presence of German 
power on the borders of the Union was viewed with suspicion from the start. 'If 
Germany's policy either in Europe or overseas had been a policy of peace, South Africa 
might perhaps have watched the development of this territory on her boundaries with 
friendly and sympathetic interest. But German's scheme of colonisation was directed on 
military lines and with military intent'.142 Many South Africans, of British and 
Afrikaner heritage opposed Germans as the immediate colonial neighbour. They were 
already uneasy with the presence of a single colonial power, the British. Now they were 
to be confronted with two European powers. Cape public opinion in 1884 continued to 
feel that there was no room for two European flags in South Africa.143
The third reason for South Africa’s attitude was the extemalisation of South Africa's 
anti-German sentiment, especially with her participation in the First World War. 
According to Vanderbosch, 'it was generally assumed that when Great Britain declared
141 Extracted from Hancock. W. K. and van der Poel, J. Selections from the Smuts
Papers, Vol. III. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1966), p. 198.
142 Park, Maitlan. “German South West African Campaign” Journal of the African
Society. Vol. XV., No. LVm., January 1916. p. 11.
143 Louis, W. R. Great Britain and Germany’s Lost Colonies, 1914-19. (1967), p.
18.
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war on Germany on August 4, 1914, South Africa automatically became a belligerent. 
The Union was part of the British Empire and when the United Kingdom became 
involved in war, so did the whole Empire'.144 Ritchie argued that with the victory of the 
South African forces over the German force in South West Africa, 'the British Empire 
thus acquired, through the agency of Union of South Africa and by right of conquest, a 
territory which thirty years before it had allowed to slip through its hands.145 In a 
similar vein, Bernard observed that ‘everyone who approves a colonial setback for 
Germany is helping England to secure for herself that universal domination'.146
Rayner has shown that the South African government and forces acted upon the 
instruction of the Imperial Government to capture German South West Africa. He 
observed that, 'on the 7th August, 1914, the Imperial Government, through the then 
Acting Governor General (Lord de Villiers) invited the Union Government to "seize 
Swakopmund, Luderitzbutch and other parts of the South West Africa that had wireless 
stations. Three days later, General Botha announced that he and his colleagues 
"cordially agreed" to do so'.147 Botha strongly believed that the Union was a part of the 
whole of the British Empire. When the Empire was in war, South Africa was ipso facto 
involved. The British Government moulded, and prepared the colonies and dominions 
for war against the Germans. In 1907, the Imperial Conference in London agreed on the 
collaboration between the Home and Dominion General Staffs, and the Imperial
144 Vanderbosch, Amry. South Africa and the World: The Foreign Policy of
Apartheid. (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), p. 31.
145 Ritchie, op cit., p. 170.
146 Benard, Augustin. “Germany's Colonial Aims”, Journal of African Society, No. 
LVIX., Vol. XVI., July 1917, p. 308.
147 Rayner, W. S. How Botha and Smuts Conquered German South West Africa.
(Cape Town: The African World/ Red Cross, 1915), p. 7.
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Conference of 1911 drew their attention to the dangerous state of affairs in Europe. The 
Conference established the British Committee for the Defense of the Empire that drew 
up military and civil contingency plans for war. In addition, the Union Defence Act of 
1912 made the South African troops available for service anywhere, including German 
South West Africa and German central Africa.148
Britain and South Africa had a separate, but similar interest in keeping Germany out of 
southern Africa. However, within South Africa those with sympathy for with Germany 
challenged their government. General James B. M. Hertzog, the National Party leader, 
believed that just because South Africa was in a state of war as a consequence of the 
war between Britain and Germany, this did not make it South Africa's war. Many 
Afrikaners sympathised with the Germans, who had supported them during the first 
Anglo-Boer War.149 Hertzog’s criticism, like the Bismarck cable, to which we next 
turn, raises an important question, which has been neglected for over a century: can a 
non-sovereign state have full status and enjoy equal spoils as a sovereign state as 
defined by classical positive international law. This question in particular is related to 
the 1910 South Africa Act, under which South Africa still lacked the legal and 
constitutional capacity to conduct foreign policy or wage war on her own. Yet in 1919 
South Africa became a Mandatory Power.
148. Schnee, Henirich. German Colonisation-Past and Future: The Truth About the 
German Colonies. (London: George Allen and Unwin Limited, 1926), p. 89.
149 There were two Boer wars: the first war was between 1880-81, and the second was in 
1899. Until, 1902, when the Boer finally surrendered, Germany in particular, saw Britain 
as the aggressor, an evil Goliath against the David who was pluckily standing up to his 
bullying. See, John Cannon (ed.), The Oxford Companion to British History, (Oxford: 
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2.7. The Bismarck cable and international law
It is tempting to focus exclusively on the political components of Bismarck’s colonial 
policy. To do so, however, ignores the importance of how norms in international law 
are embedded in the practice of power politics within the context of the legitimisation 
of European power in non-European territories. The cable of February 1883 sought to 
determine whether South West Africa was a territorium nullius. The concept of 
territorium nullius is controversial. Indeed, at its session at Lausanne in 1888, the 
Institute of International Law set up a committee to agree a definition. It failed, neither 
of the drafts proposed by two of its members, Martitz and Engelhardt was accepted by 
the Institute. Notwithstanding, Martitz’s definition of territorium nullius as 
“comprising any region not effectively under the sovereignty or protectorate of one of 
the States forming the community of international law, whether inhabited or not” was 
operationally accepted by European rulers.150 It is not within the remit of this thesis to 
question the ideology underpinning the acceptance and usage of Martitz’s definition by 
the European powers, as at this time, the European powers were both judge and jury of 
which states were considered to be members of the family of nations. Rather, the 
purpose of this section is to put into historical perspective the principle of territorium 
nullius as it was understood in the late 19th century.
The doctrine of territorium nullius has passed through different phases. It began with 
the Papal Bull, in which the Pope granted to its favoured Kings and Princes the 
exclusive rights of acquiring dominions in the New World. The Bull was limited to 
lands which were not actually possessed by any Christian kings, and required the
150 The following paragraphs were based on the account given by Lindley, M. F. in The 
Acquisition and Government of Backward Territory in International Law: Being a
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grantee to lead the inhabitants to the Christian faith. The Bull of Nicholas V o f1452 was 
the first known Bull, and followed with the Bull of Alexander VI o f 1453. The grant of 
Nicholas V to King Alphonse of Portugal in 1452 was to invade, conquer, storm, attack 
and subjugate the Saracens and other enemies of Christ. The Bull of Inter Caetera of 
Alexander VI granted Ferdinand and Isabella the exclusive rights of acquiring 
dominion in the New World. The Papal Bull was supplanted with the rule o f discovery. 
This was because other European Kings found themselves competing for wealth and 
dominions in the New World and the Far East. The rule of discovery was a direct 
challenge to the Papal Bull and the Papacy’s favoured princes. This rule presupposed 
that discovery by the representative of one nation was sufficient to exclude others from 
the region discovered. It was devised to minimise conflict amongst European princes 
and to regulate competing territorial claims. However, it brought more problems than it 
anticipated. Extravagant claims were made. The Spaniards in particular, heretofore 
granted the Papal Bull, used the rule of discovery to reinforce their claims.
Gradually, a new principle emerged to complement the rule of discovery-the principle 
of occupation. It gave the discoverer the right to a period of grace for making a 
settlement through the building of forts, cultivation of soils, and erection of factories. It 
also focused on the establishment of an efficient governmental institution capable of 
providing security to life and property on the territory. Subsequent to the principle of 
occupation was the principle of geographical contiguity. This principle suggested that a 
Power that was in actual possession of certain territory had thereby acquired rights over 
contiguous country, which has not been appropriated by another Power.
Treatise on the Law and Practice Relating to Colonial Expansion. (London:
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So much for the historical development of the concept of territorium nullius. We will 
now turn to the legal issues raised by the cable of February 4, 1883 and London’s 
response. In the first place, we must note that the cable asked whether Britain had 
sovereignty over the Angra Pequena, and if she had, whether the British government 
would protect German citizens in the territory. It could be argued that Bismarck was 
following the emergent practice amongst the European powers of notifying each other 
when making colonial claims. Yet it also seems more likely that Bismarck made his 
inquiry partly to keep German policy within the law, and partly to signal Germany’s 
intentions.
The cable provided the legal ground on which Germany could advance its colonial 
claims, yet its main motive was to contain Britain’s continental and global expansion. 
In short, Bismarck’s political interest was both indissolubly linked and interlocked with 
legal constraints. In turn, there were legal imperatives behind the action of the British 
government. As we have seen, three years earlier in 1880, Britain had annexed Walfish 
Bay but proclaimed that it had no sovereign rights on the rest of Angra Penquena, i. e. it 
was a territorium nullius. Britain claimed that the territory had no economic value 
worthy of occupation. Yet it was ready to deny any competing Power the right of 
occupation. Lord Granville, remarked that: “although English sovereignty had been 
proclaimed at Walfish Bay and the islands off Angra Pequena, any claim to sovereignty 
or jurisdiction by a foreign power between Angola and Cape Colony (i.e. South West 
Africa) would infringe England’s legitimate rights”.151 Thus, when Germany made its 
own claim, Britain invoked the principle of geographical contiguity on behalf of the
Longmans, 1926), p. 16.
151 Dugdale, op cit., p. 177.
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Cape government against Germany without admitting that it was doing so. Even if 
Britain had no material interests of its own, her conduct was decidedly Machiavellian.
From a political point of view, Taylor is right when he argues that Bismarck achieved 
his goal of preventing a British colonial monopoly in vast parts of Africa. Yet his 
account of German colonial claims failed to appreciate Bismarck’s desire not to 
overthrow the existing European order by flouting the norms of international law. 
Bismarck had to follow the tradition that existed amongst the European powers. Since 
the rule governing colonial acquisition had moved from the preserve of the Papacy to 
the principle of occupation, he had to obey the norm of notification. Now we can turn 
to the question regarding the status of South Africa within the context of classical 
positive international law.
In retrospect, South Africa, as the other British dominions, Australia, Canada and New 
Zealand, illustrates the problem of ‘quasi-states’ in international relations. Robert 
Jackson coined the phrase ‘quasi-states’ to describe those states, which despite their 
recognition by other states and international institutions nonetheless lacked substantial 
and credible statehood judged by the empirical criteria of classical positive international 
law.152 Established states enjoyed what Jackson described as ‘positive sovereignty’, 
while quasi-states have only ‘negative sovereignty’, that is their legitimacy rests to a 
considerable degree on international recognition. Such states were usually incapable of 
defending themselves against any industrialised states that possessed a modem arsenal. 
It has to be pointed out that in the 1920s South Africa could not be considered as weak 
or soft in Jacksonian terms. Yet it actually existed on the sufferance of the major
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powers, and to a great extent depended at the critical moment of its formation on 
international support. Under the 1910 South African Act, it lacked the constitutional 
capacity to conduct an independent foreign policy or declare war, two prerequisites of 
positive sovereignty. It was not until the Balfour Declaration in 1926 that South Africa 
ceased to be constitutionally dependent on Britain. Paradoxically, this was after it had 
benefited from the First World War by being granted the mandate South West Africa.
2.8. Conclusion
In this chapter, we have considered the link between balance of power and international 
law. More importantly, we have established the centrality of balance of power in 
general, and Anglo-German rivalry in particular, as the proximate cause of the creation 
of German South West Africa. Yet its existence was simultaneously defined within the 
prevailing international law of territorium nullius. There is thus a link between the 
issues discussed above, and those to be discussed in the next chapter on the Mandate 
system. The League of Nations created the mandate system for two competing reasons: 
to create a sense of international responsibility for the colonised peoples; and 
simultaneously to satisfy the interests of the Allied and Associated Powers. Thus the 
mandate system reflected a delicate balance between power politics and the 
responsibility of international community to the peoples of the former German colonies.
152 Jackson, R. H. Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third 
World. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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Chapter Three 
The Politics and the Principle of the Mandate System
3.1. Introduction
Who was to inherit Germany's colonial possessions was a major concern of the Allied 
and Associated Powers, even before the last gun of the First World War was silenced. 
At the end of the war, however, the concept of taking over German colonies as the 
‘spoils of war’,153 clashed with the emerging internationalist idealism championed by 
President Wilson of the United States. The Allied and Associated Powers believed that 
the fighting had stemmed from Germany’s bid for mastery in Europe, and that the war 
was about power. Germany was too powerful relative to her neighbours, and she had to 
be radically, if not permanently weakened. Wilson concluded that the war had been 
caused by the imperfections of the balance of power. His recipe for a New World order 
was democracy. The Allied Powers wanted to negotiate a punitive peace with 
annexations and indemnities, while Wilson wanted a peace with no gains for any of the 
belligerents: a lenient peace underpinned by the linked concepts of collective security, 
self-determination and democracy.
The League of Nations was formed amidst these conflicting interests, objectives and 
personalities in the Great Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles. The mandate 
system was an integral part of the new order. From the discussion in the preceding 
chapters, we have established the relationship between law and power, and concluded 
that South West Africa was a pawn in power politics between Germany and Britain.
153 Blakeslee, H. George "The Mandates of the Pacific", Foreign Affairs- An 
American Quarterly Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, September 1922, p. 98.
87
This argument is in itself contingent, suggesting another element, concerning how the 
relationship works. This is that law may have a role but only when it is within the 
bridles of power, and that law can only succeed if backed by power, and in particular, 
when it serves the interests of the great powers. The formulation of the mandate system, 
to which we now turn, explains by example our second argument. In particular, we shall 
examine the differing interests that made South West Africa a Class C mandate. We 
therefore suggest that as a Class C mandate, South West Africa became a ward of the 
international community, whose existence was dictated by the overarching political 
interests of the Allied Powers but legitimated with a legal instrument.
To recap, in chapter two, we started an examination of the legal status South Africa’s 
participation in the First World War. We took into consideration its dependence on a 
Great Power. In this chapter we shall continue with this line of inquiry: that is, South 
Africa’s status as a mandatory power and how its participation in the League of Nations 
helped in completing its international personality. Furthermore, we shall examine the 
political contents of the Advisory Opinions of 1950 and 1955 and the South West 
Africa cases before the International Court of Justice. Much has been written on the 
legal side of the case.154 However, international law does not operate in a political 
vacuum but reflects the prevailing exercise of power. Its relevance in international 
politics derives from its impact on prevailing contentious issues, such as decolonization
154 See the followings for the legal proceedings of the South West African case, 
International Court of Justice, SW Africa Cases (Second Phase), ICJ Report 1966. 
(Netherlands: ICJ, 1967) Green, L. C., "SW Africa and the World Court", 22 
International Journal, (1966-67), p. 39; Gross, E. A., "The SW Africa Case: What 
Happened"? 45 Foreign Affairs, (1966), p. 36; Higgins, R., "The International Court 
and SW Africa: The Implications of the Judgement", 42 International Affairs, (1966), 
p. 573; Manning, C. A. W., "The SW Africa Cases: A Personal Analysis", 3 (2) 
International Relations (1966), p. 98; Roberts, M. "SW Africa and the UN", The
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and self-determination. As we shall see, the United Nations adopted a legalistic 
approach to secure the transfer of the mandatory authority from South Africa.
The chapter is divided into four parts. Part I explains South Africa's transition from a 
de facto to a de jure Mandatory Power in South West Africa; and explores the principle 
of the mandate system and the nature of a C-class mandate. Part II discusses the 
principle of the United Nations' Trusteeship System. Part III examines South West 
African issue within the United Nations General Assembly. It focuses on the differing 
interests and conflicting principles among the member states. Part IV explores the 
beginning of transformation of the United Nations tone and actions on South West 
Africa.
3.2. South West Africa and the Military Occupation Interregnum, 1915-1919
There was a five-year interregnum between South Africa’s military occupation and its 
full legal control over South West Africa. The German Force in South West Africa 
conceded military defeat to South Africa’s armed forces in early 1915, within less than 
a year of the outbreak of war. It was not until the end of 1919 that South Africa 
accepted the Mandatory status and passed the Act of the Union Parliament (Act 49 of 
1919).155 The agreement between the Council of the League of Nations and South 
Africa was signed on December 17, 1920. In the period between 1915-1920, South 
Africa was the de facto authority in South West Africa and ruled with martial law. With 
the mandatory agreement, it became the de jure government. Its five-year old martial 
law was abrogated, and full civil administration under the mandate system was
World Today, (October 1966), p. 407; and Verzijl, J. H. W., "The SW Africa Cases 
(Second Phase)", 3 (2) International Relations, (1966), p. 87.
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established. Notwithstanding, the road to mandatory power was paved with competing 
needs, values and interests.
3.3. The principle and politics of Mandate System
The etymology of the mandate system can be traced to the ancient idea of a mandatum,
under the Roman law, which is "a type of contract whereby one party agrees to execute
gratuitously a commission received from another, and in the execution of which he
must show omnes diligentia. "156 In simple terms, it is the transfer of property (A) from
X to Y, but with a proviso of no direct benefit for Y being in possession of A.
According to Reginald,
“ a mandate is a power or influence given by the League of 
Nations to one State, called the Mandatory, over a 
community or region, varying in character and degree in 
ratio to the stage of political and economic development, 
the civilisation and geographical locality of that 
community or region for the trust of the civilisation”.157
In wars, the confiscation of the possessions of the defeated powers could either be used 
as the ultimate sign of victory or as a bargaining chip in the settlement of other claims. 
The groundwork for the distribution of German colonial possessions had been agreed 
two years before the war ended by Britain, Italy, France and Japan, formally known as 
the Council of Four, (C-4). In early 1917, these powers agreed that the occupied 
German territories would be divided amongst themselves upon victory. However, at the 
Paris Peace Conference, the disposition of the German colonies amongst the Allied and
155 Union of South Africa, Official Year Book of the Union and Basutoland, 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland, 1910-1920, No. 4., 1921 (Pretoria: The 
Government Printing and Stationery Office, 1921), p. 904.
156 Smith I. C., "Smut’s Role in the Establishment of the League of Nations and the 
Mandate for South West Africa", South African Historical Journal, No. 5, Nov. 
1973, p. 96.
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Associated Powers clashed with Wilsonian idealism. The battle was between the 
annexationists and the non-annexationists. Amongst the annexationists were France, 
Italy and the British Dominions; while the United States led the non-annexationist 
camp. The annexationist group was not homogenous: Britain itself was reluctant, but 
constrained by the agitation of the Dominions. On the other hand, France, wanted as 
much German territories as it could get.
In London Lloyd George’s government wanted the captured colonies to be used as a 
bargaining chip in the pursuit of other settlement claims. For instance, at the beginning 
of the war, a British telegram had urged the Southern Dominions to begin military 
operations "that any territory must be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for 
purposes of an ultimate settlement at conclusion of the war".158
Amongst the Dominions, South Africa did not believe that these German colonies 
should be used as a trade-off. It called for total annexation, invoking two reasons: 
national security concerns and German misrule of dependent peoples. The Cape 
Government used the accusation of German barbarism in the colonies as an effective 
argument for annexation, thus putting the idea of British retention of colonies in a 
humanitarian light.159 The South African delegation spoke of the Herero's uprisings 
against the Germans in 1904. It claimed that the German colonial administrators were 
insensitive to the local needs using the British Foreign Office's Blue Book as
157 Reginald, Berkeley. "Mandates", The Covenant-A Quarterly Journal of the 
League of Nations, Vol. 1, No. 1, October 1919, p. 33.
158 Mackenzie, S. S. Australians at Rabaul (Sydney, 1934), p. 5.
159 Gaddis, Smith. "The British Government and the Disposition of the German 
Colonies in Africa, 1914-1918" in Gifford, Prosser and Louis, Roger. WM. (eds.), 
Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1967), p. 284 and 287.
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corroborative evidence.160 In addition, South Africa's Prime Minister Louis Botha 
referred to South West Africa as 'a piece of land cut out of the Union", and "the very 
few white people lived there and the natives were 'quite happy' under South African 
rule'.161 South Africa also played the security card, claiming that the country would be 
insecure with a post-war German South West Africa.
Under pressure from General Smuts, the Imperial War Cabinet inaugurated Lord 
Curzon’s Committee on territorial war aims in early 1917. The Committee met between 
April 17-19, 1917 and later recommended that German South West Africa and German 
East Africa must be annexed.162 Although, the Imperial War Cabinet adopted the 
Curzon report, it faced a strong opposition both within and outside Britain by the time 
the war settlement claims were made in 1919. Domestic opposition came from a 
surprising quarter, Lord Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War; and externally, from 
President Wilson of the United States.
Ironically, Lord Kitchener placed the issue of colonial settlement in the context of the 
European balance of power. He argued that it would be a mistake for Great Britain to 
take more than an irreducible minimum of Germany's colonies "as it would more than 
anything else interfere with the future establishment of goodwill between Germany and
160 See British Parliamentary Papers Cd. 8371, Vol. XX, 1916; Cd. 8306, Vol. XX, 
1916; Cd. 9146, Vol. XVII, 1918; and Cd. 9210, Vol. XLE, 1921.
161 Maurice Hankey's notes of a meeting of the Council of Ten, BC-12, January 27, 
1919 (3 P.M.), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Library of Congress, Washington 
D.C.), p.296-297.
162 The final report of the Curzon Committee of April 28, 1917 can be found in the
Austen Chamberlain Papers, University of Birmingham Library, Birmingham.
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ourselves after the war”.163 He believed that the annexation of colonies was an 
unnecessary humiliation of Germany that would add little if anything to British 
security. To him, the annexation of Germany's colonies could cause a stress on Anglo- 
German relations in post-war period. He felt that a co-operative, friendly Germany was 
necessary for post-war stability in Europe and thus for Britain's safety.164
President Wilson shared Lord Kitchener’s view, but with a different logic and
conclusion. His contempt for annexation stemmed from his belief that the continuous
struggle for balance of power precipitated intense territorial conquests and
consequently the imperfection of the balance of power caused the war. He argued that
power politics should not the guiding principle of state relations. With the American
experience in the Philippines, he believed that colonial powers should act as trustees
until colonial populations were ready for self-government and even independence.165
His famous "Peace Without Victory" address to the United States Senate, on January
22, 1917 became a manifesto in which he first launched his critique of European
imperialism, militarism and balance of power.166 He further remarked that:
"No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not 
recognise and accept the principle that governments 
derived all their powers from the consent of the governed, 
and that no right anywhere exists to hand peoples about 
from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were 
property".167
1 See Secretary's notes of a War Council Meeting, 10 Downing Street, March 10, 
1915, and memorandum by Lewis Harcourt, "The Spoils", March 25, 1915, Asquith 
papers, the Bodleian Library, Oxford University.
64 Gifford and Louis, op cit. p.280.
165 New York Times, October 7, 1913.
166 Knock, Thomas. J. To End All Wars: Woodrow Wilson and the Quest for a New
World Order. (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. ix.
167 The December peace note and the address to the Senate can be found in The Public 
Papers o f Woodrow Wilson, 4, 402-14.
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Wilson declared that "the world [was] against any further annexations". The 
Dominions’ rationale for annexation, he went on, if it was sincerely based on concerns 
for their own security, indicated "a fundamental lack of faith in the League of 
Nations".168
However, the opposing camps, France and the Dominions, especially South Africa and 
Australia subdued Kitchener and Wilson’s voices. For instance, Lloyd George 
expressed that Britain was not interested in annexation in any form. Yet he spoke about 
the concerns of the Dominions as they feared being neighbours to the ex-German 
colonies. Lloyd George told Walter Hines Page, the American Ambassador in London 
that: "Even Great Britain, who wants nothing for herself, will be prevented from 
returning the German colonies. South Africa and Australia will not permit the giving 
back of lands that would make them neighbours to German subjects and give Germany 
secret submarine bases throughout the world".169
Plausibly, Lloyd George's statement suggested that the quest for colonial possessions 
was no longer a major issue in Anglo-German rivalry. Yet the German question had not 
declined on its importance in the overall European politics, especially on Franco- 
German relationship. By contrast to England, France wanted Germany to be smaller on 
all fronts. To the French mind, the war had been about France, and so the peace, 
consequently had to be, too. France alone suffered about six million casualties, which 
was more than the losses of the other Allied and Associated Powers combined.170 More
168 op cit., Knock., p. 211.
169 Walter Hines Page to the Secretary of State, February 11, 1917, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, 1917. Supplement I (Washington, 1931), p. 43-44.
170 Fromklin, David. In Time of the Americans: The Generation That Changed 
America’s Role in the World. (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 224.
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important, Georges Clemenceau was a survivor of the National Assembly that in 1871 
had been forced to accept the punishing peace that Bismarck’s victorious Germany had 
imposed upon a weakened France. The ghosts of 1871 haunted him: time and venue. 
Coincidentally, the declaration of German Reich in 1871 and the opening of the Peace 
Conference fell on the same fateful date of January 18.171 More significantly, it was in 
this same Palace that Germany’s Empire had been proclaimed 48 years previously. 
Now he wanted revenge. Indeed, his aim pursued through the redrawing of the 
frontiers, indemnities and annexations was how to keep Germany from being able to 
harm France again. Clearly, Clemencau’s peace with revenge contrasted with Wilson 
idea of a peace with justice, and without victory. Wilson’s self image of a latter day 
Moses or Joshua: that is as a saviour from dangers past, who would deliver Europe 
from dangers future, was a mile apart from those European leaders, who had 
experienced the war at first hand. For instance, in his attempt to further distance himself 
from the European leaders, Wilson named the charter of the League, a Covenant, 
revealing his Presbyterian background.
As the gulf widened between the non-annexationists and the annexationists, Britain, 
with South Africa’s Smuts in the shadow suggested that the United States should 
acquire the African territories. The United States rejected this proposal. It therefore, put 
Smut’s proposal on the table: a middle approach that would retain the substance but 
remove the opprobrium of "selfish imperialism".172 The idea was that the German 
colonies be placed under some sort of international control. This was a delicate 
balancing act, as it was conceived to satisfy the appetite of the Dominions and yet fulfil
171 See The Independent -London- (The Monday Review) Gazette, January 18,1999, p. 7.
172 Gifford and Louis, op cit., p.291.
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the ideal envisioned by President Wilson. For instance, Knock observed that in order to
avoid fatal rupture in the Council of Ten on the application of the mandate principle:
"Lloyd George and General Smuts hastened to construct a 
detour over which both Wilson and the Dominions might pass.
This could be done, Smuts reasoned, by yielding to Wilson on 
general principle, while differentiating between the character of 
mandated territories according to their stage of development”.173
3.4. The classification of the Mandates
Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations divided the mandates into three 
categories namely: “A”, “B” and “C” respectively. Class ‘A’ Mandates applied to a 
few former Turkish communities including Armenia, Syria Mesopotamia and 
Kurdestan, Palestine and Arabia, whose stage of development warranted their 
provisional recognition as independent states, subject to administrative advice and 
assistance. Class ‘B’ Mandates governed the cases of the bulk of the former German 
colonies, including Central Africa and New Guinea. Here, however, there were some 
restrictions on the Mandatory powers, despite its competence to govern the territory. 
Amongst the restrictions was open trade.
Class ‘C* Mandates were South West Africa and certain South Pacific islands. There 
was no restriction on the right of governance given to the Mandatory Power in this 
category. It was held that these territories could best be administered under the laws of 
the Mandatory State as an integral portion of the territory of the Mandatory, as a sacred 
trust of civilisation. This categorisation was based on crude factors such: population 
density, smallness in size, remoteness from the centres of civilisation, and geographical 
contiguity to the Mandatory State. The Article concluded that in every case of mandate, 
the Mandatory shall render to the League of Nations an annual report in reference to the
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territory committed to its charge. This brought the idea of international responsibility 
into the history of international relations. Dr. William E. Rappard, a professor of 
Harvard University served as the Director of the Mandates Section, under the aegis of 
the Permanent Mandates Commission (PMC). The duty of the Commission was to 
"examine the annual reports of the Mandataries and to advise the Council on all matters 
relating to the observance of the Mandates".174
The political question to be addressed here is who really controlled the Class C 
mandate, despite the establishment of the PMC. It was noted that the Council of the 
League of Nations approved the terms of the mandates and the Mandatory Powers did 
agree to exercise their mandates on behalf of the League. Yet there was no provision 
for a replacement of a mandatory within the Treaty in case of any failure on the part of
17Sthe Mandatory State to carry out the trust it has undertaken. In addition, the power of 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCU), on the reference to it of a dispute 
‘relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate’ did 
not cover revocation. The PMC was given the responsibility of being an accounting 
institution, but it lacked the most effective weapon: the power of revocation. South 
Africa would later seize on this deficiency to strengthen its control over South West 
Africa.
In form, the C-mandates provided for international accountability. Behind this pretence, 
however, lay the hidden interests of the dominant Powers. It could be argued that the
173 Knock, op cit., p. 212.
174 Blakeslee, op cit., p. 114.
175 Lindley, op cit., p. 269.
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League of Nations was used to legitimise what has been concluded among the C-4. For
instance, Miller pointed out the overarching influence of the C-4 with a conclusion that:
"It is least arguable that even without any treaties those 
four powers would have agreed that South West Africa 
should go to South Africa, Mesopotamia to the British and 
so on, a distribution politically logical and also in accord 
with the military situation".176
He argued further that "what the secret treaties did was to prevent the mandates,
particularly in respect of the ’C' mandates, from going any farther toward League of
Nations control of those areas".177 In the main, the Treaty of Versailles was nothing but
an international law of power in which the victor’s interests for punitive sanctions
against the defeated powers was acknowledged, with no chance for the Germans to
participate in its drafting and negotiation. Arguably, and contrary to the original spirit
of the Roman mandatum, it was the Associated Powers such as South Africa that
benefited from the Treaty more than the Allied Powers.
Thus far, the creation of the mandate system was an outcome of political 
considerations. Yet the mandate system, as it subsequently metamorphosed into the 
trusteeship and decolonisation regimes, became a living instrument, which offered the 
prospect of statehood for the colonised peoples. The mandate system may have been 
radical by the standard of the status quo, for it ingrained the ideas of self-determination 
and international accountability into the consciousness of the metropolitan powers. 
What is interesting is how the idea underpinning the mandate system survived to 
influence much of the transfer of power debate. While the mandate system may be the 
lamest of models; it was the best of precedents. It did not stop power politics, but over
176 Miller, David. Hunter. "The Origin of the Mandate System" Foreign Affairs: An 
American Quarterly Review, Vol. VI, No. 2, January 1928, p. 281.
177 ibid.
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the long term it changed the legal framework in which it operated. There was a belief 
on the duty of care to the colonised peoples by the international community. In any 
event, South Africa’s status as a mandatory power remained controversial.
3.5. South Africa and the C-mandate
In chapter two, I examined the beginning of the South Africa’s attempt to incorporate 
South West Africa as a step towards the realisation of Greater South Africa. The war 
galvanised this idea. Indeed, by the time of the Peace Conference in 1919, the 
annexation issue had become an inter-party affair within South African domestic 
politics. To both Botha and Smuts, the leaders of the ruling United Party, the quest of 
annexation was a means for securing political advantage over their main rival, General 
Hertzog. The National Party which, Hertzog led, expressed its anti-British sentiment by 
accusing them of subservience to the Empire.178
The possession of the South West African mandate was of enormous value to Smuts in 
his argument against the nationalist attack. Hertzog, held that dominion status was 
actually subservience. Smuts replied that the dominion's right to govern the mandate, 
and the power of its legislature to enact laws that would also apply in the mandated 
territory carried with them essential connotations of sovereignty. Alongside satisfying 
territorial and security interests, the control of South West Africa was a demonstration 
of Smut’s claims that South Africa was effectively independent, and thus took much of 
the wind out of the Nationalist sails.179 It was therefore not surprising that Botha and 
Smuts were committed in every respect to winning and keeping South West Africa as a
178 Simpson, Maynard. W. "South West Africa in Trust, 1915-1939", in Gifford and 
Louis, op cit., p. 642.
179 The Times, September 13,1919, p. 9.
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bona fide prize of war. For the next seventy years, the South West African issue would 
be a driving force within South African domestic politics. Yet, it was at the 
international level that South Africa benefited most from its mandatory power status. In 
the subsequent chapter, it will be shown how, by engaging with the Western powers, 
the government used the South West African question to offset its pariah status at the 
height of its isolation over its apartheid policies. Our immediate concern here, however, 
is the issue raised by Hertzog: that is the status of South Africa within the family of 
nations.
The question of South Africa’s status in the 1920s is usually discussed in terms of its 
dominion position. Yet it raises wider question, namely which states constitute 
international society. As conventionally represented, international society,180 consists of 
formally recognised independent sovereign states that interact together. On this view 
the legal status of the British Dominions was problematic. The Article 1 of the League 
recognised very explicitly that a Dominion or Colony is not identical with a State. It is 
possible to maintain that the rights of a Dominion within the League are not rights 
under international law in general, but rights given by a distinct instrument by contract 
for certain purposes.181 Oppenheim observed that "after the Great War, the position of 
the British Dominions underwent a fundamental change". Without doubt, he said, 
“their admission to the League of Nations gave them a position in International Law”.
180 Bull, op cit., p. 22-50 for the idea of international society.
181 Article 1 of the Covenant states that: “any fully self-governing State, Dominions or Colony may become a 
member of the League if its admission is agreed to by two-thirds of the Assembly, provided it shall give 
effective guarantees of its sincere intention to observe its international obligations”. For a detail analysis on 
the status of the Dominions in the League, see, Arthur Berriedale Keith, The Dominions as Sovereign 
States: Their Constitutions and Governments, (London: Macmillan, 1938), p. 40-48.
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Nevertheless, he also noted that their position in the Family of Nations ’’defies exact 
definition".182
The controversy surrounding the status of South Africa stemmed from the fact that at 
this time, the imperial government was responsible for the management of its external 
relations. It was not until the passing of the Balfour Declaration of 1926 that the British 
Dominions were given the right to formulate and executive their own foreign 
policies.183 On June 1, 1927, General Hertzog’s government established the South 
African Department of External Relations. Four years later, in 1931, the Statute of 
Westminster conferred full autonomy on Dominions. For South Africa, the Status of the 
Union Act, 1934 was passed.
To consider this line of argument more fully, we need to contest South Africa’s position 
as an autonomous independent action within the context of classical positive 
international law. As noted earlier, the Dominions, including South Africa, were 
implicitly recognised as independent signatories to the Treaty of Versailles by being 
dependent on a major power, Britain. Their membership of League, however, did not 
give them an automatic and immediate recognition by other states as autonomous actors 
in international affairs. Hertzog expressed this fear of non-recognition when he told the 
House of Assembly in 1926 that: "unless our status is acknowledged by foreign nations 
we simply do not exist as a nation".184
182 Oppenheim. L. F. L, International Law: A Treatise Volume 1-Peace, 3rd Edition, 
1920.
183 See South Africa, "Foreign Relations" in Official Yearbook of Republic of South 
Africa, 14th Edition, 1988/89 (Pretoria: Bureau for Information, 1989), p. 201 for a 
detailed analysis
184 Dawson, R. M. The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936. (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 104.
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Opinion continued to be divided on this point. Zimmem argued that the League was an 
answer to the constitutional dilemma over the Dominions' right to autonomous foreign 
policy making, because international relations would only take place within the 
structures of the League Covenant.185 Baker noted that the Dominions' admission to the 
League was "the decisive step in the consolidation and development of their 
international position".186 However, Manning reiterated Oppenheim’s view that the 
membership of the League did not in itself prove that the Dominions were independent 
and sovereign. He argued in 1932 that League membership did not guarantee 
international recognition of the Dominions' sovereign independence.187 From this 
perspective, it could be argued that the United Nations system marked a radical 
departure from League doctrine. Most of the post-Second World independent states 
defined and gained their recognition from other states by being members of the United 
Nations, whereas being a member of the League of Nations had not conferred 
automatic recognition from other states. As the League of Nations and the United 
Nations were governed by different political and legal principles, so also, South Africa 
sought to redefine its mandatory role within the emerging international order of the 
post-Second world war, United Nations.
185 Zimmem, A. The Third British Empire. (London: Oxford University Press, 
1926), p. 65.
186 Baker, Noel. P. J. The Present Juridical Status of the British Dominions 
in International Law. (New York: Longmans Green, 1929), p. 65.
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3.6. South Africa and the Trusteeship regime.
The League of Nations lived for a quarter of a century, 1919-1945.188 The Permanent 
Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, to which the Union reported on the 
administration of its Class -C Mandate, was dissolved in the spring of 1946 at the last 
meeting of the League of Nations Assembly. The United Nations was to replace the 
League of Nations as the organised international community.189 In retrospect, the 
question is why South Africa did not annex South West Africa during the Second 
World War? The answer is conjectural, but some reasons have been proposed. 
According to Vanderbosch, if the South Africa had wanted to annex South West Africa 
the war seemed to offer a good opportunity.190 Hancock also held that had South 
Africa simply annexed the territory during the war "Not a dog would have barked", but 
Smuts's "old fashioned respect for the legal fabric of the Society of Nations restrained 
him".191 Hancock noted that Smuts thought that South Africa needed a seal of 
international recognition.192 To that extent therefore, South Africa thought that the
187 Manning, C. A. W. The Policies of the British Dominions in the League 
of Nations. (London: Oxford University Press, 1932), p. 9.
188 For a comparison between the League of Nations and the United Nations, see 
Fliegers, Serge. "The League Is Dead-Long Live the Charter" Free World Magazine, 
July 1954 as reprinted in the Congressional Record Appendix, 79th Congress, First 
Session, July 11, 1945-October 11, 1945, p. A3446-A3448; as well as Congressional 
Record Vol. 91, Part 6, entitled "The Charter of the United Nations", July 2, 1945- 
Sept., 10, 1945, p. 7941-7994.
189 For a complete official record of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organisation, see Documents of the United Nations Conference on International 
Organisation, Vols. I to XV (London and New York: UN Information Organisation, 
1945).
190 Vanderbosch, op cit., p. 207.
191 Hancock, W. K. Smuts, 2 Vols. (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1962), 
Vol. 2: Fields of Force, 1919-1950, p. 467.
192 ibid. It must be pointed out that Smuts's request for the seal of international 
recognition and his desire to annex South West Africa were irreconcilable. The 
international community would not provide the necessary instrument. Although Smuts 
devised the differentiation of the mandates system, his belief that the international 
community would acquiesce in annexation suggests a partial blindness to the changing
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United Nations would be a necessary vehicle for this seal of international recognition. 
General Smuts, (now a Field Marshall), sought a seal of approval at the United Nations. 
On May 11, 1945, at the Yalta conference, during the discussion concerning the 
provisions of the Charter of the UN relating to the dependent territories, he expressed 
South Africa's desire to incorporate the mandated territory of South West Africa into 
the Union. However, the Chairman ruled the statement of South Africa out of order on 
the ground that specific territorial questions were not under discussion. In any event, at 
the San Francisco Conference, the Fourth Committee as well as the Trusteeship Council 
were established to manage the trusteeship territories.193
A proposal moved by the Egyptian delegation during the first meeting of the Fourth 
Committee seems worth a brief comment at this point. The delegation proposed:
(1) that the General Assembly should have the power to terminate the status of 
trusteeship of a territory and declare the territory to be fit for full independence; and (2) 
that whenever an Administering Authority violated the term of trusteeship, or ceased to 
be a Member of the United Nations, the organisation should transfer the territory under 
trusteeship to another Administering Authority. These proposals, however, were not 
adopted.194 In retrospect, the power to terminate the status of trusteeship would have 
redressed the shortcoming bequeathed by the League of Nations. The rejection of these 
Egyptian proposals consequently limited the authority of the United Nations on the 
trusteeship question. And, as we shall see, South Africa would later question the 
competence of General Assembly on method of trusteeship.
nature of the international order. And for Smuts to achieve such a feat would have 
ignored the sensitivities of the international community.
United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1946-47. (New York, UN 
Department of Public Information, 1947), p. 31.
194 ibid., p. 31.
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The United Nations had two parts of its first session in London and New York 
respectively.195 On January 17, 1946 during the London session, Neaton Nicholls (the 
Union High Commissioner in London) and a member of the South Africa delegation 
opened the campaign for the annexation of South West Africa.196 Following him, Prime 
Minister Smuts said that: “due to the political contiguity of South West Africa and its 
peoples’ ethnologic kinship with the rest of the Union, South Africa was legitimately 
concerned in seeing the annexation of the Territory. On the basis of a consultation 
exercise conducted in the Territory by referendum, the Legislative Assembly had 
requested the incorporation".197 The results were mis-leading as the 18-member 
Legislative Assembly consisted only of Europeans, while the blacks who constituted 
85% of the Territory’s population were disenfranchised.198
On December 14, 1946, the General Assembly rejected South Africa’s request to annex 
South West Africa. It recommended that the Territory should be placed under the 
international trusteeship system. South Africa was invited to propose a trusteeship 
agreement for the Territory in conformity with Articles 77 and 79 of the Charter. On 
July 23, 1947, South Africa replied that it had abandoned the incorporation project, but 
could not place it under international trusteeship. It maintained that it did not consider 
itself to be under any legal obligation to propose a trusteeship agreement, but continued 
administering the Territory in the spirit of the existing mandate. Nevertheless, it would
195 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-48. (New York: UN Dept, 
of Public Information, 1948), p. 10.
196 Ibid., p. 188-93. United Nations, General Assembly, 1st Session, 17 January, 1946.
197 Ibid., p. 199-235, 235-55. UNGAOR, 1st Session. Part II, Fourth Committee, Pt. 
Annex 13.
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transmit an annual report on its administration as required under Article 73e of the 
Charter. South Africa further argued that since the League was no longer in existence, 
the United Nations, could not have any jurisdiction over South West Africa. The 
argument that the UN was not the legal heir of the League is not valid. The UN was, in 
form, a revised version of the League. With the exception of the veto power of the 
permanent members of the Security Council, which departed from the unanimity rule of 
the League, where every member had a veto, the principal organs of the two bodies 
were very similar. As Calvocoressi succinctly put it: “the framers of the UN aimed, not 
to devise a new kind of organisation, but to retain a familiar framework and insert into 
it more effective machinery for the prevention of war”.199 More significantly, in 1942 
South Africa was amongst the first 21 signatories of the Atlantic Charter that agreed to 
create a general international organisation to replace the League at the end of the war.
In response to South Africa’s decision, on September 23, 1947, the General Assembly 
referred the question of the future status of South West Africa to the Fourth Committee. 
In the Committee discussion, France, Mexico, United Kingdom, United States and 
Venezuela expressed satisfaction that South Africa had not incorporated South West 
Africa. France, United Kingdom and United States declared that they saw no reason to 
condemn South Africa, but the Soviet Union interpreted South Africa's action 
differently. Her representative argued that measures such as the invitation to the 
territory to participate in South Africa’s Parliament, signified de facto annexation. The 
ensuing debate in the General Assembly revealed the difference of opinion between
198 The results of the elections were as follow: 208,580 in favour of annexation, 33,520 
opposed the annexation, and 59,790 could not be consulted. See, Yearbook of the United 
Nations, 1947-48. ibid, p. 10.
199 Calvocoressi, Peter. World Politics Since 1945. ((London: Longman, 7the Edition, 
1997), p. 146.
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East and West, a difference that hardened with the onset of the Cold War. The impact 
of the Cold War on the South West Africa is the main theme of the next chapter.
There was another conundrum. The ensuing debate on South West Africa revealed the 
attitudes of many states on the divorce between moral force and legal considerations. 
Liberia, the Latin American and most of the Eastern bloc states argued that South 
Africa had both a moral and a legal obligation to submit a Trusteeship Agreement. 
They stated that the provisions of Chapter XII of the Charter were obligatory with 
respect to former Mandated territories. On the other side, the United Kingdom, United 
States, Austria, Belgium, Denmark Canada and Netherlands believed that there was no 
legal obligation to submit a Trusteeship Agreement for a Mandated Territory. They 
held that Article 77 (2), was permissive and not mandatory.200 Britain specifically 
argued that the South African Government was fully entitled to adopt the attitude it had 
taken. France and United States, however, maintained that while there was no legal 
obligation, there was a strong moral obligation for the South African Government to 
submit a Trusteeship Agreement. They stressed that a recommendation of the General 
Assembly had a moral power, and expressed the hope that the moral force reflected in 
the General Assembly's resolution 65 (1) of December 14, 1946, would prevail.
The attitudes of these states to self-determination reflected the nature of their relations 
with South Africa, also determined where they drew the line between moral force and 
legal consideration. Given her historic, maternal relationship and economic interests, it 
was difficult for Britain to pull the plug on South Africa. The United States’ emphasis
200 Article 77 (2) states that: “it will be a matter for subsequent as to which territories in 
the foregoing categories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what 
terms”.
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on moral force underscored its Wilsonian sensibilities. Liberia and Ethiopia, the Latin 
American states and India all took the high moral and legal ground in demonstration of 
their fear of injustice in international relations, having once being colonised territories. 
Yet they were also interested raising their own profile as active players on international 
arena, and the issue at stake provided an opportunity.
True to the letter of the old order, but in aversion to the new, South Africa submitted an 
annual report of her administration of South West Africa to the Trusteeship Council in 
July 1948. However, the government argued that South Africa had submitted the report 
on a purely voluntary basis, for the purposes of information only. And on the 
understanding that the United Nations had no supervisory jurisdiction over the Territory 
of South West Africa and that the forwarding of information should not be construed as 
a commitment for the future. Subsequently, in November 1948, South Africa proposed 
to the Fourth Committee a “closer association and integration* of South West Africa in 
the Union. It would be effected by representation of South West Africa in the Union 
Parliament: six members in the House of Assembly and two representatives in the 
Senate”.201
The submission in itself raised another problem for South Africa and the Trusteeship 
Council. It suggested that South Africa had recognised the competence of the 
Trusteeship Council by default, and by implication, the authority of the United Nations, 
despite its denial that this was the case. On the other hand, the Trusteeship Council had 
no standard operating procedure for dealing with the submission. Its final discussion
201 See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948-49, (New York: UN Department of 
Public Information, 1949), p. 864- 865, for a discussion on the 76th to 84th meetings of 
the Fourth Committee.
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not only portrayed the absence of clarity, but also indicated the limit of the institution’s
ability to influence the behaviour of states. For instance, in his opening speech to the
Council, the Chinese representative proposed that "in accordance with the resolution of
the General Assembly, this Council should undertake to examine the report in the same
manner as it would examine a report from a Trust Territory". This proposal met with
reservations from the representatives of Australia and France, while representatives of
Iraq, Belgium, Mexico and New Zealand supported it. After an intense debate, the
Council agreed to the Belgian proposal. It is important to quote at length the proposal
made by Mr. Ryckmans of Belgium:
[I] do not think it advisable to tell the representative of the 
Union of South Africa that the Trusteeship Council will 
examine the report submitted by the Union Government as if 
it were a report from a Power administering a Trust Territory.
This is a controversial question. We shall in fact examine this 
report as we examine any other, but in principle we should 
consider it in the same way as it would have been considered 
by the Permanent Mandates Commission. There is, however, 
no need to mention this. It is sufficient to say that the 
Trusteeship Council will, as authorised by the General 
Assembly, examine the Union of South Africa's report on the 
Territory of South West Africa on a given date. It is also 
unnecessary to state that the report will be dealt with in the 
same way as a report on a Trust Territory. Should we do so, 
we might receive the reply: "This report must not be 
examined as a report on a Trust Territory but as one on a 
mandated territory". I therefore think it is unnecessary to 
specify this {to South Africa)".202
There was deadlock between South Africa and the United Nations in 1949. In a letter 
dated 11 July 1949, South Africa noted that the United Nations was using South West 
Africa to criticise its domestic policies. It accused the Tmsteeship Council of behaving 
as a 'government in exile' for the peoples of South West Africa by deliberating on its
202. United Nations, "General Assembly Resolution 141 (II) of 1 November 1947 
regarding the question of South West Africa", Trusteeship Council Official Records-
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internal matters. Consequently, South Africa informed the United Nations that it would 
furnish no further report on the territory. From a preliminary analysis, South Africa’s 
charge of the Trusteeship Council as ‘government in exile’ was premature. In the light 
of subsequent structures and institutions created by the United Nations to wean South 
West Africa from South Africa, it may not, have been technically correct to criticise the 
Trusteeship Council on this score. In the next section, we shall examine some of these 
United Nations organs and structures with state-like competencies, or at least 
aspirations?
The immediate question is why South Africa adopted this new position? Some 
observers have claimed that South Africa’s change of heart was due to the strong 
position taken by the new hard-line National Party government under the leadership of 
Dr. Malan.203 But, there were no signs that the previous United Party administration 
had been ready to take a soft approach-leading political elites in South Africa believed 
in the policy of integration, irrespective of their political affiliation.
3.7. The 1950 and the 1955 Advisory Opinions.
The UN General Assembly feared the ramifications of South Africa’s refusal to 
recognise the authority of the UN Trusteeship Council. It effectively challenged the 
legitimacy of the world body. It also called into questioning its competence to secure 
self-determination for the colonised peoples. In December 1949, the United Nations 
therefore, requested an advisory (i.e. non-binding) opinion from the International Court 
of Justice on the international status of the Territory of South West Africa, and the
Second Session: First Part-From the first meeting, 20 November 1947, (New York: 
Lake Success, 1947), p. 120-133.
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international obligations of South Africa arising therefrom.204 Seven months later, on 
July 11, 1950 the Court gave its opinion,205 rejecting South Africa’s argument that the 
Mandate had lapsed with the demise of the League, but declaring that the Mandates 
were to continue until ‘other arrangements’ were established. The Court then, 
transferred the supervisory role of the Mandate to the General Assembly, and observed 
that South Africa alone could not modify the status of the Territory without the consent 
of the United Nations. Finally, with regard to the applicability of Chapter XU of the 
Charter, the Court held by a vote of 8 to 6 that the Charter did not impose upon the 
Union of South Africa the legal obligation to place South West Africa under the 
International Trusteeship System.206 This was a convoluted opinion.
Its ambiguity led to multiple interpretations by both South Africa and the United 
Nations.207 The opinion denied South Africa the opportunity to annex the Territory, but 
it made it impossible for the United Nations to assert a complete authority over it, 
having ruled that the Trusteeship System was not applicable to South Africa.
203 See, for example, Ballinger, Ronald. B. South West Africa: The Case against the 
Union. (Johannesburg: South African Institute of Race Relations, 1961), p. 18-22.
204 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950 (New York: Department of 
Public Information, 1950), p. 807.
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International Court of Justice, Reports of Judgements, Advisory Opinions and 
Orders. International Status of South West Africa. Advisory Opinion of July 11th, 
1950. (Netherlands: ICJ, 1950).
206 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, ibid, p. 810.
207 The Court's decision that the Union of South Africa was under no legal obligation to 
place South West Africa under International Trusteeship System and that the General 
Assembly was legally qualified to exercise supervisory function exercised by the 
League with regard to the administration of the Territory suggests a contradictory 
posture. The Trusteeship Council had been established to supervise and control the 
Mandated territories, and to transfer such authority to the General Assembly as the 
Court's decision portends to do looks irreconcilable.
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Predictably, South Africa rejected the Court’s opinion. For the United Nations, there 
was the dilemma of how to implement this convoluted opinion. The Fourth Committee 
passed three drafts for a standard procedure of implementation. The first draft 
(A/C.4/L.116/Rev. 1) implicitly rejected the ruling and called for the establishment of a 
ten-man expert Commission for South West Africa. The second draft (A/C.4L.121) 
called for the establishment of a ten-man expert ad hoc committee. The third draft 
resolution (A/C.4/L. 124/Rev. 1) called upon the General Assembly to accept and 
endorse the advisory opinion of the Court. It also called for the establishment of a 
committee, composed of the President of the Trusteeship Council, the Chairman of the 
Fourth Committee and the Chairman of the interim Committee to confer with the Union 
of South Africa on the implementation of the advisory opinion. Finally, with 
Resolution 449 (V) of 1950, the Assembly established a five-member Committee to 
confer with South Africa concerning the procedural measures necessary for 
implementing the Court's opinion, and to report to the Assembly's sixth session. This 
five-member Committee consisted of the representative of Denmark, Syria, Thailand, 
the United States and Uruguay.
The creation of the Ad hoc Committee on South West Africa marked an important 
juncture in the functions of the United Nations. It marked the process of creating a 
series of multiple institutions and structures by the United Nations to replace South 
African rule. These institutions and structures were often given executive capacity to 
wrestle control from South Africa. More importantly, they were stateless structures 
created to act as a midwife for a state waiting to be bom. This process was a converse 
of Jackson’s quasi-state thesis. In this case the state was not dependent on its
208 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1950, op cit., p.816.
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membership of international organisations to justify its existence, it was the 
international organisation, which was helping the state to come into existence. The UN 
was now defining the menu, and creating the agent of statehood.
3.8. The Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa
The Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa held 15 meetings with the South African 
government between 6 March 1951 and 17 October 1951. The most significant 
outcome of these meetings was South Africa’s proposal to negotiate a new international 
instrument with France, the United Kingdom and the United States- the three remaining 
members of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers of the First World War. South 
Africa maintained that the proposal was made not because the Union Government had 
any legal obligations towards these Powers but because they had been connected with 
the original Mandate for South West Africa. If these three Powers were willing to 
become "the other party" to a new contractual agreement, the United Nations would 
then call upon them to negotiate the instrument and the Union of South Africa would be 
directly responsible to them and not the United Nations.209 To South Africa, the three 
Powers would act as principal and not as agents. It seems clear that South Africa 
believed that she could achieve her aim on South West Africa by relying on the support 
of these Powers. In this way, South Africa would use the most powerful and respected 
group within the Security Council to undermine the authority of the United Nations. It 
is of some interest therefore that twenty-six years later, the same trio of France, the 
United Kingdom and the United States would form the core of the Contact Group that
209 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951. (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1951), p. 631.
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in 1978 negotiated Resolution 435, which set up a mechanism for South African 
withdrawal from Namibia.210
The Ad Hoc Committee rejected South Africa’s proposal of negotiating a new 
international instrument. It said that it could not accept any proposal which did not give 
adequate effect to the principle of international accountability and which did not allow 
for a full implementation of the Court's advisory opinion, or undermined the United 
Nations' authority and competence. Instead, the Ad Hoc Committee resurrected the 
League’s formula. It proposed that the General Assembly should establish a fifteen- 
member Committee on South West Africa, to include the Union of South Africa to 
undertake the functions and responsibilities akin to those of the former Permanent 
Mandates Commission. South Africa and the Eastern bloc states rejected this proposal 
for different reasons. South Africa did not want any power sharing formula. The 
Eastern bloc states felt that the new Committee would serve no useful purpose, but 
become a mere 'reconstruction of the Ad Hoc Committee.211 They called for an 
immediate termination of South Africa's Mandate and its re-placement with the 
International Trusteeship System demonstrated another difference of opinion between 
East and West.
From the Ad hoc Committee, the South West African question was now transferred 
back to the Fourth Committee. Yet South Africa’s relationship with the Fourth 
Committee was equally cold. For instance, at its 361st and 362nd plenary meeting 
between 18-19 January, 1952 South Africa argued that the Committee had acted
210 See Chapter Five for a detail analysis of the dynamics of the Contact Group diplomacy 
on Namibia.
211 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1951, ibid., p. 631.
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unconstitutionally, unwisely and improperly by adopting a draft resolution which 
permitted oral hearings from certain Herero chiefs and from the Rev Michael Scot, a 
nationalist cleric. South Africa intimated that its delegation would not take part in any 
vote on the draft resolution submitted by the Committee on this item.
At this point, Uruguay described the South West Africa question as a struggle between 
a Member State that refused to fulfil its international obligations and the great majority 
of the General Assembly which, wished to enforce respect for international 
undertakings and defend weak peoples and human rights.212 Yet, there was no 
coherence on how the international community condemned South Africa. For instance, 
United Kingdom and Belgium reiterated that South Africa was not legally obliged to 
place South West Africa with the Trusteeship Council as the Court had declared. On the 
other hand, Philippines, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt and India, maintained that South Africa
should conclude a Trusteeship Agreement with the United Nations as soon as
01 ^possible. With so much diversity of opinion, South Africa had plenty of scope for 
non-compliance.
3.9. Committee on South West Africa
Following three years of unproductive negotiation, the Committee on South West 
Africa (hereafter CSWA) was set up at the eighth session of the General Assembly in 
November 1953 with new terms of reference. The Committee was composed of Brazil, 
Mexico, Norway, Pakistan, Syria, Thailand and Uruguay. 214 It was given formal and 
extended functions. These included: (1) to examine reports and petitions concerning
212 ibid., p. 643
213 ibid., p. 641. (Five-power resolution: A/C.4/L.157).
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South West Africa; (2) to report to the Assembly on conditions in the Territory; and (3)
to enter into negotiation with the Union of South Africa in order to implement fully the
Court's advisory opinion. As with its predecessor, South Africa maintained an arms
length relationship with the CSWA. It reiterated that it had never recognised any
obligation to submit the South West Africa report to any international body since the
demise of the League of the Nations. In its first report, the CSWA rebuked South Africa
concerning the political status of the native inhabitants, who were excluded on the
political and economic spheres. It concluded that:
"After 35 years of administration under the Mandate System 
the native inhabitants are still not participating in the political 
development of the Territory, that their participation in the 
economic development is restricted to that of labourers, and 
that the social and educational services for their benefit are far 
from satisfactory".215
The CSWA also tried to raise the stake with South Africa by calling for the adoption of 
the 'Special Rule F. This stipulated that: "decisions of the General Assembly on 
questions relating to reports and petitions concerning the Territory of South West 
Africa shall be regarded as important questions within the meaning of Article 18, 
paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations".216 In effect, Article 18 (2) of the 
Charter would raise the South West African question to an important question before 
the General Assembly, and then upgraded it to one that threatened international peace 
and security.217 Meanwhile, this clause requires a two-third before it could be passed.
214 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1954. (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1954), p. 24.
215 Ibid, p. 325.
216 Ibid., p. 325.
217 Article 18 paragraph of the United Nations Charter provides that: "Decisions of the 
General Assembly on important questions shall be made by a two-thirds majority of the 
members present and voting. These questions shall include: recommendations with 
respect to the maintenance of international peace and security, ...the questions relating 
to the operation of the trusteeship system, and budgetary questions.
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The CSWA felt disappointed when the clause failed to achieve the required two-third- 
majority vote. The vote was 13 in favour, 8 against and 29 abstentions. Consequently a 
request for a second advisory opinion from the Court on the voting procedure was 
sought. The contentious issue was what constituted a two-thirds majority? Was it a two- 
thirds majority of the General Assembly membership, or of those in attendance during 
the South West Africa debate. The Court ruled on June 7, 1955, that issues on South 
West Africa should be regarded as important questions within the meaning of Article 
18, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and should therefore be made by a two-thirds majority 
of the Members present and voting.218 Yet those states which had voted against the 
preambular clause were unconvinced. It was not until six years later with the adoption 
of Resolution 1596 (XV) of 7 April 1961, that the General Assembly confirmed that 
South West Africa constituted a potential threat to international peace and security.
The UN’s main liability was its long-term asset. It had the opportunity to accuse South 
Africa of breaking different norms of international arrangements. For instance, in early 
1956, the CSWA claimed that South Africa's treatment of the native inhabitants of 
South West Africa constituted a breach of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
The CSWA’s invocation of this international instrument on behalf of the peoples of 
South West Africa coincided with India’s calling attention of the world body to the 
treatment of the Indian descents living in South Africa. As a result, on November 1956, 
South Africa withdrew from the Fourth Committee on the basis that the Assembly's 
was considering questions outside its remit on South West Africa.219
218 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955. (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1955), p. 265.
219 The treatment of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa and the 
question of race conflict in the Union of South Africa were the questions that made 
South Africa to pull out of the Fourth Committee. These two issues were championed
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In order to restrict South Africa’s stratagem, the General Assembly again sought the 
Court's advice on hearing of the petitioners from the Territory.220 When South Africa 
refused to co-operate further with the United Nations, the petitioners were personally 
invited to New York. This was a departure from the League practice and the 1950 
Court opinion, which indicated that the UN supervision should not exceed that 
exercised by the League and that the same procedures should be followed as far as 
possible. By a vote of 8 to 5 the Court held that the CSWA might properly grant oral 
hearing to the petitioners. The significance of the Court’s ruling as reported in its own 
report was that the judges were influenced by the "practical considerations arising out 
of the lack of co-operation by the Mandatory".221 This arguably broke the barrier 
between political and juridical reasoning. Based on this opinion, on December 7, 1956, 
the Fourth Committee granted the request of the Rev Michael Scott and Mr. Mburumba 
Kerina Getzen for permission to make a statement before the Committee. Their 
statements were forwarded to the CSWA for study and consideration.
3.10. Good Offices Committee on South West Africa
The UN did not rest on its resolve to take South Africa head on. It was ready to explore 
all options contained within the Charter to take control of South West Africa. Yet like 
most bureaucratic institutions, it favoured an incrementalist option. Accordingly, on 
October 25, 1957, it expanded the membership of the CSWA from seven to nine and 
established a three-nation Good Offices Committee (hereafter GOC). The first African
by the Indian delegation to the UN General Assembly. For details, see Chapter X of 
the Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956, (New York: UN Department of Public 
Information, 1956).
220 Landis, Elizabeth. S. "South West Africa in the International Court: Act II, Scene 1", 
Cornell Law Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 2, winter 1964., p. 191.
221 International Court of Justice, ICJ Report 23, 25 (Advisory Opinion), SWA 
Petitioner 31. (Netherlands: ICJ, 1956).
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representative, Ethiopia was included in the CSWA as was Finland, the United States 
replaced Norway, while the other six old memberships were retained.222 The GOC 
consisted of the United Kingdom, the United States and Brazil. Its remit included 
holding talks with the South African Government on a satisfactory definition of the 
status of the Territory, and the establishment of a working international arrangement 
between the United Nations and South Africa in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations.
In political terms, the GOC marked a fundamental departure. It was hoped that the 
United States and Britain would play a leading and positive role in negotiation with 
South Africa. It is important to point out that contrary to Kerina’s suggestion that the 
inclusion of the United States in both the CSWA and the GOC has some Cold War 
undertones,223 that Europe was then the main theatre of the contest between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, and that African issues were not yet prominent within 
Cold War politics. Neither West nor East interpreted their difference of opinion on the 
issue in zero-sum terms. Far from the Cold War imperatives, the inclusion of the United 
States as well as the United Kingdom was intended to secure the co-operation of South 
Africa. To recap, on October 17, 1951, South Africa had proposed to negotiate a new 
instrument with France, United States and the United Kingdom in the course on 
negotiation with the first Ad hoc Committee on South West Africa.224
222 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1956 (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1956), p. 309.
223 Kerina, Mburumba. "South West Africa and the United Nations", Africa South. 
Vol. 3., No. 1., Oct.-Dec., 1958. p. 15.
224 See footnote 209.
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Be that as it may, South Africa went into discussions with the GOC and neglected the 
CSWA. They had two meeting between May and June 1958 in London and Pretoria. 
South Africa made two proposals. It reiterated its intention to negotiate a new 
instrument with the remaining three Allied and Associated Powers. It also proposed to 
partition the Territory, administering the northern portion containing the Bantu 
population, as an integral part of South Africa under a trusteeship agreement with the 
United Nations, with the rest being annexed to South Africa.
The GOC was quiet on the first proposal, but expressed the opinion that some form of 
partitioning could provide a basis for agreement. It implored South Africa to consider 
the practicability of such a partitioning. It must be said, however, that when South 
Africa had earlier put forward this idea in 1953, it was vehemently opposed by the 
General Assembly. Neither of the two proposals was agreed: the General Assembly 
regarded partition as an endorsement of apartheid. South Africa only wanted to annex 
the richer southern part of the Territory, and exclude the black majority, who would 
now live in the administered territory and be denied access to the Territory’s rich 
resources. Partitioning would also have been a breach on the principle of territorial 
integrity.225 It would also damage the United Nations’s credibility and amount to a 
repudiation of responsibility. As Dugard put it, “the Principal and Allied Powers in 
1920 placed South West Africa under international tutelage in order to erase the legacy 
of racial dominance and brutality perpetuated by the Germans during the colonial
225 For a concise analysis of the Good Offices Committee Report to the General 
Assembly's Fourth Committee, see United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 
1958. (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1958), p. 312. Criticisms and 
critiques of the Good Offices Committee visit to South West Africa are well treated of 
in the Editorial Analysis and Comment of Africa South, Vol. 3., No. 1., Oct.-Dec 1958 
under the caption "The Pattern of Betrayal", (p. 1-5).
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period; hence acquiescence to South Africa's proposal would ultimately defeat this
0 0  fi'humanitarian' objective.
South Africa's attempt to ride on the back of some its ‘trusted’ members of the GOC 
was shattered by the General Assembly. For a while, it put on hold a discussion with 
the GOC. Perhaps, working with the belief that it could gamer the support of the United 
States and United Kingdom, it renewed discussions on all possibilities with the GOC in 
September 1959.227 This marked a moderate departure from South Africa's thirteen- 
year-old non-recognition of the United Nations authority and competence on the South 
West Africa question.
All mandatory territories other than South West Africa had been under the International 
Tmsteeship System, including those under the control of the Great Powers such as 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States.228 If the Great Powers could place 
their Trust territories under the International Tmsteeship System, why had South Africa 
refused to act in the same manner? We might attribute South Africa’s apparent change 
of position partly to the demand for economic sanctions against South Africa, partly to 
linking of the South West African question to the apartheid issues, and partly to the 
evidence of a new flexibility at UN. For the first time, the United Nations gave South 
Africa a choice on which of its agencies to negotiate with. Thus, in Resolution 1360
226 Dugard, John, (ed.), The South West Africa/ Namibia Dispute: Documents and 
Scholarly Writings on the Controversy between South Africa and the United 
Nations. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), p. 26.
227 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1959. (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1959), p. 323.
228 By 1959, there were 10 Trust Territories that continued to be administered under the 
International Tmsteeship System. Those held by the Great Powers are listed below 
together with the Administering Authority of each Territory. United Kingdom-
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(XIV) of November 17, 1959, the General Assembly invited the South African 
Government to enter into negotiation with either the CSWA or the GOC or any other 
committee appointed by the Assembly, with a view to placing the Mandated Territory 
under the International Trusteeship System. Yet South Africa selected to discuss with 
the uncompromising CSWA rather than the GOC. The discussions immediately broke 
down.229 In a serpentine manner, the newly independent African countries such as 
Ghana and Egypt seized upon the situation to call for robust action against South 
Africa. As the number of independent African countries multiplied in the early 1960s, 
the contour of the South West African question was altered.
3.11. The United Nations' coercive resolutions against South Africa
Prior to the entry of the newly independent African states, the United Nations aimed to 
secure a solution through soft resolutions, persuasions and compromises. The strategies 
were primarily legalistic. Overnight, the African states became a bloc working as a 
giant pressure group pursuing the eradication of colonialism. At the 15th General 
Assembly in 1960, seventeen states joined, fifteen of them were from Africa. Their 
inclusion as members of the organised international community affected the 
composition and orientation of the UN. To them, UN was a forum in which to vent 
their anger against South Africa, which was seen as a pseudo-colonial overlord. 
However, their constant stalking of South Africa on the self-determination and 
apartheid issues put a wedge between them and the Western powers. The Soviet Union 
became their natural ally in accusing the West of being duplicitous in their views on
Tanganyika and the Cameroons; France-the Cameroons and the Togoland, the United 
States—Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands as a strategic area.
229 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960. (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1960), p. 491; and The United Nations Review, 
Vol. 6, No. 6, December 1959, p. 64-69.
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apartheid and the self-determination. Yet there was an element of dis-ingenuity in their 
criticisms of the West. They were potential free riders of the stability guaranteed by the 
Western powers, despite their formal non-alignment. The South West Africa was a 
convenient platform on which to advance their own political agenda within the 
international arena. Their entry would also influence the management of the 
international system, and heighten the organisational problems of the United Nations. 
Old issues became defined in a new way and exerted an influence on real political 
struggles. The increase in size made the UN less homogenous, more fictionalised. It 
reduced the capacity for concerted action as global issues were shaped by bloc interests 
and priorities. Since our concern here is on the South West African question, we need 
to examine their role on the issue.
To a great extent, South Africa’s strong-arm tactics against its opponents were a Greek 
gift to the African states. The infamous Sharpeville incident of March 1960 provided 
tangible evidence of the oppression suffered by South African blacks. One African 
proverb says: "If a snake can eat its own offspring, what then can it not do to other 
animals' o ffsp r in g Sharpeville was interpreted as a warning of what South Africa, a 
guardian, could be expected to do in South West Africa. Although the UN remained 
committed to a resolution within the confines of a legal order; it was ready to 
‘outsource’ the solution by ‘delegating responsibility to qualified member-states’. Thus, 
under Resolution 1361 of November 17, 1959, the General Assembly ‘invited’ 
qualified states to take legal action against South Africa in the Court.230 In a strict 
sense, only the signatories of the League of Nations met this requirement. Thus, Liberia 
and Ethiopia were the only African states that qualified. However, before taking on
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this burden, they sought the endorsement of other African states at the Second 
Conference of Independent African States at Addis Ababa, held in June 1960. Before 
we examine their case against South Africa, it is important to see how most of the new 
states of Africa reacted to the South West African question.
Ghana and Nigeria were the most vocal. The representative of Ghana informed the 
General Assembly that the Ghanaian President had proposed on September 23, 1960 
that South African government should be asked to surrender the Mandate to the United 
Nations. He also recommended that a committee of the independent African states 
should administer the Territory, on behalf of the United Nations, under the International 
Trusteeship System. He further suggested that should South Africa fail to accept the 
proposal, the General Assembly should terminate the Mandate at its next session (16th 
Session), and designate the African states as the Administering Authority.231 Perhaps, 
Ghana did not know that Egypt had made a similar proposal back at the San Francisco 
in 1945. This idea that a committee of the independent African states should take over 
the Territory reflected the overbearing self-importance of these new comers. Nigeria 
was even more egotistical. Nigeria served notice on South Africa that the issue had 
passed beyond the stage of legal dispute. It warned that it would use all necessary 
means to bring about a restoration of basic rights and human dignity to the people of 
South West Africa. Paradoxically, seventeen years later, in 1977, Nigeria joined five 
other southern African front line States, and the five Western powers, to secure a 
solution.
230 UN General Assembly Resolution 1361 (17 Nov. 1959), United Nations. Yearbook 
of the United Nations, 1960.
231 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, ibid., p. 492.
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The tension between South Africa and the UN reached a near crisis point in mid-1961. 
Resolution 1568 (XV) of 18 December 1960 gave the CSWA the power to conduct on- 
the-spot assessment of the prevailing socio-economic and political conditions of the 
people. South Africa refused to grant the CSWA a visa to visit the Territory. The 
CSWA however, was determined to carry out its mission with or without South African 
consent. It also planned to visit the neighbouring states of Southern Rhodesia, and 
Bechuanaland, under the British control, and Portuguese Angola. London’s eleventh 
hour withdrawal of visa facilities previously granted to the CSWA frustrated its plan to 
visit the neighbouring countries. The Committee’s chairman, Mr. Fabregat of Uruguay 
later called this ‘the most excruciating experience of the mission’. This action taken by 
the British government suggested that South Africa was under a protective shield of a 
great power, despite the rhetoric of anti-colonialism. Yet the CSWA was determined to 
enter the Territory by any means. And in a letter dated 7 July 1961, the South African 
Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that: "if members of the Committee and or other 
members of its party should attempt illegally to cross the South West African border", 
his Government would "however reluctantly, be obliged to prevent such attempt".232 He 
maintained further that an attempt by a Committee of the United Nations to enter the 
Territory after visas had been refused "would involve the United Nations in an act of 
aggression".233
The CSWA, therefore concluded that the lives of the indigenous peoples and the 
security of South West Africa could not be guaranteed without any strong measure 
within the purview of the UN Charter. Accordingly, it called for an immediate removal
232 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1961. (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1961), p. 457.
233 .ibid., p. 457.
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of South Africa from South West Africa, with effective and simultaneous transfer of 
power to the United Nations or to the indigenous inhabitants, either through the CSWA 
or through a UN Special Committee of Assistance to South West Africa.234 It called for 
the establishment of a Special Committee of Seven (hereafter the Special Committee) 
to undertake this Herculean task.
3.12. The Special Committee of Seven
The significance of the Special Committee was that it was instructed to work towards 
the goal of implementing Resolution 1415 (XV) of 1960, which focused exclusively on 
granting independence to colonial countries and peoples irrespective of their political, 
economic and social developments. For the first time, the UN was no more interested 
on the process of trusteeship regime, but on formal decolonisation.
However, South Africa granted only two of 17-member Special Committee the
opportunity of a working visit to the Territory. The Special Committee's
recommendation was more robust than its predecessor’s. The Chairman and Vice-
Chairman stated that:
"Short of the use of force or other compulsive measures within 
the purview of the Charter, there seemed to be no way of 
implementing Resolution 1702 (XVI) of 19 December, 1960, or 
of solving the question in a way which would be acceptable to 
South Africa, other than the virtual or outright annexation of the 
Mandated Territory by South Africa".235
234 For the CSWA detailed recommendation, see, op cit., p. 458.
235 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962. (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1962), p. 440.
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It also recommended the imposition of sanctions or employing other means to enforce 
compliance with its decisions or resolutions. It is tempting to be sympathetic to Ruth 
First’s argument that that the Special Committee- the fourth of such committees to have 
been set up in ten years- should not have been established at all, for it was a means of 
circumventing the whole trusteeship system.237 The UN however, is a bureaucratic 
organisation that thrives on multiplication of institutions.
Meanwhile, South Africa was irked at the Special Committee’s recommendations. Not 
surprisingly, it resorted to blackmail. It alleged that the Committee’s Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman had signed a communique, after visiting South West Africa, where they 
admitted that they had found no basis for the most serious charges levelled against 
South Africa, i. e. threat to international peace and security, territorial militarization and 
a gradual extermination of the population.238 Mr. Carpio and Dr. de Alva later 
questioned the authenticity of this communique. The significance of the Carpio-de Alva 
mission was that it indicated a toughening of the UN’s position against South Africa. It 
provided the background in which the Liberian and Ethiopian case against South Africa 
took place.
236 ibid., p. 440.
237 First, Ruth. South West Africa. (Middlesex, Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1963), 
p. 193.
2 8 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1962, op cit., p. 440. Mr. Carpio 
of the Philippines and Dr. de Alva of Mexico were the Committee's Chairman and 
Vice-Chairman respectively. Their mission to South West Africa was known as the 
Caprio-de Alva mission.
127
3.13. Ethiopia and Liberia V. South Africa
In October 1960, Liberia and Ethiopia (hereafter the applicants) instituted a legal action 
against South Africa based on the GA Resolution 1361.239 Legal scholarship has paid 
much attention to the jurisprudence of the case.240 Indeed, according to one author, 
Marinus Wiechers, the South West Africa case suffered from verbal indigestion due to 
the proliferation of articles and reviews,241 which made it doubtful whether another 
article on the legal aspects of the case could elucidate anything'.242
Wiecher's criticism reminds us of the necessity of broadening our understanding of the 
South West Africa case beyond the legalistic frame. It is important to examine the 
political and international contexts in which the case arose. On the one hand, the post­
war international political environment impacted on the effectiveness (or otherwise) of 
international law on decolonization issues, on the other hand, international law, exerted 
real influence on political struggles, especially over self-determination. The General 
Assembly’s decision to invite ‘legally qualified states’ to bring an action against South 
Africa raises further questions: (1) why should the General Assembly have invited 
legally qualified states, and how did they respond? (2) what did the outcome tell us 
about the efficacy of international law as a means of influencing state behaviour; and 
(3) to what degree did the outcome of the case change the position of the main parties 
on the South West African question?
239 U. N. General Assembly Resolution 1361,14th Session (17 November 1959).
240 See ref. 154, for writings on case proceedings. For South African view of the case, 
see, South West Africa Case, 1971, (Cape Town: Cape and Transvaal Printers 
Limited, 1971).
241 Wiechers, Marinus. "South West Africa: The background, content and the 
significance of the opinion of the World Court of 21 June 1971", The Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, Vol. V. No. 2., July 1972, p. 
123.
242 ibid., p. 123.
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3.14. The limited personality of the United Nations
The Article 7 of the Mandate read in conjunction with Article 37 of the Statute of PCU 
(Permanent Court of International Justice) put a burden of responsibility on the 
signatories of the League to help in making the mandatory power fulfil its obligations. 
In a sense, this decision was borne out of South Africa’s insolence. However, it 
exposed the limitation of the ‘personality’ of the United Nations. The founding fathers 
of the United Nations gave limited personality status to the organisation devoid of the 
supreme right with which sovereign states, whether big or small, are endowed. More 
importantly, the UN is denied the right to judicial recourse, designed to lead to an 
enforceable judgement. It can only request an advisory opinion.243 The General 
Assembly’s needed to devise a way of seeking binding adjudication on the case in line 
with Article 59 of the statute of the Court.244 Indeed, Ethiopia and Liberia justified their 
involvement in the case on the limited legal personality of the United Nations. They 
said: 'we are in fact appearing in representational capacity to bring proceedings which 
the Assembly cannot bring for itself, because under Article 34 of the Statute of the 
Court, only States can appear in contentious proceedings before the Court.245 They 
asked the Court: whether the Mandate was still in force, whether the United Nations 
had supervisory authority, and whether South Africa was violating its obligations under 
the Mandate by among other things, imposing apartheid upon the 'non-white' 
inhabitants of the Territory, and by establishing military bases in the Territory.246
243 Gross, A. Ernest., "The South West Africa Case: What Happened", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 25. No. 1., October 1966., p. 47. As a result of the 1966 judgement, Gross argued 
that the Statute of the Court should be amended so as to enable the United Nations to 
appear as a party in appropriate cases before the Court, but this is yet to materialised.
2 Nordau, op cit., p. 125.
245 Gross, op cit., p. 47.
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Alongside their justification on the limited personality of the United Nations, both
Ethiopia and Liberia also claimed the representational interest of the international
community. They argued that they act in their capacity:
"...As members of a United Nations collegiate organ.... guided 
not by their individual interest but by the interest of the 
Organisation. They had in mind...an alleged right of the 
Organisation and not...a right belonging to them 
individually".247
Without rehearsing the legal arguments, it could be argued that what constitutes 
‘representational interest’ is a political question. At onset, South Africa raised a 
preliminary objection that such an interest was insufficient to give the Court 
jurisdiction under Article 7. It claimed that such interest must be 'personal and direct', 
arising out of obligations owed individually to the applicant states or to their 
nationals.248
The applicant’s claim that they were representing the interests of the whole 
international community is a controversial one. They viewed decolonisation as a 
communitarian project. Yet different bloc interests and priorities presupposed drawing 
a scale of preference for international issues on regional and ideological biases. Thus 
far, the General Assembly had been the focus of the South West African debate. The 
Security Council had remained silent. Why is so? A plausible reason is that that the 
Security Council was primarily concerned about the maintenance of international 
security and peace. As earlier shown, the CSWA attempt to rein in Article 18 (2) of the 
UN charter on South West Africa in 1954 failed to meet the required two-third majority
246 Landis, op cit., p. 194. Landis quoted the applicants verbatim as recorded in the 
court's opinion.
247 ibid.
130
votes. That the only two African countries present at the League of Nations took a legal 
action against South Africa underscored the priorities of other signatories to the 
Covenant. Never the less, it was to their credit that these two African states took the 
legal action. They, and the whole international community, had to wait for six years for 
a judgement.
3.15. The 1966 Judgement
On July 16, 1966, the Court passed a judgement, having dismissed South Africa’s
preliminary objections four years earlier. It ruled that the applicants had no specific
legal right or interest in the performance of the mandate for South West Africa.249
Commenting on the ruling, Kiewiet stated that:
"July 16 1966 is a memorable day in contemporary South 
African history. For South Africa the decision was a windfall. It 
acquired a precious gift of the time. The internal danger of 
surrender to an adverse decision was reduced. The government's 
position of legal correctness was unimpaired. Before local 
public opinion the government grew again in reputation for 
steadfastness and competence. A debatable legal 
pronouncement was popularly translated into vindication, an 
exoneration from fault and incompetence".250
Two elements are conspicuously absent in Kiewiet’s interpretation of the ruling. One, is 
the reaction of the international community, especially the General Assembly, which 
initiated the legal action. The other is the effect of the ruling on the Court itself and 
international law in general.251 In the main, by focusing on these issue, we intend to
* yA Q
Memorials of Ethiopia and Liberia, SWA Cases, Second Phase, ICJ Report (1966) 
p. 62-63. (Netherlands: ICJ, 1966).
249 The verdict of the Court was full of suspense, the vote being evenly divided (7-7). It 
was the President, Sir Percy Spender (Australia) that threw the 'casting vote' to break 
the tie in favour of South Africa.
250 de Kiewiet, C. W. Africa Report, Vol. 14. No. 2. February 1969, p. 50.
251 Some international law experts had observed that the vote cast by the Court’s president, 
Sir Percy Spender of Australia to unlocked the seven-seven tie shifted the decision making
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shed more light on the limitations of international law. The paradox however is that 
had the Court ruled against South Africa, the ruling would have been binding, but 
South Africa might not have complied with an adverse ruling. More contentious is how 
to effect compliance. It is also highly debatable whether South Africa would be 
persuaded by the ‘shadow of the future’ reason for compliance as argued by idealists 
such as Robert Axelrod. The shadow of the future implies that states must be aware that 
short term gains from breaking rules that they helped create may be offset by future 
costs imposed by other states”. 252 It is not only that the Court lacks an enforcement 
mechanism of its own, but both Ethiopia and Liberia were also incapable of imposing 
considerable costs on South Africa, either politically or economically. And the Western 
powers commitment to the South West African question was non-committal, but 
circumspect.
The international community received the Court's judgement with shock and dismay. 
The United Nations as a whole was visibly shaken. The Africans felt betrayed. To 
them, the Court had diminish its prestige as a means of settling international disputes 
and had raised serious doubts about its integrity and usefulness. Perhaps, as an 
expression of its annoyance, the General Assembly on 10 October 1966 rejected a 
proposed supplementary appropriation of $72,500 for the Court's 1966 budget. 
Clearly, the credit of the Court in settling decolonization issues was damaged and its
process of the Court from its Eurocentric jurisprudence, with its postulated a priori 
dichotomy between law and politics, to the adoption of an American style judicial policy 
role. See, McWhinney, Edward. Judicial Settlement of International Disputes: 
Jurisdiction, Justiciability and Judicial Law-Making on the Contemporary 
International Court, (The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), p. xvii.
252 Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Co-operation. (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
253 United Nations. United Nations Monthly Chronicle, (UNMC), 3 (10), 1966, 
p. 62-63.
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adjudicative function impaired. Yet the judgement has significant effect in the political 
arena in the light of the reactions of the international community as well as SWAPO.
3.16. The response of the international community to the judgement
Contrary to Kietwiet’s suggestion, alluded to earlier, the judgement was not in totality a 
windfall for South Africa. It was more of a Greek gift, as it changed the character of the 
South West African dispute. The judgement raised the probability of political actions 
against South Africa, and the spectrum of action moved from the legal framework to 
the political sphere. In particular, it also transformed the perception of the liberation 
movements to armed struggle and guerrilla warfare.254 SWAPO, in particular, came to 
the conclusion that no court could really deliver justice in a political conflict. 
Independence was not in the gift of any court. According to Levinson, prior to the 1966 
judgement, the liberation movements still believed that the United Nations would free 
them. "It was only in 1966 when the Court judgement favoured South Africa that they 
finally resolved that there was no other course but to fight for freedom".255 From now 
on SWAPO believed itself to be engaging in an armed struggle, a war of national 
liberation. The first armed encounter between SWAPO and South African security 
forces took place at Omgulumbashe in Ovambo land on 26 August 1966.
254 It must be noted that this study does not focus on the history, development and 
operations of these liberation movements. An excellent discussion on the liberation 
movements can be found in Dreyer, Ronald. Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional 
Dynamics of Decolonization, 1945-1990. (New York: Kegan Paul International, 
1994).
255 Levinson Olga, Story of Namibia, (Cape Town: Tafelberg Publishers Limited, 
1978), p. 74; and Dube, Emmanuel. M. "Relations between Liberation Movements and 
the OAU", in Shamuyarira, N.M. (ed.), Essays on the Liberation of Southern Africa, 
(Dar es Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972), p. 39.
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It was not only SWAPO that was concerned with the outcome of the 1966 judgement, 
some Western powers were also concerned. For example, Coker revealed that in a 
memorandum to President Johnson, in July 1964, the State Department had warned that 
if the ICJ ruled against Pretoria, ‘we (America) may be in a serious crisis with South 
Africa next year’.257 While this study found no evidence to suggest that Washington 
wanted to pervert the course of justice in any way, the State Department concern 
indicated that a ruling in favour of South Africa was a relief to the Johnson 
administration.
After the Court’s ruling, the United Nations’ faith in legal means sank to zero, hence a 
political decision had to be taken. It must be noted that South West Africa had been 
debated by every General Assembly session since 1946. It had been referred to the ICJ 
four times, with a total of 73 resolutions by the General Assembly.258 On October 27, 
1966, with Resolution 2145 (XXI), the General Assembly finally delivered its own 
verdict.259 It declared the mandate "terminated' and placed the territory under its 'direct 
responsibility'. The revocation revived a neglected 1946 Egyptian proposal. As we 
have already seen, in its Working Paper to the Fourth Committee in 1946, Egypt had 
proposed that the General Assembly should be given powers to terminate the Mandate 
and declare the territory independent. At that time, the proposal was rejected.
256 Alao, C.A. “A Comparative Evolution of the Armed Struggle in Namibia, South Africa 
and Zimbabwe”, in William Gutteridge and J.E. Spence, Violence in South Africa, 
(London: Frank Cass: 1997), p. 63.
257 Coker, op cit. p. 243—Memo to President Johnson from William Brubeck, 29 July 
1964.
258. United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967. (New York: Office of 
Public Information, 1966), p. 595.
259 Cheng, Bin. "The 1966 South West Africa Judgement of the World Court", 
Current Legal Problems, Vol. 20. 1967, p. 181.
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Now, the revocation of the Mandate led to the establishment of the 11-member United 
Nations Council for South West Africa (hereafter The Council). With the assistance of 
a United Nations Commissioner, the Council was to become the legal administering 
authority for the territory. In essence, the Council was conceived as a parallel authority 
to South Africa, a government in exile for South West Africa. It was instructed to use 
all its powers to enable the territory to become independent by June 1968. Not 
surprisingly, the question of how the Council should pursue its duties became a matter 
of controversy within the United Nations, across the East and West ideological 
divide.261
The Soviet Union doubted the necessity of a transitional period between the ending of 
the Mandate and the date of independence. Supported by Czechoslovakia, it opposed 
the direct administration of the Territory by the Council and advocated that the General 
Assembly should declare the territory independent immediately to allow the OAU to
Off)assist the national liberation movements with the formation of a new government. 
The Soviet Union feared that any new UN agency would be used by the opponents of 
independence for purposes other than those envisaged in the Charter".
The United States, Canada and Italy led the opposition to the Soviet position. These 
states preferred a gradualist and negotiated settlement with the appointment of a Special 
Representative. Among other things, the Special Representative would make a
260 United Nations, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967, op cit., 596-605.
261 The debate on the role of the Council revealed the division within the UN along bloc 
and ideological divide. See, UNMC, Vol. IV, No. 3, March 1967, p. 5; UNMC, Vol. IV, 
No. 6, June 1967, p. 33; and UNMC, Vol. IV, No. 4, April 1967, p. 11-15.
262 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967. (New York: Office of 
Public Information, 1967), p. 691.
263 ibid. p. 692.
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comprehensive survey of the situation in the territory, and determine the conditions 
necessary to enable it to achieve independence. The Soviet Representative saw the 
appointment of a Special Representative as an implicit acquiescence in the continuation 
of the illegal administration in the territory for an undetermined period of time. In his 
reply, the USA representative said that the Soviet Union’s representative had been the 
first to lose sight of the importance of the criterion of practicability.264
The liberation movements were also not satisfied with the revocation of the Mandate 
and the establishment of the Council. They argued that their faith in the effectiveness of 
the United Nations and its strategies had reached its limit. In their testimony before the 
Committee of 24 on its mission to Africa on June 7-9 1967, Solomon Mifimo, Moses 
Garoeb and Jacob Kuhangua (SWAPO) expressed their disappointment on the 
functions entrusted to the Council. They said that they had hoped that the General 
Assembly would decide upon the use of force to terminate South Africa's control of the 
territory. In addition, they said that the people of South West Africa consequently felt 
that they could not rely entirely on the United Nations to liberate the territory and were 
determined to fight on their own behalf.265
South Africa, predictably, challenged the revocation. It refused landing rights to the 11- 
member Council for its on-spot visitation to the territory. More importantly, it 
expedited the implementation of the Odendall Plan that intended to incorporate South 
West Africa as a fifth province of South Africa. The Plan effectively exported the 
principle and practice of apartheid policies to South West Africa. With the Odendall 
Plan, South Africa played to the gallery of its critics and angered its friends in the
264 UNMC, Vol. IV, No. 3, March 1967, p. 10.
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international community. The Plan united South Africa’s foes and allies. It was like 
giving one’s sword to the enemy in a battle. It was at this juncture that the Security 
Council finally intervened. Presumably, the Council had refused to deal with the South 
West Africa on the grounds that it did not constitute a potential threat to international 
peace and security. In a twist of events, it now challenged South Africa’s 
implementation of the Odendall Plan. On January 30, 1970 the Security Council 
abandoned it cavalier position with the establishment of the first Security Council Sub- 
Committee on Namibia.266 Six months later, on 29 July 1970, the Namibian question 
was placed before the Security Council as a situation constituting a threat to 
international peace and security. It could be argued that the West changed its stance 
under constant pressure from the Afro-Asian bloc. It could also be argued that Western 
powers interpreted the Odendall Plan as a gross violation of liberal values, which they 
themselves held. Thus, to do nothing would be a dereliction of duty in safeguarding 
human rights. Namibia was now within the legitimate remit of the Security Council.
Under Article 12 (1) of the Charter, the General Assembly cannot make 
recommendations regarding a situation when the Security Council is exercising 
functions assigned to it with respect to that situation. The interpretative function of this 
article has legal and political implications. From a legal standpoint, it confirms the 
primacy of the Security Council over the General Assembly on matter of international 
concern. On the political side, it draws a boundary on the competencies between the 
populous General Assembly and the authoritative Security Council. In effect, the ability
265 United Nations. Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967, op cit., p. 698.
Before the establishment of this Sub-Committee, all the initiatives on South West 
Africa were from the General Assembly, but now, the Sub-Committee consisted of all the 
council members. See, UNMC, Vol. VII, No. 2, February 1970, p. 3; and UNMC, Vol. 
VII, No. 8, August-September 1970, p. 37.
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of the African group to shape the outcome of the Namibian question was inherently 
limited. Through Resolution 282 (1970), the Security Council asked the Court for an 
advisory opinion on the following questions: What are the legal consequences for 
States on the continued presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding 
Resolution 276 of 1970?
3.17. The 1971 Opinion: a reversal of the Court’s position
The Court delivered its opinion on 21 June 1971. The 15-man Court held:
Firstly, by 13-2 that South Africa was in illegal occupation of South West Africa and 
under an obligation to withdraw its administration from the Territory immediately. 
Secondly, by 11-4 that the Members of the United Nations were obliged
(i) to recognise the illegality of South Africa's presence in the Territory and the 
invalidity of its acts on behalf of or concerning the Territory; and
(ii) to refrain from any acts or dealings which would imply recognition of the legality 
of, or lend support or assistance to, the South African presence and administration. 
Thirdly, also by 11-4 that it was incumbent on State Members of the United Nations to 
give assistance in the action taken by the United Nations with regard to the Territory.
It has been argued by critics that the 1971 Court decision was to serve two inter-related 
purposes: the rehabilitation of the Court's image, and the harmonisation of hitherto 
disjointed positions between the Court and the United Nations on one hand, and within 
the United Nations itself. For instance, Crawford argued that 'there is clear link, legally 
and politically, between the decisions in the South West Africa cases (Second Phase) of
267 ICJ. Yearbook 1970-71, (Hague: ICJ, 1970), p. 105.
138
1966 and Namibia (1971). 268 In the latter decision the Court did what it could to undo
the damaging effects of the former. It marked the most important reversal of position in
the history of the Court. Though the Court was 'mindful of its 1966 decision, the events
between 1966-71 transformed it from 'a first-world' to a 'third-world' court- in terms not
only of composition but also of orientation. Crawford noted further that:
"in the whole context of the decolonization process' the Court's 
role has been to an extent secondary, with 'the corpus iuris 
gentium' taking the form, more or less, of an administrative law, 
a body of rules relating to and supportive of the application of 
Chapters XI and XII of the Charter by the political organs, and 
in particular the General Assembly. The Court has not-as it has 
so markedly in the field of maritime delimitation-played the role 
of 'lead agency'. But its role has not been merely adjectival, but 
has consistently supported the principle of self-determination, as 
implemented by the General Assembly".269
More significantly, the Court’s decision took the Namibian question back to its roots: a 
political question. The architecture of the mandate system had been reshaped to reflect 
the realties of the new order: decolonisation. Its principal architects now had a duty of 
care to make Namibia a self-governing entity, within the framework of the UN. It 
conferred upon them levels of responsibility hitherto unknown since the trusteeship 
regime was formed in 1946. The question now was whether they would put a premium 
on securing South African compliance, which international law by itself, had been 
unable to do, at the expense of their economic, political and strategic interests in South 
Africa.
268 Crawford, James. "The General Assembly, the International Court and self- 
determination", in Lowe, Vaughan and Fitzmaurice, Malgosia (eds.), Fifty Years of 
the International Court of Justice: Essay in honour of Sir Robert Jennings. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 39.
269 ibid.
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Chapter Four 
Namibia and Henry Africanus.
4.1. Introduction
In the preceding chapter, we have established that the Court’s ruling in 1971 shifted the 
Namibian question into the political arena. Yet, in the two South West Africa cases 
(1960) and (1966) international law, though it provided machinery for the settlement of 
the dispute, failed because of the lack of a compliance mechanism, and agents 
competent to enforce its rulings. These limitations however, do not imply that 
international law has no utility in international politics. Indeed, international law is 
useful as a system of restraint on the actions of states. In the case under review, 
international law restrained South Africa from annexing South West Africa. It also 
served as an institutional device for communicating to the South African government 
the prevailing standard of acceptable behaviour within the community of states, 
especially on self-determination. By contrast, in this chapter, the focus will be on how 
the Namibian question became inextricably linked with the balance of power. And 
paradoxically, how Namibia emerged as a beneficiary of the changes in the global and 
regional balance of power of the 1970s.
It will examine the American initiative to resolve the conflict taken by Secretary of 
State, Henry Kissinger. His diplomatic and political investment in resolving the wider 
southern African conflict in 1976 has been termed as Henry Africanus.270 This chapter 
will show that the power struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union
270 This term is associated with Elaine Adam, a US State Department official. She coined 
the term to described Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in Africa from April 1976 to January 
1977. We shall use this concept as it is for the rest of the study. See, Adam, Elaine.
“Henry Africanus”, The United States Foreign Relations, 1976. (Washington, DC: State 
Department, 1976), p. 59-60.
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created an opportunity to break the Namibian stalemate. It seeks to demonstrate that the 
United States, acting out of self-interest in containing the Soviet Union globally and its 
influence in southern Africa in particular, discovered that securing a solution on 
Namibia was an effective means of achieving this objective. In other words, mediation 
came about within the context of power politics. Indeed, resolving the Namibian 
conflict can be viewed as one of the externalities of the balance of power.
It is tempting, to neglect the impact of international law on the Soviet intervention in 
Angola. However, besides power considerations, this chapter will show that the Soviet 
understanding of the utility of international law of wars of liberation also influenced its 
action in southern Africa. But as this particular set of international laws was shaped and 
defined by the political realities of the decolonization era, for the Soviets, it served less 
as a vehicle for justice for the third world, than as a means of furthering its own 
political interests.
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first part begins by evaluating the failure of 
the UN regime'. Part two examine the changes in the global and regional balances of 
powers of the mid-1970s. It shows that the Soviets intervened in Angola partly for 
power considerations and partly as a result of its own interpretation of the utility of 
international law. Part three discusses Henry Africanus. It examines the process of 
negotiation between South Africa and the United States of America, and the leverage 
that Washington was able to exercise on Pretoria in solving southern African problem.
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4.2. The end of the United Nations' regime
The election of Kurt Waldheim as the UN Secretary General in January 1972 created a 
new opening for the UN-South Africa dialogue on Namibia. This was at the urging of 
the French Ambassador to the UN, Jacques Kosciusko-Morizet, and Ambassador Oritz 
de Rozas of Argentina.271 At the UN Security Council meeting in Addis Ababa in 
February 1972, the Secretary General was requested to initiate contacts with all parties 
concerned with Namibia on the process of self-determination. It is important to explain 
the event that surrounds this request. Since it was the American Ambassador to the UN, 
George Bush who made this proposal,272 it was greeted with predictable scepticism by 
the Soviet Union, China, and many African states. It took some considerable 
persuasions from the western and Latin American delegates, and a grudging 
acquiescence from the Soviet Union and China before the resolution was adopted. At 
first South African was reluctant to invite the Secretary General, but it later issued an 
official invitation.273 On March 6, 1972, Waldheim embarked on a five-day visit to 
Namibia and South Africa. He had a long discussion with Prime Minister John Vorster 
and Foreign Minister, Hilgard Muller. But on his return to New York, Waldheim
271 Africa Report, Vol. 17, No. 4, April 1972, p. 8-9.
272 United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. IX, No. 2,1972, p. 40. It was evident that 
George Bush made the proposal to avert the resolution called for the imposition of 
sanctions against South Africa that was being moved by some African states with the 
support of the Soviet Union.
27 In a statement to the Press, Waldheim remarked that his visit was at the invitation of 
the Government of South Africa in connection with Resolution 309 (1972). See UN 
Monthly Chronicle, Vol. IX. No. 4. April 1975. Prime Minister B. J. Vorster said: 
"South Africa has always been prepared to talk to the Secretary-General of the UN. In 
fact we invited Mr. Dag Hammarskjold when he was Secretary General to come to us, we 
later invited Mr. U Thant when he was Secretary General to talk to us, he wouldn't come. 
We invited Dr Waldheim to come and talk to us. He came. “Indeed South Africa was 
prepared to talk to representative of the Secretary-General of the UN, but it refused to 
accept the Chairman of the UN Council for Namibia”.
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admitted that there was a 'deep gulf between the position of the United Nations and 
South Africa.274.
Nonetheless, the UN continued to find a way to break the imaginary Chinese wall that 
South Africa was erecting. On Namibia, the credibility, competence and legitimacy of 
the UN was at stake. The UN appointed Alfred Martin Escher, a Swiss diplomat as a 
Special Representative to Namibia. Mr. Escher met with John Vorster between 8 
October to 3 November 1972, and again in the early part of 1973. In his report to the 
Secretary-General, he remarked that Vorster indicated to him that the time was not yet 
ripe for a detailed discussion on Namibian independence. Meanwhile, prior to Escher- 
Vorster talks, China and Soviet Union had expressed scepticism about the dialogue.275 
To these states, the talks were “'delaying tactics', a confusion strategy, and an attempt 
by the South African authorities to extricate themselves from their political isolation 
and to mollify their condemnation by the peoples of various countries”.276 Contrawise, 
the United States and Britain believed that the talks were the appropriate ones. For 
instance, Christopher Phillips, America's Representative at the United Nations 
remarked that:
274 See Africa Report, op cit., p. 9.
275 United Nations, UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. IX. No. 11. December 1972, p. 22. It is 
worth pointing out that the appointment of the Secretary-General Representative became 
a divisive issue between the Soviet Union and the Western powers. When the Secretary- 
General proposed that Lord Caradon (United Kingdom) be appointed for an initial period 
of one year; the Representative of the USSR said that his delegation was categorically 
opposed to the approval of Lord Caradon because he (Lord Caradon) was a representative 
of a Colonial Power which not only maintained under colonial rule a number of 
territories but also extended various sorts of assistance to racist colonial regimes of South 
Africa. For that reason, the USSR delegation considered that such a Representative could 
not further the liberation of the peoples of Namibia from the tyrannical rule of South 
Africa. As a result of the Soviet objection, the President of the General Assembly called 
attention to a note by the Secretary-General withdrawing the nomination of Lord Caradon 
as UN Commissioner for Namibia on 23 December 1971. See UN Monthly Chronicle, 
Vol. IX. No.l. January 1972, p. 161-62.
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"the progress was a relative term and should be considered 
within the context of the particular problem. The progress 
achieved with regard to Namibia since the adoption of 
Resolution 309 (1972) seemed greater when compared to the 
progress achieved between the birth of the UN and the adoption 
of Resolution 309 (1972)".277
However, like its predecessor, the Escher-Vorster talks broke down. In his report to the 
Security Council on 30 April 1973, Waldheim concluded that the position of the South 
African Government was still far from coinciding with that established by the 
resolutions of the UN concerning Namibia, in particular, Resolution 323 (1972).278 In 
its Lusaka Declaration of 14 June 1973, the UN Council for Namibia also termed the 
results of the Escher-Vorster talks not only unsatisfactory and counterproductive, but 
called for their immediate termination. The OAU and the UN General Assembly 
equally expressed the same view. In the light of the above, the Security Council 
decided in December 1973 to discontinue contacts with South Africa.279
With the breakdown of talks, both South Africa and the UN started blaming each other. 
South Africa pointed out the partiality of the UN; while some UN member-states 
accused South Africa of bad faith. South Africa charged the UN of creating a "spirit of 
mutual distrust [that] was ...hardly conducive to the settlement of the South West Africa 
question within a United Nations framework."280 The UN’s creation of the Council for 
South West Africa in 1967, the General Assembly’s recognition of SWAPO as the
276 United Nations, UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. IX. No. 1. January 1973, p. 6.
277 United Nations, UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. IX. No. 1. January 
1973, p. 1-12.
278 Official Records of the Security Council, 28th Year, Supplement for April, May 
and June 1973, United Nations, Document S/10921.
279 Resolution 342 (1973) of 11 December 1973.
280 Jordan-Walker, "Settlement of the Namibian Dispute: The United States Role in Lieu 
of UN Sanctions", Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 14 (1982), p. 
543,551.
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authentic representative of the Namibian people in 1973, and the subsequent action of 
granting SWAPO a full observer status in 1976, arguably lent credence to South 
Africa's claim of UN impartiality and partisanship. In fact the move to granting 
SWAPO an observer status was led by Cuba at the Havana Seminar held by the Special
O Q 1
Committee of Twenty-Four on 12 June 1976. As the Non-Aligned bloc secured the
vote in the General Assembly, some Western countries felt that the ‘tyranny of the
majority’ was at work. Even, some neutral states such as Netherlands and Australia
criticised the UN for granting a sole-representative status to SWAPO. For example,
Netherlands argued that:
"It was not for the United Nations to express support for armed 
struggle to achieve independence. The Netherlands recognised 
SWAPO as a major political force in Namibia that should be 
directly involved in the negotiations in progress, but it could not 
regard SWAPO as the sole and authentic representative of the 
Namibian people. There were other political groups in Namibia 
which, with SWAPO, should establish their credentials in free 
and democratic elections as provided for in Security Council 
Resolution 385 (1976).282
Yet South Africa claim of being fair on Namibia has become something of an 
oxymoron.
Some institutionalist scholars have puzzled over the question of the breakdown of the 
talks between South Africa and the United Nations. Sushma Soni’s ‘regime’ analysis
281 For the General Assembly’s debate on recognizing SWAPO as the sole representative 
of the Namibian people, See, General Assembly Resolution 3111, UN GAOR, 28th 
Session, Supp. No. 30, at 94, UN Doc. A/9030 (1973). For the debate on SWAPO’s full 
observer status, see, “The Havana Seminar”, UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XII. No. 6. 
June 1976, p. 19. and G.A. Res. 31/152, UN GAOR, 31st Session, Supp. No. 39 at 136, 
U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1977).
282 UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XTV. No. 11. December 1977, p. 40. In the same 
session, New Zealand held that for the United Nations to endorse any one organisation as 
the sole representative of the Namibian people might prejudge the wishes of the Namibian 
people as a whole.
145
of the Namibian question comes into the frame.283 Soni argued that, "the formal, 
democratic processes that contributed to the UN regime's legitimacy eventually led the 
negotiations over Namibia into acrimony and failure".284 In other words, the militant 
posture of the African group as well as the non-committal attitudes of>the western 
powers undermined the UN regime. The significance of Soni's analysis is that it points 
us to the political elements within the Namibian conflict.285 In 1976, the Western 
powers and the African group in the Security Council passed Resolutions 385 and 386 
to demand an immediate withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia and the necessity 
for a free and fair election under the UN supervision.286 However, the original African 
sponsored draft, which was intended to empower the Security Council to act under 
Chapter VII on the grounds that the illegal occupation by South Africa constituted a 
threat to international peace and security, was vetoed by France, the United States and 
the United Kingdom. The two resolutions, although weaker than the African draft were 
intended to show the international community’s condemnation of the South African 
sponsored Tumhalle Conference.287 However, the triple Western veto sent out two
283 Soni, Sushma. "Regimes for Namibia's Governance: A Comparative Study", 
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 29. No. 3., 1991, p. 563-607.
284 ibid., p. 583.
285 For a critique of regime theory as a framework of analysis of the super-power 
relationship, see, Hoffmann, Stanley. “Ethics and Rules of the Game Between the 
Superpowers” in Henkin, Louis and Hoffmann, Stanley (eds.), Right V. Might: 
International Law and the Use of Force. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations 
Press, 1989), p. 79. In brief, Hoffman argued that the superpower game does not constitute 
an overall regime, if regime is taken as a co-operative, diffuse reciprocity between the 
actors; as the superpowers demonstrate no preference of joint action over unilateral action. 
He noted that although partial regimes existed on the nuclear and arms control issues, they 
were often fragile, and beset with skepticism and less co-operative instincts. To him, 
therefore, the superpowers’ overall relationship constitutes even less of a regime that the 
security practices of past balance of power systems.
286 United Nations, "Security Council Makes Unanimous Demand for Free Elections in 
Namibia under UN Supervision", UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XII. No. 2. February 
1976, p. 18.
287 Below is a brief note on the Tumhalle Conference. The conference was convened in 
Windhoek between 1-12 September 1975, and concluded its work on 19 March 1977. The
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contradictory messages: one was plain, the other latent. It was clear that the Western 
powers did not want to exalt the Namibian question into the mainstream of Security 
Council business, where the Soviet Union could have a considerable influence. Yet, 
they needed to be seen to be censuring South Africa for breaching a norm of 
international community. In the same vein, the Western leaders were more concerned 
with political developments in southern Africa, in particular with the presence of the 
Soviet and Cuban forces in Angola than with South Africa’s illegal occupation of 
Namibia. Washington, in particular, was greatly concerned that the Soviet 
expansionism in southern Africa was a test of America’s credibility in world politics in 
the wake of the Vietnam war; an affront to the precarious global equilibrium, and a 
breach of the prevailing rule of detente of the mid-1970s.
4.3. The United States and the Soviets and Africa, 1960-1971.
As shown in chapter two, both the United States and the Soviet Union were present at 
the Berlin Conference of 1885. Neither was interested in the partitioning of Africa. 
Each was concerned with different issues. America was concerned with commerce and 
navigation issues and its Latin America neighbourhood, while Russia was interested in
meetings were held in Tumhalle, a former German gymnasium. The conference was 
composed of tribal representatives of Namibia's eight black groups, plus representatives of 
the white, Colored and Baster populations, a total of 136 participants. Non-white political 
parties were excluded from the talks. As a result, the Ovambos, Kavangos, East Caprivians 
and Rehoboth Basters were represented by their homeland governments, and the Bushmen 
and other groups were appointed by the South African government. The Tumhalle 
Conference idea was designed partly to deflate international criticisms and partly to 
exclude SWAPO on the political process. It was an attempt to entrench the 
bantustanization' of the Territory, or what critics termed a 'creeping UDI'. See: UN 
Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XII, No. 8., August-September 1976; United Nations, 
Decolonization: A publication of the UN Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship 
and Decolonization, No. 9, Revised Edition, December 1977), For Sam Nujoma’s 
condemnation of the Tumhalle Conference; see, UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XU, No. 9, 
October 1976, p. 12.
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preserving its interests in Asia.288 For most of the colonial era, Africa was regarded as 
an extension of Europe, and treated as such by both Washington and Moscow. The 
wave of decolonization after the Second World War brought Africa into the mainstream 
of international system. Individually and collectively, Africa became an actor in global 
affairs; and accordingly, it was politically expedient for each of the two superpowers to 
see how Africa could be used to advance its respective political and geostrategic 
interests.
Mindful of its relationship with the colonial powers, Washington was confronted by 
two dilemmas: how to choose between the Europhiles and the Afrophiles, or between 
national interest concerns and moral responsibility (defined in the Wilsonian 
tradition).289 Most Afrophiles believed in the pursuit of a moral concern on foreign 
policy and had sympathy for African nationalism. The Europhiles saw most nationalist 
leaders such as Nkrumah, Lumumba and Diof as recruits of Soviet socialism, and 
believed that the American support for the remaining colonial powers, especially 
Portugal, was important in securing its support for America’s European policy.
Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union had unreservedly supported anti-colonial 
groups. African nationalist leaders were anti-colonialists to a man, but crudely, they 
were also anti-westem and anti-free market economies. Many were seduced by 
socialism with its promised cradle-to-grave philosophy of care, and by Moscow, which
288 Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. (New York: Vintage Books, 
1989), p. 194.
289 The Kennedy Administration was the most confronted with a choice of European 
solidarity against communism or a support for the African nationalist groups, in their 
quest for self-determination as enunciated by Wilson. This was termed as "Europeanist 
versus Africanist" See, Noer, Thomas. J. "New Frontier and Old Priorities in Africa", in
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they regarded as a New Jerusalem. Many forms of hyphenated-socialism (i. e. African- 
socialism, scientific-socialism and pragmatic- socialism) were professed, and provided 
African leaders with a roadmap for centrally planned economic policies. Through its 
support for African trade unions and political parties with communist affiliations in 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Sudan and South Africa using the World Federation of the 
Trade Union (W.F.T.U.) the Soviet Union intended to gain a foothold in the new 
states.290 Soviet ideological support did not bring with it the hard currencies needed for 
nation building. It used its economic aid sparingly. The economic and historical cords 
that tied Africa to the West remained unbroken. Some conservative states such as 
Nigeria and Kenya obstructed the Soviets’ full penetration of Africa and many 
remained within those western institutional arrangements such as the Commonwealth 
and French Franc monetary system and LaFracophonie, albeit their double-faced policy 
termed Non-Alignment.
As the post-independent African states internal politics were characterised by personal 
rule, tribal politics, coups and counter-coups and rampant kleptocracy, African affairs, 
rather than Africa itself began to lose its appeal to both Washington and Kremlin. 
According to Rivkin, "American disillusionment with African affairs had already been
901apparent by the mid-1960s". Guelke similarly observed that 'the same was true of 
Moscow'.292 Even Kissinger's 1969 National Security Study Memorandum 39 
concluded that "The Soviets appear to afford Africa a low priority at present and can be
Patterson, Thomas. G. (ed.), Kennedy’s Quest for Victory: American Foreign Policy, 
1961-1963, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 253-283.
290 M. H. "Soviet Interest in Africa", The World Today, Vol. 12. No. 9. September 
1956, p. 356.
291 Rivkin, A. "Lost goals in Africa", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 44. No. 1., October 1965, 
p. 112-3.
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expected to limit the extent of their commitment and involvement”.293 In the wider 
international arena, Africa’s influence, which had been greatly exaggerated particularly 
in Africa, slumped. Mayall, in a book with a paradoxical title, Africa: The Cold War 
and After observed that the momentum of Africa’s revolution and Africa relevance in 
global affairs began to wane as early as 1963. He pointed out that the weighted vote of 
the African group, in concert with other Non-Aligned states failed to secure the 
necessary Security Council Resolution on South Africa. Mayall’s conclusion that "the 
very incoherence of African state structures and the volatility of African politics were 
likely to undermine any sustained attempt at political influence”,294 was an apt 
description of the constraints that weakened Africa’s influence on international arena.
Furthermore, the emerging superpower relationships of the late-1960s and early 1970s 
were less fortunate to many Africa states, contrary to the popular expectation. It was a 
period briefly known as the ‘era of detente’, during which Washington and Moscow 
sought to modulate their global competition by pursuing areas of mutual interests and 
indulging in occasional displays of friendship in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis.295 
‘Detente’ is a French word that refers to the loosening of tension; in Russian it 
translates as razryadka, a relaxation of tension. As a policy, it was popularised by 
Kissinger during the Nixon administration. The 1972 ‘Basic Principles of Soviet- 
American relations marked the hallmark of detente. In it, both sides agreed to forswear 
“efforts to obtain unilateral advantage at the expense of the other,” and they pledged not
292 Guelke, Andrian. "Southern Africa and the Superpowers", International Affairs, Vol. 
56. No. 4. Autumn 1980, p. 650.
293 ibid., p. 650.
294 Mayall, James. L. B., Africa: The Cold War and After. (London: Elek Books, 1971), 
p. 13.
95 Issacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 
p. 437.
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to exploit regional tensions or to claim spheres of influence in various areas of the 
world.296
The impact of detente on the Namibian conflict cannot be ignored. As earlier indicated, 
the 1966 Court ruling shifted the main issue from legal plain into the arena of politics. 
Each superpower, nonetheless, considered the Namibia question as a residual issue 
within the global concerns. It was an issue not to be exploited, albeit some posturing at 
the United Nations. Detente, as it later emerged, was not glorious; yet it became a 
difficult reality for the superpowers in the context of the embedded paradox of mutual 
assured destruction.297 Irreverently, each superpower was ready to cheat on the other 
whenever the opportunities arose. Washington went into the Middle East while 
Moscow headed for Africa. Artfully, the United States supported Israel during the 
October 1973 War, but it made impossible an absolute Israeli victory. Consequently, 
both the Arabs and Israel now looked to Washington to resolve their differences. It 
paved the way for America to gain a foothold in Egypt and successfully squeezed out 
the Soviet Union of a role in the Middle East peace process. It also made possible for 
Washington to contain Arab nationalism. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union’s support for 
the Federal Government during the Nigerian civil war (1967-70) won her a symbolic 
and political achievement in Africa.298 The Nigerian experience showed that other 
African states could count on the Soviet Union, especially when betrayed by their 
Western allies or ex-colonial power. Soviet military hardware became popular in 
Africa. Such ‘cheating’ (that is, in the Western view of detente) were not construed as
296 ibid.
297 For a chronicle of Detente and the Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), see Isaacs, 
Jeremy and Downing, Taylor. Cold War: For 45 Years The World Held Its Breath.
(New York: Bantam Press, 1998), p. 231-245.
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an absolute breach of the rule of detente until the Angolan conflict. Prior to 1975, any 
gains were not seen as large enough to dislocate global equilibrium, but accommodated 
within the margin of safety. Washington became uneasy with what it perceived as 
Soviet gains in Angola, and indeed in southern Africa in general.
4.4. The Angolan crisis: a shift in the southern African balance of power.
The fall out of the ‘carnation revolution’299 in Portugal in April 1974 led to an abrupt 
termination of colonial order in Angola and other Portuguese territories. In Angola, 
each of the three nationalist movements was primarily based on tribal loyalties. Yet the 
United States, Soviet Union and China were the ‘patrons’ of these nationalist 
movements. Thus, Angola became a ‘little fish in a pond full of sharks’, as a colonial 
war was exalted into a new superpower contest. Significantly, it served as the first test 
of the new rules of detente, a way to feel out the limits of how far each superpower 
could go in seeking an advantage in the third world. More relevantly, it introduced a 
significant shift in the balance of power in southern Africa, and the Namibian conflict 
was externalised within it. For now, we are primarily concerned with different motives 
of the external powers in the Angolan conflict.
According to Rothchild and Hartzell, there were two types of external intervention in 
the Angolan conflict, namely, the direct and indirect interventions. Each intervening 
state had a different mix of motives, and sought to shape the outcome that would
298 Kaplan, Stephen. S. Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political 
Instrument (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 172.
299 The revolution is called a ‘carnation revolution’ as revolutionaries and the masses went 
into the street in Lisbon with a pink colored flower to show their support for the coup 
plotters. I got this term from the Open University programme on Democratization aired by 
the BBC 2 on April 09,1999. It was presented by David Goldbatt under the titled 
‘Democracy from the classical times to the present’.
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advance its perceived interests.300 The United States and the Soviet Union intervened 
indirectly; South Africa and Cuba directly. Yet any distinction of intervention 
according to troop involvement tells only half the story. Although, troop commitment is 
a useful way of determining the extent of the intervening states’ political interests in the 
Angolan conflict, there exists a difference in the level of intervention by the United 
States and Soviet Union. For its part, the Soviet Union used the international law of 
wars of liberation as a cover for its pursuit of power political interests rather than 
justice in a colonial war. On the other side, the United States was forced to limit its 
involvement to covert operations, and even, the US Congress, despite Soviet advisers 
and materiel being fully committed subsequently curtailed these. It was also clear, that 
while South Africa felt betrayed by the United States, which had initially encouraged it 
to get involved in Angola, there was no similar breach in the Soviet-Cuba axis. Each of 
the lesser powers, South Africa and Cuba however, had their self-interest independent 
of the superpowers.
4.5. Cuba and the Angolan conflict
Several studies on the Angolan conflict have examined the motives of the intervening 
powers. For Cuba, three interrelated motives are discernible. These are: personal, 
ideological, and political. The Cuban President, Fidel Castro saw himself as the heir 
apparent to the leadership of the Third World after Ghandi and Nasser. He also believed 
that Cuba should be a vanguard of revolution in the third world.301 Angola was a good 
place for both Castro and Cuba to advance their objectives. The third motive was
300 Rothchild, Donald and Hartzell, Caroline. "The Case of Angola: Four Power 
Intervention and Disengagement", in Levite, Ariel. E., Jentleson, Bruce. W. and Berman, 
Larry, (eds.), Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 165.
301 Ibid., p. 168.
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contingent on the first two. The MPLA's Marxist-Leninist orientation established a 
unity of interest between Cuba and the Soviet Union. Castro saw in Angola the 
opportunity to improve Cuba’s relationship with the Soviets.302 A relationship that had 
been strained since Krushchev withdrew the missiles in Cuba in 1962 without formal 
consultation. In effect, Angola became a critical ground to reverse the moral defeat 
suffered by Cuba, and to a lesser extent, the Soviets themselves. Meanwhile, Cuba 
pursued a relatively autonomous policy in Angola, independent of Moscow.303
4.6. The Soviet Union in Angola
The question of whether the Soviets or the United States intervened in Angola first is 
like asking which comes first, chicken or egg: did America respond to a Soviet 
intervention or the Soviets to an American one? What was clear was that both sides 
were responding to the cycle of escalation in the Angolan conflict. Soviet intervention 
has been variously explained as the result of opportunism and pragmatism. Leading the 
opportunist view, Porter noted that Moscow simply took advantage of extremely easy 
pickings.304 Legum, on the other hand, argued that the Soviet actions in Angola were 
not being opportunistic, but pragmatic and tactical’'.305
302 Grande, William. Leo. "Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa", Cuban 
Studies/Estudios Cubanos, Vol. 10, No. 1. January 1980, p. 20
303 New York Times, January 30, 1976. The number of Cuban military personnel in 
Angola in 1976 reached between 15,000 and 18,000 men. See, Petersen, Charles. C. and 
Durch, William. J. "Angolan Crisis Deployments (November 1975 to February 1976)", in 
Bradford, Dismukes and McConnell, James (eds.), Soviet Naval Diplomacy. (New York: 
Pergamon, 1979), p. 146-67.
304 Porter, Bruce. The USSR in Third World Conflicts. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984).
305 Legum, Cohn. “Foreign Intervention in Angola”, Africa Contemporary Record, Vol. 
8,1975-76, (London: Rex Colings, 1976), A 3-38.
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an*Another factor was ideology. The MPLA was regarded as a regime of shared values. 
Other factors included Sino-Soviet rivalry and the fear of a US-Chinese condominium 
in Southern Africa. Sino-Soviet rivalry was an important but not a sufficient 
interpretation of Soviet motives.307 It should not be overestimated: Chinese support of 
the FNLA in 1974 may have spurred the Soviets and Cubans to back the MPLA, but 
Peking folded its hands and withdrew well before the escalation of the war in 
November 1975. The massive Soviet-Cuba commitment took place well after China 
was out of the scene. Garthoff s observation is more plausible. He argues that “the 
'parallel view' held by Washington and Peking on Angola may have heightened Soviet 
fear of a possible US-Chinese condominium, but that Soviet action was directed more 
against Washington than Peking".308 Porter also shared Garthoff s view. To quote him 
again: “from November 1975 to the end of the war, the Kremlin was clearly more 
concerned about Washington's action than about Peking's propaganda".309 Thus, it 
could be argued that the Soviet intervention in Angola fitted its grand design for Africa, 
in line with its ‘symbolic victory’ in the Nigerian war. The ‘rules’ of detente were 
insufficient to prevent these states from intervention.
306 For instance, the MPLA was rated as one of the “vanguard revolutionary democratic 
parties”. These vanguard revolutionary democratic parties were in the Class A category 
of the Soviets classification of the national liberation movements. In fact only seven were 
members of this exclusive club out of about 80. The activities of the group and the way 
they are treated by the Communist Party of Soviet Union (CPSU) highlight their special 
place in the national liberation movement. Their leaders were accorded the privilege of 
addressing the main session of the 26th CPSU Congress in February-March 1981, an 
honour extended to leaders of only 26 of the 83 regular foreign Communist parties in 
attendance. See, Spaulding, Wallace. “Checklist of the National Liberation Movement”, 
Problem of Communism, Vol. XXXI, March-April 1982, p. 75, and p. 80.
307 Legum, Colin. “National Liberation in Southern Africa”, Problems of Communism, 
Vol. XXIV, Jan-Feb 1975, p.7.
308 Garthoff, Raymond. Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relationships 
from Nixon to Reagan. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 529. 
According to Garthoff, while Kissinger stated twice in news conferences in December 
1975 that the U.S. and China had "parallel views", and even policies in Angola, he made 
clear that U.S. decisions and actions were not "coordinated" with Beijing.
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Another explanation could be found in game theory analysis. The Soviet Union was 
more of a jealous power, than an opportunist. First, it is doubtful whether the Soviets 
believed, as they insisted, that they were not breaking the rule of detente.310 Both 
superpowers were cheating each other. Cheating becomes unacceptable within the 
game if it imposes a considerable cost on the party that is being cheated. It was business 
as usual for Moscow. But assuming Moscow did recognise that it was breaking the 
rules, there were no comparable domestic constraints as they were in Washington to 
make the Soviets desist. Secondly, it would be an illusion to believe that with nuclear 
parity status achieved, the Soviet Union would remain a satisfied power. Bismarckian 
Germany was an example of an un-satiated power. Power is like alcohol, intoxicating. 
The rule of detente had to be broken for the Soviet Union to project its power globally. 
Angola's geopolitical position was undoubtedly an important Soviet consideration. 
Zaire, Angola's northeastern neighbour had been a primary target of the Soviet Union's 
Africa policy since the Congo crisis of early 1960s. A breakthrough in Angola could 
also extend Soviet's influence to Namibia, and so to the threshold of South Africa. Each 
of the motives identified above is plausible. Yet there is a missing element. Why did the 
Soviets use international law as part of their grand strategy? To answer this question it 
is necessary to examine the Soviet understanding of the international law of wars of 
national liberation.
4.7. Soviet Union and the international law of wars of national liberation
To the Soviets, wars of national liberation constituted the third most important 
component of the ‘world revolutionary process’, after the ‘world socialist system and
309 Porter, op cit.
156
the revolutionary movement of the working class in capitalist countries.311 Broadly 
conceived, wars of national liberation were waged to defend people from foreign attack 
and from attempts to enslave them, to liberate the people from capitalist slavery, or 
lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent territories from the yoke of the imperialism.312 
For our purposes, it is this last justification-that is to liberate colonies and dependent 
territories from the yoke of colonialism-that is relevant.
In the wake of the Second World War, there emerged a consensus in the international 
community on the necessity of putting an end to all forms of domination, exploitation, 
including racist and minority regimes. Yet the Soviet Union and the Western countries 
had opposing views on the means of achieving self-determination and the nature of 
assistance to the liberation movements. Thus, Kremlin’s view of these wars borrowed 
largely from Lenin’s interpretation of the First World War, as later developed by 
Soviets jurists:
‘The national-liberation war of dependent people against the 
colonial power will always be a just, defensive war from the 
political as well as the legal standpoint, independently of 
who initiated the military action. This means that the national 
liberation war begun by a dependent, disenfranchised people 
will represent but a lawful act on its part in response to an act 
of aggression committed earlier by the imperialist state 
which led to the forcible enslavement of said people and the 
territory which it occupies”.313
Since Lenin, the Kremlin had maintained that any struggle between a colonial power 
and a native independence movement amounted to a formal international war since it
310 Washington Post, January 12,1977.
311 Spaulding, op cit., p. 77.
312 See, History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), Short 
Course 167-168, (Edited by a Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1939).
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represented an armed collision between two distinct entities, each fully acknowledged 
as a subject of international law in its own right. It had even tried to bring the colonial 
conflicts within the scope of the notion of aggression.314 Thus, in the Soviet view, any 
resistance to the free realisation by the peoples of the right to self-determination 
represented a violation of the norms of international law, and the letter and spirit of the 
UN. Consequently, the Soviets professed to believe that the UN must act as an 
institutional guarantor of the rights of the national liberation movements and the 
legitimacy of their use of force in situations where they were denied the right to self- 
determination. Unsurprisingly, this interpretation of the law was contested, if only 
because it appeared to contradict Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.315 The Charter 
acknowledges the right of people to self-determination, but does not prescribe any 
specific procedure for its implementation. For example, Resolution 1514 (1960) known 
as the 1960 decolonization declaration explored the various strategies and tactics for
T  1 iT
opposing colonialism. Yet it did not contain any provision permitting a colonial 
people to use force for the realisation of their rights. The implementing provisions 
simply stated that the immediate steps should be taken to transfer all powers to the 
colonial people.
313 Ginsburgs, George. “Wars of National Liberation” and the Modem Law of Nations-The 
Soviet Thesis”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, Autumn 1964, 
Duke University-School of Law, p. 920.
314 Ibid., p. 918.
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Islam, Rafiqul. M. “Use of force in self-determination claims”, The India Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 25, No. 3 and 4, July-December 1985, p.434.
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The 1960 Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), See, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1960, p. 46.
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The right to use violence to achieve self-determination was claimed explicitly for the 
first time in Resolution 2625 (1970) known as the 1970 declaration.317 It was intended 
in the 1960 declaration that the colonial powers would promote the realisation of self- 
determination of dependent people in good faith. The shift was partly a consequence of 
Portugal’s refusal to decolonise, and partly the robust posture adopted by the newly 
independent African states in the UN.318 In 1964, for example, all anti-colonial 
struggles, including armed struggles, were declared entirely legal by the conference of 
Afro-Asian jurists.319 In the same year the conference of non-aligned states agreed that 
‘colonial peoples may legitimately resort to arms to secure the full exercise of their 
right to self-determination and independence if colonial powers persist in opposing 
their natural aspirations.320 It is important to put the 1970 declaration into proper 
historical context. The 1969 Lusaka manifesto of the OAU became the text of the 1970 
General Assembly declaration. It was partly informed by Portugal’s and Spain’s 
reluctance to allow their colonies the right to self-determination. It was also partly an 
attempt by the African group to establish their claim to contribute to the making of 
international law in the international arena. It was partly to reinforce the view that 
armed resistance should become the alternative means to secure self-determination. 
Despite this trend toward the approval of the violent exercise of self-determination, the 
western countries refused to accept its legality. They maintained that the right to use 
force as an act of self-defense had specifically been accorded to the UN members under
317 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co­
operation Among States in Accordance With the Charter of the UN, UNGA Resolution 
2625 (XXV) of 24 October 1970, for brevity hereafter cited as ‘the 1970 declaration’, for 
the text, see International Legal Materials, Vol. 9, (1970), p. 1292.
318 Islam, op cit., p. 434.
319 Umozurike, U. Self-Determination in International Law, (New York: Archon 
Books, 1972), p. 80-81.
320 For the text of the NAM Cairo Summit of 1964, see, Indian Journal of International 
Law, Vol. 4, (1964), p. 603.
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Article 51. Since membership was open only to sovereign states (Article 4 of the 
Charter), national liberation movements could not justify their resort to force by 
referring to Article 51.321
The other area of disagreement was the nature of external support and assistance. The 
1970 declaration signified that third states are permitted to render assistance to the 
people struggling for the fulfilment of their rights. However, the nature of the support 
that could be given was not specified. Controversy over the nature of aid was manifest 
in the Special Committee debate where two opposite views emerged. The Afro-Asian 
and the Socialist states argued that foreign armed assistance could be sought and 
received within the scope of the right to seek and receive external aid. The western 
states maintained that such aid could only include moral and political support. On the 
insistence of the Western countries group a right to seek and receive foreign aid was 
granted instead of direct foreign assistance.322 This authorisation was thus designed to 
avoid legitimising any attempt to seek outside armed intervention, although it was 
subsequently disingenuously construed as embracing a wide variety of military aids, 
including armed intervention. According to Higgins, “such external support and 
military aids are so frequent in recent years that there is, as has been asserted, an 
‘incipient’ rule of customary international law which permits such assistance.323 As 
will be shown in the next section, it could be argued that the United States covert and 
financial supports for the FNLA, and later UNITA were within the bounds of the 1970 
declaration. On the other hand, the presence of the Cuban forces and the Soviets
321 Dugard, C. “The OAU and Colonialism: An Inquiry into the Plea of Self-Defence as a 
Justification for the Use of Force in the Eradication of Colonialism”, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 46, (1967), p. 171-77.
322 Islam, op cit., p. 443.
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advisers in Angola appeared to stretch the 1970 declaration to its limits, if not to 
establish a total breach of it. To show to their opposition to armed struggle, the United 
States, Britain, France, West Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg cast the six negate 
votes when the General Assembly voted in December 1976. The vote was 197-6. It 
was the first time the UN had ever endorsed armed struggle by a national liberation 
movement. In spite of its opposition to armed struggle, and as its behaviour in Angola 
indicated, the United States did not rule out giving assistance to armed liberation 
movements
4.8. The United States in Angola
The United States did not pretend that its involvement in Angola was based on legal 
considerations, yet it was unwittingly constrained by liberal and domestic pressures. 
The rationale for the American intervention rested on Kissinger's view of global 
stability in terms of equilibrium between major international actors. Despite stiff 
opposition from the Congress,325 Kissinger believed that Soviet expansionism had to be 
stopped. This rationale can be broken down into three parts: to contain the Soviet 
Union; to maintain the strategic status-quo in Africa; and to serve as a strategic shield 
for South Africa in the midst of neighbouring and internal communist storms.
323 Higgins, Rosalyn. “International Law and Civil Conflict”, in E. Eduard, (ed.), 
International Regulation of Civil Wars, (London: Thames and Hudson, 1972), p. 183.
324 Africa Report, “Namibia”, Vol. 22, No. 2, March-April 1977, p. 32.
325 The Senate voted 54-22 on December 19, 1975 to approve the Turney Amendment to 
the Financial Year 1976 defense appropriation bill cutting off all funds for CIA's military 
assistance to the FNLA and UNITA.
326 Providing ’shield' for allies and friends if threatened by a nuclear power is one of the 
core objectives of Nixon Doctrine. It was therefore not surprising that America wanted to 
do so for South Africa, when the latter felt threatened with communist storms both 
externally and domestically. For a comprehensive analysis of the Nixon Doctrine, see 
Kissinger, Henry Diplomacy, (London: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 708.
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In explaining the Ford administration's decision to intervene in Angola, Kissinger left 
no doubt about his priorities: "America's modest direct strategic and economic interests 
in Angola are not the central issue. The question is whether America still maintains the 
resolve to act as responsibly as a great power”.327 “A failure to counter Moscow's 
moves in southern Africa could”, Kissinger declared, “encourage expansion elsewhere 
and cause our allies to question our will to defend them.” “Should foreign countries 
begin to doubt American resolve, we are likely to find a massive shift in the foreign 
policies of many countries and a fundamental threat over a period of time to the 
security of the United States. If Moscow get away with this one, it will try again soon in 
some other area”.328 The United States made clear that if the Soviet Union had not been 
in Angola, it would not have cared which party came to power in Luanda,329 although 
whether this is true is doubtful. Within the Soviet’s club of national liberation 
movements, the MPLA was primus inter pares. Its socialist doctrines made it an 
unlikely candidate for an American client. The United States support for the FLNA and 
UNITA was probably not unconnected with their preference for capitalism. The CIA's 
Angolan Operation dubbed IAFEATURE was a $32 million covert support to Holden 
Roberto's FNLA.330 With the demise of FNLA, the pendulum of America's support 
swung to Jonas Savimbi's UNITA.
327 Henry Kissinger press conference, Pittsburgh, November 11, 1975.
328 Henry Kissinger testimony, sub-committee on African Affairs, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, January 29,1976.
329 The most useful analyses of the U.S. decision to intervene in Angola are Morris, 
Roger. "The Proxy War in Angola", The New Republic, January 31, 1976, p. 19-23; 
Davis, Nathaniel. "The Angola Decision of 1975: A Personal Memoir", Foreign Affairs, 
Vol. 57. No. 1 (Fall 1978), p. 109-24; and Hyland, William. Mortal Rivals. (New York: 
Random House, 1987), p. 130-47.
330 Stockwell, John. In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story. (New York: W. W. Norton, 
1978), p. 55, 67, 162, 206-7. John Stockwell was chief of the CIA Angolan Task Force 
during the civil war. The CIA provided Holden Roberto limited financial and material 
assistance during 1962-69, through President Mobutu of Zaire; and later trained him 
(Roberto) as an intelligence agent. See New York Times, September 25,1975.
162
It was Kissinger's belief that any marginal increase in Soviet power would disrupt both
the global and regional balances of power. In the era of parity, he argued that:
When one great power tips the balance of forces 
decisively in a local conflict through its military 
intervention-and meets no resistance-an ominous 
precedent is set, of grave consequence even if the 
intervention occurs in a seemingly remote area.331
A study by the Congressional Research Service reinforced this view. It saw the role of 
the third world in international relations as multi-purpose subsidiaries that could be 
used to enhance or lessen the power ingredients of a superpower. It reasoned further 
that there was a necessity of maintaining regional balances so that the larger global 
balance might be preserved.332 This CRS study resonates with the Kissinger’s brand of 
realism.
Kissinger began with a simple premise: any event should be judged foremost by 
whether it represented a gain for the Soviets or for the West in the overall global 
balance. In Angola however, it was American ‘credibility’ that was at stake. In the 
wake of post-Vietnam depression, Kissinger concluded that America could not abandon 
its commitments without undermining its influence elsewhere in the world.333 
Notwithstanding, the ‘credibility case’ is fraught with problems, such as the lack of 
clarity between vital and peripheral interests. Yet within the realist tradition, 
maintaining a state’s position in the hierarchical order of power is a non-negotiable
1
Kissinger, address in San Francisco on February 3, 1976, Department of State 
Bulletin, (February 23,1976), p. 209.
332 This excerpt from the study by the Congressional Research Service is quoted in 
Klinghoffer, A. J., The Angolan Civil War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third 
World, (Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1980), p. 77.
333 Isaacson, op cit. p. 656.
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matter. In Angola, Kissinger did not want America’s credibility to be called into 
question as it had been in Vietnam, therefore, he was determined to resist any challenge 
to the US position.
Sceptics have maintained that Kissinger’s strong commitment in Angola was to save 
his own intellectual ego. Their argument was that the Angolan independence refuted the 
main premise of the NSM-39 of 1969, which stated that "the whites [of southern 
Africa] are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come about is 
through them".334
There was also an economic dimension to Kissinger’s policy. Shielding South Africa 
from communist encroachment meant the preservation of the region's linkages to the 
international economic system. For instance, by 1971, the United States had about $1 
billion investment in South Africa, representing about 300 firms. Trade with South 
Africa amounted in 1972 to $597.1 million in exports and $324.7 million in imports. To 
put the investment into perspective, it represented 15% of the total foreign investment 
in South Africa. For the U.S., this represented 25% of its total investment on the 
African continent.335 Compared to US's global investment, this was insignificant, but
334 For a brief but insightful analysis of the NSM-39 and the contradictions inherent the 
American foreign policy during Nixon, see, Robert Sutherland Litwark, Detente and the 
Nixon Doctrine: American Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability, (An 
Unpublished thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations, London School 
of Economics, University of London, May 1981, chapter six focuses exclusively on the 
Angolan Civil War, p. 305; and Legum, Colin. “The Role of the Big Powers” in Legum, C. 
Hodges, T. After Angola: The War over Southern Africa. (London: Rex Collins, 1976), 
p. 41.
335 This economic data was extracted from the statement of David D. Newsome, the US 
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs to the Sub-committee on Africa of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, March 27, 1973, U.S. House of Representatives, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), 
p. 578-79.
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the fear of a communist government in Angola influencing events in South Africa 
(through the ANC and the South Africa Communist Party) was sufficient to threaten the 
margin of advantage enjoyed by the American investors. It was therefore considered 
important for the United States, to maintain, if not to expand its market share in South 
Africa and its neighbourhood.
The Angolan conflict also highlighted the impact of domestic structures on foreign 
policy. Kissinger’s favoured confrontational stance in Angola did not win domestic 
support. The lack of support from both the Congress and some of the State 
Department bureaucracy did not put an end to realpolitik. The paradox of the 
Congressional action was an outcome, which imposed an idealist map on a realist 
landscape. Angola converted Kissinger, the prince of realism to ‘idealism’ 
peremptorily. Paradoxically, an analysis done for realpolitik led to the re-adoption of an 
idealist motif within American foreign policy. Yet Kissinger’s overarching concerns 
were still global equilibrium, and the relative position of the United States to the Soviet 
Union, but he was forced to abandon the threat of the use of force, and to reinvent the 
values based on the Wilsonian tradition. In other words, it became necessary to 
accommodate South Africa, the black Africa states, and the liberation movements 
(those that had previously seen as the handmaidens of Moscow) to offset the gains of 
the Soviets. This is the pillar that supported the strategy of Henry Africanus.
336 For instance, on December 19,1975, the Senate voted 54-22 to approve the Tumey 
Amendment to the Financial Year 1976 Defense Appropriation Bill cutting off all funds 
for CIA’s military assistance to the FNLA and UNITA. In January 1976 this amendment 
to the Defense Department appropriations bill received an equally one-sided vote in the 
House. Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1975, Vol. 31, (Washington, D.C.: 
Congressional Quarterly, 1976), p. 885-886. See, Stockwell, John. In Search of Enemies: 
A CIA Story. (New York: W.W. Norton, 1978).
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In effect, negotiating the end of white minority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia and 
encouraging reform in South Africa was America’s strategy to pre-empt Soviet gains in 
southern Africa.337 Politics remained usual in US-Soviet relations, but in relation to 
Africa with a different American methodology- ‘containment through mediation’. The 
change was clearly due to the failure of covert action. More importantly, the new 
strategy incorporated the Rhodesian and Namibian conflicts. It was then assumed that 
using the political and economic leverage of the United States to act as peacemaker, 
rather than searching for enemies, was a more effective way to exclude the Soviets 
from Namibia and Rhodesia. The Namibia conflict became an externality from the 
balance of power by default. It is however, difficult to tell, whether America’s 
relationship with South Africa was a benefit or a liability. Kissinger had to maintain a 
delicate balance between the American relationship with South Africa, and his sceptical 
African friends.
4.9. South Africa and the Angolan conflict
South Africa’s intervention in Angola was initially limited to the supply of arms and 
advice to UNITA. But as the MPLA was seen to be gaining military advantage, the 
prospect of a left-wing government in Angola that would provide a cover for the ANC 
unsettled the apartheid government. In October 1975, Pretoria encouraged by 
Washington, decided to dispatch several thousand of South African regular troops into 
Angola.338 In order to disguise its direct involvement, these troops moved north towards
337 Clough, Michael. Free at Last: U.S. Policy Toward Africa and the End of the Cold
War. (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), p. 10.
In his autobiography, former South African Prime Minister, F. W. de Klerk revealed 
that: “when Angola had become independent in 1975, South Africa had been asked by the 
United States and several moderate African countries to come to the aid of UNITA and the 
FNLA. We had done so, but had to withdraw when the US Congress demanded the end to 
any US involvement in the war. As a result, the Cuban-backed Marxist MPLA had been
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Luanda, and later joined the UNITA forces, whose power base was in the south of 
Angola. It was in summer 1977 that the South African government declared that it 
joined forces with the UNITA to fight the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA between 
September 1975 and March 1976. It listed three principal reasons for its intervention: to 
defend the Cuene River hydroelectric and irrigation project; to facilitate "hot pursuit" 
tactics against the SWAPO based in southern Angola, and to aid the FNLA and UNITA 
against Communist infiltration.339 A major incentive leading to South Africa's direct 
intervention was its perceived geopolitical-security concerns. Pretoria worried about 
challenges to itself as well as its continued control of Namibia.340
South Africa feared that with a left-wing MPLA government in Angola and FRELIMO 
government in Mozambique, the spectre of communism was growing in its perimeter. 
The Portuguese coup removed the 'buffer' provided by other white regimes in the 
region. A South African defense document noted that, "the threat to the Republic within 
the ambit of the communist international battle for world domination is also related to 
the increase and establishment of communist influence and presence in Southern 
Africa, the India Ocean and its littoral countries".341 More generally, South Africa was 
concerned about what it perceived to be a total Communist onslaught on the African 
continent. Prime Minister Vorster charged the Soviets and the Cubans that: "their aim is 
not simply the establishment of a Marxist state in Angola, but to endeavour to secure a
able to consolidate its hold over the country. See, de Klerk, F. W. The Last Trek: An 
Autobiography (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. 68.
339 Facts on File, Vol. 37. No. 1892, Feb 12 1977, p. 85-86
340 Rothchild and Hartzell, in Levite et al, op cit., p. 169.
341 Republic of South Africa, Department of Defense, White Paper on Defense and 
Armament Production, 1975, p. 7.
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whole row of Marxist states from Angola to Dar-es-Salam".342 Besides its fear of 
communism South Africa was concerned about the OAU’s position on Angola and 
Namibia.
The OAU did not condemn the large scale Soviet-Cuban involvement in Angola after 
the breakdown of the Alvor Accord. South Africa had hoped that the OAU would 
abide with its policy of opposition to any superpower intervention. Despite Nigerian 
criticisms on the continued presence of the Soviets and Cuban troops in Angola,343 the 
OAU continued to provide the institutional framework for activity against South Africa 
both within and outside African continent.
The OAU had established the African Liberation Committee (ALC) in 1963. In 1970, 
the Committee recognised the ANC and the PAC as legitimate liberation movements in 
South Africa. At the OAU Summit in Rabat, Morocco, the Freedom Fund was 
increased by 50% while the ALC membership was enlarged from 11 to 17. Its 
inclusion of the liberation movements in the deliberations of the Council of Ministers 
(before they had been limited to observer status) was aimed against South Africa, 
which was not even accepted as a member of the OAU.344 The dilemma for South 
Africa was that at the time that the OAU and NAM were mounting a concerted 
campaign to isolate the South African government from the social and international
342 Hallet, Robin. "The South African Intervention in Angola, 1975-76", African Affairs, 
No. 308. July 1978, p. 363
343 The Nigerian head of state, General Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-79), in one of his 
speeches before the OAU in 1977 warned Soviet Union and Cuba that “Africa is not about 
to throw off one colonial yoke for another”, he added that what Africans need are 
economic and technological assistance and “not military hardware for self-destruction and 
sterile ideological slogans which have no relevance to our African society”. Africa 
Contemporary Record, 1978-1979, (London: Rex Collins, 1980), p. 34.
344 Africa Record, July-August 1972, p. 10.
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sporting events,345 Pretoria was confronted with a fracture on the US-South African 
axis. South Africa believed that it had been first encouraged to support UNITA and 
then left in the lurch when the Senate blocking further American involvement.346 South 
Africa was constrained in its ability to control Namibia when it was embroiled in the 
Angolan conflict. In retrospect, South Africa’s intervention in Angola was too 
ambitious. Prime Minister Vorster belatedly acknowledged that: “the Soviet Union was 
sending sophisticated weapons to Angola, only big powers can affect this arsenal. It is 
certainly beyond our limits” 347 When the Angolan conflict was really beyond the limits 
of the South African government, its main preoccupation shifted back to Namibia. But 
its effort to affect the emerging shift in the regional balance of power established the 
connection between the Angolan conflict and the Namibian question.
4.10. Angola and Namibia: A marriage of convenience
Prior to the installation of the MPLA government in Luanda, SWAPO was operating 
from military bases in Zambia. These bases were distant from Namibia and 
consequently made it difficult to pursue effective successful military operations.
345 The OAU’s charter strongly condemned the apartheid policies. Through the OAU’s 
effort, South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth, excluded from the Economic 
Commission of Africa and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation. Yet the effectiveness of the OAU strategy was always undermined by some 
African countries such as Zambia, Malawi, which economically dependent on South 
Africa and Ivory Coast and the Western powers at the Security Council level. See, South 
Africa: Time Running Out, -A Report of the Study Commission on US Policy Toward 
Southern Africa, (Berkeley, CA.: University of California Press, 1981), p. 295-297.
346 Arguably, South Africa may have forgiven the United States on the Angolan issue, but 
it never forgot. Paradoxically, Washington’s action could be seen as a blessing in disguise 
for South Africa. It prompted South Africa’s withdrawal from Angola, and perhaps saved 
it from a worse fate: the Vietnamization of southern Africa. See, Campbell, Kurt. M. “The 
Soldiers of Apartheid”, SAIS Review, Winter-Spring 1988, p. 43-56; and Spence, Jack. E. 
“Current Trends in South African Foreign Policy”, The South African Institute of 
International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3, December 1976, p. 1-16.
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However, the MPLA victory changed their prospects. SWAPO acquired a militant ally 
in MPLA's Neto and got permission to attack the South African forces from close range 
on the Angolan border. Moses Garoeb, SWAPO's secretary general noted in March 
1976:
"The independence on Angola, under the government of 
the MPLA, has changed the whole situation of our 
liberation. Many of our supplies are going to come 
through Luanda and other ports along the coast of Angola.
The armed struggle can only intensify and increase. We 
have that long border with Angola now, there is no way 
South Africa can barricade itself fully against our 
efforts."348
SWAPO and the MPLA formalised co-operation in February 1976, when Nujoma 
transferred his headquarters and training camps to Luanda.349 Pledging Angolan support 
for Namibia's liberation, Neto indicated that he would not remain passive as long as the 
South Africans were in Namibia: Angola would always be in danger of being invaded 
again. In return for this support, Nujoma renounced his past association with UNITA's 
Jonas Savimbi.350 In addition to providing a dependable rear base for PLAN, Neto 
facilitated their training by Cuban and Soviet military instructors. After the 
formalisation of MPLA-SWAPO links, Garoeb said: "the Cubans are already helping 
with aid and training. SWAPO now has the initiative. The balance of arms is in 
SWAPO's favour as South Africa no longer has the monopoly that it had previously in
347 Jaster, Robert. The Defense of White Power: South African Foreign Policy Under 
Pressure, (Basingstoke: Macmillan with International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London, 1988), p. 74.
348 Southern Africa, April 1976, p. 5-6.
349 Khadiagula, Gilbert. M. Allies in Adversity: The Frontline States in Southern 
African Security. (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1994), p. 99.
350 Africa Confidential, 10 February 1976, p. 5; Burchett, Wilfred. Southern Africa 
Stands Up: The Revolutions in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Namibia, South 
Africa, (New York: Urizen Books, 1978), p. 128.
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that field, seeing that SWAPO has the same weapons as the MPLA in Angola such as 
Soviet-made AK47 automatic rifles”.351
According to Dreyer Angolan independence reinforced co-operation between SWAPO 
and ANC.352 The relationship between SWAPO and ANC was not organic, but a 
function of necessity. For many years, the ANC suspected SWAPO’s commitment to 
socialism. Until 1976, SWAPO was on the soft side of the socialist spectrum; and it 
found it difficult to fit into the hard socialist philosophy of the ANC-SACP alliance. In 
1976, SWAPO adopted its first political programme that positioned it as a “vanguard 
party capable of safeguarding national independence and of building a classless, non- 
exploitative society based on the principles and ideals of scientific-socialism”.353 The 
MPLA, ANC and SWAPO became allies on the political and ideological levels as well 
as in the field from 1976. In a self-confession, Namibia Review, a government 
publication argued in 1993, that: “in theory, SWAPO as a liberation movement was 
considered a socialist, but in practice, it was not. The Namibia Review revealed that: ‘ a 
number of factors created this belief, such as the flirtation of SWAPO’s political 
programme with the concept of scientific socialism, and the fact that SWAPO was
351 Daily News, 18 February 1976.
352 Dreyer, op cit., p. 103.
353 According to Checklist of the National Liberation Movements, SWAPO belonged to 
what could be called the ‘Class C category’. These were national liberation movements 
that through their membership of the World Peace Council were regarded by the Soviets as 
the most important of the international Communist front organizations ranking, viewed 
with skepticism that they would gather support from any quarter. Most of their relationship 
with Moscow was often based on opportunism. None of the leadership of this category was 
given the privilege of addressing the 26th Congress of the CPSU in Feb-March 1981. See, 
Spaulding, op cit. p. 78 and p. 81.
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receiving arms and military training in ‘socialist countries’. It is important to note that 
SWAPO turned to the East for military support after the West refused to assist”.354
The relationship between SWAPO and MPLA was also a marriage of convenience. It 
would later impose more costs than benefits on the two parties, as each was confronted 
with multiple political, diplomatic and strategic realities. It was a relationship of 
unequal. The MPLA was always mindful of its status as a governing party, whose aim 
included the preservation of the territorial integrity of the Angolan state. SWAPO’s 
bases in Angola often made this task difficult. Strategic co-operation between SWAPO 
and MPLA was not sufficient to allow SWAPO to defeat the South African forces. In 
numerical and strategic terms, SWAPO's guerrilla efforts could not match South Africa 
military capability. However, its 'hit and run' tactics inflicted a considerable human and 
economic cost on South Africa. It made winning the war difficult for South Africa, 
despite its military superiority.
The presence of UNITA forces in most of SWAPO's operational areas also impeded its 
ability to conduct an effective guerrilla war. When SWAPO established close political 
relations with Luanda and Zambia expelled UNITA forces, Savimbi found sanctuary in 
northern Namibia as a guest of the South African government. With a base at 
Grootfontein and continued logistical support from South Africa, UNITA began 
harassing the MPLA and SWAPO. For example, in August 1976 Jorge Sangumba,
354 Namibia Review: A Review of Policy and Development Vol. 2. No. 1. January 1993, 
p. 14. It could be argued that SWAPO had always advocated the establishment of a mixed 
economy. It also relied on the Nordic countries to support the construction and 
management of its educational centres in Angola, Zambia and the Congo. Some of its 
leaders, in fact, admired social democracy, or hidden capitalism as practiced in Sweden.
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UNITA's spokesman, indicated that his movement was committed to defeating
SWAPO because:
"a SWAPO victory would make it impossible for us to 
continue to operate from Namibia. Our objective is to 
create a Vietnam-type situation in which the Soviet-Cuban 
troops are cast in the role of the American government.
The UNITA forces will take on SWAPO and its allies 
until the Luanda government concedes to our demands".355
Suffice to conclude that there exists a confluence of interest between South Africa and 
United States in southern Africa, that is the maintenance of regional and global balance 
of power respectively. In particular, the United States was motivated by the expansion 
of the Soviet Union into the southern Africa, an action that it interpreted as a complete 
breach of the rules of detente. South Africa, however, seized the opportunity of the 
Soviet-Cuban presence in Angola to present itself to the West as a bastion against 
communism in southern Africa. It was a strategy devised to end its isolation from the 
international community, and simultaneously to curtail the influence of those forces 
that threatened its regional dominance. It has also been established that the Soviets 
were in Angola as a demonstration of their global reach. Yet the Soviet presence in 
Angola brings us back to the central theme of this study-namely, the complex 
relationship between the balance of power and international law.
The Soviets presence in Angola cannot be explained solely in terms of power politics; it 
also resulted from the Soviets understanding of international law, especially as it 
regards wars of liberation. It is this understanding that accounts for the difference in 
the intensity of the United States and Soviet Union involvement in Angola. While the 
United States confined its involvement to the provision of financial resources to its
355 New African, August 1976, p. 35.
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favoured nationalist movement; the Soviet Union and Cuba favoured direct foreign 
involvement with men, advisers and resources. There emerged two paradoxes. One, the 
United States driven by power calculus, was involuntarily constrained by forces of 
idealism. Two, while the Soviet Union and Cuba legitimised their presence in Angola 
with the ‘just war’ doctrine,356 and stretched the 1970 declaration to its limits; the 
United States reverted to idealism to reposition itself in southern Africa. This was 
intended to pre-empt further Soviet gain in either Rhodesia or Namibia. This strategy 
created the opportunity that broke the stalemate between South Africa and the United 
Nations. Namibia was now directly involved in the great game.
4.11. Henry Africanus
The strategy of Henry Africanus modelled on Kissinger’s ‘shuttle diplomacy’ in the 
Middle East.357 It described Kissinger's efforts in resolving the southern African 
conflict through his series of meeting with both the South African Prime Minister John 
Vorster and the leaders of the Frontline States. It began in April 1976 and continued 
until the American presidential election of 1977. It started with a two-week trip to 
Africa between April 24- May 7, 1976. This trip marked Kissinger's debut as one of the 
determining influences in African affairs; and his willingness to use moralism as a 
foreign policy tool. In his pre-trip message before the Congress, Kissinger described his 
mission as intended to establish with African leaders a 'community of concerns'
o r / :
A close reading of the speeches of the Soviets Representatives to the United Nations 
indicated that they constantly repeated certain words like ‘just cause’ in relation to the 
colonial wars. For example, the Soviets Representative to the UN in 1976, Mr. Kharlamov, 
said during the Security Council Debate on Namibia on 19 October 1976 that: “the USSR 
fully supported the demands made by the representatives of African and other countries. It 
would continue to support the just cause of the African peoples struggling for freedom and 
independence. It would not slacken its efforts in the struggle to achieve a just solution to 
the question of Namibia”, See, United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XIII, No. 10, 
November 1976, p.121.
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specifically to the problem of the political evolution of southern Africa, and generally 
to the problem of African development'.358 The trip started in England with a 
consultation with the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crossland. It ended in France, 
when Kissinger gave a feedback on his visit to French President, Giscard d'Estaing.
There were probably two reasons for Kissinger’s consultation with London and Paris: 
Africa was never America's sphere of interest, hence it was desirable to keep the two 
former colonial powers informed before America ventured into the continent's affairs. 
Secondly, these two powers could be used to gain access to African leaders. Britain's 
access to Commonwealth Africa and the France's influence within LaFracophonie and 
Franco-African Summit could both be useful. In addition, Britain was directly involved 
in the Rhodesian issue, and an Anglo-American group had been formed to co-ordinate 
the two countries’ policies. From England, Kissinger's itinerary took him to Kenya and 
Tanzania in East Africa, to Zambia and Zaire in Central Africa, Liberia and Senegal in 
West Africa. The trip, encountered covert Soviet resistances-the Ghanaian government 
called off Kissinger's proposed visit, reportedly under pressures from the local 
intelligentsia and the Soviets.359
357 Adam, op cit., p. 59-60.
358 Department of State Bulletin (DSB), Vol. LXIV. No. 1925. May 17,1976, p. 623.
359 For various editorials in the local press critical of Kissinger's role in southern African 
affairs, see Ghanaian Times (Accra), 29 April 1976, p. 4; 11 May 1976, p. 4; 16 
September 1976, p. 4. It is significant that a petition circulated at the University of Ghana, 
Legon, prior to the visit's cancellation characterized Kissinger as the "enemy" for his 
policies on the Angolan issue.
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In Lusaka, Kissinger enunciated a 10-Point Initiative that primarily sought to address 
the issues of Rhodesia and Namibia. He depicted these two issues as containing 
seeds of greater conflict, which now required urgent attention. At one point, Kissinger 
pointedly referred to Rhodesia as Zimbabwe, the name given to it by the black 
nationalists. This won the hearts, but not the heads of many nationalist leaders. Progress 
on Namibia could result from direct negotiation between Kissinger and Vorster, 
whereas Kissinger had to use Vorster to get to Rhodesia's Ian Smith.
Passing from generalities to specifics on Namibia, America's position was unequivocal. 
It contained the following elements: a free and fair election and electoral system in 
Namibia under the United Nations' supervision, but which had the confidence of the 
United States; a consultative mechanism between the United States and the African 
leader on the transition programme; the easing of American trade and investment 
sanctions on Namibia; and a top-up of economic and technical assistance to Namibia 
once concrete movement toward self-determination was under way.
The realisation of these objectives was dependent on South Africa's co-operation and 
willingness to forgo its uncompromising posture. Kissinger tailored his speech to soften 
South Africa’s hard-line posture, and to gain the confidence of the African leaders. His 
strategy of divorcing South Africa's internal apartheid policies from the Rhodesia and 
Namibia issue won over Vorster.361 Apartheid was seen as a different phenomenon that 
required a different sort of influence on the part of the United States. Kissinger craftily
360 Kissinger’s Statement in Lusaka, 27 April, 1976, Africa Contemporary Record, 
1976-77, C161. (London: Rex Collings, 1977). See Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal, 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), p. 943.
361 It was later noted that Kissinger made no reference to majority rule in South Africa 
during his Lusaka address.
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disembodied political separateness from self-governance. Kissinger, an architect of 
‘linkage’, now de-coupled related issues. It worked: previously he had made clear that 
he was not concerned with apartheid, and Vorster agreed to negotiate the Namibian 
issue, and to persuade Ian Smith to abandon his internal self-determination. Although 
black African states wanted more robust American pressure against the Pretoria regime, 
by seeking an end to South African occupation in Namibia, an issue that had nearly 
defeated them, Kissinger had softened their criticisms. The United States was now
'I f S J
viewed as having a measure of understanding of African concerns. It was Kissinger, 
the student of Bismarck and Mettemich at work. In psychological terms, he was 
concerned with satisficing the main parties rather than satisfying them.
His Machiavellian strategy even started before he personally visited Africa. He had 
dispatched William E. Schaufele JR, the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs to the 
OAU Summit held in Ethiopia in January 1976 with the infamous ‘Ford letter’ on 
Angola. The letter suggested that United State's pressure would be brought against 
South Africa to withdraw its troops from Angola, if African leaders were to reject the 
intervention of communist forces in Angola.363Kissinger’s tactic was to ‘handcuff the 
Africans, with the knowledge that some OAU members, especially Nigeria, were 
expressing disquiet at the presence of the Soviets and Cuban forces in Africa. President 
Nyerere of Tanzania reacted indignantly. He defended the Soviet and Cuban role and 
said ’the Ford letter had contributed to the failure of the OAU’s special session on 
Angola.364
362 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXIV. No. 1925. May 17,1976, p. 623.
363 See Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1837. January 1976, p. 36.
364 See Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1835. January 10,1976, p. 16. At the January 13 OAU 
Extraordinary Session of the Head of States and Governments, there was a deadlock. The 
46-member organisation had a 22-22 split in the voting with 2 nations abstaining. They
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The April-May trip was followed with two American and two British missions at 
ministerial level. The Kissinger-Vorster Bonn’s meeting was the outcome of this shuttle
o r e
diplomacy. The venue of the meeting was the first procedural issue that had to be 
sorted out between United States and South Africa. Kissinger wanted Switzerland, 
while Vorster insisted on West Germany. On this issue, Vorster had his way, and the 
meeting was held in Bonn. Perhaps, as a compromise, the follow-up meeting was held 
in Zurich, Switzerland. In fact, the Bonn meeting was split into two sessions, and 
convened at their respective quarters. The first was held on 23 June at Bodenmais, 
where the South African delegation was housed. The second day’s talks took place at 
the United State headquarters at Grafenau, near the Czechoslovakia border.366
This meeting was explorative, but symbolic to both states. It was the first high-level 
meeting since the World War II between South Africa and the United States. Each party 
wanted to maximise its benefit. For the United States, the meeting represented a pre­
emptive strike to shape the course of events in southern Africa. It was also an 
opportunity to begin efforts towards achieving a negotiated solution in Rhodesia and 
Namibia.
For South Africa, the meetings represented a major diplomatic achievement and a step 
toward breaking out of Pretoria’s diplomatic cul de sac. No other statesman, except 
Kissinger could have been as useful to Pretoria. He was a Nobel Peace Prize Winner. In
were Ethiopia, the host state, and Uganda, whose president was the OAU Chairman for 
the year. The vote was polarised between the pro-MPLA nations led by Nigeria and those 
that favoured the formation of a government of national unity in Angola, led by Senegal.
365 New York Times, June 15,1976.
366 See Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1859. June 26,1976, p. 446.
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a Gallop poll, a few years earlier, he had been voted as the most admired person in 
America. A photo opportunity with Kissinger was worth more than a mere symbol to 
Vorster. It was an opportunity that many developing countries leaders often dreamt
' i f . n
of. Besides its symbolic role, the meeting had some political significance for South 
Africa. Just as its mandatory power status helped to confirm South Africa as a member 
of the family of nations, South Africa’s engagement with the United States on 
Namibia helped Pretoria to recover from its exclusion from ‘respectable’ international 
society due to its apartheid policies. In other words, South Africa was using the 
Namibian question to break loose out of the shackles of being a pariah.
To a limited extent, a preliminary assessment of Henry Africanus suggests a positive 
outcome. For instance, it led to a shift in the position of Cuba, albeit in a premature 
manner. For example, at the First Congress of the Cuba Communist Party held in 
Havana between December 17-22, 1975, Fidel Castro asserted that 'Cuba would 
continue to aid the MPLA and the Puerto Rican independence, even at the cost of 
continued hostility from the US'.369 In one of his responses to the OAU on January 11, 
1976, the Cuban Deputy Premier, Carlos Rafael Rodriquez, said that 'Cuba would 
continue to provide troops to the MPLA regardless of any resolution that the OAU may 
adopt regard foreign intervention in Angola'. During his April 1976 visit to Africa,
367 One anecdotal evidence revealed that when Kissinger visited Bolivia, protocol 
prevented the president of that country from being part of the welcome party, but he went 
to the airport that night anyway, incognito, and stood in the crowd anonymously so that he 
could witness Kissinger’s arrival. See, Washington Post, December 30,1973. It was 
reported that President Nyerere once claimed that: “ Africa only needs two men: God and 
Kissinger. If the two are with us, nothing can be against us”.
368 See Chapter Two of this study for more detail.
369 For a detailed account of the First Congress of the Cuban Communist Party of 
December 17-22,1975, see Facts on File, Vol. 35. No. 1833, December 27, 1975, p. 984. 
The MPLA was represented at the Congress by Lucio Lara.
370 See Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1835, January 10,1976.
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Kissinger hedged the US position by stating that it would only consider the 
normalisation of relations with Angola if Cuban troops were withdrawn.371 After 
Kissinger's visit, Castro, offered a partial withdrawal of the Cuban forces at a rate of 
200 per week, in a letter to the premier of Sweden, Olof Palme. Castro authorised 
Palme, who received the letter on May 21, to divulge its contents to Kissinger, who was 
in Stockholm on an official visit. Kissinger was notified of Castro's letter on May 24, 
1976;372 and he termed it as a ‘positive development’.'373 He later asked Palme to tell 
Cuba that the US still insisted upon a total withdrawal of Cuban troops; and that the US 
would not consider recognising the Luanda regime until such actions were taken.374
It is important not to exaggerate the influence of Henry Africanus on Cuban behaviour. 
The United States had limited leverage in this regard. Kissinger himself conceded that 
America had no equal diplomatic leverage with Cuba, as it had with the USSR because 
of the US-Soviet relations.375 To Cuba, the United States taunted the threat of MPLA's 
non-recognition and non-restoration of relations with Havana. In international 
diplomacy, non-recognition of one state by another is not a matter of concern to the 
third state. A state recognises another on the basis of its own rational explanation of 
cost and benefits. Arguably, Havana was not urgently pressed to restore diplomatic 
relations with Washington, given the knock-on effects of Cuba’s policies as 
immigration and border control problems to the United States. As it later emerged, it 
was Washington under the Carter administration in 1977 that made the first move 
towards a restoration of diplomatic relations with Havana.
371 Kissinger made the proposal in Monrovia, Liberia at a state dinner given in his honour 
by President William Tolbert. See. Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1852, May 8,1976, p. 318.
372 Facte on File, Vol. 36. No. 1855. May 29,1976, p. 370.
373 ibid.
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Perhaps, to demonstrate its leverage over the Soviet Union, the US Department of State 
announced on March 16, 1976 that because of actions such as the Soviet Union’s (and 
Cuba) in Angola have their penalties, the government have decided to defer further 
cabinet-level meetings of joint US-Soviet Commission. Robert L. Funseth, State 
Department spokesman said the decision was to postpone US participation in the joint 
Commission on housing, trade and energy, three of nine of such commissions. 
Washington was cautious though by not breaking off the SALT talks or the exportation 
of American grains to the USSR.376 It is clear that United States recognised the pecking 
order of issues in superpower relations. By implication, both Angola and Namibia 
became footnotes in the global balance of power. Yet each measured differently on the 
Richter scale of the great game, with Angola on a higher range than Namibia.
America had to make concessions as well. At the 31st session of the UN General 
Assembly, the United States formally showed its support for SWAPO.377 This support 
did not mean a formal recognition of SWAPO as the sole representative of the 
Namibian people, as the UN majority would have wanted. Washington also abandoned 
its vetoing of Angola's admission into the UN. In what he described as ' a new spirit of 
give and take', the US Ambassador to the UN, Mr Scraton, remarked that ‘'out of 
respect for the sentiments of our African friends, the US would discontinue its 
resistance to Angolan admission to the UN by refraining from casting another veto’.'378 
The US abstention on this occasion paved the way for Angola's admission on 
December 1, 1976 as the UN's 146th member-state. Yet Washington continued to ‘road
375 New York Times, February 6,1976.
376 Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1845. March 20,1976, p. 196.
377 Department of State Press Release 485, text from Bulletin 75, p. 497-510, 31st 
Regular Session of the UNGA, New York, Sept. 21-Dec. 22, 1976.
378 ibid., p. 59.
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block’ Angola’s membership of the International Monetary Fund, and did not formally 
recognise the MPLA government. Indeed, the absence of a diplomatic relationship 
between Washington and Luanda would later constrain the former’s effectiveness in 
negotiating with the latter on the Namibian issue.
Washington’s acceptance of SWAPO amongst the southern African nationalist
movements such as the ANC in South Africa, and the MPLA in Angola was
incongruous given its view that they were terrorists under the remote control of Soviet
Union. It showed however, that the United States recognised that SWAPO was sui
generis amongst these organisations. As earlier indicated, SWAPO was not a socialist
ideologue like the ANC or SACP.379 Political calculations rather than the essentials of
international law, as espoused by the United Nations informed the United States action.
Elaine Adam’s view that it was the respect for the United Nations that prompted the US
action on SWAPO is misleading. Adam noted that:
The United States itself had not been much enamoured of 
SWAPO whose leader, Sam Nujoma, was on close and 
friendly terms with the new Angolan government and 
boasted of substantial aid in the guerrilla struggle in 
Northern Namibia. At the same time, however,
Washington could see no virtue in attempting to bypass 
the United Nations and the territory's principal nationalist 
movement.380
As earlier argued, the US never saw SWAPO as the sole-representative of the peoples 
of Namibia, but as one of the political groupings, contrary to the wishes of the United 
Nations. Washington’s acceptance of SWAPO was intended to reinforce its bargaining
379 In fact, SWAPO’s internal wing was not banned in Namibia under the provisions of 
the Suppression of Communism Act, as were the ANC or the SACP in South Africa. 
SWAPO itself eschewed any ‘communist’ label, described itself as a “socialist, non- 
aligned political party”. See, Murray, Roger. “Namibia: No Easy Path to Independence”, 
Africa Report, Vol. 22, No. 3. May-June 1977, p. 18.
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strategy leverage over South Africa. If the US had not done so, it would not have had a 
strong voice in condemning the Tumhalle constitutional conference. Recognition was 
intended to gain the confidence of the African leaders. Washington knew that it had to 
‘paddle the boat’ with many African leaders inside it. Their confidence in America's 
initiative to act as a broker depended on its relationship with SWAPO, which since 
1965 had been recognised as the sole Namibian liberation movement by the OAU. 
Acceptance of SWAPO was thus politically expedient. Many OAU member states saw 
SWAPO as Namibia’s govemment-in-waiting’. It was this fact that had often hardened 
South Africa’s resolve to exclude it from the political process. According to Amheim,
"if SWAPO is going to take power, then it is best to be on good terms with it from the 
beginning. In other words, the West was competing with Russia in wooing what it had 
identified as the future government of Namibia-a country very rich in mineral wealth 
and also of some strategic importance."381 The Angolan experience was a warning to 
the United States of the consequences of backing the wrong horse.
What Washington did not know (or if it knew had never openly declared) was that neither 
the Soviet Union nor Cuba had a stranglehold on SWAPO. On Angola, the Soviet Union 
and Cuba publicly acknowledged their military and political support to MPLA, while their 
assistance to SWAPO was never publicly confessed. For instance, in his meeting with 
British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, on 25 March 1976, Soviet Foreign Minister, Andrei 
A. Gromyko reiterated that Moscow was not involved with nationalist movements in either 
Namibia or Rhodesia.382 Similarly, during his nine-day visit to southern Africa between 23
380 Adam, op cit., p. 59.
381 Amheim, M.T.W. South Africa After Vorster, (Cape Town: Howard Tmmins 
Publishers, 1979), p. 100.
382 Andrei A. Gromyko made the assertion at the conclusion of an official visit to London. 
Prior to his visit to London, James Callaghan, British Foreign and Commonwealth
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March to 1 April 1977, Soviet President, Nikolai Pogomy, and buttressed Gromyko's view 
of the Soviet's minimal interest in Rhodesia and Namibia. In his meeting with Joshua 
Nkomo of the Patriotic Front (Rhodesia), Oliver Tambo of the ANC (South Africa) and 
Sam Nujoma of SWAPO, he merely expressed Soviet support to the nationalist struggle in 
Rhodesia and Namibia.383
The position of Cuba on Namibia was largely rhetorical. It was resource-driven and 
resource constrained. In Dar-es-Salaam, during his historic one-month eight Arab and 
African countries tour between March 1-April 2, 1977, Castro unequivocally stated that 
Cuba's aid to Africa would not be stretched beyond Angola.384 At a press conference he 
declared that Cuban troops would not be sent to aid Black Nationalist guerrillas in
Minister had called on Soviet Ambassador to London, Nikolai Lunkuv, three times on 
March 15-19-1976 to express British concern over Soviet intervention in southern Africa. 
Hence, after his meeting with Harold Wilson, Groymko said the talks had covered the 
situation in Angola and the 'areas around Angola'. The meetings were also said to have 
related to South Africa's withdrawal of its forces from Angola. See Facts on File, Vol. 
36, No. 1846, March 27,1976, p. 228.
383 President Pogomy visited Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique. He also had an 
unexpected one-day visit to Somalia where Soviet Union maintained naval facilities. 
Pogomy's visit marked the first state visit of a top ranking Soviet official to southern 
Africa. Pogomy's tour could be interpreted as a move to consolidate Soviet influence in 
southern Africa, and to counter Kissinger's initiatives. However, at this time, Kissinger 
had taken the high moral ground. The high point of Pogomy visit was the signing of the 
Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation with Mozambique. The terms of the treaty 
indicated the possibility of direct Soviet involvement in any conflict threatening 
Mozambique's security and pledged continuing military co-operation. See Facts on File., 
Vol. 37, No. 1900. April 9. 1977, p. 248..
384 Cuban President, Fidel Castro visited eight Arab and black African countries between 
1 March-2 April, 1977. These included: Algeria, Libya, South Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Tanzania, Mozambique, and Angola. In Tanzania, he addressed African issues. The 
highlight of his tour was a nine-day visit to Angola. Castro declared March 24 that Cuba 
would "not place any limit on its co-operation" with Angola and would give the Luanda 
government "all the aid it needs". See Facts on File, Vol. 37. No. 1900. April 9, 1977, p. 
249. It was not clear whether Castro and Pogomy visit to Africa at the same time was 
coincidental or a deliberate act to muster a joint collaborative action to undermine 
America's efforts in southern Africa. For instance, at the end of his tour, Castro went to 
Moscow, where he met with the leading Soviet officials.
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Rhodesia and Namibia. “We believe the struggle for independence is primarily a task 
which belongs to the people concerned themselves, and independence is not bought 
from outside” he said.385 This statement contradicted Cuba’s policy in Angola.
4.12. Kissinger-and Vorster in Zurich
As earlier mentioned, the Bonn meeting was an exploratory one. It was followed with 
another in Zurich, Switzerland on Sept. 4-6, 1976, that focused on how to achieve 
majority rule in Rhodesia and South African acceptance of Resolution 385 (1976) on 
Namibia. Kissinger touched a painful nerve in South Africa politics, in the aftermath of 
the Soweto unrest of June 1976. According to Johnson, a deal was done in Zurich over 
the gold price, over foreign loans and the US veto in the Security Council.386 On 
Rhodesia, Vorster agreed to an Anglo-American plan to provide financial guarantees of 
about $2.0 billion for white Rhodesians to assure them of their rights in an independent 
Rhodesia as well as choice of emigration with financial compensation.387 The 
significance of the Zurich talks was that it broke the stalemate that existed between 
South Africa and the UN since the collapse of the Escher-Vorster discussions in early 
1973. For the first time, Vorster agreed to the Kissinger’s proposal for a conference on 
Namibian independence, which was scheduled for Geneva in October 1977. Also for 
the first time, Vorster acknowledged SWAPO as an important political faction, which 
had a role to play with other political groupings (especially those being sponsored by 
South Africa) in the political developments of Namibia. Furthermore, Henry Africanus
385 ibid. p. 249.
Johnson, R. W. How Long Will South Africa Survive. (London: Macmillan Press 
Limited, 1977), p. 247.
387 Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1870. September 11, 1976, p. 660. For a detailed 
discussion on the Rhodesian issue, see Windrich, Elaine, "Rhodesia: the Road from 
Luanda to Geneva”, The World Today, Vol. 33. No. 3. March 1977, p. 101-111.
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triggered a concerted action outside the mainstream UN and OAU platform from those 
states that are in the same neighbourhood with South Africa, commonly called the 
Frontline States.
4.13. The Frontline States: a facilitator
In tandem with the Zurich talks, the leaders of Frontline States met in Dar-es-Salaam to 
work out a concerted opinion of developments in the region.388 In response to the Zurich 
meeting in which Kissinger and Vorster had agreed to a UN-sponsored international 
conference, the FLS exerted its leverage over the SWAPO leadership. Accordingly, 
Nujoma agreed to discuss with South Africa arrangement for the transfer of power. More 
importantly, SWAPO was persuaded by the FLS, that attending the conference was the 
most beneficial option available. Failure to accept could have marred its relationship with 
the Frontline leaders, and increased the suspicions of the United States and other Western 
powers about SWAPO’s inclination towards socialism and romance with the Eastern bloc. 
Furthermore, it was recognised that SWAPO’s armed struggle could not bring about an 
outright military victory against South African forces, which now concentrated its men on a 
single front.
With the substantive issues under discussion, Kissinger needed to broaden his country’s 
support base. He did. When he left Zurich, he met three European leaders, namely, the 
British Prime Minister, James Callaghan; the French President, Valery Giscarg d'Estaing 
and the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt. This broadening was very important in
For a detailed understanding of the FLS, see, Thompson, Carol. B. Challenge to 
Imperialism: The Frontline States in the Liberation of Zimbabwe, (Harare: Zimbabwe 
Publishing House, 1985) chapter 2; and Ajala, Adekunle. “The OAU and Southern 
Africa”, in Aluko, Olajide and Shaw, Timothy M. (eds.), Southern Africa in the 1980s, 
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985), p. 10-11.
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facilitating a composite Western influence on the main parties. However, there were 
different priorities, as between Rhodesia and Namibia. Britain, as the nominal sovereign in 
Rhodesia was particularly interested in solving the Rhodesian issue. Germany, being 
Namibia's former colonial power, was more interested in the resolution of Namibian 
question, as Chancellor Schmidt made clear in his meeting with Kissinger on September 7, 
1976. He pointed out that "We Germans are a little bit more interested in Namibia than 
Rhodesia because in Namibia, there are about 25,000 of German descent with whom we 
naturally have special links".389 France had no direct stake in either Namibia or Rhodesia. 
However, her influence within the Francophone states was considered important to reduce 
any unwarranted obstructions. The hope was that with French support, their doubts about 
the American action would be greatly reduced.
Kissinger had earlier suggested that: "The United States is the only country which can 
speak to all sides on southern African conflicts".390 Although this was true, in practice, he 
needed the cooperation of the European powers and the goodwill of the Frontline leaders. 
In fact, he later understood the influence of the FLS as an important factor within his whole 
mediation package. For instance, after leaving Europe, he held a series of talks with 
African leaders in Dar-es-Salaam, on September 14, 1976. This meeting ascribed 
legitimacy and credibility to his efforts. From there, he went to Pretoria to meet with 
Vorster and Ian Smith on Rhodesia. On September 18, 1976, Kissinger and Vorster 
discussed Namibia. It was reported that 'considerable progress' had been made toward the 
hastening of Namibian independence and Rhodesian majority rule. At this stage, America 
was more optimistic about the prospect for success on Namibia than over Rhodesia.
389 Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1870, op cit., p. 660.
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The Frontline leaders shared this optimism. During Kissinger's visit in April 1976, Nyerere 
and Kaunda impressed upon him the importance of concentrating on Namibia. There was a 
consensus among the FLS that of the two immediate items on Kissinger's agenda, Namibia 
was less intractable. Paul Bomani, Tanzania's ambassador to the US echoed this view, when 
he said: "it is here that we had expected Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy to produce the 
quickest favourable results. Instead we have been told that substantially the Namibian 
question is easy but that procedurally it is very difficult".391 This optimism rested on two 
factors: Firstly, Resolution 385 (1976) was universally acknowledged as the framework 
document. It only required the persuasion of South Africa to respond positively to the spirit 
and letter of this document. Hence American resolve was seen as crucial factor that would 
make South Africa comply. Kissinger was believed to have possessed the wherewithal.
Presumably, the Africans faith in Kissinger was not misplaced. He had a history of securing 
diplomatic breakthroughs from the Middle East to Vietnam. While it is important not to 
exaggerate his successes, what was evident that within five months, he was able to 
convince South African the importance of giving serious consideration to Resolution 385
(1976). He persuaded South Africa to ‘talking’ and broke the deadlock that formerly 
existed between the UN and South Africa. He made Nujoma adopt a flexible approach 
towards United States initiatives. For instance, in August 1976, Nujoma stated that, 
"Kissinger's approach on Namibia is bound to fail because it is a serious subversion of the 
commitments made by the United Nations. The United Nations is the only authority to 
organise any negotiations on the future of our country. Kissinger is simply playing into
390 Department of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXV. No. 1943. September 20 1976.
391 Bomani, Paul. "Southern Africa and the World", Journal of Southern African 
Affairs, 1 (October 1976), p.4.
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South Africa's hands, which wants to create an illusion that something is being done".392 
However, after meeting Kissinger in New York in late September 1976, Nujoma declared 
that 'there is a general ground for negotiation with South Africa'. He continued that if 
America was 'serious' about pressing for a South African troop withdrawal from Namibia, a 
peaceful solution was possible. Yet, it took another fourteen years before a final 
resolution was reached on Namibia, ironically, by another Kissinger disciple, Chester 
Crocker.
4.14. Limitations of Henry Africanus
To some, Henry Africanus was an opportunistic move: an opportunity for Kissinger to 
regain prestige for himself and the United States. According to Stedman, “the Kissinger 
approach was based on the crude intervention of a ripe moment”.394 Yet there existed a 
disjunction between the theory of ripeness and the reality of the Namibian conflict at the 
time Kissinger intervened.395 To others, Kissinger’s diplomatic style, which was 
characterised with secrecy and deal making was a subject of criticism. According to 
Johnson, “Kissinger had relied on ‘lying to both sides’ to save the day”, and stepped out of
392 Times of Zambia, 10 August 1976.
393 United Nations Monthly Chronicle, October 1976.
394 Stedman, Stephen. John. Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in 
Zimbabwe, 1974-1990, (London: Lynne Rienner Pubs., 1991), p. 118.
395 According to William Zartman, A crisis is ripe when the following factors are present: 
(1) here occurred a situation of deadlock and deadline. (2) The blocking of ‘unilateral 
solutions, and consequently, joint solutions become conceivable. (3)The party that
previously had the upper hand in the conflict has slipped and the underdog has gained in 
strength. And (4) a hurting stalemate situation: a moment when things will significantly 
worsen if they have not gotten better in ways that negotiation seeks to define. It is doubtful 
whether we can transpose the ‘ripeness’ argument into the Namibian conflict. South 
Africa hands were yet to slip in Namibia, while SWAPO was yet to inflict a considerable 
damage to South Africa that would have made it thought otherwise. For a detailed 
analysis, see, Zartman, I. William. Ripe for Resolution, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1983), p. 353.
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his initial role of an interlocutor to be a mediator.396 Each of these criticisms looks 
plausible, but they have to be seen in context.
An informal rule of negotiation is the necessity of doing deals in one area, for payoffs in 
another. Hence secrecy, changes of role and tactics, and massaging of facts are all 
inevitable. Indeed, Henry Africanus was full of halfway measures, inconsistencies and 
suspected by many within the United Nations, especially the Soviet Union and Nigeria. 
Kissinger did not push Vorster beyond his ‘comfort zone’, or what Alexander George 
called the resistance point.397 Vorster was still within his own maximum demands. The 
issue of Walvis Bay was sidestepped; and Vorster maintained his opposition to any direct 
negotiation with SWAPO. Nigeria and Soviet Union were the leading critics of America's 
'honest broker' role in southern Africa. The Soviet press denounced Kissinger's efforts and 
called his negotiations 'a fraud' that was giving breathing space to white minority regimes in 
Africa.398 Tass, accused him of shielding the white minority regimes, and warned Africans 
that similar 'shuttle diplomacy' tactics in the Middle East had caused the Lebanese civil 
war.399 The United Nations platform served as the venue where America and Soviet Union 
exhibited their glaring mistrust of each other’s moves and motives in southern Africa.
On 28 and 30 September 1976, in his address before the world body, Soviet Foreign 
Minister, Andrei Groymko, delivered a sharp attack on Kissinger's diplomatic efforts in 
Africa. Groymko maintained that such efforts were aimed at containing 'the just struggle of
Stedman, op cit., chapter three, “Henry Kissinger, Geneva, and ‘Lying to Both Sides’”, 
p. 85, and p. 119.
97 The resistance point is defined as the least each party in a negotiation is willing to settle 
for. It is each side’s irreducible goals in the negotiations. See, George, Alexander. L. and 
Craig, Gordon. A. (eds.), Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 167.
398 Tass, September 17, 1976.
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the people of Zimbabwe and Namibia and of the indigenous population of the Republic of 
South Africa for their legitimate rights. "Every possible method is being brought into play", 
Groymko declared, "from direct suppression and violence to attempts to divert the national 
liberation movement away from genuine independence and freedom through political 
gimmickry and financial handouts”.400 He was referring to the proposed Anglo-American 
$2.0 billion compensation to the white Rhodesians.
In his own address before the General Assembly the same day (September 30, 1976) 
Kissinger strongly denounced what he called Moscow's "crude attempt to distort the 
purposes of diplomacy and to impede hopeful progress toward peaceful solutions to 
complex issues" 401 These efforts "only foster tension", Kissinger maintained. "They cannot 
be reconciled with the policy of improving relations. We have been concerned by the 
continuing accumulation of Soviet armaments and by recent instances of military 
intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts."402 Kissinger continued, referring to the 
Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola. "There may be some countries who see a chance for 
advantage in fuelling the flames of war and racial hatred. But they are not motivated by 
concern for the peoples of Africa, or for peace. And if they succeed, they would doom 
opportunities that might never return".403
Nigeria on the other hand, pointed out that Kissinger’s exclusion of the United Nations in 
the negotiation undermined the credibility of his mediation. Leslie O. Harriman, the
399 Tass, September 25, 1976.
400 Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1873, October 2, 1976, p. 718-9. The financial handout 
was a joint United States and Britain $2.0 billion trust fiind designed to keep the white 
Rhodesians. Other western countries such as Germany, Canada, Australia and Japan as 
well as private investors were to contribute to the fund.
401 ibid., p. 719.
402 ibid., p. 719.
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Nigerian, Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid warned that resort to individual 
shuttle diplomacy outside the United Nations framework could only lead to chaos. He 
emphasised that the only meaningful dialogue would be between the South Africa regime 
and the liberation movements on the basis of the Charter and resolutions of the United 
Nations. He maintained the view that America's mediatory role was not predicated on its 
firm commitment to freedom in southern Africa; but that its bottom line was the danger of 
Soviet and Cuban involvement in the region, as stressed by various reports.404
Irked by these criticisms, the United States vetoed a resolution aimed at forcing South 
Africa to surrender control of Namibia and impose an arms embargo against the Pretoria 
regime. Britain and France also vetoed the resolution. In explaining the American position, 
the US ambassador to the UN, William R. Scranton, maintained that its approval would 
have undermined the 'substantial progress' that had been made in negotiation on Namibia 
between Kissinger and Vorster.405
The final outcome of Henry Africanus included the following: a proposed Geneva 
conference to negotiate a constitution; the United Nations as an observer; an all Namibian 
negotiated constitution acceptable by South Africa; a post-independence South Africa- 
Namibia relationship; and an election and independence plan by 31 December 1978.406 
The content of the Geneva plan confirmed the sceptic’s view that South Africa was evading 
the necessity of negotiation with SWAPO under UN auspices. Nyerere later revealed that 
the Geneva conference option was presented to him and Kaunda in general terms. He said
403 ibid., p. 719.
Harriman, Leslie. O. "Shuttle Diplomacy Outside UN Framework is Dangerous”, UN 
Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XIH. No. 9. October 1976, p. 14.
405 Facts on File, Vol. 36. No. 1876. October 23, 1976, p. 781.
406 Vance, op cit. p. 273.
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that they accepted the plan without noticing that both the United States and South Africa 
would attend as observers.407
Presumably, the exclusion of the UN was the most practical ploy that could be used to get 
South Africa to the negotiating table. South Africa’s fear of UN partiality that had existed 
for the past thirty years needs to be taken into consideration by any mediator. The UN was 
not completely excluded. Resolution 385 (1976) was still the framework document of 
Kissinger-Vorster talks. Kissinger later met with the UN Secretary-General in late 1976 to 
brief him on his journey so far on southern Africa conflicts.
Broadly speaking, it could be argued that Henry Africanus typified the realist tradition of 
diplomacy, namely: persuasion, compromise and threat of force. As Morgenthau observed, 
"the great negotiator was someone who put the right emphasis at any particular moment on 
each of these three means, and the diplomat must at the same time use persuasion, hold out 
the advantages of a compromise and impress the other side with the military strength of his 
country" 408 The failure of military means in Angola prompted the device of diplomacy. In 
specific terms, Henry Africanus showed in vivid detail Kissinger’s style of diplomacy. As a 
lone ranger diplomat, his operational code revolved around personal diplomacy, secrecy 
and surprise, contempt for bureaucracy, established methods and regular procedure. The 
Geneva plan was Bismarckian in design. As Bismarck was able to preserve the peace of 
Europe by manipulating the commitments and interests of other powers, so Kissinger used 
the southern African situation to craft a position that would sustain the status quo in favour 
of the United States and its allies.
407 Nyerere, Julius. K. “America and Southern Africa”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 55. No. 4.,
(1977), p. 680.
408 Morgenthau, (1967), op cit., 521.
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In the final analysis, Henry Africanus was a reflection of Kissinger's understanding of 
international relations, primarily as a continuum of interactions of the Great Powers.409 
It locked in regional stability with global balance of power; and saw the role of the third 
world countries as pawns that could be used to enhance or lessen the power ingredients 
of a superpower. It was designed to deter an adversary, reassure an ally, and win new 
friends. The overarching concern of Henry Africanus was a resolution of a seemingly 
thorny decolonization issue as a means of maintaining both the regional and global 
stability. The paradox of Henry Africanus is that while it was conceived as an exercise 
in power politics, it set in motion an outcome preferred by international law. The 
departure of Kissinger in January 1976, once again, raised the question of whether the 
Namibian issue would be shaped by the logic of power politics or by idealist 
imperatives championed by the new Carter administration
409 For a classic study on Kissinger’s historicism, see, Cleva, Gregory. D. Henry 
Kissinger and the American Approach to Foreign Policy. (London: Associated 
University Press, 1989), p. 23-47.; Graubard, Stephen. R. Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind, 
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1973); Dickson, Peter. W. Kissinger and the Meaning of 
History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
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Chapter Five 
The Dynamics of the Contact Group Diplomacy410
5.1. Introduction:
It was concluded in the last chapter that Henry Africanus was essentially driven by 
power politics. This chapter focuses on how, by contrast, the Carter administration, 
which organised the Contact Group, sought to free its policy from the realist tradition by 
giving it an idealist orientation. Most studies on Namibia have placed the emphasis on 
the role of the Contact Group as a third party mediator.411 Yet, this appraisal fails to 
understand the extent to which Contact Group diplomacy represented a continuation of 
power politics by other means. In other words what started as an exercise in traditional 
liberal diplomacy was unwittingly transformed into another attempt to limit Soviet gains 
in southern Africa. The literature on the Group also mostly overlooks its efforts to 
resolve the dilemma of its relationship to international law. This chapter is divided into 
two main parts. Part one deals with the Contact Group’s four year negotiations with the 
South African Government. Part two focuses on two of questions that the Contact 
Group raised. To what extent did they reinforce or deviate from the assumptions
410 The Contact Group or the Five Western powers consisted of the three western 
permanent members of the Security Council namely: the United States, Britain and France 
and two western non-permanent members namely: Germany (West) and Canada.
Germany and Canada were nominated in 1977 as members of the ten non-permanent 
members. It is important to point out that the details of this negotiation are yet to be 
officially released by those governments concerned. Most of the materials used in this 
section are from the public record. These include: documents from the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, London; the State Department in Washington; official documents 
from the South African High Commission in London, the Canadian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Canada as well as newspapers and journals such 
as the United Nations Monthly Chronicle, the New York Times, Facts of File (USA) and 
Financial Mail (South Africa).
411 Jabri, Vivienne. Mediating conflict: Decision-making and Western intervention in 
Namibia. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996). Jabri showed that the
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concerning the balance of power of Henry Africanus! And what were the constraints 
and successes of Contact Group diplomacy?
5.2. The Road to the first New York Proximity Talks: April 1977 -September 1978412 
On April 17, 1977, the Contact Group ambassadors in Pretoria presented an aide
memoir to the South African Government about their disapproval of the Tumhalle
proposals. They informed the South African Prime Minister, John Vorster that the
Tumhalle proposals would not gain their support or international approval, as they
deviated from the major provisions of SCR 385 (1976). The Contact Group stated that
the Tumhalle proposals were in contravention to the principle of international law
concerning self-determination as well as the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.
Mr. Vorster replied that he welcomed discussions with any government, but stressed
that the people of Namibia must approve any independence plan.413 In other words, the
Tumhalle proposals would not be abandoned.
The second round of talks was held in Cape Town on April 27-29, 1977. At the 
meeting, Vorster turned down the request that South African troops should withdraw 
from Namibia. However, further talks were agreed. On May 1, Vorster expressed South 
Africa’s willingness to accept the UN involvement, but not its supervision and control 
of the electoral process 414 Significantly though, he indicated that SWAPO would be 
encouraged to participate in a universal suffrage election, without literacy qualification.
Contact Group, acted as an interested third party, and by so doing, its intervention 
transformed the Namibian conflict from dyadic into a three-cornered relationship or triad.
412 A History of the Namibian Negotiations (until April 1981), (London, 1981), 
hereafter A History. I got this document from the British Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office in January 1997. The document is not paged, but covers these talks (section, 12).
413 Facts on File, Vol. 37, No. 1901, April 16,1977, p. 285.
414 A History, op cit, section 13.
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The third meeting was held on May 8-10.415 The main issue discussed was the nature of 
the interim administration. Vorster noted that South Africa would refrain from seeking 
a parliamentary approval for the Tumhalle constitutional proposals. He maintained that 
the interim administrative authority would be based on the Tumhalle proposals. On 
behalf of the Contact Group, Don McHenry insisted that the authority should be 
broadly based. He described South Africa’s offer as “predominantly ethnic, lacking 
neutrality and appearing to prejudice the outcome of free elections.416
South Africa’s abandoning parliamentary approval for Tumhalle indicated some 
softening of its position. Presumably, it was connected to the following: (1) the Contact 
Group’s threat of sanction, and its unequivocal rejection of the Tumhalle conference. 
(2) The United States strategy of “strangulation by finesse” as exemplified at the 
Mondale-Vorster Vienna meeting. (3) The forthrightness of the Frontline States at the 
Maputo conference.
5.3. The threat of economic sanctions
In their first meeting with Vorster, the Contact Group unequivocally pointed out that 
should South Africa fail to agree to free and fair elections open to all parties in 
Namibia, they would support the sanctions vote being called for by the African states. 
Vorster was reminded that the triple veto of October 1976 had prevented the sanctions 
resolution. Although he described the threat of sanctions as “obnoxious”,417 he must 
have feared the consequences on the South African economy. When the Contact Group 
once more visited Namibia between May 8-10 1977, they persisted in their
415 ibid., section 12.
416 Facts on File, May 7,1977, p. 349.
417 ibid., p. 349.
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condemnation of the Tumhalle arrangements as undemocratic and a breach of the 
international norms on human rights. They warned Tumhalle members in person that 
the West would not recognise the territory’s independence until the Tumhalle delegates 
rewrote the constitution to eliminate ethnic divisions.418 Whilst South Africa claimed 
that the presence of these diplomats conferred a measure of external legitimacy on the 
Windhoek administration, it was the requirements of negotiation that lay behind the 
visit. Even so, some Contact Group members were uneasy about being seen to 
legitimise the white-minority government in Pretoria or its protege in Windhoek.
5.4. “Strangulation by finesse”
Unlike its predecessor, the Carter Administration conceived the Namibia, Rhodesia and 
South Africa issues as inextricably linked. In Carter’s words: “in southern Africa, we 
have three major simultaneous and interrelated goals (Namibia, Rhodesia and South 
Africa), and they can be categorised respectively as: independence, majority rule and 
human rights”.419 In essence, Carter regarded South Africa’s illegal occupation of 
Namibia as a violation of the international law on self-determination and human rights. 
To drive the point home, when on May 18-20, the American Vice President, Walter 
Mondale met with Vorster, he (Mondale) told him that South Africa has no alternative, 
but a “one-man, one vote” principle 420 The administration strategy was to use its strong
418 Facts on File, May 28,1977, p. 400.
419 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated September 5,1977, p. 1263; 
Department of State Bulletin (hereafter the DSB), Vol. LXXVII, No. 1996, September 
26,1977, p. 397.
420 In his post-Vienna conference with Walter Mondale, Vorster’s statement was nothing 
but a direct attack on the Carter’s administration attitudes towards the apartheid regime. 
And in his statement before the South African House of Assembly on June 13,1977, 
Roelof Botha, the Minister of Foreign Affairs unequivocally warned that “South Africa 
was heading inevitably for worsening relations with the United States unless US demands 
for one man, one vote in South Africa were modified. See, South Africa, South Africa 
and the World: A Political Backgrounder, (London, South African Embassy, no date
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objection to apartheid to ‘push’ South Africa on both Namibia and Rhodesia. Vorster 
would later describe this strategy as “strangulation by finesse”. It was this liberal 
agenda and not power politics that underpinned the Contact Group diplomacy on 
Namibia.
Yet there was a tension within the Carter administration between those who wanted to 
anchor the foreign policy in the liberal agenda, and those who saw issues within the 
prism of power politics. The former were known as regionalists, and the latter as 
globalists. Cyrus Vance, the Secretary of State, and Andrew Young (the Ambassador to 
the UN) were the leading regionalists, while, Zbignew Brzezinski, the National 
Security Adviser, a quintessential realist, led the globalist camp.
Andrew Young was the administration’s ‘unique selling point’ to the African leaders, 
being an African-America. His role in the UN was to secure the cooperation of the 
African states on Namibia. However, during his first visit to Africa between May 10- 
24, 1977, he was confronted with the division of opinion among the US ambassadors- 
along the regionalist-globalist divide over the influence of the Soviet Union in Africa. 
The globalists expressed their grave concern at the presence of Soviet and Cuban troops 
in Africa. They wanted firm action from the United States to contain the Soviets. The 
regionalists thought that Soviet influence in Africa had been exaggerated, and that most 
African conflicts emerged out of tribal politics, dysfunctional and weak governmental 
institutions, and personal rule. They argued that most African states were not governed 
by ideology, but like ‘consumers’ were ready to switch brands when they grew dis­
satisfied. The tension between globalists and regionalist remained unresolved
given, p. 3-13; and 16.1 got this material from the South African High Commission in
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throughout the Carter administration. Although initially the administration pursued the 
regionalist line, events in the Horn of Africa in late 1977, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan in 1979, prompted some of the regionalists to take a crash course in 
geopolitics.
Young started his African trip with a visit to Ivory Coast. From there, he went to Ghana 
and from Ghana to Liberia. From Liberia, he went to Lisbon, where he met with 
Mondale, who was about to meet with Vorster in Vienna. 421 His visit to Ghana was 
both significant and symbolic. It was significant, as it was intended to bring West 
African states into the mainstream of the mediatory initiatives. As we saw in the last 
chapter, both Ghana and Nigeria had rejected Kissinger’s offer of a visit in mid-1976. 
Nigeria, would later become a significant player in the Namibian question, as it served 
as part of the Frontline States, despite its geographical remoteness from southern 
Africa. Young met Mondale for policy co-ordination. After Mondale concluded 
meeting with Vorster, he conferred with the British Prime Minister, James Callaghan 
and the Foreign Secretary, David Owen. Vorster, on the other hand, went to Ivory 
Coast, to meet President Houphouet-Boigny. Boigny was a moderate African leader, 
who was France’s most courted and trusted leader in Africa. Given that France was 
amongst the Contact Group, Vorster wanted to tell the South African side of the story 
to France via Boigny. While the United States had defined for itself an undiluted 
responsibility for setting the Contact Group agenda and guiding it through, the 
Frontline States raised its profile on Namibia with the Maputo Conference.
London.
421 Facts on File, May 28,1977, p. 398.
422 Financial Mail (South Africa), November 11,1977, p. 476-77.
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5.5. The support of the Frontline States at the Maputo conference
By 1977, the FLS had become an effective, albeit informal regional actor. At this time, 
the Namibian question was a more important FLS diplomatic project than 
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. The FLS provided SWAPO with some materials, diplomatic and 
organisational support. More importantly, it served as the political fixer between 
SWAPO and the Contact Group, as shown during the six-day UN conference (May 16- 
21) held in Maputo.423 The conference intended to mobilise international support for 
and assistance to, the peoples of Rhodesia and Namibia in their struggle for self- 
determination and independence. Despite the Contact Group’s reservations about the 
Maputo Declaration and Programme of Action,424 the FLS expressed their support for 
the Contact Group’s aide memoir to South Africa. There were two turning points in 
Maputo. First, President Machel of Mozambique, the conference’s chairman gave his 
support to both the Contact Group’s action and the Anglo-American plan on Rhodesia.
Secondly, Nujoma gave a cautious welcome to the Group’s initiatives. On May 16, he 
accused the Big Five of trying to perpetuate South African control over Namibia, but 
after meeting with Young the next day, he declared the “Western nations contact with 
South African Government were useful”, though he remained opposed to Western 
activity in Namibia.425 Although SWAPO continued to be suspicious of the Contact
423 United Nations Monthly Chronicle (hereafter UNMC), Vol. XIV, No. 6, June 1977, 
(New York: UN Office of Public Information, 1977), p. 41; Yearbook of the UN, 1977, 
(New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1977), p. 828-833.
424 Maynes, William- The United States’ Assistant Secretary of State for International 
Organization, spoke on behalf of the Five. He said: “The position of the Western members 
of the Security Council is clear. In the light on the initiatives we have taken, we find 
ourselves unable to associate ourselves with the number of the provisions of the 
Declaration. To associate ourselves would prejudice the results of the negotiations which 
have brought about the most promising start to resolve the Namibian problem”, See 
UNMC, ibid., p. 48.
425 Facts on File, May 28,1977, p. 399.
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Group, the FLS exerted considerable pressure to make SWAPO’s outright rejection 
impossible. After Maputo, with the persuasion of the FLS, Nujoma met with the 
Contact Group to discuss SWAPO’s response to Ambassador Murray’s correspondence 
between August 8-11,1977 in New York.426 Nujoma agreed to a parity of status of both 
the UN Special Representative and the South African appointed Administrator-General. 
But he insisted on the total withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia before 
elections were held.
Having got SWAPO conditional agreement, the Contact Group had a discussion with 
the South African government on September 22-25.427 Roelof (Pik) Botha, the South 
African Foreign Minister, rejected Nujoma’s demand for a phased withdrawal of the 
South African troops. Surprisingly, South Africa made a sharp turnabout from the April 
and June concessions. Botha called the plan for a phased reduction of the South African 
troops to a 1,500-man level a device to turn Namibia over to SWAPO terrorists. He also 
insisted that South African forces would not withdraw until there was a watertight 
guarantee that the Cuban forces would not enter Namibia. The Contact Group found it 
difficult to provide the guarantee.428 Vorster had to persuade his foreign minister to set 
aside the Cuban issue,429 but he warned that South African forces would re-enter 
Namibia if there were any Cuban tricks. According to Vance, Pik Botha’s new demand 
was dictated by his fear of an Afrikaner conservative backlash, following Proclamation
426 A History, op cit., section 14.
427 A History, op. cit., section 14.
428 Vance, op cit., p. 276.
429 It is important to note that South Africa never raised the issue of the Cuban troops, 
until it was raised by United States in 1981 as a condition for the withdrawal of the South 
African troops in Namibia.
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264 of September 30, 1977, which de-linked the National Party of South West Africa 
(NPSWA) from National Party of South Africa (NP). 430
Between October 15-19, the Contact Group briefed SWAPO on the outcome of its 
meeting with South Africa 431 SWAPO insisted on a total withdrawal of South African 
troops. Afterwards the Contact Group had a discussion with the FLS on November 21 - 
December 7. A fourth round of talks with South Africa was held in Pretoria on 
December 2-3, 1977.432 The position of South Africa and SWAPO on the withdrawal of 
South African troops remained incompatible. So also was the issue of the Walvis Bay. 
The Contact Group proposed a compromise. It included; a token of South African 
forces of 1,500 men to remain in Namibia, confined to a single base and to operate 
under UN monitoring until independence; the release of all political prisoners; a UN 
military presence of some “2,000 men”; and the deferral of the Walvis Bay issue for 
negotiation until after independence. South Africa and SWAPO did not accept these 
proposals.
The Contact Group feared a stalling of the momentum of the negotiation. At this stage, 
the consensus that bound them together was threatened. Britain and France were 
tempted to go along with the internal settlement plan. Even President Carter considered 
an internal settlement solution owing to SWAPO’s rigidity.433 Vance recalled that he 
had to persuade Britain and France on the danger of agreeing to the internal 
settlement,434 which would have amounted to de facto international recognition of the
430 See Jabri, op cit., p. 111.
431 A History, op cit., section 14.
432 ibid., section 14.
433 Vance, op. cit., p. 302.
434 ibid., p. 302.
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South African plan. It would also have undermined the neutrality and the credibility of 
the Contact Group, and fuelled the scepticism of some radical African states. More 
importantly, it would have undermined the liberal premise of the Contact Group effort. 
In the light of these wider implications, it was consequently shelved. The Contact 
Group, however, concentrated on how to hold off South Africa from raising new and 
additional issues. By freezing new demands from South Africa, it would not be difficult 
to convince SWAPO through the FLS. The ‘proximity talks’ were the option to 
forestall a stalling.
At the ‘proximity’ talks the two principal parties, South Africa and SWAPO, met 
separately with the mediator without any direct dialogue between themselves. It 
involved a laborious process of notepassing by the mediator on issues being discussed 
between the main parties. The meeting was convened to bridge the gap between South 
Africa and SWAPO; to increase the momentum of the negotiation; and to minimize 
procedural difficulties.
SWAPO was willing to negotiate directly with South Africa; but Pretoria continued to 
refuse to deal directly with SWAPO.435 For the United States, Vance commented that, 
“contact with SWAPO was difficult, partly because its leaders were so out of reach, but 
also because of its suspicion about our motives”.436 The proximity talk was designed to 
bring them as close as practicable. The choice of New York was important to all the 
parties, including the Contact Group. Being the centre of the United Nations, it denoted
435 South Africa and the World, op cit., p. 10. For instance, in his Vienna meeting with 
Mondale, Vorster described Nujoma as an “adventurer”. He said, “We have nothing to 
say to an adventurer like Sam Nujoma, we have nothing to discuss with him...But as the 
South African Government, we have nothing to say to them (SWAPO) whatsoever”.
436 Vance, op cit., p. 303.
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neutrality. South Africa and SWAPO had established posts in New York, and both were 
taken out of their natural bases: Pretoria and Luanda or Dar-es-Salaam. To the Contact 
Group, the choice of New York was a matter of convenience. The ‘working group* of 
the Contact Group was based at UN Headquarters. The FLS also had a considerable 
presence in New York through their UN representation.
The talks began on February 11, 1978, and focused on three issues: the South African 
troop withdrawal, the status of Walvis Bay and the role of the UN.437 As the talks 
progressed, there were signs that South Africa was stonewalling, whilst SWAPO was 
giving more grounds that anticipated as it agreed to allow 1,500 South African troops to 
remain inside Namibia throughout the elections. At one stage, German Foreign 
Minister, Hans Dietrich Gencher warned Pik Botha that sanctions would be 
unavoidable if Pretoria remained intransigent 438 Pik Botha suddenly withdrew from the 
talks, and they broke down. According to Peter Katjavivi, SWAPO’s information 
secretary, Botha withdrew because he was startled by SWAPO’s new flexibility. He 
remarked, that “Botha went to New York expecting to be confronted by SWAPO’s 
rigid adherence to its earlier position. Instead, he found SWAPO more willing than in 
the past to discuss points put to it by the Five, and open to negotiation on its own 
detailed proposals” 439 He concluded that: “for its part, SWAPO views Botha’s 
departure as a clear indication that South Africa is not prepared to negotiate 
realistically”.440 Indeed, Botha’s action prompted the Contact Group to delay the 
submission of its proposal before the Nigerian-chaired Security Council.441 As a
437 Financial Mail, February 17,1978, p. 465.
438 ibid.,
439 Financial Mail, February 17,1978, p. 465.
440 ibid., p. 465.
441 Financial Mail, January 6,1978, p. 14.
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damage-limitation exercise, British Foreign Secretary, David Owen described Botha’s 
walkout as only a temporary setback.442 On his return to South Africa, Pik Botha 
disclosed that there was still hope for negotiations, if the Five were prepared to accept 
the “reasonableness of South Africa’s position”.443
It is tempting to conclude that Nujoma’s flexibility wrong-footed Pik Botha. Botha’s 
walkout, however, was a device to win more time for its protege, the DTA, to solve its 
internal problems. In the wake of the assassination of Chief Clemens Kapuuo, the black 
leader of the DTA, South Africa wanted to seen to be tough on SWAPO, in order to cut 
the DTA’s losses.444
5.6. The Post-Proximity Talks and the South Africa’s Ascension Day military strike.
In March, the Contact Group presented Pik Botha with “amplifications and 
clarifications” of aspects of Namibian settlement plan. The German Ambassador to 
South Africa, H. J. Erick, represented the Group on this occasion. Afterwards, he 
briefed SWAPO representatives in Windhoek on the latest developments, and assured 
them that the basic proposals remain unchanged, but merely fine-tuned.445 The Contact 
Group tacitly appealed to the ‘good faith’ of both SWAPO and South Africa to gain 
their consent on the modified proposals. They stated that if South Africa failed to 
endorse the proposals, it would not be because of technicalities, but because it lacked 
the political will to agree to a process that might result in a loss of de facto control of 
Namibia. Likewise, they stated that if SWAPO rejected the proposals, it would not be 
because the proposals were unfair, but because it did not want to face the prospect of
442 ibid., p. 14.
443 ibid., p. 14.
444 See, Financial Mail, March 31,1978, p. 999, for Chief Kapuuo’s assassination..
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not winning in a democratic test of acceptability.446 In addition, the Contact Group 
employed a pre-emptive tactic to gain the consent of South African and SWAPO. On 
April 10, it formally handed over its proposals to Andrew Young, who was the Security 
Council President at the time, requesting that they be circulated among the council 
members as an official UN document. This was done- (UN Document S/12636).447 The 
content of the proposals was carefully packaged. The deferment of the Walvis Bay 
issue was to satisfy South Africa, while a call for a free and fair election, under the UN- 
supervision and control was to satisfy SWAPO. African states wavered in their support 
because of Walvis Bay, but there was no outright rejection of the whole proposals. 
Nevertheless, the Contact Group’s pre-emptive tactics, as well as Pretoria’s surprising 
offer of acceptance on April 25, 1978, prompted Nujoma to blow the whistle on the 
whole exercise.
In his address before the General Assembly, Nujoma pointed out that the manner in 
which the proposals had been handled had the effect of creating confusion in the UN, 
which was perhaps the objective.448 He further declared that, “SWAPO did not think 
that the timing of those developments was a mere coincidence, but had rather been 
done to hijack the deliberations of the session and to give the false impression that a 
settlement was at hand for Namibia”. He accused the Contact Group of “deliberately 
framing in ambiguous terms the role of the UN Special Representative, so as to confuse 
the minds of those who read it”.449 The strongest criticisms against the proposals came 
from the Soviet Union. Ambassador Mikhail Khalamov, told the Assembly that
445 ibid.,
446 Financial Mail, March 24,1978, p. 912.
447 A History, op cit., section 16; United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XV, No. 6. 
June 1978 [Special Session on Namibia]; Financial Mail, April 14, 1978, p. 115.
448 UNMC, ibid., p. 6.
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SWAPO must take over the nation: “the true goal of the Western settlement plan was 
clear: it was intended to make things difficult for SWAPO and it could involve the 
puppets of the Tumhalle conference”.450
The Contact Group, on their own found it difficult to persuade Nujoma to accept the 
proposals. They therefore solicited the support of Joe Garba, Nigerian External Affairs 
Minister. Nigeria’s role was predicated on the fact that Lagos was widely 
acknowledged to have provided political and financial support to SWAPO. Yet Garba’s 
efforts to persuade Nujoma to abandon his equivocation got nowhere.451 Nujoma 
maintained that he would neither reject the proposals nor scuttle the negotiations, but 
instead called for substantive changes. However, Nujoma’s scepticism about the plan 
was less damaging compared to South Africa’s next course of action. On May 4, 1978, 
the South African military struck against two SWAPO bases in southern Angola. In his 
letter to the United Nations via the Contact Group, P. W. Botha, South Africa’s 
Defense Minister, termed the attack “a limited military operation”.452 But its scale 
indicated that it was more than a mere reprisal for border violations. Its timing 
suggested a deliberate diversionary act. It was intended to inflict psychological wounds 
on SWAPO. For example, a South African Defense Force spokesman told newsmen in 
Windhoek after the attack that “we expect SWAPO to attempt an attack on a
449 ibid.
450 ibid., p. 100
Vance, op cit., p. 95. It worth noting that SWAPO had established its first diplomatic 
post in Nigeria in early 1970s before the ANC and the PAC. In showing its further 
commitment to the independence of Namibia, the Nigerian government decided to create a 
N100 million ($40 million) Namibia Solidarity Fund, on June 16,1989. The Fund was 
chaired by Nigeria’s former representative to the UN, Ambassador Maitama Sule. See, 
Chukwuma, Odi. E. President Ibrahim Babangida: Foreign Policy Triumphs. (Lagos: 
Bisau Publications: 1991), p. 140-142- “Nigeria in the struggle to free Namibia”.
452 . UNMC, Vol. XV, No. 6, June 1978, p. 12, (S/12697); Randy Daily Mad (South 
Africa), May 5,1978.
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prestigious target in Ovambo to show that it still has the right to exist”.453 Its other 
political ends were to lift the morale of the DTA. Ben Amathila, SWAPO’s Secretary 
for Economic Affairs opined this view in London when he said that: “the Kassinga raid 
was an attempt to reassure the whites in Namibia and the Tumhalle leaders of South 
Africa’s ability to protect them”.454
This was dangerous brinkmanship. The attack put the co-operation of the FLS, 
especially Angola, at risk. It increased the potential for escalating conflict on the 
Namibia-Angolan frontier. It reinforced Nujoma’s view that South African forces must 
completely withdraw from the territory. As a result of the attack, Angola withdrew its 
effort in persuading SWAPO. Consequently, Nujoma broke off talks in New York and 
returned to Angola.455 The Contact Group’s support for a Security Council Resolution 
428 (1978) condemning the attack did not dissuade SWAPO from declaring that it was 
no longer interested in the negotiation.456
Pretoria’s reactions to these waves of condemnation were confused. Immediately, it 
embarked on a damage limitation exercise by reaffirming its commitment to the 
Contact Group proposals for Namibian independence. It offered documentation to show 
that the strike had been aimed at a guerrilla base, not civilian targets. The South African 
government quickly abandoned this approach, and decided to play the ‘Soviet and the 
communism cards’. First, it claimed that its troops had found USSR military uniforms 
and documents in rebel bases it captured. Secondly, Pik Botha attacked the United 
States for using double standards by calling the timing of the raid “unfortunate” while
453 Financial Mail, May 12,1978, p. 437.
454 Financial Mail, May 19,1978, p. 538.
455 New York Times, May 6,1978, p. 4.
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ignoring guerrilla attacks by SWAPO.457 Thirdly, Vorster accused the United States of 
seeking to make South Africa a scapegoat for the failure of the plan 458 Pretoria played 
the ‘communism card’ in the wake of the increasing tension in the Horn of Africa. 
Pretoria’s allegations touched a raw nerve in the US government.
At this stage, the administration did not want to be seen to be soft on communism in 
any of its manifestations. Consequently, the State Department denied Pretoria’s 
allegation that the US did not oppose SWAPO’s terrorist activities.459 The United 
States also reminded Pretoria that President Carter had started calling for a Cuban 
military withdrawal from Angola, as early as April 1978 460 Carter, himself, spoke 
about “the very tight constraints” imposed by Congress on his ability to aid friendly 
African nations, in contrast to the eagerness of the Soviets and Cuba to provide military 
weapons to any group where they might see a foothold there”.461
While Pretoria’s attempt to play the ‘communist card’ achieved little by way of policy 
changes, it successfully exposed the tension between regionalists and globalists. For 
instance, Young continued to maintain that the Cuban and Soviet presence in Africa did 
not constitute a threat to US strategic interests. He said he did not favour a repeal of the 
legislation barring US aid to Angolan guerrillas 462 Cyrus Vance also declared on June
456 UNMC, ibid., “Special Assembly Session on Namibia”, p. 8.
457 New York Times, May 13,1978, p. 3.
458 New York Times, May 29,1978, p. 3.
459 New York Times, May 13,1978, p. 4.
460 Facts on File, May 26,1978, p. 383.
461 ibid. In a speech to the editors’ group on May 19, Carter expressed resentment over 
congressional restrictions on his power to commit the US to overseas conflicts. He 
contrasted what he said was a US incapacity to act in Africa with the USSR and Cuba, 
which he said were “quite eager to provide military weapons to any group where they 
might see a foothold there...”.
462 Facts on File, May 26,1978, p. 383.
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20, that the US would not “treat Africa simply as an arena for East-West competition”. 
Yet Carter’s concerns were a sharp contrast to both Young’s and Vance’s positions. 
The president’s concern was in line with that of Brzezinski, who preferred robust 
American action to check the Soviets and Cubans in Africa.
However, on June 11, after a month-long suspension of talks with the Contact Group, 
SWAPO announced their resumption after two-day meeting with the FLS in Luanda.463 
The FLS demanded that the Security Council take adequate measures to guarantee the 
territorial integrity of Namibia including Walvis Bay. They added: “any attempt by 
South Africa to use Walvis Bay to sabotage Namibian independence should be 
regarded by the Security Council as a threat to international peace and security” 464
As important as were these FLS pressures, they were not sufficient. SWAPO was only 
finally jolted into action by internal disputes. For instance, on May 25, Andreas 
Shipanga, former SWAPO secretary of information, and 18 others, were released, after 
2 years in Zambian and Tanzanian jails 465 They were jailed in April 1976 as a result of 
leadership tussle with Nujoma. Speaking in London after his release, Shipanga said 
that the Western proposal was the “only solution” for Namibia.466 He favoured a 
moderate political course for Namibia, and strongly criticised Nujoma. As far as he 
knew the only opponent to the plan was SWAPO’s Marxist leader Sam Nujoma, whom 
he described as a selfish power-seeker tyrant.467 Perhaps, Shipanga’s criticisms of
463 A History, op cit., section 18.
464 Financial Mail, June 16,1978, p. 892
465 For a brief analysis of the SWAPO internal crisis of 1976, see, Iina Soiri and Pekka 
Peltola, Finland and National Liberation in Southern Africa, (Uppsalla: Nordiska 
Africainstitutet, 1999), p. 126.
466 Facts on File, June 23, 1978, p. 475-76.
467 ibid.
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Nujoma were less threatening than the action he took with other released political 
prisoners, in forming a new political party, the SWAPO-Democrats, on June 19. And 
even more worrisome to SWAPO, was his action to forge an alliance with the Namibia 
National Front, under the leadership of Mr. Brian O’Linn. SWAPO felt vulnerable 
because Pretoria could use the combinations of SWAPO-D, the NNF and the DTA to 
justify a Namibian UDI.
The creation of SWAPO-D was also worrisome to the FLS. They did not want another 
“Angolan scenario”. They wanted to avoid having to reconcile rival liberation 
movements or, failing that, to choose between them in Namibia as they had been forced 
to do in Angola. It was therefore not surprising that it was reported that President 
Nyerere told Nujoma bluntly at the Luanda meeting that: “I want the South African 
troops not only out of Grootfontein, I want them out of the whole of Namibia. The only 
way to ensure this is the acceptance of the Western plan.” On June 20, when, 
unexpectedly, SWAPO announced the postponement of its discussion with the Contact 
Group,469 Vance warned SWAPO that the West could do little for Namibia if it 
continued to reject or stall Western proposals 470
For the second time, the Contact Group feared that its efforts would be derailed. The 
increase in the number of Soviet and Cuban advisers in the Horn of Africa fuelled the 
Contact Group’s concern that the Soviets could exploit the consequence of a 
breakdown in the negotiations to its advantage471 To prevent this scenario, Don
468 Financial Mail, July 28,1978, p. 301.
469 New York Times, June 21,1978, p. 3.
470 New York Times, June 23,1978, p. 1.
471 New York Times, June 26,1978, p. 5.
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McHenry visited Angola between June 21-26.472 This was the first official 
Washington-Luanda contact since Angolan independence in 1975. McHenry focused 
on the crisis in the Horn of Africa conflict and the Namibian issue.473 He received an 
Angolan pledge to influence SWAPO to accept the Contact Group plan. In exchange, 
the US promised to suspend support for Angolan anti-government guerrillas. On July 
12, and following further discussions in Luanda between Nujoma and the Contact 
Group, SWAPO announced its acceptance of the plan 474
Having secured the agreement of both SWAPO and South Africa, the Contact Group 
put its proposals before the Security Council meeting on 27 July. However, Pretoria’s 
interpretations of the draft resolutions nearly scuttled the proposals. The draft resolution 
called for early steps to “re-integrate” Walvis Bay into Namibia, and stated that the 
Security Council “would remain seized of the matter until Walvis Bay is fully 
integrated”.475 South Africa believed that the Walvis Bay question had been upgraded 
to a status level with the main settlement proposals and that the incorporation of the 
port would run parallel with implementation of the settlement plan. The Contact Group 
members embarked on an intensive lobby to keep the resolutions “clean”, and to 
prevent the Walvis Bay issue from becoming a pretext or an excuse to break off the
476exercise.
By this stage, South Africa’s tactics had become almost predictable: keeping the ‘back 
door open’ to pull out or raise a new issue at the last minute. The Group had to explain
472 Facts on File, June 30,1978, p. 487-88.
473 New York Times, June 28,1978, p. 1.; Facts on File, June 30,1978, p. 488.
474 Facts on file, July 21,1978, p. 547.
475 Facts on File, July 28,1978, p. 301.
476 ibid.
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to Botha that the draft resolution was in no way represented a legal commitment by the 
Security Council to support moves for the incorporation of Walvis Bay before an 
independence government has been stalled in Namibia.477 This draft resolution, 
therefore, applied to a future situation, which would be dealt with only after successful 
implementation of the independence plan. They assured South Africa that the draft 
resolution did not affect the existing legal position and sovereignty of South Africa over 
Walvis Bay; it called for negotiations, not a direct transfer. Despite these assurances, 
Pik Botha was not fully convinced that the proviso on Walvis Bay had not become a 
secret addendum to the formal proposals.
All these ploys failed to derail the debate on Namibia in the Security Council. On July 
27, the Security Council endorsed the Group’s Proposal.478 The voting was in two parts. 
The first round of balloting approved a Resolution (431), which formally endorsed the 
formula for a UN troop presence to monitor a cease-fire, South African troop 
withdrawal and UN supervision of elections for a Namibian government. It was passed 
by a 13-0 vote, with the USSR and Czechoslovakia abstaining.479 The abstention by 
these two states demonstrated their dissent, but it was a relief to the Contact Group, as
478 UNMC, Vol. XV, No. 8, August-September 1978, p. 5-18; Facts on File, July 28, 
1978, p. 561-62.
479 The SCR 431 (1978) provided for the composition of the UNTAG. The UNTAG 
composition would consist of the military component and a civilian component under the 
over-all direction of the Special Representative of the Secretary General. The strength of 
the military component would be in the order of seven infantry battalions, totaling 5,000 
plus 2,000 monitors. In addition, the command, communication, engineers, logistics and 
chain supports would be approximately 2,300. The civilian component would consist of 
two elements: the civil police, of about 360 experienced police officers on secondment 
basis from the UN memberstates; the non-police element consisted of 300 professional 
officers, supervising and controlling all aspects of electoral process. Thereafter, 1,000 
professional and 200 field service and general staff. The UNTAG team would serve a 
duration period of one year. The cost was estimated at $300 million. See UNMC, Vol. 
XV, No. 9, October 1978, p. 5. (S/12827).
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they had feared a Soviet veto. The second resolution (432), adopted by 15-0 gave 
official UN support to the unification of Walvis Bay with an independent Namibia. The 
Secretary-General also announced the appointment of Mr. Marti Ovia Ahtisaari of 
Finland, who had previously served as the UN Commissioner for Namibia as the UN 
Special Representative for Namibia.
Four days later, on July 31, the South African Government accepted Resolution 431, 
but rejected Resolution 432. Vorster maintained that only the South African Parliament 
could change the status of Walvis Bay; and that South Africa would not be “dictated to” 
on the subject. He indicated however, that his government would permit Ahtisaari to 
visit Namibia, but would defer final approval of the plan until receiving Ahtisaari’s 
report.480
With a 47-member team, Ahtisaari embarked on 16-day mission (August 5-22, 1978) to 
prepare a plan on effecting a transition to independence.481 The delegation met with 
Marthinus Steyn, South African administrator-general for Namibia, and the 
representatives of SWAPO and other political groups. Steyn, under the influence of 
South Africa refused to consider halting the voter registration. He also insisted that 
December 31 remain the date for Namibian independence following election for the 
new government. SWAPO, on the other hand, maintained its opposition to the South 
African unilateral action in registering voters and demanded a new registration drive 
under the UN supervision.
480 A History, op cit., section 20.
481 A History, op cit., section 21; Facts on File, August 18,1978, p. 633; New York 
Times, August 22,1978, p. 23.
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The Ahtisaari’s visit was marred with a new fighting between South Africa and 
SWAPO in the Caprivi Strip. By now a pattern was evident. Each party was 
juxtaposing military action with negotiation. Whenever either side calculated it would 
be effectual, or found that it might have to conceded too much at the negotiating table, 
military action followed. For instance, SWAPO declared that “in accepting the West’s 
offer of mediation, it was aware of the design that the Contact Group member states 
were allies of apartheid South Africa. But we proceed from the premise that political, 
diplomatic and military aspects of the struggle are not contradictory, but 
complementary, and as such they can be pursued concurrently”.482 Thus on August 22, 
SWAPO launched a military strike against the South African troops from Zambia. 
Military reports announced that nine South African soldiers were killed and 10 
wounded in the 2-hour SWAPO assault. It was the highest South African death toll in 
any single battle with SWAPO in the guerrilla war. Due to its heavy casualties, South 
Africa initially accused Zambian soldiers of helping SWAPO out, but later withdrew 
the charge. Ahtisaari left Namibia on August 23, a few hours before South Africa made 
a three-day retaliatory attack. 483
With the Caprivi Strip incident, the fragile settlement plan faced an uncertain future. 
The sudden resignation of John Vorster, due to ill health and the ‘Rhoodigate 
scandal’484 as South African Prime Minister, heighten the state of nervousness of the
482 NAMIBIA TODAY: OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE SWAPO, Vol. 6, No. 2,1982, 
p. 7.
83 Facts on File, September 1,1978, p. 669.
484 Facts on File, September 29,1978, p. 741. The Rhoodigate scandal involved the 
Information Secretary, Eschel Rhoodie over his agency misuse of money to buy influence 
abroad for South Africa. The Auditor-General, Gerald Barrie, found out that the 
Information Department had diverted some money to buy goodwill and influence overseas 
without the knowledge of the Parliament and approval of the Treasury. More damagingly, 
the money were said to be used to influence political campaigns in the United States to
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negotiation, as hawkish, Pieter Botha became his successor. The Contact Group was 
now faced with two Bothas: Pik Botha and Pieter W. Botha. As demonstrated in 
chapter two, since the days of Generals Smuts Hertzog in the 1920s, the Namibian 
conflict has always been a factor in any leadership contest in the South African 
domestic politics. The game was not different now. Even Pik Botha, a dovish liberal 
seized on the Namibia conflict for political advantage. His reaction to the Waldheim’s 
report, based on Ahtisaari’s findings suggested extreme scepticism about the UN’s role. 
On September 6, he wrote a lengthy letter to Mr. Waldheim, where he foresaw ‘severe 
problems’ with the size of the UN forces. A copy of the letter was given to the Contact 
Group ambassadors in New York on September 12, and asked for their reply within 72 
hours, i. e. September 15. The Contact Group insisted that the Waldheim plan was un- 
negotiable.485
On September 20, he pointed out that the Waldheim plan contradicted the proposals 
South Africa had accepted in talks with the Contact Group. He declared that South 
Africa would not accept more than 5,000 UN peacekeepers in the territory, and that the 
UN plan for a 7,500 strong UN peacekeeping force was tantamount to installing the 
USSR-backed SWAPO to govern the territory. Pik Botha’s language indicated that he 
had a wider audience in sight with his strongest criticism of the UN since the 
negotiation started 18 months ago.
oppose the reelection of Senator Dick Clark [D-Iowa], who was known for his anti­
apartheid policies, and led the Congressional votes in 1976 that terminated the United 
States covert support to the UNITA rebels and assistance to South Africa based on its 
involvement on Angola..
485 A History, op cit., section 23. For the implementation of the UNTAG, see, Thomberry, 
Cedric, op cit, p. 19-6.
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Two days later, on September 22, SWAPO announced that it would intensify its war 
efforts. Nujoma told the press that SWAPO was now looking to UN, and not the 
proposals drawn by the Contact Group. His call on the “socialist countries to furnish 
SWAPO with weapons” to step up its guerrilla struggle, un-nerved the Contact Group. 
None of them was comfortable with the South African decision, nor interested in seeing 
the involvement of the Soviet Union, in any form. The State Department sharply 
criticised South Africa, and called for “urgent consultations” with the FLS and the other 
members of the Contact Group.486 Meanwhile, on September 28,1978, the 172-member 
caucus of the ruling National Party elected P. W. Botha, the Defense Minister, as the 
new Prime minister 487
Pieter Botha was a militarist hawk. His election was a victory for the archconservative 
wing of the National Party. It signified the victory of the Cape Province faction of the 
party, over the Trasvaal wing led by Connie Mulder, minister of plural relations, and 
the more liberal Afrikaner faction, led by Pik Botha. During the leadership contest, 
Botha chose the Namibia negotiations as one of his campaign issues. He asserted that 
Western diplomacy was bent on installing a Marxist state in Namibia. Furthermore, in 
his first post-victory speech outside National Party headquarters in Cape Town, he not 
only ruled out any possibility of abandoning apartheid; but also maintained that South 
Africa was determined to remain in Namibia despite the UN decision. He stated that 
South Africa had no intention of challenging the world, but he would not allow other 
nations to push it around 488 The Vorster’s announcement in his farewell speech that
486 New York Times, September 22,1978, p. 68.
487 Facts on File, September 29,1978, p. 741-42.
488 New York Times, October 1,1978, p. 39.
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Pretoria would withdraw from the UN initiative, 489 was a foretoken that the Contact 
Group now had to work against being fulfilled.
In any event, the Contact Group succeeded in convening a Security Council meeting on 
September 29. The Security Council approved the Contact Group documents as 
Resolution 435 (1978).490 The Security Council decided to send 7,500 peacekeepers; 
and ordered South Africa “forthwith to co-operate” with the Secretary General in 
facilitating the work of the UN. It also authorised the establishment of UNTAG for a 
period of up to 12 months.491 All unilateral measures taken by South Africa to conduct 
an election in Namibia were declared null and void, and the Secretary-General was 
requested to report on the implementation of Resolution 435 by October 1978. The 
Afro-Asian bloc made clear to the Contact Group that they expected the Contact Group 
to support sanctions if South Africa compliance was not forthcoming.492
5.7. Resolution 435 (1978): a legal and political formula on the Namibian question
Resolution 435 augmented Resolution 385 (1976) and later served as the final legal 
‘frame of reference’ on South Africa’s authority in Namibia. It strengthened other 
resolutions such as the 1966 General Assembly’s termination order, and the subsequent 
revocation order of the ICJ in 1971. These instruments detached all the intricacies of 
Mandate system, and brought the Namibian settlement from the realm of international 
law, into the political sphere. However, unlike the previous resolutions such as 
Resolution 385 (1976), Resolution 435 (1978) grew out of diplomatic manoeuvres. As 
both a legal and political formula, it assumed a life of its own, and like all similar
489 Facts on File, September 29,1978, p. 741.
490 UNMC, Vol. XV, No. 9, October 1978, p. 5,16.
491 New York Times, October 1,1978, ibid., p. 13.
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documents, it contained some inherent flaws. Its basic flaw was that it determined that a 
constitution for Namibia should be drafted after independence elections. Its main 
outcome would have secured the prospect of a SWAPO dominated government with no 
guarantee of minority rights. Its other implication was that given the volatility of the 
tribal politics in Africa, SWAPO would have a free ride in settling old scores through 
the use of state apparatuses against the minorities, whose rights are not guaranteed. Its 
main premise differed sharply from the usual practice in Africa. It had been generally 
assumed that a pre-independence constitution such as the one drawn up at Lancaster 
House for Zimbabwe was essential for the long-term stability of a new nation-state. 
Interestingly though, South Africa never seized upon these flaws, until the United 
States came on with the ‘strengthening’ of Resolution 435 in 1981 under the linkage 
politics. We shall focus on the linkage politics in the next chapter.
Its strength however, was that it put the burden of South African compliance on the 
Contact Group. The resolution was a little short of an ‘ultimatum’. It had a specific, 
clearly defined objective, with a threat of punishment for non-compliance.493 It 
required the Contact Group to make sure that South Africa did not derail the plan. For 
the first time in 18 months, the Contact Group was faced with some tough decisions to 
make, should South Africa fail to comply. Should they vote for mandatory economic 
sanctions, partly to satisfy the Afro-Asian bloc; and partly to fulfil their threat of doing 
so, as made clear to South Africa in April 1977? Or should they veto the sanctions, 
even at the risk of damaging their own credibility and reputation for impartiality?
492 Vance, op cit., p. 308
493 George and Craig, op cit., p. 198, for a detailed analysis of coercive diplomacy in 
general and a ‘ultimata’ in particular.
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Meanwhile the African states were threatening to put the sanction issue to a vote. The 
Contact Group was in a difficult position, especially the United States and Britain. 
Collectively, the Group was being deprived of its reasoning for not supporting the 
sanctions resolution. For instance, at the end of 1977-the last occasion when Africa 
called for economic sanctions- the Contact Group dissuaded the Africans pushing on 
the grounds that Pretoria was co-operating with the Contact Group, and that South 
Africa might also help to produce an internationally acceptable settlement in Rhodesia. 
Sanctions, it was argued, would jeopardise hopes on both counts. This line of reasoning 
was no longer tenable. Yet a sanction vote would be a moral victory to the black 
African states and the Soviet Union.
Individually, each member of the Contact Group also had its own reasons for 
supporting or opposing sanctions. For Britain, at this time, was sensitive to the 
Bingham inquiry, which concluded that there was evidence of some enigmatic 
relationship between the government officials and the oil companies that led to sanction 
busting on Rhodesia.494 For instance, before leaving London for New York, Britain’s 
foreign Secretary, David Owen specifically stated that he was not opposed to sanctions, 
although these would have to be carefully prepared if they were to have the desired 
effect. This, he said, was a lesson of Bingham inquiry.495 “Britain would not rush into 
anything-but neither would it lag behind”.496
For the United States, Vance later revealed that the tough choice imposed by the 
sanction vote had led President Carter to convene an emergency meeting of the
494 Financial Mail, September 29,1978, p. 1151.
495 ibid., p. 1153.
496 ibid.
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National Security Council on October 6, 1978 to review the whole southern African 
issue.497 Carter agreed that, failing positive moves by South Africa, the time had come 
for direct pressures. He wrote P. W. Botha a personal letter, to be delivered by Vance in 
company of other Contact Group ambassadors 498 This contained a personal plea for 
South Africa to ease its opposition to UN plan. Carter offered to meet Botha in 
Washington for discussions on how South Africa’s international standing could be 
improved, providing Pretoria reversed its September 20 decision 499 As a further 
inducement, Carter offered that the Contact Group would squeeze SWAPO for more 
concessions. His intention was a re-scheduling of the UN supervised election for the 
spring of 1979, and a reduction in the number of the peacekeepers from 7,500 to 3,500 
combat troops, but with an increase in the civilian personnel from 1,200 to 1,500 
officials.
The NSC concluded that should Botha fail to respond positively to these proposals, a 
sanction vote was imminent. Yet when the vote was called, each of the five balked on 
total UN embargo. In New York, David Owen made it clear that, despite the Bingham 
report, Britain was not ready to take any measure that would be injurious to South 
Africa, or leading to significant economic loss for Britain.500 The Contact Group as a 
whole settled for ‘soft sanctions” such as the restrictions on landing rights for South 
Africa civil aircraft and denying Pretoria access to export financing from Western 
sources.
497 Vance, op cit., p. 308
498 New York Times, October 17,1978, p. 32.
499 Vance, op cit., p. 308.
500 ibid.
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From the foregoing, it is discernible that the content of the Contact Group package 
contained too many “soft spots” that would undermine its capacity to convince South 
Africa to change course. Bearing in mind the “softness” of the package, their three-day 
“rapid-response mission” to Pretoria (October 16-18, 1978), was a futile one.501 Vance 
admitted after he left Pretoria that “the West had no assurances on South Africa’s 
position”. “We will have to wait and see”.502 The gulf between the two parties 
remained wide and was widening. For example, the South Africa Government stressed 
that it would not withdrawal it forces without a cease-fire. For its part, the Contact 
Group stated that it saw no way of reconciling South Africa’s unilateral elections with 
the proposal endorsed by the Security Council. The response of SWAPO to the Pretoria 
talks did not surprise many within the international community. Theo-Ben Guribab, 
SWAPO permanent observer to UN asserted that Contact Group should “concede 
failure” on Namibian question.503
As Vance and other members of the Contact Group left Pretoria empty-handed, they 
turned to the United Nations.504 Waldheim was called to send Ahtisaari to Windhoek to 
work the “modalities” of the UN-supervised elections with Steyn. For the first time, the 
United Nations was to be used by the Contact Group to salvage the negotiations. Two 
reasons could be adduced for this move. First, to get South Africa via the administrator- 
general to commit itself to going on with the settlement plans. Secondly, to manoeuvre 
Waldheim into underwriting the Pretoria agreement before SWAPO and the African 
states could have a chance to block it. Perhaps, having recognised that the UN had been 
largely marginalised in the negotiation process, Waldheim refused the Contact Group’s
501 Financial Mail, October 27,1978, p. 297.
502 ibid.
503 New York Times, October 24,1978, p. 63.
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suggestion. His refusal was predicated on principle and credibility, rather than 
expediency. If Waldheim had sent Ahtisaari to Windhoek, the UN would have found 
itself in an impossible situation. It would have been tantamount to a breach of its own 
words. Most of the pre-conditions, on which the UN agreed to the Western plan, were 
yet to be fulfilled by South Africa. Under the plan, it was the UN military and civilian 
force that was to be responsible for enforcing the cease-fire, not South Africa. For the 
election to go ahead irrespective of the withdrawal of South African troops would be a 
clear breach of the UN favoured plan.
Meanwhile, the FLS were becoming increasingly irritated with the Contact Group’s 
diplomacy. Consequently, Andrew Young embarked on another African tour.505 He 
visited Guinea, Nigeria, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia, to “cool off’ their anger. 
Young’s efforts came too late. Carter’s signing of the legislation on November 10 
restricting the Export-Import Bank in financing trade with South Africa also too late. 
Three days afterwards, the African states called for the sanctions vote in the Security 
Council. They believed that any negotiation with Pretoria without any sanction threat 
was to engage in a “dialogue of the deaf’. The Security Council warned South Africa 
through Resolution 439 (1978) to cancel its planned elections in Namibia or face UN 
economic sanctions.506 Resolution 439 gave Pretoria an ultimatum of two weeks in 
which to change its plans. It was passed by 10-0 votes with abstentions by the five 
Contact Group members. Their abstentions undermined the strength of the resolution, 
and reinforced the ‘credibility gap’ being suspected by the African states. They now 
lacked the ‘teeth’ with which to force Pretoria abandoning its own strategy.
504 Financial Mail, October 27,1978, p. 297.
505 New York Times, November 20,1978, p. 1.
506 UNMC, Vol. XV, No. 11, December 1978, p. 5,9.
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It is tempting to deride the abstention. But such cynicism seems literally beside the 
point. The abstention marked a contrast with the Carter Administration policy of 
“strangulation by finesse”. The sanction issue highlighted the paradox embedded on the 
Contact Group objective, that it is a strange mixture of interests and idealism. A 
tension between the weight of the national interests over the letter of Resolution 435 
(1978). They engineered the process that led to the passing of the resolution, yet 
refused to take action that would actualise its main goal, as other members of the 
international community had hoped. It was evident that the Contact Group did not want 
to weaken their own ally (South Africa), and, unwittingly strengthen their uncertain 
friends (the African states); or make the Soviet sense a stress on the West-South 
African relationship. As shown in chapter four, Pretoria believed that the West, 
especially the United States left her in the lurch at the most critical moment of the 
Angola crisis. P. W. Botha, (then Defense Minister), was a passionate believer of this 
view. For example, in his statement before the South African House of Assembly in 
April 1977, he said without deference that: “it is time the West heard in stem language 
that South Africa has never left it in the lurch, but it has left us in the lurch a number of 
times. The most recent time was last year in Angola”.507
In effect, the abstention aimed at not incurring the anger of the South Africans given 
that at this time, the Soviets and Cuban troops were helping Ethiopia against Somalia 
over the Horn of Africa. If they had voted for the sanctions, both Soviets and the 
Africans would have claim a moral victory of sort against South Africa. In addition, the 
Contact Group was concerned of not setting a precedent for a sanction against Israel, an
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issue, which by itself reflected a division of opinion along the West/South Africa and 
Soviet Union/Africa divide.
Perhaps, a threat of sanction would have deterred Pretoria from announcing on 
November 25, 1978, that the December election would go ahead as scheduled. The 
FLS, although angered, did not waver. Three diplomats namely Gwendoline C. Konie 
(Zambia), Leslie O. Harriman (Nigeria) and Salim A. Salim (Tanzania) urged UN 
correspondents to stay out of Namibia during the elections in December, insisting that 
their presence will help to legitimise “sham elections” aimed at installing a puppet 
regime in the territory.508 The Contact Group embarked on a damage-limitation 
exercise for abstaining on the sanction vote. President Carter invited P. Botha to 
Washington. Vance warned P. Botha in New York that South Africa should not assume 
that the Contact Group, and the US in particular would continue to resist attempts to 
impose sanctions, if it failed to comply with Resolution 435. On November 30, during 
his meeting with P. Botha at the White House, with Vance and Brzezinski in 
attendance, President Carter warned him that the US would support economic sanctions 
against Pretoria unless it co-operates with UN on Namibia.509 The reactions of South 
Africa afterwards indicated that it felt susceptible, for the first time since the 
negotiation began in April 1977. Afterwards Pik Botha pledged that South Africa 
would not use internal elections to install a government in Namibia. He further declared 
that Pretoria would “recommend strongly” to the winners of the December elections 
that they accept Resolution 435 and agree to new elections seven months after the
507 South Africa: Defense and Strategic Value: A Political Backgrounder, (London: 
South African Embassy, 1977), p. 27.
508 New York Times, November 29,1978, p. 1.
509 New York Times, December 1,1978, p. 4.
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introduction of UNTAG.510 He added that South Africa would retain full authority in 
Namibia after the elections, hence the December victors would not form an interim 
government. Heretofore, South Africa was only interested in using its ‘best efforts” to 
persuade the victors of the December elections to accept the UN plan. All these 
reflected a mild shift on South African position, nonetheless its insistence on the 
December elections.
Washington’s immediate reaction to Pretoria’s gesture is worth elucidating upon. 
Hodding Carter, the US Department spokesman said on early December that US was 
“gratified” by South Africa’s announcement that no power would be handed over to the 
winners of the December elections.511 Two days later, President Carter said, he was 
encouraged by recent developments regarding Namibia, and hoped that SWAPO would 
agree to terms of UN-sponsored elections in 6 months or so.512 Washington’s reaction 
went beyond belief when President Carter mistakenly said that South Africa had 
accepted the UN plan for Namibia; and that the next step was to find out whether 
SWAPO would also accept it. Recognizing its error, both the White House and the 
State Department retracted President Carter’s statement. They correctly pointed out that 
SWAPO had accepted the UN plan but South Africa has not yet accepted some of the 
UN’s proposals.513
Elections were held in Namibia on December 4-8, 1978, with SWAPO boycotting the 
exercise. The Pretoria-backed DTA was declared the winner on December 15, by 
winning 41 of the 50 seats, with 82% of the votes cast in an 80% poll. The Aktur Party,
510 New York Times, December 4,1978, p. 3.
511 New York Times, December 5,1978, p. 6.
512 New York Times December 5,1978, p. 6.
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a white conservative group came in second with 6 seats and 12% of the vote.514 Three 
minor parties won one seat apiece: the National Christian Democratic Party, the 
Hertstigte National Party and the Liberation Front. As a reprisal for holding the 
elections, the Africans went to the General Assembly to call for mandatory sanctions 
against South Africa. The vote was 123-0, with 17 abstentions. Even at the General 
Assembly, the Contact Group feared the tyranny of the majority. They maintained that 
they were not prepared to take any action that would undermine their negotiations with 
South Africa.
Meanwhile, event in Namibia was moving in opposite direction to what the Contact 
Group had hoped. The Constituent Assembly was set up based on the recently 
concluded elections. The Tumhalle plan was a step short of being a government. Two 
days after its formation, although, it passed a resolution which it ‘agreed in principle” 
to UN-supervised elections in Namibia, it then made a new demand on the UN. It 
requested the UN to withdraw its recognition of SWAPO as the sole representative of 
the Namibian people. Henceforth, South Africa attempted to secure international 
recognition for the Constituent Assembly, by presenting its decision as a joint one, 
based on consultation. For instance, on December 22, Pretoria informed Waldheim that, 
following consultations with the newly elected Namibian leadership, it would co­
operate in the expeditious implementation of Resolution 435. There were a number of 
provisos: (a) There should be no reduction of the South African troop strength in 
Namibia until a comprehensive cessation of hostilities had been achieved, (b) The date 
for UN supervised elections should be no later than 30 September 1979. (c) The 
Administrator-General should be consulted on questions such as the size of the
513 New York Times, December 13,1978, p. 3.
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UNTAG military force and the monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighbouring states, (d) 
The maintenance of law and order should remain the primary responsibility of the 
existing police force, (e) The Administrator-General should continue to exercise 
legislative and administrative responsibility during the transition period, and (f) that 
Ahtisaari should visit South Africa and Windhoek for consultation.
5.8. The Cease-fire Deadlock
Between 13 January and 13 February 1979, Ahtisaari visited Namibia, South Africa, 
the FLS and Nigeria to discuss the establishment of a UN presence in Namibia before 
the end of February. He proposed February 26, 1979 to the South African authorities, as 
the target date for dispatching of the first contingent of UN. However, both South 
Africa and SWAPO differed on the cease-fire issue. In a statement issued on 12 
February, following talks with Ahtisaari, SWAPO declared that it was not prepare to be 
confined to bases in the countries bordering Namibia or to have them placed under UN 
supervision, as Pretoria demanded. At the same time Nujoma sought Waldheim’s 
agreement to the confinement of 2,500 SWAPO forces to five bases to be established 
inside Namibia. Pretoria, which insisted on UN monitoring of SWAPO bases at their 
bases in Angola and Zambia, rejected SWAPO’s demand. For their part, the Contact 
Group made clear to SWAPO that the settlement Proposal did not permit the 
introduction into Namibia of armed SWAPO troops. In a report to the Security Council 
on 26 February, drawn up after consultation with the Contact Group, Waldheim stated 
that, while the settlement proposals made no specific provision for the monitoring by 
UNTAG of SWAPO bases in neighbouring states, these countries had, nevertheless,
514 New York Times, December 11,1978, p. 3.
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been asked to ensure that the provisions of the transitional arrangements would be 
respected.515
In addition, Waldheim sought the agreements of the Governments of Angola, Zambia 
and Botswana to the establishment of UNTAG liaison offices in their countries. 
Waldheim suggested specific arrangements for dealing with SWAPO armed troops, 
differentiating between those inside Namibia and those outside at the time of the cease­
fire which he propose should commence on March 15.516 Any SWAPO armed forces in 
Namibia at the time of cease-fire were to be restricted to designated locations inside 
Namibia. Those forces in neighbouring countries would be restricted to bases in those 
countries. In a communique following a summit meeting in Luanda on March 4, the 
FLS agreed with SWAPO that its forces inside Namibia should be confined to UN 
controlled bases as provided for in the Waldheim plan, but those SWAPO forces 
outside Namibia should be independent of any neighbouring states control. The 
communique also said that the UNTAG military component should not be drawn from 
countries which belonged to “military alliances”. In essence, the FLS ruled out a 
contribution of troops from either the NATO or the WARSAW Pact bloc, and more 
specifically from the Contact Group memberstates.
In a manner reminiscent of South Africa’s Ascension Day attack of May 1978, 
SWAPO embarked on a “sneak attack” on South Africa’s Nkongo military bases on 
February 13, 1979.517 Presumably, for tactical reasons, the Contact Group did not 
condemn SWAPO’s attack. This annoyed South Africa, and accordingly, on March 6, it
515 UNMC, Vol. XVI, No. 3, March 1979, p. 18, “Secretary General Reports to Council 
on Namibian Issue”, (S/13120); A History, op cit., section 27.
516 ibid., section 28.
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accused the Contact Group of bad faith in the negotiations and of conniving at 
measures aimed at giving SWAPO a decisive advantage. Furthermore, Pretoria claimed 
that Waldheim’s report of 26 February contained two major “deviations” (that SWAPO 
bases outside Namibia need not be monitored by UN troops, and that armed SWAPO 
guerrilla should be allowed to establish bases inside the territory) which were 
inconsistent with the original Proposal. Waldheim rejected charges by Botha of 
“scheming” and “double dealing” by UN officials.518 The Contact Group also issued a 
statement that rejected Pretoria’s accusations of bad faith, and supporting Waldheim’s 
report as fair and reasonable and consistent with the original Proposal.
5.9. The road to the second ‘proximity talks’
At this stage, some US Department of State officials, were in private resenting 
Pretoria’s schizophrenic attitude towards the negotiation. They resented Pretoria’s 
rejection of the cease-fire proposal.519 The question facing the Contact Group was no 
longer negotiation-fatigue, but whether they could resuscitate the settlement plan and 
overcome the intense mutual mistrust between South Africa and SWAPO. Differing 
interests motivated the US and Britain. In his meeting with Vance in Washington in 
early February 1979, David Owen, British Foreign Secretary emphasised that the 
implementation of UN plan for Namibia was crucial for invigorating the Anglo- 
American plan for settlement in Rhodesia. On the other hand, because the Carter 
Administration had invested considerable political capital in the Namibian issue, its 
failure would dent the administration’s image. The fresh blood pumped into the 
negotiation was a suggestion of another round of “proximity talks”.
517 New York Times, February 15,1979, p. 1.
518 New York Times, March 10,1979, p. 3.
519 New York Times, March 7,1979, p. 6.
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The meeting was held in New York between March 19-23 1979.520 The day before, the 
Contact Group held private strategy talk and later conferred with Waldheim.521 At 
Pretoria’s request, a member of DTA participated on Vance’s assurance that the DTA 
delegation would have the same access to the Contact Group as SWAPO. Although the 
status of the DTA delegation was unclear, their attendance legitimised the party at the 
international level. For the first time, SWAPO had an international competitor other 
than South Africa. Before leaving Pretoria, Pik Botha described the talks as the “last 
chance” for the UN peace plan. As part of his cat and mouse game, Botha cancelled 
meeting with the Contact Group on the ground that he had to follow the Security 
Council debate on Angola’s charges that South Africa was intensifying attacks against 
SWAPO bases in Angola.522 He then resumed talks with the Group, after an ‘organised’ 
breakfast meeting by Vance.523 As in February 1978, the Contact Group held separate 
talks with Botha and SWAPO officials. The main issue of discussion focused on 
controlling guerrilla infiltration. As a compromise, US proposed planting electronic 
monitoring devices along the Namibian border to detect SWAPO infiltration.524 
SWAPO also accepted the restriction of its forces outside Namibia to bases in the 
countries concerned.
Following the talks, the Contact Group’s ambassadors in Cape Town handed a message 
on March 26 to the South African Government containing proposals for implementing
520 A History, op cit., section 30.
521 New York Times, March 19,1979, p. 5.
522 New York Times, March 20,1979, p. 1.
523 ibid.
524 Financial Mail, March 23,1979, p. 947.
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the settlement plan based on the understandings reached in New York.525 Pik Botha 
replied on 7 May. He rejected the Waldheim’s report of 26 February as a basis for 
implementing the Proposal, despite the clarifications in the Contact Group’s letter of 26 
March. He said that South Africa would implement the original Proposal as agreed by it 
in April 1978. He also stated that Pretoria had agreed to a proposal made on April 9, 
1979 by the DTA, that an interim government should be formed in Namibia with an 
enlarged “National Assembly” vested with legislative powers.
What underpinned Pretoria’s action was the April 2 meeting of the two Bothas with the 
DTA leadership in Windhoek. Pretoria’s proclamation on May 8 that the Constituent 
Assembly was to be the Namibian national assembly, with powers to legislate anything 
short of independence, was a blow to the two-year Contact Group negotiation. For 
instance, the announcement of an interim government provoked a sharp rebuke from 
the Quai D’Orsay, the French Ministry, which was genuinely reluctant to condemn 
South Africa publicly because of nuclear projects being undertaken by the French 
companies with the South African government. None the less, in its five-point 
declaration, the Quai D’Orsay warned South Africa that there was no possible solution 
outside the UN plan. It maintained that South Africa held the entire responsibility for 
Namibia’s destiny, insisting that SWAPO had shown definite and genuine signs of
527goodwill, of which the same is required from South Africa. (Emphasis mine). 
Unquestionably, the Contact Group diplomacy was heading for derailment; and more 
worrying still was a strained relationship between Washington and Pretoria.
525 A History, op cit., section 31.
526 Financial Mail, April 13,1979, p. 118.
527 ibid.
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5.10. London taking charge of the Contact Group
A good bilateral relationship is an effective facilitator in wider multilateral 
negotiations. It was therefore not surprising that in the wake of espionage charges 
between Washington and Pretoria, and the subsequent diplomatic friction between 
them,528 London took over the lead of the Contact Group. Between May 24-June 1, 
1979, the British government dispatched Richard Luce, Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State, to Lusaka, Cape Town and Windhoek as the personal representative of Lord 
Carrington, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.529 His 
mission was to put the negotiation on the right track, especially from the South African 
side. Subsequently, Lord Carrington and Pik Botha held talks in London on June 20, 
1979. At the end of this meeting, Botha agreed to a resumption of discussions between 
South Africa and the Contact Group on the implementation of Resolution 435. 
Differences over the UN plan were now narrowed down to how to restrict SWAPO 
forces to two locations inside Namibia and the question of monitoring SWAPO units in 
Angola and Zambia. London consolidated its position by securing the appointment of 
Sir James Murray, British Ambassador to the UN at Geneva, as the Contact Group
528 Facts on File, April 20,1979, On April 12, Pretoria ordered the expulsion of three US 
Embassy staffs on charges of espionage. In a televised announcement, Prime Minister 
Botha charged that they had outfitted the US ambassador’s airplane with an aerial 
surveillance camera. Those expelled were USAF Col. Alvin Crews, the defense attache, 
Maj. Bemd McConnell, assistant air attache, and Master Sgt. Horace Wyatt, the airplane 
crew chief. Botha expressed “profound shock and dismay over this reprehensible action...” 
“These actions against South Africa are actions which I would have anticipated from the 
Russians but not the leading Western country”, he declared. The reaction of the US State 
Department was swift. It issued a communique expressing “regret” over the expulsion.
Not surprisingly, the communique said: “It is particularly unfortunate that the South 
African government chose to act as it did at a time when we are engaged with it in seeking 
solutions to the problems in Namibia and elsewhere in southern Africa. The next day, 
Washington expelled two South African military attaches. In a tit for tat move Pretoria 
order, the men were given a week to leave the US. Those expelled were Commodore 
Willem du Plessis, defense attache and Col. Gert Coetzee, the air attache. Commodore 
William de Plessis would later be among the five South African military men that visited 
Washington on March 5-15,1981.
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special envoy. Sir James was entrusted with the task of exploring with the South Africa 
the remaining problems relating the cease-fire and the early arrival of UNTAG in 
Namibia. He visited Pretoria from August 9-23 1979.530
The departure of Andrew Young, as the US ambassador to the UN, was another setback 
on American position within the Contact Group. Young resigned in the wake of his July 
26 meeting with Zehdi Labib Terzi, the PLO’s UN observer, at the New York home of 
Abdala Yaccoub Bishara, the Kuwaiti delegate to the UN.531 His replacement was 
Donald McHenry, his deputy at the UN. Although McHenry was the US chief 
negotiator for the Contact Group, in the wake of the rapid deterioration of US-South 
African relations, Pretoria was more disposed to listen to London. McHenry was a 
career diplomat, who had resigned in 1973 when Kissinger became the Secretary of 
State, but returned to government with the Carter Administration in 1977.532 
McHenry’s displeasure of Kissinger’s style and ideas was resurrected when Kissinger 
offered to meet both South African and the SWAPO officials on the stalled negotiation 
in November 1980.1 shall examine this episode in the next section.
Through Sir James Murray, Britain resurrected a proposal, which had earlier been made 
to Waldheim by President Neto of Angola.533 This was that a demilitarised zone (DMZ) 
of 50-km wide should be created on either side of the Namibia/Angolan border and 
encompassing the entire Caprivi Strip. There were political elements to the making of 
the Neto proposal. First, Neto believed that the creation of the DMZ would sever
529 A History, op cit., section 33; Financial Mail, May 25,1979, p. 671.
530 A History, ibid., section 35.
531 Facts on File, August 27,1979, p. 605.
532 Facts on File, September 7,1979, p. 661. See Who’s Who 1997 (London: A & C 
Black, 149th Edition, 1997), p. 1245, for McHency profile.
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UNITA’s supply lines and stabilise the situation on Angolan side of the border.534 
Secondly, the plan itself was an outcome of the meeting between Neto and McHenry in 
late July 1979.535 More significantly, Neto now argued that SWAPO would be 
informed, but not consulted as the issue was now seen as being purely a matter between 
the two- border countries-Angolan and South Africa. Presumably, Neto conceded in 
anticipation for American recognition of Angola.
Following Sir James Murray’s mission, the Contact Group and the UN Secretariat 
presented the demilitarisation arrangement to Pretoria, the FLS, Nigeria and SWAPO 
between October 1-5, 1979.537 To both South Africa and SWAPO, the notion of a DMZ 
had some important military and political implications. Both Pretoria and Luanda 
requested technical discussions from the Contact Group. Pretoria was not averse to the 
idea of DMZ, but it was sceptical, in view of the inhospitable terrain and massive force 
required to effectively sterilize both sides of the frontier. Its action resulted particularly 
from deep-seated mistrust of both the UN and the neighbouring governments that were 
required to co-operate with the sponsors of the plan. Then, too, Pretoria’s control over 
the situation would diminish as it began its phased withdrawal from five frontier bases 
inside the zone. Pretoria was also concerned about security and stability during the 
transition period.
From the more important political point of view, Pretoria was determined not to accede 
to any transitional arrangements that would undermine the political influence of non-
533 A History, op cit., section 36.
534 Financial Mail, August 17,1979, p. 632.
535 New York Times, August 11,1979, p. 2.
536 Financial Mail, September 7,1979, p. 930.
537 A History, op cit., section 36.
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SWAPO parties inside Namibia. Pretoria’s concerns about SWAPO bases inside 
Namibia were not purely for security reasons, but reflected the fear that SWAPO 
electioneers would exploit their presence in Namibia to secure a moral and tactical 
victory over the other parties. On the other hand, SWAPO’s main concern was that the 
current proposal provided for no fewer than five bases at which South African troops 
would be confined under UN supervision. These points of clarifications and 
reservations on the DMZ were to be the subject of the UN-convened four-day all party 
conference in Geneva from November 12.
5.11. The Geneva Conference
The Geneva conference was a recasting of the 1976 Kissinger’s model, but now with 
the UN in the driving seat. Waldheim led the negotiation by agreement with the Contact 
Group. These were the first all-inclusive talks, with the Contact Group, the FLS, 
Nigeria, SWAPO and the UN attending.538 Pretoria agreed to participate, having 
secured a place for the DTA representatives. To a great extent, the Geneva conference 
was another opportunity for South Africa to raise new obstacles, rather than solve the 
old ones. For instance, South Africa raised an objection to what it called the “vagueness 
of the new supplementary proposals” to the original settlement plan embodied in 
Resolution 435. It also challenged the incorporation of “designated locations” assigned 
to SWAPO forces, especially those inside Namibia when the cease-fire comes into 
operation.539 The UN officials refused to be taken in by South Africa’s legalism. They 
emphasised that the supplementary document was merely a working paper, not a legal 
document. South Africa made it clear, however, that its acceptance of the Geneva
538 A History, op cit., section 37.
539 .Financial Mail, December 7,1979, p. 1089.
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document would depend on its satisfaction with all the technical details. On this basis, 
all parties accepted the DMZ concept in principle.
The acceptance in itself did not resolve the problems of implementation. For instance, 
while Nujoma objected to the disarming or removal of SWAPO forces in Namibia at 
the time of the cease-fire, South Africa expressed reservations about the capability of a 
UN peacekeeping force to supervise adequately the huge area of the proposed DMZ.540
Prior to South Africa’s confirmation of acceptance of the DMZ concept on December 5 
1979, Lord Carrington and the West Germany foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, had a meeting with Pik Botha.541 For the umpteenth time, the meeting was to 
persuade Pretoria not to raise unnecessary obstacles to a settlement that could be seized 
upon to launch sanctions resolutions against her in the Security Council. Yet, Pretoria 
raised no fewer than six technical conditions.542 These included: the number of South 
African bases in the DMZ; the arrangements for disarming SWAPO forces after UN- 
supervised elections in Namibia; the deployment of sufficient UN troops in the DMZ to 
meet the practical needs; an agreement between UNTAG commander and the South 
African military authorities on other practical arrangements; a confirmation that the 
Contact Group proposal accepted by South Africa on 25 April 1978 remained 
unchanged; and a confirmation that SWAPO would not revive its claim to bases inside 
Namibia.
540 .ibid.
541 .Financial Mail, November 30,1979, p. 909.
542 .Financial Mail, December 14,1979, p. 1153.
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South Africa’s acceptance of the DMZ once again led to optimism about the prospects 
for securing Namibian independence. The abolition of a series of racial laws to 
enfranchise more blacks by the Namibian National Assembly also reflected the spirit of 
optimism. However, South African sensitivity to the conservative opinion within South 
Africa threatened the negotiations. The conservatives in South Africa were increasingly 
uneasy about the perceived outcome of the Namibia negotiations. The National Party 
leadership regarded Marthinus Steyn as unsuitable for the position of Administrator- 
General, alleging that he was biased in favour of the DTA, and excluded the white- 
dominated Aktur party. Perhaps to appease this constituency, Professor Gerrit Viljoen 
of Rand Afrikaans University replaced Steyn. Viljoen's appointment was intended to 
serve two mutually exclusive interests. Viljoen, as head of the Broederbond, the 
powerful Afrikaner secret society, was thought by Botha to have the qualities to restore 
white unity, by bringing back the Aktur Party into the national stage in Namibia. He 
was seen as a 'third way' man. As a broeder, he had enough of the conservative in him 
to appeal to die-hard Afrikaners who favoured the status quo in South Africa; as a 
verligte intellectual, he was among those who believed that apartheid should be 
reformed to accommodate urban blacks in Namibia. In essence, Botha hoped that 
Viljoen had the political clout to ‘soft land’ the plans for Namibia, without upsetting 
white conservatives, excluding the black electorate, and appearing insensitive to the 
international community.
5.12. From stage of discussion to the stage of implementation
As a result of South Africa’s acceptance of the DMZ concept, Waldheim announced the 
appointment of Lieutenant-General Prem Chand of India as UNTAG Force
239
Commander on 12 January 1980.543 A leap from the discussion stage to implementation 
required circular negotiations. Gen. Chand visited Angola, Zambia, Botswana and 
Namibia from February 5-29, 1980 to discuss with the Governments and authorities 
concerned the technical details of establishing a DMZ.544 From March 1-9, Gen. Chand 
joined Mr. Brian Urquhart, the UN Special General for Special Political Affairs, and 
Mr. Ahtisaari, in Cape Town for talks with the South African Government. The 
Urquhart team, accompanied by some members of the Contact Group held talks with 
leaders of Angola, Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique on the implementation of the 
DMZ proposal. The team returned to New York via Botswana. Meanwhile, Pretoria 
continued to express reservations on a number of points, but agreed to give further 
consideration to the plan and to inform Waldheim on whether or not it found it 
acceptable. For his part, Waldheim reported to the Security Council on Urquhart’s 
mission to southern African on 31 March. The date for implementation was fixed for 
June 15, 1980.
The number of issues in dispute continued to decrease, but slowly. On May 12, Pik 
Botha wrote to Waldheim, assuring him that South Africa would co-operate in 
implementing the UN plan once certain issues were resolved.545 Most significantly, he 
officially raised the issue of the UN partiality.546 The difference this time around was 
that South Africa was doing the bidding of the Constituent Assembly. To recap, the 
first resolution that was passed by the Constituent Assembly was on the UN partiality. 
He disclosed that Pretoria was upset over UN’s grant to SWAPO totalling $730,000 a
543 Financial Mail, February 1,1980, p. 341.
544 A History, op cit., section 39.
545 New York Times, May 14,1980, p. 3.
546 UNMC, Vol. XVE, No. 6, June 1980, p. 10, “South Africa Raises Issue of SWAPO as 
Sole Representative of Namibians”, (S/13935)
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year.547 Pik Botha demanded that: (a) The Secretary General and the UN Secretariat 
should refrain from giving effect to the General Assembly’s recognition of SWAPO as 
the “sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia”, (b) The Secretariat 
should not single out SWAPO for preferential treatment not accorded to other 
Namibian political parties, (c) That the Funds from regular UN budget should not be 
used to further SWAPO’s aims, including inter alia support for its office in New York 
and its inclusion in the activities of the Council for Namibia.548
Expectedly, SWAPO’s reaction to Botha’s conditions was hostile. At the OAU 
Liberation Committee meeting in Dar-es-Salaam in early June, Nujoma threatened that 
SWAPO was likely to retreat from its earlier endorsement of the UN initiatives.549 
However, Robert Mugabe, the newly elected Prime Minister of Zimbabwe, counselled 
Nujoma on the costs of withdrawal. Other FLS leaders, which had been a stalking horse 
on Namibian negotiations agreed.
Whilst the FLS was trying to keep SWAPO’s nerves, South Africa, in a ceaseless 
rhythm, displayed another two ruthless streaks. First, in a move reminiscent of the 1978 
Ascension Day military attack, the South African Defense Force (SADF) commenced a 
major offensive against SWAPO’s operational headquarters in southern Angola in early 
June.550 The three-week campaign was condemned by the Security Council Resolution 
475 of June 27, 1980. General Jan Geldenhuys, commander of South African troops in 
Namibia described the attack as “mopping up” operations; but the numbers of
547 UNMC, Vol. XVII, No. 4, May 1980, p. 8, “South Africa Asks for Time to Study 
Proposal, Security Council Told”; Facts on File, May 16,1980.
548 A History, op cit., section 40.
549 Facts on File, June 20,1980, p. 466.
550 New York Times, June 14,1980, p. 1.
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causalities (360 SWAPO and 17 South African soldiers dead) indicated that the 
operation was bigger than any previous military confrontations.551 In return, SWAPO 
switched its tactics from clashes with South African troops to sabotage with attack on 
energy installations both inside and outside Namibia. SWAPO’s mortar attack on the 
border town of Rucana destroyed South Africa’s contention that it had destroyed the 
former’s operational headquarters.
Secondly, on July 1, South Africa swore in a 12-member ‘Council of Minister’ led by 
Dirk Mudge of the DTA.552 Pretoria’s game plan was to develop the DTA as the power 
in situ and make it impossible for it to be ignored in any settlement. Mudge had powers 
akin to those of a Prime minister. The Administrator-General’s sphere of responsibility 
was reduced. The Council of Minister had other legislative and executive powers, 
exclusive of the Namibian foreign affairs, and security, that were the prerogatives of 
South Africa. In its response, Contact Group was deliberately restrained. A statement 
issued in New York on July 11, rejected the “Council of Minister”, the establishment of 
which, they said, complicated an already difficult settlement process.553
Like the Contact Group, the UN refused to be distracted by the South African 
chicanery. Waldheim replied to Botha’s letter of May 12 on June 20,554 reaffirming 
SWAPO’s new concessions. These included, SWAPO abandoning it claims to bases in 
Namibia, and an acceptance of South Africa’s offer to reduce its bases from 40 to 20. 
On the question of impartiality, Waldheim referred to his report of August 28, 1978 in
551 Facts on File, July 11,1980, p. 524.
552 A History, op cit., section 42.
553 ibid., section 43.
554 UNMC, Vol. XVn, No. 7, August 1980, p. 58, “South Africa Assured of Impartial UN 
Position in Namibian Election”, (S/14011); A History, op cit., section 44.
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which it was stated that UNTAG would act with complete impartiality. He added that, 
despite the various General Assembly resolutions to which Botha alluded, the UN Plan 
would be carried out under the authority of the Security Council. Britain described 
Waldheim’s letter as a “significant step forward in an early and speedy resolution of the 
Namibian conflict”.555 However, these concessions did not satisfy Pretoria. Pik Botha 
replied to Waldheim on August 29,556 stating that Pretoria was ready to discuss the 
composition of UNTAG, the status of forces agreement and the implementation of SCR 
435, subject to Waldheim’s confirmation that certain assumptions that he (Botha) had 
made were valid. These included that the conditions laid down for bases in the DMZ 
(20 on the South African side, seven in the Angolan and Zambian sectors) should apply 
equally to all parties, with SWAPO being excluded from the Angolan/Zambian bases, 
(b) Angola and Zambia should accept responsibility for the peaceful return of SWAPO 
personnel to Namibia, (c) That all parties involved in the implementation of SCR 435 
should henceforth maintain a strict impartial approach with preferential treatment of 
SWAPO ceasing immediately.557 He went further than previously in criticising the UN. 
He called the UN “the most ardent protagonist” of SWAPO, and argued that it was too 
prejudiced to supervise free elections in Namibia.558 He also called Waldheim to 
include the internal parties on any future dealings on Namibia.
It was clear that the Waldheim’s letter of June 20 had been intended to checkmate 
Pretoria on the issue of the DMZ by agreeing that the UN peacekeeping force would be 
responsible for sterilizing the entire DMZ on both sides of the Namibian border. 
Certainly, there was no flash of genius on South African negotiating tactics. It was just
555 Financial Mail, June 27,1980, p. 1447.
556 A History, op cit., section 45.
557 ibid.
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playing the old game of resurrecting an old issue in a new format. As Botha’s reply 
suggested, as South Africa experienced drought on new issues, it always back to the 
issue of the partiality of the UN.
Pretoria’s charges of the UN partiality did not go down well in the United States. For 
instance, McHenry, [now the US ambassador to the UN] defended the world body and 
its top officials before the US House of Representative Foreign Affairs subcommittee 
on Africa on September 9. He called Botha’s charges “distorted” and “unjustified”. He 
rebuked Pretoria’s demand that the UN General Assembly should retract its recognition 
of SWAPO as the “sole legitimate representative” of the Namibian people, by stating 
that Pretoria sought to “extract a major concession without committing itself to an 
agreement.” McHenry concluded that Pretoria’s demands were detractions, as the UN 
Security Council, which would be in charge of the Namibian elections, had never 
recognised SWAPO.559 Paradoxically, it was not only the Security Council that had not 
recognised SWAPO; the United State had not done either. In fact, the UN Council on 
Namibia revealed that there were secret efforts by the US and South Africa to promote 
Chief Clemens Kapuuo of the DTA as an alternative figure to Nujoma, and his party as 
a credible and effective force to SWAPO.560
In the main, at this stage, it was evident that Pretoria’s best-case outcome would have 
being the transfer of power to a friendly, pliant regime that would have at least secure
558 New York Times, September 4,1980, p. 3.
559 Department of State Bulletin, (September 29,1980)
560 The UN Council on Namibia revealed that both Washington and Pretoria wanted to 
establish Chief Kapuuo as a ‘credible international figure. Kapuuo got legal counsel from 
a New York law firm, Bums and Jacoby. A New York Marketing firm, Psycolographic 
Communications Inc., according to its founder Jack Summers, is marketing Kapuuo and
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international recognition. But after three years of intense negotiation with the Contact 
Group, this was increasingly difficult to achieve. Moreover, Pretoria’s attempt to 
asphyxiate or smother the negotiation had been unsuccessful. By raising the question 
of the partiality of the UN, Pretoria hoped to shunt the negotiation exercise into another 
lane, the most obvious being an all parties’ conference, similar to Zimbabwe’s 
Lancaster House conference. Arguably, the all-parties conference was based on two 
beliefs. First, it could present Pretoria with a face-saving formula under which to leave 
Namibia, without incurring the anger of the conservatives in both South Africa and 
Namibia. It would be possible for South Africa to present itself as the ‘Britain of 
Namibia, rather than as a defeated colonial power, a counsellor guiding all parties to an 
acceptable outcome, whilst protecting its own kind from the predators. Second, Pretoria 
may have reasoned that a Lancaster House type conference had the potential to throw 
up more problems than it would solve, especially on the status of the delegates. It 
would therefore provide new opportunities for stalling, possibly until the DTA had the 
capacity and ability to compete on equal terms with SWAPO. Meanwhile, as Pretoria 
was working on this plot, SWAPO embarked on a diplomatic offensive.
Nujoma called on the African members to call a UN Security Council meeting not later 
than October 15, 1980. He lobbied them at the international conference on Solidarity 
with the Struggle of the People of Namibia, held at the UNESCO Headquarters in Paris 
between September 12-15, 1980.561 In Paris, he had a discussion with the French
all the anti-SWAPO black groups at the Tumhalle conference. See, Sunday Yimes, 
(London), November 21,1976; and Africa Report, January-February 1977, p. 33.
561. UNMC, Vol. XVH, No. 9, November 1980, p. 5; Financial Mail, September 19, 
1980, p. 1347.
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Foreign Minister. A week later, he met the German Foreign Minister, and in late 
September, he met Sir Ian Gilmour, British Deputy Foreign Secretary.562
Back on the negotiation track, a UN delegation led by Brian Urquhart held a discussion 
with the South African government in Pretoria on October 20-25, 1980.563 The purpose 
of the delegation was to allay the South African fear concerning the impartiality of the 
UN. Dr. Brand Fourie, the South African Director-General of Foreign Affairs, led the 
South African team. Dr. Fourie maintained that the UN could not be an impartial and a 
fair administrator of a Namibian cease-fire if it continued to give political and financial 
support, reportedly over $10 million over a decade to SWAPO. Urquhart’s assurance 
that the assistance would end as soon the cease-fire plan was implemented failed to 
convince the South African team.
5.13. The Return of Kissinger
On November 24, 1980, four weeks after the Urquhart’s mission, Waldheim announced 
to the Security Council that South Africa had committed itself in principle for the first 
time to a specific date for commencing the UN supervised process that could lead to the 
Namibian independence.564 He noted that Pretoria had conditionally agreed to a March 
1981 cease-fire and independence by the end of 1981. He stated that Pretoria had 
agreed to a multiparty meeting as a means of facilitating agreement with all the parties 
concerned. Pretoria’s acquiescence did not come out of a void. Two major events 
provided it. These were the intervention of Henry Kissinger and the defeat of the DTA
562 Financial Mail, October 3,1980, p. 42.
A History, op cit, section 47. Other UN team members included Mr. Ahtisaari, Gen. 
Chand of India and Abdulrahim Farah.
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in the Legislative Assemblies elections of November 11-13. Kissinger met with Pik 
Botha in Paris on November 15.565 He sought to convince Botha to soften its 
obstructionist policy and give credible undertakings. He also had a meeting with 
Nujoma on the settlement plan. Kissinger’s meeting with Nujoma was without 
precedent. 566 It echoed the similar meeting the two had in October 1976, in which 
Nujoma told Kissinger that he was ready to negotiate with South African 
representatives at a UN meeting.
What led to the re-involvement of Kissinger at this stage remains unclear. It could 
be argued that he thought that he needed to prod the main parties into a conclusive 
end, having initiated the process in the first instance. Thus, the Namibian question 
was a pet project that he had a duty of care for, whether in or out of office. On the 
other hand, it could be argued, as the leading Carter administration officials 
believed that the incoming Reagan administration had encouraged him. For 
instance, Kissinger’s re-involvement did not go well with the leading Carter 
Administration officials, especially McHenry, or some of the Contact Group 
members. They feared that Kissinger, and the incoming Reagan administration 
would hijack and take the credit for their own three-year laborious negotiations. 
They also feared, justifiably so, that South Africa would exploit any time lag 
between the old and the incoming administration to further delay any moves 
towards securing independence to Namibia. In a coincidental manner, after meeting 
with Kissinger, Botha informed the UN that South African delegations would attend
564 UNMC, Vol. XVm, No. 1, January 1981, p. 5, “SWAPO and South Africa Agree 
to All-Party Talks”, (S/14266); Facts on File, December 19,1980, p. 967; A History, 
op cit., section 49.
5 5 New York Times, November 15,1980, p. 1.
566 Africa Report, January-February 1977, p. 33.
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the pre-implementation conference, but as a “non-participating adviser/observer”, 
while the internal Namibian parties should participate as independent negotiators, 
led by the Danie Hough, the new Administrator-General. It is worth recalling that in 
the aborted Geneva conference of late 1976 devised by Kissinger, South Africa also 
agreed to attend as an “observer”.
The second reason was the defeat suffered by the DTA in the ethnic ‘second tier’ 
elections held between November 11-13. The South West Africa National Party
r/:o
won 11 of the 18 seats while the DTA won only seven seats. The DTA defeats 
damaged South Africa’s claim that the multiracial group had support of the 
majority of Namibians and was therefore entitled to international recognition of its 
rule. The Namibian political landscape as designed by South Africa suddenly look 
very different. The ground had not radically altered, but previously impregnable 
position no longer look so secure. Yet South Africa refused to politically adjust its 
position and expected outcome.
5.14. The collapse of ‘second’ Geneva
The defeat of the DTA did not sap Pretoria’s resolve to put its protege on equal 
footing with SWAPO. The move was to undermine SWAPO’s status as the sole 
representative of the Namibian people. No other fora presented a better 
opportunity than the UN-sponsored pre-implementation multiparty conference. 
First, it could provide the propaganda leverage to sell the idea inside Namibia that 
SWAPO was no longer the “franchised child” of the international community, 
with consequent harm to its prospects of electoral success. For its part, SWAPO
567 Facts on File, December 19,1980, p. 967.
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maintained that it was ready to talk to the Namibian internal parties provided they 
were part of the South African delegation. South Africa had wanted to portray 
SWAPO as a party that feared opposition; and by implication it exhibited the basic 
trait of a Marxist-Leninist organisation. Secondly, South Africa had been the de 
facto power in Namibia for over 60 years; its role now as “adviser, in the 
background”, would also detract from SWAPO status as a principal, while at the 
same time elevating the status of the internal political parties.
Three African capitals- Zimbabwe, Maputo and Gaborone- expressed interest to host 
the conference. All however, lost to Geneva, being the only acceptable venue to both 
South Africa and SWAPO.569 Waldheim opened the meeting on January 7, 1981.570 In 
his opening speech, he made no reference to eight political groups that were seated with 
the members of South African delegation. This implied that these internal parties had 
equal status with SWAPO. The meeting, chaired by UN’s Brian Urquhart, began with 
procedural difficulties over the exact status of these eight internal parties led by Danie 
Hough. Mudge and Katuurie Kaura of the DTA maintained that UN had disqualified 
itself as impartial supervisor of transition to independence by supporting SWAPO.571 
SWAPO responded by stating that the UN Secretary-General was bound by the 
decisions of the General Assembly, and not the Security Council, as it was the former 
that had passed the resolution acknowledging SWAPO’s special status.572
568 New York Times, November 15,1980, p. 6.
569 President Mugabe of Zimbabwe offered Zimbabwe as the venue at the Paris UNESCO 
Conference in mid September 1980; while Mozambican officials disclosed that its capital, 
Maputo would hold the conference; so also there were hints that Gaborone, Botswana’s 
capital was also in the line of proposed venue. See Financial Mail, September 19,1980, 
p. 1305; and Facts on File, December 19,1980, p. 967.
70 A History, op cit., section 51.
571 New York Times, January 11,1981, p. 1.
572 A History, op cit., section 52.
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At a stage, Urquhart noted that the UN was ready to take steps to break its ties with 
SWAPO in exchange for South Africa’s agreement on the date for cease-fire.573 This 
offer did not satisfy the internal parties. In a major speech, Mudge ruled out any 
possibility of signing a cease-fire agreement during the conference. He said that more 
time was necessary to create a climate of confidence in the ability of the UN to 
supervise an election in an impartial manner.574 In conclusion, Mudge declared that 
“not only would the UN have to rescind its special recognition of SWAPO, it would 
also have to demonstrate its impartiality over a considerable period of time by 
mounting a publicity campaign to restore the equality of the parties which would fight 
the election”.575 Finally, Mr. Hough and Mr. Mudge jointly declared that it would be 
“premature” to put into effect the UN plan, in the form, that South Africa accepted it 
three years ago. These statements brought the meeting to an end on January 14.576 
Events that followed were predicable: accusations and counter-accusations.
Mr. Theo Ben Gurribab, speaking for SWAPO, blamed the breakdown of the 
conference on South Africa’s “intransigence and prevarication”.577 While reaffirming 
SWAPO’s support for the UN plan, he said his organisation would now intensify its 
guerrilla war and would call on the Security Council to impose comprehensive 
economic sanctions, including an oil embargo, on South Africa. On the other end, in his 
address before the South African Parliament on January 30, Pik Botha noted that UN’s 
partiality towards SWAPO led to the breakdown of talks in Geneva.578 Britain’s Lord
573 New York Times, op cit., p. 1.
574 New York Times, January 14,1981, p. 2.
575 A History, op cit., section 53.
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Carrington deplored the action of the South African Administrator-General. In his 
statement to Parliament on January 19, 1981, he said: “Her Majesty’s Government are 
deeply disappointed by the failure to achieve agreement on a date for a cease-fire in 
March leading to independence for Namibia by the end of 1981. This is an especially 
regrettable set-back after the great efforts of the UN, the Western Five and the Front­
line States to meet the reasonable concerns of South Africa and the internal parties”.579 
“The Five will review their position with other participants in the negotiations and we 
shall discuss the problem with the new American Administration”, he stated. Indeed, 
the new American Administration would redefine and reconfigure the whole settlement 
plan by introducing the idea of ‘linkage’ politics. This is the theme of the next chapter.
In his report to the Security Council on January 20, 1981, Waldheim appealed to South 
Africa to reconsider its position on its refusal to sign a Namibia cease-fire agreement. 
However, in his reply of January 28, Pik Botha, once again criticised the UN’s lack of 
impartiality. He insisted that the Secretary General should cease “ignoring” the internal 
Namibian parties.580 Thus the abortive Geneva conference put a stop to Contact Group 
diplomacy. The prospect of securing a breakthrough looked further away than ever.
Suffice to point out that several reasons have been offered for the failure of the Contact 
Group. According to Ohlson and Stedman, it failed to resolve the Namibian conflict for 
two reasons.581 First, it lacked the resolve to give teeth to its efforts by imposing 
deadlines and making alternatives that could be painful to South Africa. Secondly, that
579 A History, op cit., section 54.
580 A History, op cit., section 55.
581 Ohlson, Thomas and Stedman, Stephen. John . The New Is Not Yet Bom: Conflict 
Resolution in Southern Africa. (Washington, D.C.,: The Brookings Institution, 1994), p. 
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internal changes within South Africa restrained any move toward negotiated 
settlements. These included the replacement of Vorster by the hawkish Botha and 
Pretoria’s intent on implementing its “total strategy” of domestic and regional security 
problems. Such criticisms are advanced from a third party intervention vantage point 
with limited attention to fundamental questions such as, (1) what did the composition 
of Contact Group tell us about the balance of power politics? (2) How did the Contact 
Group derive its legitimacy within the prevailing view of the international law? (3) 
What were the constraints of the Contact Group diplomacy? And more importantly, 
how the essence of international law not only exerts real influence on self- 
determination, but embedds and interacts with and shaped how the political game is 
played out in international arena. Each of these questions will be addressed in turn
5.15. The origin and the composition of the Contact Group
Earlier studies have confronted two puzzling issues namely: who initiated the idea of 
Contact Group; and when was it formed to pursue the possibilities of a peaceful 
settlement of the Namibian problem. For instance, Kams582 pointed out that some of her 
interviewees traced the idea to three different individuals. These were Ambassador 
Gerald Helman, who was in the US Department of State's Bureau of International 
Organisation; Ambassador Donald McHenry, the US deputy representative to the UN; 
and President Nyerere of Tanzania. But McHenry’s account of the origin of the Contact 
Group helped to provide answers to these questions. In his address before the Cape 
Town Press Club in late April 1978, McHenry revealed that Ambassador Young took 
the initiative over a breakfast at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel. Young, said McHenry,
582 Kams, Margaret. P. "Ad hoc multilateral diplomacy: the United States, the Contact 
Group, and Namibia", International Organization, Vol. 41. No. 1. Winter 1987, p. 
93-123.
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invited member of the Security Council-including the Africans, but excluding the 
socialists-to an early morning breakfast. What, he asked them, was to be done about the 
Namibian question? "We don't want more resolutions", he added, "we want a serious 
undertaking".583 The response of Young's guests was to suggest that the South African 
government be drawn into a discussion of the question. But they pointed out that the 
initiative should come from the West, which had working contact with both sides, and 
not from the African or non-aligned blocs. In addition, they stated that the initiative 
would have to be taken without a mandate, but with the Council's covert blessing.584
An inference could be drawn that the non-inclusion of Soviet Union and other socialist 
bloc countries was a deliberate policy of the United States. It was designed to limit the 
influence of Soviet Union on the outcome of the negotiation. This was incongruous 
with the views of Andrew Young and other regionalists that African issues should be 
dis-entangled from East-West confrontation. According to Jabri, it was the conviction 
of the western five that by acting as mediators, they would be able to influence the 
settlement process and its outcome.585 In the context of our theoretical discussion, the 
Contact Group could be termed an ‘informal Western alliance’.586 Unlike
583 Financial Mail, "Breakfast Breakthrough", May 5,1978.
584 ibid., p.
585 Jabri, op cit., p. 67.
c o r
The concept of an 'informal Western alliance' is useful for analytical purposes. For 
convenience, I still employ the term Contact Group in the study. Nations form alliances 
to deal with deficiencies of power. Self-interested and autonomous states join to offset 
their relative weakness vis-a-vis stated and potential enemies. Because the power of the 
coalition exceeds that of individual states, its creation aids each in its search for 
security. Alliances are formed because of consideration of power and aggregation of 
military capabilities. NATO and the Warsaw Pact are classic examples of 
institutionalised alliances for a purposive security consideration. Not all alliances are 
institutionalised as NATO or the Quadruple Alliance-Great Britain, Austria, Prussia 
and Russia which defeated Napoleon in 1814-15. So far, the discussion has focused on
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institutionalised alliances such as NATO or the Warsaw Pact, an informal alliance is 
formed not primarily for military purposes, but for political reasons, and its existence 
serves as a deterrent signal to non-allies.587 This type of alliance is not bound by legal 
or treaty paraphernalia, but formed to manage a specific problem which is 
predominantly political in nature, partly for the enlightened self interest of the alliance 
members and partly to deny others from performing its predetermined main task, such 
as conflict-management. 588 It is by describing the Contact Group as an informal 
alliance, that we can establish a pattern of continuance between it and Henry Africanus. 
Thus, Contact Group did not emerge in vacuo of the earlier Kissinger’s diplomatic 
initiatives. As shown in the last chapter, it could be argued that Kissinger started the 
idea of contact grouping. His round-robin visit to London, Paris, and Bonn during his 
Africa tours could be said to be a catalyst to the formation of the group. In short, 
Kissinger started what the Chinese called quanxi, which meant contacting.
military alliances. Most military alliances are institutionalised, formed for deterrent or 
offensive purposes. Like other forms of alliances, within an informal alliance, there is 
also a pole of convergent interest and of autonomous self-interest. Each alliance 
member seeks simultaneously to promote its individual interests and the joint interests. 
However, an alliance dilemma or what Stein termed 'dilemma of entanglement" arises 
when individual self-interest points in a different direction from conjoint interest. This 
produces an asymmetry of impact. That is a choice between a dominant strategy of 
maximising one state's interest and of maximising the interest of the alliance. As it has 
been shown, although the Contact Group acted una voce on Namibia, their interests 
were wide and varied. It will be shown in the next chapter how the collapse of the 
Contact Group could be attributed to the problem of the asymmetry of impact or the 
dilemma of entanglement. Alliance dilemma occurred in the Contact Group when the 
United States intended to pursue the linkage issue, that is the withdrawal of the Cuban 
forces from Angola as a condition to seeking South Africa's compliance to the 
agreement on Namibian independence.
587- Stein, Arthur. A. Why Nations Co-operate: Circumstance and Choice in 
International Relations. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 153.
588. Fedder, Edwin. H. "The Concept of Alliance", International Studies Quarterly,
12 (1968).
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Kams589 acknowledged Kissinger's initiative as a timely application of what Fisher and
Ury termed as a negotiation jujitsu.590 To her, Kissinger’s initiative directed attention to
new mechanism, as it was evident that the UN- the principal vehicle for previous
settlement efforts-had reached a dead end for the time being.591 To quote her at length:
"For the first time a high level official of the U.S. government 
focused attention on Namibia; with this attention a significant 
amount of background work was done, and with American 
support, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 385 
(1976) which embodied key points for a negotiated settlement.
The stage was set for the Carter administration to pursue further 
a negotiated, internationally solution to the Namibian 
problem".592
Leading Carter administration officials later averred to Henry Africanus as the
foundation (albeit informally) on which the administration built. In his address before
the United Nations Association of Chicago on July 13, 1977, the US Assistant
Secretary for International Organisation Affairs, Charles W. Waynes, said:
"... More specifically, in the realm of dealing with African
issues, I believe that it is generally accepted that the
international community has made the most promising 
beginning in years, particularly on the Namibian issue.
Incidentally, so that you don't misinterpret my main point 
here as being just partisan, let me say that we are trying to 
build on what others began. Previous US Permanent Reps at 
the UN succeeded in convincing the US Government that 
we should take the UN more seriously. They began the 
process of reaching out to a broader circle of like-minded
589 Kams, op cit., p. 97.
590 Fisher, Roger and Ury, William. Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without 
Giving in. (New York: Penguin, 1983).
591 Kams, op cit., p. 97.
592 Ibid., p. 97.
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countries. This administration is only continuing and 
building on that process.593
Sceptics might argue that Kissinger’s ‘like minded countries’ did not include Canada. 
Canada’s exclusion from Kissinger’s trips pointed to two reasons. First, it indicated 
Canada’s lack of colonial influence in Africa. Secondly, Canada’s participation in the 
Contact Group was partly because it was a member of the Security Council in 1977, 
and more importantly, partly due to its sympathy for the Third World concerns, 
especially on decolonisation. To a greater extent, it could be argued the UN Council 
for Namibia was instrumental to Canada’s participation in the Contact Group. 
Although with the other four, Canada abstained from Resolution 2248 of the General 
Assembly of 19 May 1967 which established the Council as the legal authority for the 
territory, but unlike them, Canada had a sympathy with the decision to establish the 
Council for Namibia. Prior to the formation of the Contact Group, the Canadian 
government had invited the Council for a discussion on the Namibian question. At its 
16 February 1977 meeting, the Council decided on Canada's invitation.594 The Council 
visited Ottawa and Toronto between 9-12 March 1977. Its mission had a discussion 
with the Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot Trudeau and held a substantive talk with 
Donald C. Jamieson, the Secretary of State for External Affairs.595 It also held talks 
with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and some NGOs with
593 Maynes, Charles. W. "United States Approach to the United Nations: New 
Direction", An address to the UN Association of Chicago, July 13, 1977. Department 
of State Bulletin, Vol. LXXVII. No. 1992., August 29, 1977, p. 289.
594 United Nations, United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XIV. No. 3. Mar. 1977, 
p. 19.
595 United Nations, UN Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XIV. No. 4. April 1977, p. 29-30. 
Rikhi Jaipai of India headed the mission. Other delegates included: Thomas Tlou 
(Botswana) and Roberto Rosenzweig-Diaz (Mexico).
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interests on the situation in Namibia. At the end of the visit, the Council through its 
leader Rikhi Jaipai (India) said that the visit was very successful with mutual 
understanding achieved; it expressed the hope that Canada would take a seat on the 
Council, an invitation rejected by Ottawa.
5.16. The Contact Group and its legitimacy under the international law
The existence of the Contact Group leads us to the second question: that is its 
legitimacy and relationship with the bounds of the international law and within the 
United Nations practice. A caveat needs to be entertained here. This section benefits 
largely from the works of international lawyers, especially Richardson’s analysis on the 
question whether the power exercised by the parties to the negotiations is authorised 
under international law.596 Richardson noted that the Contact Group per se exercised no 
constitutive authority in relation to Namibian independence, through the Security 
Council. He demonstrated that when the Contact Group presented their proposal on 
April 27 1978, they requested that it be circulated as a Security Council document. This 
implied a prior lack of formal delegated authority form the Council, since otherwise 
there would have been no need for such a request, and indeed there was no record of 
any such delegation. As it turned out, Resolution 431 (1978) takes note of the proposal 
for a settlement of the Namibian situation, of 10 April 1978”, but does not take note of 
or otherwise recognise the Contact Group. The Security Council recognised the validity 
of the proposal as a separate issue from the overall authority of its originators.597
596 Richardson HI, Henry. J. “Constitutive Questions in the Negotiations for Namibian
Independence”, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 78, No. 1. January 1984, 
8^. 
ibid.
p. 7
597
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In effect, the Contact Group negotiation operated outside the normal negotiation 
processes of the UN. Although members belonged to the UN, they negotiated in their 
capacity as aggregate of interested sates rather than as UN agents. Given that the 
Security Council did not delegate negotiating authority to the Contact Group,598 it 
lacked a formal mandate, and it received no formal legitimisation of its actions until the 
passage of Resolution 435 in September 1978.5"  This resolution gave a post-hoc 
legality and legitimacy to the Contact Group's actions.600 In the same vein, Soni 
described the Contact Group as "an extra-legal regime rather than an illegal one".601 
Kams termed it as "an ad hoc multilateral mediating and facilitating team in close
f.(Y)proximity to but not directly linked with the United Nations". The Contact Group
had neither de facto nor implied agency relationship with the Security Council. Article
29 of the UN Charter provides that:
"The Security Council may establish such subsidiary 
organisations as it deems necessary for the performance of its 
functions. The repertory of UN practice has classified such 
subsidiary organisations into (1) standing committees, (2) 
commissions, and (ad hoc drafting committees). There is not 
evidence of any such action here".603
598 ibid., p. 84.
599 Kams, op cit., p. 100.
600 Security Council Resolution 435, UN Security Council, 33rd Session 2087 Meeting, 
UN Document S/12865 (1978).
601 Soni, Sushma. "Regimes for Namibia's Governance", Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law, Vol. 29. No. 3., (1991), p. 594.
602 Kams, op cit., p. 93.
603 Richardson, op cit., p. 85. This is extracted from footnote 45.
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More significantly, UN literature for the most part refers to these Governments as “the
five Western members of the Security Council”, not as the “Contact Group.604 An
example from the UN Commissioner, Martti Ahtisaari, supports the above view. An
extract from his interview by the Africa Report is given below:
AFRICA REPORT: How do you view the role and the proposals of the 
group of Western ambassadors who are seeking to effect a solution 
towards Namibian independence?
AHTISAARI: This is the initiative of the five Western members of the 
Security Council. It has not been initiated by the United Nations.605
Perhaps mindful of a lack of any de facto arrangement with the Contact Group, there 
was no statement in the text of Resolutions 431, 435 or 439 that the Security Council 
had “endorsed” or adopted the proposal, only in 431, that it had “taken note” of it.606 By 
implication therefore, the Contact Group consisted of a coterie of the great powers that 
explored their competencies in such a way to impart a degree of central direction on 
how an international conflict should be resolved. Its action in effect served as an 
essential part of the management of balance of power, both locally and globally. The 
big question is whether another group of states would have the same competencies, 
effects and leverages on the main parties. Important as it is to state this question, it can 
only be answered speculatively. It seems wiser, therefore, to leave it open and proceed 
to the outcome of the Contact Group diplomacy and the international law.
5.17. Resolutions 385 (1976) and 435 (1978) and the international law
We have established that the Contact Group took Resolution 385 (1976) as its legal 
‘frame of reference’ of seeking independence for Namibia. The resolution became a
604 UN DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, NAMIBIA: A UNIQUE UN 
RESPONSIBILITY, 24 (March 1981).
605 Africa Report, Vol. 22, No. 6. November-December 1977, p. 18. ‘Interviewed by 
Anthony J. Hughes.
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legal ‘frame of reference’ which had to adhere to and within which the dispute had 
eventually to be resolved. By so doing, its raison d'etre was to seek the deference of 
South Africa to the principle of self-determination and her compliance to the provisions 
of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. From the international law point of 
view, Resolution 385 in part consolidated the attempt by the international community to 
remove all the intricacies of the erstwhile Mandate system. The process of detaching 
the Mandate system began with the termination of the Mandate by the General 
Assembly in 1966 and the endorsement thereof by the Security Council in 1969. The 
revocation of the mandate by International Court of Justice, with the ruling of 1971
(\(Y7ended this process. Thus, the extrication of the contentions surrounding the Mandate 
system, put the Namibian question within the ambit of the United Nations’ instruments 
governing the processes of self-determination of colonial countries and peoples. In 
continuum, through Resolution 435 of 1978, the Contact Group’s diplomacy was to 
give effect to the United Nations instruments on self-determination. This had two 
implications. First, international law was no more a mere norm, but it contained a germ 
of political action, which exerts a pull on South African action. It also communicated 
the prevailing view of the international community to South Africa concerning human 
rights and self-government.
The second implication is central to the argument of this study. This concerns the 
confluence of contending paradoxes of practice of power politics and international law. 
As suggested in chapter two, the mandate system, whilst being a product of power 
politics, it also set off the idea of international accountability and a duty of care of the
606 Richardson, op cit., p. 84.
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metropolitan powers to the colonised peoples. The paradox is that having activated the 
process of transfer of power, it became the platform in which succeeding practice of 
power politics would be played out, concerning decolonisation issues. In the same vein, 
the Contact Group, succeeded to limit the influence of Soviet Union on the outcome of 
the negotiation, yet worked within the edges of international law to mould Resolution 
435.
Suffice to point out that Resolution 435 has some flaws. Although William Barton, 
Canadian ambassador to the United Nations, who presided over the Security Council in 
April 1978, described Resolution 385 (1976) as unrealistic,608 but Resolution 435 
(1978) as it were, was an imperfect document. For example, Landis observed that while 
the Group claimed to have addressed all elements of Resolution 385 (1976), it none the 
less, contained some elements which were at odds with Resolution 385. It left in place, 
to the day of independence, the South African administrative structure, including the 
police (and the administrator). The plan accepted by silence the South Africa fiat of 
1977 excising Walvis Bay. It did not seek from Pretoria a declaration of compliance or 
to dismantle the native reserves. 609
607 Wiechers, M. “The Settlement Plan for Namibia: A Critical Analysis”, in Hough, M. 
and van der Merwe, M. (eds.), Namibia: Current and Future Perspectives (Pretoria: 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1989), p. 52.
608 Sanger, Clyde. “Namibia: The Black Man’s Burden”, Canadian Annual Review of 
Politics and Public Affairs, No. 6. Summer 1990, p. 7. Clyde Sanger is a staff of the 
Department of External Affairs, Ottawa Canada. I got the Canadian view and its role 
within the Contact Group from materials send by Heather Wharton, the Reference 
Librarian, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, Ontario, 
Canada, on November 29,1996.
609 Landis, Elizabeth. “The Never-Ending Namibian Negotiations”, in LAWYERS 
COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, A SPECIAL REPORT: 
SOUTHERN AFRICA, at SOUTH AFRICA-1 (October, 1982), see Richardson op cit., 
footnote no. 6.
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Taking the Namibian question as South Africa’s violation of the principle of self- 
determination, and a disregard for the UN Declaration of Human rights, the Contact 
Group caught the minds and hearts of the African states. Yet, the commitment of the 
Contact Group to the other elements of international law upheld by the African states 
was questionable. None of the Contact Five recognised SWAPO as the sole 
representative of the peoples of Namibia as proposed by the UNGA in 1973, and some 
of them supported the DTA discreetly. None of the Contact Group recognised the legal 
authority of the UN Council for Namibia, and for three times in succession voted 
against the sanctions.
By the end of the Group initiatives, South Africa was nearer to achieving internal 
settlement than it had been before. It is the fissure between a commitment to the spirit 
international law, as exemplified in Resolutions 385 (1985) and 435 (1978) and the 
consequence thereof with the quest to defend respective memberstates economic and 
strategic interests with South Africa that undermined the Contact Group efforts.
In the final analysis, if negotiation involve the narrowing of the gap between initial 
positions, for the most of the four years, South Africa gave the loosest of undertakings 
to any agreement with the Contact Group, and used its military and political resources 
to undermine SWAPO. The Contact Group was not ready to offer either the carrot or 
the stick that would have made South Africa to fundamentally change its position. As a 
result, by the end of the Geneva conference in January 1981, the Contact Group effort 
had lacked the scent of a future success. It required another stimulus on the rationale of 
balance of power, that is ‘linkage politics’ to bring the Namibian conflict into its final 
endgame.
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Chapter Six 
The Endgame of the Namibian Conflict
6.1. Introduction
From the last chapter, it was clear that the Namibian internal parties fostered the 
breakdown of the Geneva Conference. With its failure the UN lost its leading role in 
promoting dialogue between the main parties. Even in Geneva, the invisible presence of 
the incoming Reagan administration and its much-expected reaction to the resurgent 
Soviet expansionism haunted each of the main parties. Within a period of six years, 
(1974-1980) fourteen third world pseudo-Marxian revolutions had occurred, with the 
assistance of the Soviets and the Cubans. The Reagan administration believed that its 
predecessor had allowed the Soviet Union to get away with too much, in Latin 
America, in Africa and in the Middle East. The Iran hostage crisis reinforced the view 
that the United States was no longer respected as it had been before the Vietnam War. 
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the failure of the Carter administration to ‘draw 
the line among the superpowers’ sharpened Reagan’s characterisation of the Soviet 
Union as an “evil empire”. It prompted the need to cure the Americans of the Vietnam 
Syndrome, revived the spirit of American exceptionalism and ushered in the ‘Second 
Cold War’.610
America’s new containment policy had two irreconcilable goals. The first was the 
restoration of American prestige by promoting negotiations on regional conflicts and 
support for anti-Communist forces. The second goal was to instil fear in the Soviets
610 See Halliday, Fred. Cold War, Third Word: An Essay on Soviet-American 
Relations. (London: Hutchinson Radius, 1989).
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through military strength with the Strategic Defense Initiative.611 Each goal fed on the 
other. The Reagan administration was ready to take the Namibian question into the 
heart of the new Cold War. By so doing, the ability of the Soviet Union to exploit third 
world conflict would be greatly reduced. The SDI was to test the limits of Soviet 
superpower status. Consequently, it would able to reconfigure the structural 
relationship between the two superpowers.
This chapter focuses on the re-location of the Namibian question within the new logic 
of the balance of power. It also explores the tension which embedding Namibia in the 
new Cold War caused between the United States and its allies in the Contact Group, 
and accordingly with the legal approach that they had framed. In line with the main 
thesis of this study, this chapter re-establishes the argument that that the Namibian 
question was essentially driven by the imperatives of the balance of power. In the end, 
the Namibian people became beneficiaries of power politics.
It will be sufficient to illustrate three changes in the Soviet-American relations of the 
early Reagan administration. These were: the withdrawal of the exclusive symbolic 
privilege of Moscow’s ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F. Dobmynin; 
President Reagan’s interview of March 3, 1981; and the composition of his foreign 
policy team.
(1) According Alexander Haig, the Soviet ambassador was the only diplomat in 
Washington who entered the State Department by driving into the basement garage,
611 President Ronald Reagan’s interview to the Commission on the Bicentennial of the 
Constitution. The BBC 2 broadcast this interview; Open University programme on 3 
December, 1997.
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entering a private elevator to the office of the Secretary of State. The other 150 
ambassadors had to drive to the main entrance on C Street, walk across the lobby and 
ride in the public elevator. This privilege however, ended, the first time, Ambassador 
Dobmynin met Haig. Haig claimed that bureaucratic pique influenced the withdrawal
n o
of this privilege. But, whatever the cause, it sent a clear message to Moscow that a 
new phase had emerged in the superpower relationship. The role of Cuba in southern 
Africa and Latin America was Washington’s main preoccupation. Haig told Dobmynin 
that Cuba’s role in Angola and El Salvador was contravening the understandings on the 
role of Cuba within the Kennedy-Khrushchev non-aggression agreement that ended the 
Cuban missile crisis of 1962. ‘These understandings did not include the right of 
Moscow and Havana to inspire, train, equip and arm insurgencies in Central America or 
elsewhere in the world”.614
(2) During his interview with Walter Cronkite of CBS News on March 3, 1981, 
President Reagan asked rhetorically whether the U.S could abandon a country that has 
stood beside us in every war we have fought, a country that strategically is essential to 
the free world in its production of minerals we all must have and so forth...[I]f we are 
going to sit down at a table and negotiate with the Russians, surely we can keep the 
door open and continue to negotiate with a friendly nations like South Africa”.615 
Indeed, the statement indicated an American tilt towards Pretoria, although it also 
revealed Reagan’s willingness to adopt a political view of history-many hundreds of
612 Haig, Alexander. M. Caveat: Realism, Reagan and Foreign Policy. (New York: 
Macmillan Publisher Co., 1984), p. 101.
613 ibid.
614 ibid., p. 98.
615 See Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, March 9,1981, p. 235-236; 
American Foreign Policy Documents, 1981, (Washington: Department of State, 1984), 
Document 592, p. 1090.
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thousands of ex-colonial nationals had also fought with the Allies in both world wars. 
Moreover, the National Party of South Africa-the governing party since 1948 had 
opposed South African entry into the Second World War and some of its leaders had 
been interned for their Nazi sympathies.
(3) Reagan’s foreign policy team was composed of realists. The principal figures were 
Alexander Haig, Chester Crocker (the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs), 
and Jeane Kirkpatrick (the Ambassador to the United Nations). Haig was an outgoing 
Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SHAPE). Previously, he had been deputy 
assistant to Kissinger at the National Security Council. He saw Havana as the cutting 
edge for Moscow both in Africa and Latin America (El Salvador); and believed that the 
interests of peace in the subcontinent and the rest of Africa were best served by getting 
rid of the Cubans.
Jeane Kirkpatrick, a prominent national Democrat, was known for her geopolitical 
mindset.616 She was always sceptical of the very nature of UN bloc politics and Third 
World diplomatic authoritarianism. Unlike her predecessors, Young and McHenry, who 
saw the UN as a helpful forum for reaching peaceful solutions, she considered it a 
“dangerous place” where conflicts tend to be exacerbated, an arena for the Cold War. 
While McHenry and Young cultivated the African representatives at the UN, she saw 
the Soviets opportunistically side with the Third World majority on issues like South 
Africa and the Israel-Arab conflict, frequently leaving the United States in the
616 See Who’s Who in America, Vol. 1,43rd Edition, 1984-1985, (Chicago: Marquis 
Who’s Who, 1984), p. 1793.
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minority.617 For instance, in one of her speeches before confirmation, she said “It is 
difficult to understand why we support some UN agencies that are undermining the 
work of the US and some of its allies”. Although she was speaking in the context of 
UNESCO’s expulsion of Israel after accusing it of racism, her deprecation of the UN 
would later manifest itself on the Namibia issue. Her article in Commentary magazine 
entitled “Dictatorships and Double Standards” during the 1980 presidential campaign
r i o
attracted candidate Reagan’s attention. Her views came to symbolise Reagan’s 
approach to the Third World: i.e. to favour authoritarian governments, where American 
vital interests were perceived to be at stake.
Chester Crocker regarded Africa as his second home for two reasons. He was married 
to a Rhodesian, Saone, the daughter of one of the Barons of Bulawayo. He was also a 
leading African academic expert. His doctoral thesis from John Hopkins was entitled: 
‘The Military Transfer of Power in Africa: A Comparative Study of change in the 
British and French systems of order”. Before his nomination, he had been Director of 
African Studies at Georgetown University’s Centre for Strategic and International 
Studies. Like Haig, he had served under Kissinger, and was associated with the 
preparation of the NSSM-39 in 1969. However, the archconservatives in the 
Administration saw him as a pragmatist, and more of a regionalist, than a true globalist.
Like Kirkpatrick, Crocker announced his political ambitions with an article in the 
winter 1980/81 Edition of Foreign Affairs. In it, he jettisoned Nixon’s half-measures
617 Finger, Seymour. Maxwell. “Ronald Reagan and the United Nations: His Policies and 
His Representatives”, in Eric J. Schmertz, Natalie Datlof and Alexej Ugrinsky (eds.), 
President Reagan and the World, (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997), p. 11.
618 Falcoff, Mark. “Latin America: Was There a ‘Kirkpatrick Doctrine’?”, in Schmertz et 
al, ibid., p. 393.
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and criticised Carter’s ethical foreign policy for throwing away valuable allies such as 
South Africa, positing his own “policy of constructive engagement”.619 There was, he 
argued an opportunity to help shape a regional climate conducive to political 
accommodation in both southern and South Africa if Western governments were 
prepared to engage in “a sustained and nimble diplomacy” involving leadership in 
regional problem-solving”.620 His policy called for a strong bilateral relationship 
between the United States and South Africa that would change the perception that the 
communists had unchallenged rights to exploit and militarise regional tensions in 
southern Africa. It recognised an understanding for the sequencing and interrelated 
nature of change within South African society and its polity, without embracing either 
of the previous policies.
Much has already been written on constructive engagement, amongst which Coker’s 
Oxford doctoral thesis and the book he based on it is the most important reference 
point. Coker argued that Crocker’s constructive engagement was based on three central 
premises, all of which touched upon South Africa’s relationship with the outside world, 
and particularly with the United States. 622 These were: (1) that the United State could 
not disengage itself from the evolutionary changes in South Africa, but should work 
with rather than against Pretoria. In the process, though, engagement must not be seen 
as accommodation. (2) That the changes the United States hoped would preferably be 
in response to US government initiatives. This had two implications: (a) a preference
619 Crocker, Chester, (a) “South Africa: Strategy for Change”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 59, 
No. 2, Winter 1980/81, p. 346. Full discussion of the regional proposed for southern 
Africa can be found in Crocker’s other articles: Africa Report, January-February, 1981, 
and “African Policy in the 1980s”, Washington Quarterly, Summer 1980.
620 Crocker, Chester, (b) “Southern Africa: Eight Years Later”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, 
No. 4, Fall 1989, p. 145.
621 Chester Crocker, (a), op cit., p. 346.
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for unilateralism in relations with South Africa; and (b) that the United States policy 
should not be driven by domestic pressures and public opinion; and within South 
Africa, incline towards the white governing elites, but show some sensitivity in relating 
with the liberation movements such as the ANC and the PAC; (3) that Botha’s internal 
reform within South Africa should be recognised and commended.
It was not clear however, whether constructive engagement was an end in itself or a 
means to a different goal. Herman J. Cohen, Crocker’s successor argued that 
“constructive engagement was not a policy. It was a diplomatic tool, a method for the 
purpose of certain objective”. He observed that the methodology of “constructive 
engagement” was applied to all of the governments of southern Africa, and not only to 
South Africa. Cohen defined “constructive engagement” as a “methodology that seeks 
to deal with power structures as they exist rather than as we would like them to be, and 
which seeks incremental results that are achievable within reasonable time-frames”.624 
On this view, constructive engagement gave Crocker extensive exposure to all the 
parties, except the Cubans between 1981 and 1988, thereby enabling him to shape the 
negotiations.
Constructive engagement, as originally defined by Crocker was a slippery concept. The 
tone of his article suggested multilateral co-ordination with other Western powers. Yet 
once in office, Crocker embarked on unilateral diplomacy to the discomfort of the 
Contact Group. Constructive engagement, it turned out, was no more than a means,
622 Coker., op cit
623 Cohen, Herman. J. “Constructive Engagement at Work in Southern Africa: A View 
from the Inside”, in Glickman, Harvey, (ed.), Toward Peace and Security in Southern 
Africa, (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Pub., 1990), p. 215.
624 ibid.
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with the ultimate ends of changing the southern African international relations to the 
American advantage, values and interests. In this respect, there was more continuity 
than change. Nixon’s active communication with Pretoria was a precursor and a milder 
form of constructive engagement. Crocker’s main innovation was to adapt Kissinger’s 
“linkage politics’ to Southern Africa. In this way, he tied Namibia to the machinations 
of the second Cold War.
Crocker noted that there existed an empirical, as well as a functional relationship 
between the continuing Cuban presence in Angola and the objective of achieving an 
independent Namibia. His contention was that the Namibian and Angolan conflicts 
were “empirically connected”, that is the Namibian issue transcended self- 
determination, and raised issues of regional stability (or instability), with global 
implications. He reckoned that regional stability would be restored if the Cubans could 
be persuaded to leave and the armed forces of South Africa, UNITA, and SWAPO laid 
down their arms. Such an outcome would certainly attract strong support from the FLS 
and the OAU, which were becoming increasingly irritated by the “overstaying” of the 
Cuban forces in Angola. The rationale was that the prize for a negotiated peace between 
all the warring factions in the region would prove irresistible. Conceivably, the Cubans 
would go home. Angola would be drawn closer into the Western sphere of influence, 
and new corridors of trade and co-operation would be opened in which South Africa 
could play an important part. Thus, “linkage politics” encapsulated a confluence of
The intimate relationship otherwise known as ‘empirical connectedness’ between the 
conflicts in Namibia and Angola was the main theme of the linkage politics. See Remarks 
by the Secretary of State (Haig) Before the National Foreign Policy Conference for 
Editors and Broadcasters, Washington, October 29,1981, Department of State Press 
Release 364, October 30,1981, p. 18-20; and Address by the Assistant Secretary of State 
for African Affairs (Crocker) Before the Foreign Relations and National Security
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interests from which all parties would gain. To achieve the desired outcome was more 
daunting, than anticipated. It took eight years of intense negotiations.
Linkage strategies involve attempts by foreign policy makers to tie together disparate 
issues in bargaining with their counterparts. They have characterised inter-state 
diplomacy since the Peace of Westphalia, if not before. None the less, they took on a 
special significance during the Nixon-Kissinger years, as an instrument for securing 
trade-offs over security issues in what was conceived of as a “pentagonal world”, that 
required “balanced power”. Linkage was used during the Nixon administration as an 
instrument for ensuring Soviet participation in detente. It involved tying the exchange 
of economic aid, credits, or technical information to progress on arms control or 
internal liberalisation and freer emigration to the United States from Soviet Union. In 
general, it suits great powers rather than weaker ones, as they have multiple economic, 
military, and diplomatic competencies. Viewed in neutral terms, it brings in the concept 
of additionality in situations where de-coupling of issues is vital. In a situation, where 
security issues, cry out for selectivity, linking issues, may hinder progress. Most often, 
it is important to decouple issues wherever possible. Linkage can give each of the 
parties the opportunity to divert attention to peripheral issues. In addition, bureaucratic 
footdragging by interests groups whose issues have been coupled together could 
hamper progress on the main issues. Most of these limitations would later haunt 
Crocker’s linkage politics in the subsequent years.
In general, there exists a similarity between Kissinger and Crocker’s idea of linkage. 
Both were construed to contain and pre-empt any further Soviet gains. As we have
Committee of the American Legion, Honolulu, August 29,1981, AFPCD, 1981,
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seen, Henry Africanus, firstly ‘linked’ Africa into the global system whose structure 
was largely shaped by American interests. Southern Africa in particular became a 
crucial arena for defining the rules of international conduct. Preliminary to a further 
analysis of US linkage diplomacy on Namibia, it is important to detect the logic behind 
it.
fS ) fkAccording to Crocker, the decision to engage in Namibia rested on three policy 
options, of which one was taken. These were: (1) to soldier on with the inherited 
Namibia-only approach; (2) to downgrade Southern African diplomacy or scuttle the 
Resolution 435 process, join in full support of UNITA’s military efforts, and at least 
tacit support to Pretoria’s “internal” option in Namibia; or (3) to restructure 
fundamentally the negotiations to incorporate the Angolan factor and strengthen 
Resolution 435.
To Crocker, the first option failed the tests of both feasibility and desirability. He 
reasoned that to continue the inherited policy would produce no fresh leverage to break 
the logjam. More importantly, it would not address the Reagan administration’s 
concerns about the Soviet-Cuban influence in both Angola and Namibia. The second 
option-a “no-policy policy” could cause the fracturing of the Contact Group, weaken 
the reformists within the Botha’s government, rupture the credibility of America in the 
eyes of the black African states and by implications present a gift to the Soviets. The 
chosen option, variously described as “the strengthening of the Namibia settlement 
package”, “the parallel settlements”, and “the two track approach” was based on the 
perceived need to counter Soviet expansionism and Cuban adventurism in southern
Document 610, p. 1111.
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Africa, and on scepticism about the ability of the UN to achieve these goals. The 
primary goal was to prevent a “less friendly” regime from taking over power in 
Namibia and to maintain opposition pressure on the Soviet-dominated MPLA-regime in 
Angola. It involved a rejection of both the Namibia first, and Angola first settlements in 
favour of parallel settlements in Angola and Namibia. Crocker maintained that Ronald 
Reagan had not been elected to make Africa safer for Marxism, still less to work for yet 
another Marxist take-over in the wake of the 1975-87 Soviet-Cuban gains in Angola, 
Mozambique, and Ethiopia, and the Mugabe’s 1980 victory in Zimbabwe. Thus “the 
strengthening of the Namibia settlement package” involved the altering of the context 
of the Namibian question, the expansion of the agenda with the incorporation of issues 
of regional security. In other words, South African exit from Namibia under Resolution 
435 was conditional on the withdrawal of the Cuban troops from Angola.
It later turned out that linkage politics was a resurrection of Kissinger’s diplomatic 
style: realism, unilateralism and secrecy. It sought to limit the influence of SWAPO 
within the United Nations system, but to maintain continuous contacts with Pretoria in 
secret talks. In detail, it included: the drafting of a democratic constitution before 
elections in Namibia; internationally guaranteed neutrality for Namibia; Cuban troop 
withdrawal from Angola as well as political reconciliation between UNITA and the 
MPLA; the avoidance of noisy UN debates and strains in allied relationships; improved 
relations with both South Africa and the other African states; and multiple setbacks to 
the Soviets and Cubans in the region.627
626 Crocker, (c), op cit. P. 58.
627 Crocker, (c), ibid., p. 66.
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Since, the primary objective was to undercut Soviet Union expansionism, linkage 
reinforced the realist view of the primacy of the balance of power over international 
law. Consequently, Resolution 435 (1978)-and the diplomacy through law approach 
that it represented-was sidelined. Negotiations were conducted over the head of the UN. 
It put more emphasis on the calculus and interests of the great powers, as it concerned 
the United States and the Soviet Union in particular. It remained indifferent to the 
opprobrium of the other members of the international community, especially the 
African bloc, which continuously called for justice against South Africa’s illegal 
occupation in Namibia. It is important to tease out these issues in detail with a narrative 
of the eight-year linkage diplomacy. Until ‘confidential’ documents are published in 
2010 a full analysis of the negotiations will be impossible. In the meantime, there is no 
alternative than to rely on memoirs of the participants as well as such documents that 
have already been released into the public domain.
6.2. The beginning of the end of the Contact Group diplomacy
Two events- Haig’s remarks on the Geneva conference during his confirmation 
ceremony, and Crocker’s failure to attend the conference despite having been invited by 
McHenry- illustrated the contempt, which the Reagan exhibited towards the Contact 
Group.
The confirmation of Haig as the Secretary of State coincided with the Geneva
conference. During the proceedings, Haig remarked that:
“Anyone should not be surprised that the South African 
Government would enter into these discussions in a very 
sceptical way and in a very cautious way. There are aspects of 
the issue from their point of view, strategic aspects that have 
been long-standing and historic... I guess this (the Namibian 
question) had been described as the last vestige of colonialism
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that loaded term. So it is in our interest, of course to bring about 
a solution which is not going to put in jeopardy the interests of 
those who share our values and the interest, above all, of a 
broad, strategic sense”.628
Haig’s statement was not made in a vacuum. Previously, Crocker had refused 
McHenry’s advice to attend the Geneva conference, as a private and anonymous 
observer. Like the withdrawal of the Soviet privilege alluded to earlier, Haig’s 
statement and Crocker’s refusal to attend Geneva were signs that Washington was 
ready to take a new course on the Namibian question. Washington moved from mere 
signalling to action by inviting five South African military officers to visit the US 
between March 9-15 after an 18-year ban on such visits. To drive its intention home, 
these officers trip coincided with talks with Jonas Savimbi, the UNITA leader in 
Washington and the US visit by the DTA’s Dirk Mudge.631
The clustering of these three visits more or less at the same time surprised the other 
members of the Contact Group and the Frontline States. In the wake of domestic 
opposition from the anti-apartheid groups, Washington initially denied that 
Ambassador Kirkpatrick was unaware of the identity of these visitors, because, the 
US’s mission in Pretoria had committed ‘an administrative oversight’. Kirkpartick’s 
assertion that there was an error of omission suggests an act of being economical with
Alexander Haig, Testimony by the Secretary of State-Designate Before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, January 14,1981, [Ninety-seventh Congress, First 
Session, Part 2], (Washington, 1981), p. 9-10; and American Foreign Policy Current 
Documents, 1981, {hereafter AFPCD}, (Washington, Dept, of State, 1984), Document 
589, p. 1088; New York Times, January 13,1981, p. 5.
629 This was a disclosure made by John Seiler. See Seiler, John “Crocker’s Southern 
African Policy: A Critical Review”, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 13, 
No. 2,1995, p. 197.
Testimony by the Acting Secretary of State for African Affairs (Walker) before a 
Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, March 31, 1981, AFPCD, 
Document 597, p. 1092.
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the truth. For instance, amongst the visitors was Admiral Du Plesis who was undeniably 
known as a military man. Du Plesis had previously served as a military attach^ in the 
Washington embassy, but was declared persona non grata in retaliation for South 
Africa’s expulsion of American diplomats after the spy plane incident in April 1979.
In any event, the visit of the DTA could not be a mere coincidence, as the DTA leaders 
requested in their letter to President Reagan on February 17,1981 their intention to visit 
Washington on the week of March 13.633 Their visit took place on March 16 following 
an invitation from Crocker on March 6.634 The DTA’s visit also highlighted the United 
States position that SWAPO should not be regarded as the ‘sole representative’ of the 
Namibian people.
Another way in which Washington showed that southern Africa was of immediate 
concern occurred on March 31, when both Crocker and Haig made major policy 
pronouncements. Crocker announced an extensive round of consultations with African 
governments, and declared that the administration’s objective on southern Africa was to 
strengthen the security of the region,635 while Haig declared that “as we launch into a 
new peace effort in southern Africa, we should not be inhibited by unnatural anomalies 
in our ability to conduct our executive branch foreign policies freely”. De-coded, he 
was signalling Washington’s intention to repeal the Clark Amendment. As shown in 
chapter four, South Africa felt betrayed over this Amendment, as it had ended United 
States covert support to the UNITA forces and South Africa in the Angola.
631 Financial Mail (South Africa), March 20,1981, p. 1196.
632 See footnote 528.
Letter From the Chairman and President of the DTA (Mudge and Kalangula) to 
President Reagan, February 17,1981, AFPCD, Document 590, p. 1089.
634 AFPCD, Document 594, p. 1091.
635 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, April 6,1981, p. 376-377.
636 AFPCD, Document 598, p. 1094.
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Other members of the Contact Group watched Washington’s move with interest. The 
visit of Savimbi and the DTA leaders signalled to the Contact Group that the United 
States viewed Namibia and Angola as a joint strategic exercise. The French concluded 
that Washington was no longer committed to an independent Namibia governed by 
whoever won a free election. Le Figaro warned that Washington was more likely to 
allow the Soviet Union to strengthen its reputation as the friend of African nationalism 
was, by adopting an anti-SWAPO line and showing more sympathy for Pretoria. The 
shared values that had bond the Contact Group during the Carter administration began 
to crack, even at the UN. For instance, Ambassador Rudiger von Wechmar (West 
Germany) accused the South African delegation of staging a show when it tried to take 
its seat at the UN debate on Namibia.638 This criticism was directly connected with the 
knowledge of South Africa’s intransigent action on Namibia.639
Washington’s divergence from the plan devised by the Contact Group came to the fore 
when Reagan declared that the United States would embark on a “Zimbabwe formula”. 
He said: “we want to see a peaceful solution to the Namibian situation. We think it 
begins with an election but I think an election, just as we did in Zimbabwe, should 
follow the adoption of a constitution that guarantees equal rights to all people in that
637 Financial Mail, March 20,1981, p. 1196.
638 New York Times, March 16, p. 6.
639 When South Africa joined in the debate on Namibia, the African group raised a point 
of order on the ‘illegal presence’ of the South African delegation. Only the US voted 
against the Credential Committee’s decision to reject South African credentials. In his 
concluding remark on the issue, Wechmar said that: “he could not assume but that the 
activities of the representatives of South Africa were a carefully planned attempt to 
produce a predictable decision by the Assembly majority which could later serve South 
Africa’s own purposes”. See United Nations Monthly Chronicle, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 
April 1981, p. 5.
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country-property rights, minority rights” (sic).640 This ‘building block’ formula 
involved drafting the constitution first, before discussions could move on to the 
transition agreements, and only when that had been agreed could the cease-fire be 
discussed.
Washington was attracted by the Zimbabwe formula primarily as a way of reducing the 
control of SWAPO over an independent Namibia. The protection of the minority would 
be enshrined into the draft constitution, and by implication cut into the winner-takes-all 
scenario favoured by SWAPO. A secondary attraction was the ‘speed factor’. Taking a 
cue from the Lancaster House, which had run a marathon of 14-week negotiation, 
Washington believed that not only it could breathe new life into the negotiation, but 
also quicken its pace and intensity.
This model diverged from the style and substance of the Contact Group diplomacy. In 
the Contact Group plan as enshrined in the SCR 435, Namibia’s law was to be worked 
out after elections. Whoever won the constituent assembly could conceivably 
independently write the constitution. Should SWAPO win, Washington feared that the 
country’s constitution would lean towards a centralised economy. The implication of 
the Zimbabwe formula was that Resolution 435 (1978) was no longer sacrosanct. 
Indeed, the United States had set the stage for the tearing apart of its main provisos. As 
far as the United States was concerned, this resolution could only function and serve the 
greater good if and only if it were shaped by, and suited its national self-interest. It 
remained for the United States officials to sell the American plan to its allies and foes 
alike. This responsibility fell to Crocker.
640 Transcript of an Interview With President Reagan, March 27,1981, Washington
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Crocker embarked on a 10-nation trek through Africa in early April 1981 first visiting 
London for discussion with British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Richard 
Luce. He returned to London on April 22 to meet the other four Contact Group 
representatives and to report on his mission.641 April 22 was also the day set for a 
Security Council debate on the General Assembly resolution calling for sanctions 
against South Africa due to its illegal occupation of Namibia. The timing of the 
Security Council meeting was demanded by OAU, which at one stage even pressed for 
the debate to be staged in Algiers to underline “Africa’s impatience” on the Namibian 
stalemate.642 In keeping with the new American thinking about the balance of power, 
Crocker blamed the Africans’ call for sanctions on the Soviets: “the Front-line States 
organised the showdown in the Security Council because they were backed by the full 
weight of the Soviet-East Bloc-Cuban diplomatic machinery in New York”.643 Previous 
FLS calls for sanctions had never been interpreted in this way, but as part of their quest 
for justice and fairness.
By April, the Contact Group diplomacy was, in biblical terms, the hands o f Jacob, but 
the voice of Esau. Britain continued to direct the Group at the United Nations as it had 
done since the resignation of Ambassador Young in 1979. On March 6, Sir Antony 
Parsons speaking on behalf of the Contact Group indicated, that there was a need “for
Post, March 29,1981.
641 Crocker visited the following 10 countries: Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, Angola, Botswana, Nigeria, Zaire and South Africa. The height of 
Crocker’s visit was in South Africa. Pik Botha objected to Crocker’s statement that 
SWAPO was not necessarily USSR-controlled because it received USSR arms. See 
Financial Mail, April 17,1981, p. 295.
642 Financial Mail, April 10,1981, p. 169.
643 Crocker, (c), op cit., p. 93.
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mature reflection and reconsideration” on the question of Namibia.644 He further 
revealed that “their Governments were not prepared for a specific course of action in 
the future”, and was waiting for the Reagan administration to conduct it review of its 
southern African policy. In essence, the outcome of Washington-Pretoria contacts 
would define the agenda for the Contact Group. On April 23, 1981, Mr. Whyte, British 
Deputy Representative at the United Nations read to the Security Council in toto the 
London communique issued by the Contact Group: ‘The Five recognised that the 
settlement plan as endorsed by SCR 435 (1978) with the complementary measures that 
had been added to it, such as the proposal for a DMZ, had not proved sufficient to bring 
about implementation. They urged that the search for a settlement should be intensified 
and the ways to strengthen the existing plan should be considered”.645 The wording was 
Washington’s, although read by a Briton. The Contact Group as a unit has conceded the 
initiative to the United States.
The United States then moved to break the monopoly of SWAPO in the UN. It 
persuaded the Contact Group to request that Mr. Kalangula, of the DTA should address 
the Security Council under of Rule 39 of the body,646 but in contravention of GA
644 UNMC, Vol. XVm, No. 5, May 1981, p. 6, (UN Document A/35/PV.109). This 
statement in particular angered the African group. For instance, Ferdinand Leopold 
Oyomo, of the United Republic of Cameroon, speaking on behalf of Africa said that Sir 
Anthony Parson’s words were a real failure of the part of these States to meet the 
responsibility they had assumed towards the international community for the 
implementation of SCR435 (1978), p. 6.
645 UNMC, Vol. XVm, No. 6, June 1981, p. 6. “The Five Powers State that Namibia 
Settlement Plan Should Be Strengthened”.
646 Rule 39 of the Security Council provides that the Council may invite person whom it 
considers competent for the purpose, to supply it with information, or to gain assistance in 
examining matters within its competence. Within the provision of this rule, the Security 
Council had invited the UN Council for Namibia, the Chairman of the Special Committee 
on Decolonization, the Secretary of Foreign Relations of SWAPO, Peter Mueshihiange; 
Representative of ANC of South Africa, Johnstone F. Makatami; and the Permanent
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Resolution 3111 (XXVIII) of 1973 which, had recognised SWAPO as the authentic and 
sole representative of the Namibian people. The motion was defeated by a vote of 9 to 
6.647 The opposing nine members claimed that Kalangula represented the fruits of the 
1979 internal elections, which had been declared null and void by the UN and therefore 
had no right to recognition. In protest, Jeane Kirkpatrick declared that, “The Security 
Council damages its capacity to act as a forum, as a peacemaker, as an impartial 
mediator that can be trusted to all parties fairly”.648 A week later, she not only criticised 
the United Nations as a “would-be referee with somewhat tarnished credentials”, but 
also denounced Resolution 435 as a ‘holy text’. She insisted that the United States 
would not accept Resolution 435, if incompatible with America’s two goals: (1) 
preventing Namibia from sliding into the Soviet sphere; and (2) an independent, stable, 
democratic Namibia.649
The call for the “strengthening of Resolution 435” angered the African group. They 
again called for economic sanctions against South Africa if Security Council failed to 
implement Resolution 435 unconditionally. Once again, the United States, France and 
Britain exercised their veto powers. It is tempting to conclude that a unity of purpose 
over Namibia prompted the triple veto. Rather their concern was setting a precedent of 
sanctions against their allied states, especially Israel. Germany, Canada and Britain 
were uneasy about the emerging US view that Resolution 435 was a “dead letter”. They
Observer of the League of Arab State, Clovis Maksoud. See. UNMC, Vol. XVIII, No. 6, 
June 1981, p. 10.
647 The nine states were: China, German Democratic Republic, Mexico, Niger, Panama, 
Philippines, Tunisia, Uganda and the USSR; the other six states were: France, Britain, the 
United States, Spain, Ireland and Japan. See UNMC, ibid., p. 6.
f L A Q
Statement by the Representative at the United Nations Before the UN Security 
Council, April 21,1981. See, AFPCD, 1981, Document 602, p. 1099.
649 Address by the Representative at the United Nations Before the Overseas Press Club, 
New York, April 29,1981, AFPCD, 1981, Document 604, p. 1102.
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feared that America’s plan could exclude the UN with its long-held “special 
responsibility” for Namibia. Yet none of them was ready to go public on the breakdown 
of consensus. For example, at the NATO meeting in Paris on May 3, 1981, a 
communique was issued, reaffirming that Resolution 435 “provides a solid base” for a 
deal.650 This was consensus by default. It was nothing more than an effort to 
tranquillise the African group, which was grossly disappointed over the triple veto.
Meanwhile, all eyes were fixed on the Haig-Botha talks scheduled for May 14.651 The 
talks concluded with the US demanding a ‘conclusive list’ of South African concerns 
on regional stability. Five days letter, Botha sent Haig a letter containing these 
conclusive lists including: a firm agreement between South Africa and the United State 
on a set of categorical strategic goals relating to the exclusion of all external 
Communist forces from the southern African region, UN civilian observers instead of 
the UN military component, and a regional cease-fire, that guaranteed stability before 
any settlement. France, Germany, Canada and Britain began to doubt Washington and 
Pretoria’s sincerity to deliver a settlement within the UN framework. The consequence 
of this letter showed that the Contact Group as a unit was now more concerned with 
coalition-maintenance than coalition-consolidation. It is worth recapitulating Crocker’s 
words at length:
“The allies took fright upon seeing the letter: the grievous
damage Botha’s position would do to the entire UN framework
650 Financial Mail, May 8,1981, p. 648.
The US State Department invited Pik Botha to Washington for talks with Alexander 
Haig on May 14. While Botha preferred a de facto strategic alliance on USA-South 
American relations, Haig went for a political strategy integrating the African, Cuban, 
allied and Soviet dimensions into a southern African regional policy. See, Statements and 
Remarks by the Secretary of State (Haig) and the South African Foreign Minister (Botha) 
at a Press Conference, May 14, 1981, AFPCD, 1981, Document 606, p. 1104.
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was obvious. German Foreign Ministry quivered with 
indignation at this blatant example of “Boer cheekiness”. Their 
Canadian counterpart added that Canada’s virginity on South 
African issues was what gave the Contact Group its 
“credibility”, and hinted darkly that Ottawa would have to 
assess its continued participation. We knew that the Germans 
were privately predicting the early collapse of the Group over 
the issue of American tactics. The French had two positions: a 
Socialist one at ministerial level mirroring the German malaise, 
and a far more practical and creative line from my ministerial 
counterpart, Jean Ausseil, who understood exactly what we were 
doing. London fretted supportively; the Brits were anxious, 
above all, to get the process back on the rails and keep the 
Group intact. Joint activity by our Group was placed effectively 
on hold, while we prepared the Clark mission”.652
The fear of other Contact Group members was not misplaced. Botha’s conclusive list 
was ‘linkage’ written in Pretoria. In fact, there was a remarkable similarity between the 
South African Foreign Affairs director-general, Brian Fourie’s three requisites for a 
settlement and Crocker’s proposals. These were: equal treatment of all parties, the 
protection of the rights of minority groups, and the guarantee of the fundamental 
principles of democracy for the future.653 The new plan sought to overcome South 
Africa’s misgivings about the original Western proposals, which were to have been 
implemented in terms of SCR 435. It gave rise to renewed SWAPO suspicions, which 
were shared by FLS, as Pretoria and the DTA immediately endorsed it. These 
suspicions grew as the United States impressed on Pik Botha that the Namibia 
settlement was just one element in the strategy to rid southern Africa of the Soviet- 
Cuban presence in Angola. It was the American, and not the South Africans that 
perceived an opportunity to deal with Soviet expansionism in southern Africa. 
Washington was now less concerned about the real or imagined international 
opprobrium of its moves on the Namibian settlement. As Washington was offering
652 Crocker, (c), op cit., p. 96.
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graduated rewards to Pretoria and being sympathetic to the DTA, it did not have any 
direct contact with SWAPO,654 contrary to the wishes of the international community 
and SWAPO itself. It was not until after the Clark mission had met the Namibia 
internal parties in Windhoek between June 10-13, that Crocker met SWAPO’s UN 
observer in Washington in early August 1981. Abraham du Plesis, the leader of the 
National Party of SWA (Namibia) pointed out the importance of Clark’s meeting with 
the Namibia internal parties. He said that, “everything now depends on Washington. In 
about as many words, I made it clear that any solution that militates against white 
interests will lead to political collapse, followed by a white exodus, followed by 
economic collapse. I was favourably impressed with Judge Clark”.655
The Clark mission produced the basis for Haig’s approach to the negotiating process. 
The ‘Clark paper’ was very clear about the US objective on the Namibian settlement. 
The intention was first to oppose a Marxist regime coming to power in Namibia; 
second to force the Cubans to leave the region, and to this end to provide Savimbi with 
appropriate help; third, to safeguard the rights of minority groups; and finally to place
653 See Brian G. Fourie speech before the Security Council on April 22. 1981, New York 
Times, April 23,1981, p. 1.
654 The secret memo written by Crocker to Haig, but leaked to Randall Robinson, the 
leading anti-apartheid activist, and the founder-director of TransAfrica, contained some of 
the graduated rewards offered to South Africa. The memo showed that the United States 
was ready to work to end South Africa’s isolation “if that nation cooperates in achieving 
internationally acceptable settlement of Namibia’s independence. If there was a steady 
dismantling of apartheid and if the Soviet-Cuban presence in the region could be removed, 
then Washington would provide Pretoria with the protection and friendship of the major 
powers it needs to evolve peacefully for the rest of this century”. See, Financial Mail, 
June 5,1981, p. 1130. Other rewards, some that were contrary to the spirit, if not the letter 
of the arms embargo included: the upgrading the rank and number of military attaches 
between Washington and Pretoria, an increase in the number of honorary consuls South 
Africa can appoint in the US, the training of the South African coastguard, as well as 
support for the South Africa’s loan application to the IMF, and the rejection of sanctions 
as an instrument for ending apartheid. See New York Times, May 30,1981, p. 3.
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the UN as the implementing agent in the settlement strategy.656 Haig refined the Clark 
paper into a three-phased approach, which he discussed with the Contact Group at the 
Ottawa Summit of the G-7 on July 19-21. Unsurprisingly, none of them supported such 
explicit linkage. They made it known that linkage policy could not be taken as an 
official Contact Group position, and that the withdrawal of the Cuban forces from 
Angola was and should be a separate endeavour, which should not be pursued in 
tandem with the Namibian question. Once again, the Ottawa communique produced a 
fragile and an ambiguous Contact Group consensus. It promised a return to the basic 
UN idea in a manner that would command international approval. The fragility of the 
Ottawa consensus became clear two weeks later when the US disregarded the damage 
that it would do to Contact Group unanimity, and unilaterally vetoed a Security Council 
resolution that strongly criticised South Africa’s ‘Operation Protea’.658
Operation Protea was a South Africa military attack in Angola against SWAPO forces. 
While the Soviet Union, Britain, France and Germany demanded South Africa’s 
withdrawal, the State Department issued a statement saying that the South African 
military operation underscored the need for urgent movement towards a settlement of 
the Namibian problem.659 Secretary Haig announced that the South African incursion 
should be understood in ‘full context’, that is along with the continued presence of large 
numbers of Cuban forces and Soviet advisers in Angola.660 The veto had more than a
655 Abraham du Plessis’s interview with the Financial Mail, see Financial Mail, June 19, 
1981, p. 1373.
656 Crocker, op cit., p. 98.
Communique Issued Following the Meeting of the Contact Group, Ottawa, July 22, 
1981, Department of State Bulletin, October 1981, p. 70.
/ C O
Statement by the Alternate Representative at the United Nations, Charles M. 
Lichenstein, Before the UN Security Council, August 31, 1981, UN Document S/PV.2300
659 New York Times, August 27,1981, p. 3.
660 New York Times, August 29,1981, p. 1.
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demonstration effect. This was American unilateralism in action. It revealed the high 
premium that the United States placed on the containment of the Soviet expansionism 
in Africa. Washington used Moscow’s admission that two of its soldiers died during 
Operation Protea to buttress its claim of the need to contain the Soviet thrust in 
southern Africa.
Other truths emerged from the US veto. One was that Washington was tired of the 
fudging and consensual politicking of its allies. Another was that a declaration of 
clarity and firmness about US strategic interests, showed that the United States was 
ready to take extreme measures to promote its national interests, regardless of what its 
allies thought. Linkage was to be achieved even if it involved dispensing with allied 
sympathy. Third, it added to the lesson that power must rule, no matter how great the 
moral outcry of the Third World. It set a collision course between power politics and 
international public opinion. The veto^increased the frustration of the African states, 
which held meeting with the American officials in Washington after the veto.661
The veto also confirmed the problem of alliance entanglement. To recap: in chapter 
four, we conceptualised the Contact Group as an informal alliance, and noted that the 
dilemma of entanglement arises when individual self-interest points in a different 
direction from conjoint interest. As the individual and collective interests overlap, a 
choice of dominant strategy of maximising individual self-interest over the collective 
stake becomes necessary.
661 Robert Ouko, the Foreign Minister of Kenya, in his capacity as the Chairman of the 
OAU Council of Ministers led the delegation. The delegation had a meeting with 
Alexander Haig, and it expressed the view that the African continent was impatient with 
the delay on the implementation of Resolution 435, See AFPCD, 1981, Document 612, p. 
1117.
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From this time, Washington’s commitment to Contact Group diplomacy was 
undeniably half-hearted. The signal was clear, if the Contact Group did not support the 
American agenda, the US would ride roughshod over the group. Washington did not 
outrightly denounce its membership of the group, but in a Machiavellian manner, 
‘ghost-wrote’ the South African response to any correspondence with the Contact 
Group. To quote Crocker: “to circumspect the other members of the group, Washington 
was coaching Pretoria on how to respond to any correspondence from the Group. 
Washington also planted the idea that its team should constitute a reliable channel for 
assessing the intricate and difficult issues on the negotiation”.662 Thus it effectively 
controlled the negotiation from the two sides: within the Contact Group and with 
Pretoria. This ploy aimed to tailor the outcome of the negotiations to the American 
design.
The unilateral veto was also a deliberate tactic within the broader Soviet-United States 
relationship. It was an action taken to cause anxieties amongst the Soviet leadership, 
and its proteges in Africa, especially Angola. It removed the pretence that Washington 
was not serious in containing Soviet expansionism, both politically and territorially. To 
drive the point home, the Reagan administration triggered the move to repeal the Clark 
amendment. The intention was to confer psychological and military advantages to the 
UNITA forces, and cause ripples in Luanda. In addition, the veto indicated that 
Washington did not want to abandon South Africa. Yet, Washington’s belief that the 
veto would make South Africa ‘deliver’ quickly on its own (Washington’s) game-plan 
on Namibia-Angola proved over-ambitious, as Pretoria had embarked on its strategy of
662 Crocker, (c), op cit., p. 107.
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immobility until the internal parties had been nurtured to a point where they could 
compete on equal terms with SWAPO.
The veto upset the FLS. In a bitterly worded UN resolution they called for the total 
isolation of South Africa, a worldwide trade boycott, and increased armed support to 
SWAPO. Most of the UN member-states also reacted angrily to the ‘strengthening 
of Resolution 435’. They maintained that Namibia was a question of colonialism and 
illegal occupation of South Africa. For instance, Cuba said that the imperialists were 
trying to distort the essence of the Namibian problem by placing it in the context of 
East-West confrontation.664 Guyana maintained that elements unrelated to the nature of 
the struggle in Namibia were being introduced as a ‘red herring’ intended to serve as a 
pretext for delaying and placing limitations on Namibia’s independence.665 Other states 
such as Togo and Ethiopia denounced the veto as a manifestation of naked power 
divorced from responsibility, and stated that the struggle was not between communism 
and capitalism, but between oppression and freedom.
Perhaps, mindful of the consequences of publicly displaying the split within the Contact 
Group, all five states (including the United States) abstained on the resolution. 
However, the abstention of Botswana, Swaziland, Lesotho and Tanzania on the 
sanction resolution was a shock to the other African states,666 particularly as two of the 
four, Botswana and Tanzania were members of the FLS. Their abstention was a 
deliberate calculation related to their national survival and economic dependence on
663 UNMC, Vol. XVIE, No. 10, November 1981, p. 13, “Assembly Calls for Increased 
Military Aid to SWAPO, Complete Boycott of South Africa, 3-14, September 1981”.
664 ibid., p. 16.
665 Yearbook of the United Nations, Vol. 35,1981, (New York: Dept, of Public 
Information, 1984), p. 1141.
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South Africa. They mentioned the vulnerability of their economies should sanctions be 
imposed on South Africa. The GA resolution passed with 117 to 0, with 25 abstentions. 
It was not binding,667 but the abstentions highlighted the frailty on the consensus within 
the FLS. The abstention of Botswana and Tanzania was not of equal significance as the 
US veto, but it pointed to the same conclusion. It showed that states were ready to shunt 
moral principles for economic and political gains.
In response to the veto, the FLS held an emergency meeting in Lagos, on September 
11, 1981. Crocker noted that, “the FLS would point to the veto as ‘Exhibit A’ in their 
charge that the US supported South Africa’s regional policy”.668 The FLS reaction was 
predictable. In an attempt to appease them, the Group issued a statement in New York, 
on September 24, 1981, maintaining its commitment to Resolution 435.669 More 
significantly, three days earlier, Crocker had a meeting with a six-member South 
African officials in Zurich, led by Brand G. Fourie to ‘dot the i’s and cross the t’s of the 
settlement package. A SWAPO spokesman described the talks as “a fresh gimmick to 
delay the Namibian problem instead of resolving it”.670 The New York communique 
was upbeat, stating that it was hoped to start implementing a settlement on Namibia by 
January 1983. The communique developed a timetable for ‘final negotiations’ and set 
the stage for discussions on constitutional principles. To limit the anger and frustration 
of SWAPO on its exclusion since the ‘strengthening of Resolution 435’, the Contact 
Group agreed to put the package on the “table for these disgruntled parties”: SWAPO 
and the FLS. From now on, the FLS would have no effective active role as it had
666 ibid., p. 1146.
667 New York Times, September 15,1981, p. 1.
668 Crocker (c), op cit., p. 106.
669 Statement Issued by the Contact Group, New York, September 24,1981, See AFPCD 
1981, Document 616, p. 1119.
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during the Carter administration, although it continued to serve as a buffer from any 
disruptive interference from the Moscow-Havana axis.
To get the African leaders on side, Washington played a psychological game. It used 
the ‘fear factor’ and ‘positive incentives’ simultaneously. It interpreted the presence of 
the Soviets and Cubans in Angola to the FLS as a symptom of a weak sovereignty of 
the MPLA government. The truth was that, setting aside the legalism of the principle of 
non-intervention being expressed by the FLS whenever an opportunity arose to attack 
the ‘linkage’, the prospect of a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, was an offer that they 
could not refuse. The OAU itself was becoming sceptical of the continued presence of 
foreign troops in Africa. Washington believed African states regard sovereignty as a 
priceless possession. They were not ready to share it with foreigners in perpetuity.
Foreign Aid was the incentive. The United States used the promise of aid as a leverage 
to secure the support of the African states on the Namibian question, and to ward off 
the temptation of Soviet offers. The message was clear from Washington that US 
assistance to the Third World would no longer have a charitable purpose. Instead, it 
was being defined in terms of strategic and political advancement for the United States. 
The administration warned that American foreign assistance resources were finite. In 
Crocker’s words: “the United States cannot be the financial “angel” for Africa any 
more”.671 After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, military assistance was beefed up to 
$210.5 million (1982 FY) with Kenya, Sudan and later Somalia, as the prime recipients. 
Sudan’s $100 million foreign military sales credits were an attempt to blunt Libya’s
670 Financial Mail, September 25,1981, p. 1491.
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expansionist aspirations into Chad, the Sudan’s western neighbour. More relevantly, 
was Kenya’s $50 million for mobile anti-tank force and additional $1.3 million in 
military training assistance. This assistance had a political and strategic objective. It 
was partly designed as a facilitator for President Moi to push for a Namibian settlement 
during his tenure as the OAU chairman for 1981-82.672 This dramatic increase in US 
aid to these states was also to secure their strategic co-operation. Kenya, Sudan and 
Somalia-the three main recipients-had ports that could be useful as stations for the 
American troops and supplies heading for the oil-rich Persian Gulf.
In some instances, Washington leaned on London to dissuade the African leaders from 
any un-welcoming attitudes. For instance, Crocker and Sir Walter Allison, British 
Under-Secretary of State (Africa), met the FLS leaders in October 1981. Britain’s 
Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington had warned the Commonwealth leaders in
f s i ' iMelbourne on early October 1981 of the consequences of a failure of the new plan.
South Africa sees to have been taken in by the linkage idea. For example, when Jaap 
Marais, the leader of the extreme wing Herstigte Nasionale Party vowed to make it 
impossible for South African Government to reach agreement on independence for 
Namibia, Pieter Botha replied that he would not allow right wing to block any 
agreement.674 The offer of ‘linkage’ was too seductive for Pretoria to let any internal 
dissent undermine it. Although, the favoured option of internal settlement was un-
1 Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Crocker) Before the 
Foreign Relations and National Security Committee of the American Legion, Honolulu, 
August 29,1981, See AFPCD 1981, Document 610, p. 1112.
672 Financial Mail, April 17,1981, p. 297. These
673 Financial Mail, October 9,1981, p. 170.
674 New York Times, October 25,1981, p. 1.
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realiaseable, the new proposal at least guaranteed and protected white rights and 
interests.
It envisaged a three-phased approach to the Namibian settlement. In the Phase 1 parties 
would commit themselves to a set of constitutional principles for the Constituent 
Assembly. Phase 2 would include negotiation of other issues preventing 
implementation (primarily the size and role of UNTAG and assurance on the 
impartiality of the electoral process. In Phase 3 the parties would agree on a date during 
1982 for the beginning of the implementation of Resolution 435.
The content and packaging of the proposal met with mixed reactions. For South Africa, 
it guaranteed the rights of the white minority in Namibia. To SWAPO, the package still 
guaranteed majority control, and other minor political groupings concerns were equally 
addressed. The principle of an elected constituent assembly and a Namibia 
independence constitution resembled closely the proposals drafted by John Kirkpatrick 
and Bryan O’Linn of Namibia’s Federal Party in 1978.675 The Contact Group first 
visited Nigeria and Angola, both of whose Governments were believed to have 
responded favourably to the new proposals, before visiting South Africa on October 28 
and Namibia on October 29,1981.676
Negotiations were stalled early in 1982 because of the differences between South 
Africa and the SWAPO on electoral process. When they met in London on January 13- 
14, 1982 SWAPO conceded to the demand for specific provisions for the representation
675 Financial Mail, October 30,1981, p. 548.
676 Kessing’s Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXIX, March 1983, p. 31997.
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of Whites.677 Consequently, Mr. Marais Viljoen, the South African State President 
stated that South Africa was ready to move to the second phase of the Contact Group 
package.678 However, SWAPO had still not agreed to the first phase. It rejected the 
proposal for a mixed electoral system proposed for the Constituent Assembly elections, 
combining proportional representation and a single member constituency system. On 
the day of the Viljoen speech, Mr. Luis de Almeida, the Angolan ambassador to France, 
warned that the dual voting system posed a “fundamental problem in the current rounds 
on negotiations, questioning whether it would be possible to explain such a complicated 
system to people who were largely illiterate”.679 Nujoma notified the UN Secretary 
General that the dual voting system had to be rejected as “peculiar, undemocratic and 
confusing”. Further to the joint FLS/SWAPO rejection of the Phase 1 proposals, on 
January 25, 1982, the phased-approach suffered a setback when, on 4 May 1982, the 
Foreign Ministers of the FLS in Dar-es-Salaam notified that they “shared SWAPO’s
/ O A
deep disenchantment with the current protracted and sterile phased approach”.
Faced by SWAPO’s strong opposition to the dual voting system, the Contact Group 
reconsidered the option. A new formula was mooted when they met in London on 
March 18-19, 1982. This involved a process where only one vote would be cast for the 
constituent assembly, but would be counted twice under systems of direct and 
proportional representation. SWAPO feared that the stage-by-stage approach was a 
device to tie its hands in advance on the constitutional aspects of a settlement. The 
impasse was resolved on June 2 during a meeting between the Contact Group and
677 New York Times, January 19,1982, p. 4.
678 Background Brief Series, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (London), July 
1982, p. 4.
679 KCA, op cit., p. 31998.
680 ibid., p. 31998.
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Nujoma, after which he declared that the “Contact Group had agreed to negotiate one
iCQ I
package of proposals rather than phased approach”. This was an important 
concession to SWAPO. As a result the Tanzanian Foreign Minister, Salim Salim 
announced on June 14 that the FLS “had unanimously agreed to the new revised 
proposals”.682
Two days later, the talks suffered another setback, when P. W. Botha stressed that 
South Africa could not ‘complete the three phases unless the Cubans leave Angola’.683 
Botha’s statement soured Crocker’s earlier optimism that the parties had ‘shown a will 
to move ahead rapidly, that differences were narrowing, and a predicted successful 
conclusion of talks by the end of 1982’.684 SWAPO was not taken in by Botha’s 
statement. Mr. Peter Manning, SWAPO’s information officer for Western Europe 
stated on July 6 that the ‘contact group was making a settlement appear nearer than it 
was, so that when it failed to materialise SWAPO would be seen as uncooperative and
z o r
destructive’. Through the govemment-news agency Angop, the Angolan strongly 
condemned Botha’s statement. The editorial accused South Africa of bringing up the 
question of the Cuban troops as “a manoeuvre, through infantile arguments, to delay 
Namibian independence”. It stated that the Cuban troops would leave Angola “only by 
the sovereign decision” of the Angolan Government “once all aggression or armed 
invasion was completely ceased”.686 The Angolan position on the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops was reinforced by Mr. Lopo Ferreira do Nascimento, the Angolan Planning
681 ibid., p. 32000.
682 Background Brief Series, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (London), July 
1982, p. 7.
683 New York Times, June 18,1982, p. 3.
684 New York Times, June 15,1982, p. 4.
685 KCA, Volume XXIX, March 1983, p. 32000.
686 ibid., p. 32000.
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Minister, who told a meeting of the South African Development Co-ordination 
Conference in Luanda on June 25, 1982, that Angola denied “to anyone whatsoever the 
right to determine what kind of aid [was given] to SWAPO and how it should be given, 
as well as where an in what manner Cuban troops should be withdrawn”.
6.3. The end of the Contact Group
The question of the withdrawal of Cuban troops increasingly came to dominate the 
negotiations with both Angola and South Africa adopting firm positions. The cracks 
within the Contact Group became wider. United States efforts to force Cuban troop 
withdrawal were transparently Machiavellian, thus adapting means to ends. They 
rested on (i) a minimum contact with SWAPO, (ii) a political contact, but not 
diplomatic contact with the Angolan Government and (iii) a full engagement with the 
Pretoria government. It was not until June 1 1982, that Crocker had a first personal 
contact with Sam Nujoma in Bonn, Germany, in attendance with Herr Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister. Crocker’s meeting with the Luanda 
government was archetypal high politics. Washington was ready to squeeze 
concessions on Cuban troop withdrawal through its refusal to grant diplomatic 
recognition to the Angolan government, maintaining that they had to “cut a deal” with 
UNITA’s Savimbi.688 With the Cuban troop withdrawal at the centre of the 
negotiations, a US State Department official, Mr. Robert Cabelly had a meeting with 
SWAPO in Luanda on July 4,689 to prevent further ‘souring’ of the atmosphere over the 
issue. The United States then unilaterally sponsored talks on Namibia in New York on
687 ibid., p. 32000.
In a memo disclosed in New York Times on June 1,1981, Crocker argued that United 
States recognition should not be considered until Cuban troops had left the country and the 
Angolan Government had cut a deal with a deal with Dr. Savimbi. The leak of the memo 
was an embarrassment to Crocker, least being an Assistant Secretary of State designate.
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July 6. However, the Angolan Government insisted that the problem of Namibian 
independence and that of the Cuban presence in Angola were “two distinct issues which 
must be treated differently”. Meanwhile, P. W. Botha reiterated his country’s desire for 
Namibian settlement but said there could be no final agreement on an election unless 
Cuban troops left Angola.
Within the Contact Group the centre could no longer hold. In late July, Mr. Jean-Pierre 
Cot, then the French Minister-Delegate for Co-operation and Development, declared 
after a three-day visit to Angola that the withdrawal of Cuban troops should not be 
linked to a Namibian settlement.690 Britain, America’s closest ally ambiguously 
demurred on the linkage. On July 28, Mr. Cranley Onslow, a Minister of State at the 
British Foreign and Commonwealth Office claimed that Britain was not attempting to 
link the two issues. He said that a “Cuban withdrawal was not a formal precondition for 
a Namibian settlement, but that the British Government “believed that a Cuban 
withdrawal would greatly facilitate it.691 Britain’s conditional opposition of linkage was 
due to two reasons. Like others, the British saw linkage as a deviation from the 
principle and letter of SCR 435. Secondly, there were pressures from both the Anti- 
Apartheid Movement in London and the Commonwealth Heads of Governments. For 
example, Mr. Onslow made the above statement following a meeting with a delegation 
from the Anti-Apartheid Movement. In the same vein, on 1 December 1982, Mrs. 
Thatcher, the Prime Minister reported to the House of Commons on the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting in New Delhi that “the concept of a conditional linkage
689 New York Times, July 5,1982, p. 1.
690 KCA, op cit., p. 32001.
691 KCA, op cit., p. 32001.
296
was rejected, but clearly the fact that other nations (the United States in particular) have 
made the linkage is material to how and when the problem will be resolved”.
International opposition to linkage grew considerably during the latter part of 1982, 
with the FLS, Cuba and the Soviet Union taking a particularly firm position. For 
example, following a meeting on August 9 between the FLS and SWAPO in Tripoli, 
Libya during the OAU Summit, Mr. Salim A. Salim, described prospects for 
negotiations as “bright” provided that the issue of Cuban troops was not raised. On the 
anniversary of the “Namibia Day” on 26 August 1982, the OAU stated that linkage was 
unacceptable. So also, the Islamic Minister’s Conference in Niger denounced the 
linkage, and reaffirmed SWAPO’s armed struggle to attain national independence for 
Namibia. The FLS also issued a communique that unequivocally declared that the 
linkage issue was against the letter and spirit of the SCR 435, and that it also 
constituted an interference in the internal affairs of Angola, and consequently, could 
only impede the process of negotiations.
The Soviet Union announced its own rejection at the United Nations. Mr. Richard 
Ovinnkov, the acting Soviet permanent representative at the UN, circulated a letter to 
members of the Security Council on September 11-12 calling upon the UN to renounce 
formally the “infamous link” with the Cuban military withdrawal and advocating an
fry*
end to the “secrecy surrounding the negotiations”. Moscow’s criticism was doubly 
understandable. First, Moscow feared that there was an increasing accommodation 
between Luanda and Washington, due to series of talks between Crocker and Mr. Paulo 
George, the Angolan Foreign Minister. Moscow expressed its concern during a visit by
692 Background Brief Series: (FCO), July 1983, p. 5.
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the Angolan delegation to Soviet Union early January 1982, when Mr. Nikolai 
Tikhomov, the Soviet Prime Minister, warned the Angolan delegation of a US plot to 
return Angola to the US sphere of influence. To allay Moscow’s fear, Mr. Lucio Lara, 
(the MPLA-PT secretary-general and Col. Pedro Maria Pedale (Angolan Minister of 
Defense) told the Soviets that Moscow’s interests in the Angolan and Namibian 
situations would not be prejudiced by contacts with the United States. Angola’s 
enduring loyalty to, and friendship with, the Soviet Union, was underlined by the 
signature of a $2,000 million economic and technological co-operation agreement for 
the period of 1981-1985,694 But secondly, the linkage wrong-footed the Soviet Union. 
The presence of the Cuban troops and Soviet advisers in Angola was Moscow’s sole 
effective means of influence on Luanda. The absence of such a means would amount to 
the end of any influence. The withdrawal of Cuban troops would undermine the 
stability of the MPLA-PT government; and consequently increased its vulnerability to 
external attacks from South Africa. President Santo himself publicly expressed this 
threat of vulnerability. He said that “Angola did not want a repeat of what had recently 
happened in ‘another African country’ [presumably Chad], where the government had 
fallen after the withdrawal of troops from a neighbouring State [Libya] which had 
guaranteed internal stability and territorial integrity”.695
693 KCA, op cit., p. 32001.
Tass: the Soviet news agency reported of the visitation on January 24,1982. See 
KCA, ibid. It was reported in The Guardian (London) of September 14 1981 that 
President Santo had declared that Angola was “ready to increase cooperation, which is 
justly, based either with countries in the socialist world or with those in the Western 
world”. As a demonstration of a deepening economic relations between Washington and 
Luanda, albeit the absence of a diplomatic relations, the US Export-Import Bank granted a 
loan of $85 million to finance the further development of Angolan oilfields undertaken by 
a Gulf Oil subsidiary and the state-owned Sonangol. All these developments indicated that 
Luanda was ready to weaned itself from the Soviet Union, and these worried Moscow.
695 President Santo made the statement on 10 December 1982 during the anniversary of
the founding of the MPLA. See Background Brief Series, Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office [London], February 1983, p. 9.
298
Angola’s rejection of the linkage was not consistent. It sent confusing signals to allies 
and foes alike. For instance, in mid October, Mr. de Almeida, the Angolan Ambassador 
to France released a statement saying that Angola was prepared, as a goodwill gesture, 
to advance progressive withdrawal of Cuban forces, provided that all threats and acts of 
aggression against his country ceased.696 In addition, during the secret talks between 
Luanda and Pretoria on the island of Sal in Cape Verde, the Angolan delegation did not 
take the issue head on with the South Africans. The Angolan delegation conceded that
/TQ<7
the withdrawal of Cuban troops was the “task of the Americans”. Undeniably, it was 
the Americans that factored in the linkage, but the South Africans immediately seized 
the opportunity and hardened their position, whenever a window of opportunity of 
resolving the impasse on Namibia opened. On the other side, whether the Angolans 
were in the company of the FLS or alone, they always voiced their rejection of linkage.
Neither opposition from the international community nor the ambivalence of its trusted 
ally, Britain, led the United States to soften its position on the Cuban troop withdrawal. 
In a confidential letter sent to the FLS leaders in early September 1982, President 
Reagan warned that unless there was an agreement on the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
‘this summer’ then a ‘fragile, historic opportunity’ to achieve a Namibian settlement 
would be lost. He also declared that Washington could not and would not “put aside the 
Cuban issue”.698 Mr. George Bush, the US Vice-President stressed this position during 
his 12-day tour of seven African countries in mid-November 1982. In Nairobi, Mr. 
Bush reiterated that despite criticism by African leaders, Washington would continue to
KCA, op cit., p. 32992; and New York Times, December 9,1982, p. 1
698 ibid,. New York Times, December 9,1982, p. 1.
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labour on until all foreign troops had withdrawn from southern Africa, so Namibia 
might be free.699
Washington’s resolve irritated France, which unilaterally increased contacts with the 
SWAPO/Angolan leadership. Mr. Jean Ausseil, head of the African Department of the 
French Foreign Ministry, had talks with the Cuban officials in Havana on 19 September
1982. Less than a week later, Mr. Nujoma held talks with French Foreign Ministry 
officials and members of French Socialist Party on 24 September 1982. Then on 
October 11, 1982, Mr. Claude Cheysson, the French Foreign Minister declared in Dar- 
es-Salaam on 11 October 1982 that the French Government saw no justification for any 
request being put to the Angolan Government regarding the withdrawal of Cuban 
troops. He revealed that France had received assurances from both the Cuban and 
Angolan Governments that the Cuban troops “would be quite ready to leave Angola the 
day Angola finds it proper”. He further stated, that the ‘Contact Group had finished its 
work and the present “stagnation” on the Cuban issue was outside its competence’.700 
There was even a rumour, later denied by Mr. Cheysson, that France was planning to 
send troops to replace Cuban forces in Angola. Unlike the other three members of the 
Contact Group, France did not want to go out quietly. On December 7, 1983, it 
announced the suspension of its membership of the Contact Group on December 7,
1983. Cheysson stated that “France now considered that the group was unable to carry
699 New York Times, November 22,1982, p. 4. As a reaction to the arrogance of Mr. 
Bush’s statement, a group of 31 African leaders issued the famous ‘Tripoli Declaration on 
Namibia”. It condemned in strongest terms the linkage. See, Background Brief Series, 
(FCO), London, February, 1983, p. 9.
700 Background Brief Series, op cit., p. 6.
701 ibid., p. 6.
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out its mandate because of the introduction of, and subsequent problems concerning, 
the ‘linkage argument.’702
6.4. The Lusaka Accord: a false optimism
While Luanda was reluctant to negotiate the linkage directly with Pretoria during the 
secret Cape Verde talks;703 Washington seized the initiative. Crocker had secret talks 
with Mr. Leonid Dyichiev, the Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister on December 7,1982,704 
and simultaneously encouraged direct talks between Pretoria and Luanda. 
Washington’s direct contact with Moscow was designed to outmanoeuvre Havana, and 
dictate terms of settlement to Moscow. Moscow, at this stage was in a dilemma. It 
needed to go along with Washington in order not to be excluded altogether and be seen 
as a spoiler, whilst it did not want to kowtow Washington. Meanwhile, the mass 
exchange of prisoners between Angola and South Africa in late 1982 under the auspices 
of the International Committee of Red Cross705 signalled the possibility of an 
improvement between Pretoria and Luanda. The outcome of a series of secret talks 
between them and between Washington and Moscow, and between Washington and
702 KCA, Vol. XXX, December 1984, p. 33265.
President Aristides Maria Pereira of Cape Verde initiated the Secret Cape Verde talks 
between Angola and South Africa. President Pereira used his influence as chairman of the 
Head of States of the five Portuguese-speaking African countries, with the Angolan 
Government. He had previously chaired the Third-Summit of these countries on 22 
September, 1982. The Angolan-South African meeting was held on 8 December 1982. Lt. 
Col. Alexandre Rodrigues, the Minister of the Interior and Mr. Fernando Faustino Muteka, 
the Minister of Transport led the Angolan delegation. Mr. Pik Botha, the Foreign Minister, 
and Gen. Malan led the South African delegations. The meeting was more than a 
symbolic one. It marked the first bilateral contact between the two governments. The 
essence of the talks was to ease the mistrust between the two countries, as a precursor to 
tackling the larger questions. See, KCA, op cit., p. 32002.
704 New York Times, December 14,1982, p. 3.
705 Among the prisoners exchanged were 94 Angolans, three US citizens, three Soviet 
citizens and one Cuban. Coffins containing the remains of four Soviet citizens, two South 
African and one Cuban were also exchanged. The exchange showed the complicity of 
both the United States and the Soviet Union on the Angolan conflict.
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Pretoria was an experimental one-month truce offered by the South African 
government.
Pretoria promised to pull out its forces from Angola on the basis of assurance given by 
Crocker that the Angolan and SWAPO troops would not “exploit the resulting 
situation” by making attacks across the border into Namibia. The timing of the South 
African offer was important. Pik Botha communicated the proposal to the UN 
Secretary-General on December 15, 1982, in the hope of influencing the Security 
Council debate on December 20. In the event, the Security Council demanded South 
Africa’s “unconditional withdrawal” of all its “occupation forces. The impact of the 
offer and its timing was minimal-only the United States abstained on SCR 545 (1983) 
in a vote of 14 to none. Initially both SWAPO and the Angolan government rejected the 
experimental cease-fire. However, Washington’s pressure bore fruit, when on February 
16, 1983 in Lusaka, Crocker persuaded Angola and South Africa to formalise the cease­
fire unilaterally declared by Pretoria. The agreement was commonly known as the 
Lusaka accord.706
The Accord provided for the establishment of a Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) to 
consist of 200 military personnel from Angola and South Africa, with sub-provision for 
US participation if all parties deemed it necessary. A draft timetable was also drawn up 
for the total withdrawal of all South African troops numbering about 1,000. More
706 New York Times, January 23-24,1983, p. 1 and p. 5. Washington’s role in brokering 
the agreement was firstly flatly denied. For instance, according to the New York Times 
when the Portuguese Radio reported a secret trip of one US official to Cape Verde for 
talks on Namibia, Washington denied the trip. A few days later, Washington declared that 
Frank G. Wisner of the State Department went to Portugal, but denied that he was 
participating in talks with Angola and South Africa. The following day however, Wisner’s
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importantly, it stipulated that South Africa would end logistical and other support to 
UNITA from Namibia. The Lusaka Accord was rich in breadth, but shallow in depth. 
Firstly, it was no more than a ‘gentleman’s agreement. Secondly, although Crocker had 
been instrumental in bringing it about, the Accord was not officially guaranteed by 
United States, such an American imprimatur would have lessen cheating from the main 
parties. Thirdly, each party went to Lusaka for different reasons. South Africa was 
suffering from financial-fatigue. This was clear from P. W. Botha’s speech to the South 
African Parliament on January 31, 1983, when he stated that South Africa was no 
longer prepared to shoulder the tremendous financial burden of South West Africa. 
Botha’s secret proposal to the European leaders during his European tour in May-June 
1993 suggested that South African enthusiasm for its Mandatory power was exhausted. 
'South Africa' he claimed would “gladly withdraw” from Namibia within two months, 
if one or more Western nations would assume administrative, financial and defence 
responsibility for the territory.707
In addition, prior to the Lusaka Accord, South Africa’s prevarication had engendered 
dissension amongst the South African-favoured internal parties. There were increasing 
tensions in the relationship between the different Namibia governmental structures. The 
tension between Mudge’s Council of Ministers and Hough’s Administrator-General’s 
office widened due to impatience at the slow pace of change towards self-government 
and the policy of Namibianization and phasing out of apartheid legislation. Indeed, 
internal divisions within the DTA and the problem of locating authority between the 
chairman of the Council of Ministers and the Administrator-General prompted the
mission to Cape Verde on Namibia was acknowledged by the State Department 
spokesman
™7 KCA, Vol. XXIX, March 1983, p. 32001.
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resignation of Mr. Mudge as the chairman of the Council of Minister effectively on 
January 18,1983.
The tension between the two structures reached its peak in late 1982, when Mudge 
declared that the DTA would take up the struggle as a “liberation movement” against 
any interim government formed by Mr. Hough. During a press conference on January 
18, 1983, Mudge and his Council of Ministers resigned accusing South African 
government of dishonesty and manipulating Namibian politics. This was a new 
development. It showed that the internal parties, heretofore, South Africa’s shield 
against SWAPO had lost confidence in Cape Town. More worrying for South Africa, 
the outgoing ministers used the same kind of language as SWAPO itself.708 By 
contrast, Angola’s participation in the Lusaka Accord was primarily driven by the 
prospect of US recognition, and anticipated military benefits. Washington’s recognition 
of the MPLA government would ultimately deny full military support to the UNIT A 
forces.
The first setback faced by the Lusaka Accord occurred on February 24, when a follow-
700up meeting between Angola and South Africa broke down after only three hours. 
During the meeting, the Angolan delegation protested at the low level of the South 
African delegation, that it did not include a cabinet minister. South Africa, however, 
had decided to reduce the level of its delegation because of its anger at SWAPO’s 
offensive into Northern Namibia-only days after the Accord- from a base in Angola’s 
Huila province. In reality, the breakdown of the talks had little to do with the status of 
the delegations; it reflected acute mutual distrust between the main parties.
708 ibid., p. 32004.
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Parallel to the Lusaka Accord, SWAPO proposed SWAPO-South Africa bilateral 
talks.710 South Africa, however, maintained that it “would not oppose talks taking place 
directly between SWAPO and a delegation led by the administrator-general, whereas 
SWAPO reasoned that it should meet with the Pretoria officials, and not the internal 
administrators. Pretoria had limited room for manoeuvre, which decreased partly due to 
the structure of the Lusaka Accord, and partly due to the economic and political 
constraints of Namibia on South Africa itself.
Faced with a crisis, South Africa was adept at re-cycling its old strategies, in order to 
achieve a desired outcome. Thus, during a secret meeting on January 29, between 
representatives of South Africa and SWAPO, South Africa suggested the setting up a 
government of national unity involving SWAPO and other Namibian political
711groups.
On March 1, South Africa next released a Namibian nationalist leader, Mr. Herman 
Toivo ya Toivo from Robben Island. Mr. Toivo who had been sentenced under the 
draconian Terrorism Act of 1968 for attempting to overthrow the South African regime 
in Namibia was released four years early, having served 16 years in prison.712 The 
release was clearly an attempt to divide the SWAPO leadership, and to undermine 
Nujoma, who had only succeeded to the presidency following Toivo’s incarceration.
709 KCA, Vol. XXX, December 1984, p. 33265.
710 Facts on File, January 13,1984, p. 124.
711 KCA, op cit., p. 33265. The details of this secret meeting between a SWAPO, 
delegation including Sam Nujoma, and the South Africa officials, headed by Professor van 
Niekerk, the new Namibian Administrator-General was later revealed four months later
712 Background Brief Series, (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London), July 
1984, p. 3. Toivo ya Toivo was amongst the SWAPO leaders that were arrested in the 
wake of the first armed encounter between SWAPO and the South African security forces 
at Omgulumbashe, in Ovamboland on 26 August, 1966.
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On March 11, Pretoria finally proposed an inclusive regional peace conference on 
Namibia that would include all the parties.713 The participants would be South Africa, 
Angola, UNITA, SWAPO and a South African sponsored coalition in Namibia known 
as the multiparty conference.
This offer of inclusive talks increased the suspicion that Pretoria was bent on 
circumventing SCR 435. Perhaps, because it had not been consulted beforehand, 
Washington reacted cautiously. John Hughes, the spokesman for the US State 
Department only stated that “We take note of the foreign minister’s latest idea. Our 
position on such a meeting would depend on further developments in the negotiations 
and the desires of all the parties.”714 Washington refrained from endorsing the South 
African plan, as it was suspicious that South Africa wanted to cut a deal on its back. 
There was no prescribed role for either the United States or the United Nations in the 
proposed conference. Two week previously the United States had upgraded its role in 
the negotiation by establishing a mission in Windhoek, to complement its role as a 
mediator, with monitoring the disengagement of forces from the Angolan border. In 
any event, both Angolan and SWAPO officials rejected the proposal for similar 
reasons. The Angolan government refused “categorically” to attend a conference that 
included UNITA representatives, while Sam Nujoma stated that SWAPO would not 
agree to the inclusion of Angolan affairs in any Namibian talks.715
None the less, United States pressure had started to count with the Angolan 
government. Havana was incensed at Washington’s leverage over Luanda, and
713 ibid., p. 4.
714 Facts on File, March 30,1984, p. 226.
715 ibid., p. 226.
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consequently felt excluded. For Angola, it was therefore imperative to re-assure 
Havana. President do Santo visited Cuba on March 17, 1984 for the first time since 
1980. He discussed with Castro the withdrawal of 25,000 Cuban troops from Angola. 
The outcome of the meeting indicated that both Luanda and Havana had conceded the 
inevitability of withdrawal. Firstly, Luanda recognised that Washington was not ready 
to budge on the issue, and would not recognise the MPLA government without 
withdrawal. Secondly, the Lusaka Accord had offered Angola, the prospect of the 
South African cease-fire. Angola wanted to obey the spirit and letter of the Accord to 
deny South Africa any opportunity for cheating. Thirdly, on the Cuban side, there was a 
sign of Luanda-fatigue. For instance, in an interview on March 14, 1984, the Cuban 
Vice-President, Carlos Rafael Rodrigues, was reported as saying that: “We have never 
envisaged an over-long presence of our forces. We are prepared for the moment when it 
is necessary and appropriate to begin the process of withdrawal”.716 A joint statement 
issued at the end of the visit set out four conditions for withdrawal: (i) the unilateral 
withdrawal of South African troops from Angola; (ii) the “scrupulous implementation” 
of SCR 435; (iii) the cessation of all acts of direct aggression or threats of aggression 
against Angola by South Africa, the USA or “their allies”; and (iv) the cessation of all 
help for UNITA or any other dissident group in Angola. Although these conditions 
were not radically different from those made in August 1982, South Africa would now 
interpret them in the spirit of the Lusaka Accord.
In response to the communique, Pretoria accused the Angolan government of being in 
breach of the Lusaka agreement by seeking to impose conditions for the withdrawal of 
Cuban troops. Henceforth Pretoria would use the Lusaka Accord both as a disguise for
716 Background Brief Series (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London), July
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its own bad faith in the negotiations, and as a benchmark to judge the deviation of the 
other parties from the ‘agreed’ course for Namibian independence. Pretoria also 
objected to a phrase that described SWAPO as the “sole legitimate representatives” of 
the black majority in Namibia.717 Luanda replied that its recognition of SWAPO was a 
matter of principle,718 in apparent ignorance of the fact that the United Nations was 
ready to de-recognise SWAPO as the sole representative of the Namibian people, as a 
result of earlier deal between Pik Botha and Perez de Cuellar.
The United States response to the communique is worth comment. Secretary Shultz 
described the terms of Cuban troop withdrawal as a “positive development” if it took 
place.719 The unresolved question was which withdrawal: was it a simultaneous 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and South African troops from Namibia or 
should the South Africans leave first. It is this question that would dominate the 
Namibian issue for the next three years. Nonetheless, Washington had scored a first 
diplomatic coup, by convincing Luanda and Havana of the inevitability of withdrawal, 
and was now watching with great attention the moves of South Africa and Angola 
concerning the Delphic multiparty conference. At this stage, President Kaunda of 
Zambia, personally offered himself as convener of the regional peace conference on 
Namibia on May 12.
Unlike other FLS leaders, Kaunda was ready to do business directly with the South 
African government. As indicated in chapter five, the FLS had no authoritative 
chairperson, although the onus of leadership rested largely on Tanzania’s Julius
1984, p. 4.
717 New York Times, March 21,1984, p. 1.
718 KCA, Vol. XXX, November 1984, p. 33198.
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Nyerere. While economic interests were a factor behind Kaunda’s rapport with the 
Pretoria regime, he saw himself as a contender for the leadership of the FLS. President 
Kaunda served as co-chair of the conference with Prof. William van Niekerk, the South 
Africa’s administrator-general in Namibia. In his opening speech, Kaunda said that the 
main purpose was to produce an agreement between SWAPO and the coalition of 
internal Namibian parties known as the Multiparty Conference to implement SCR 435. 
Although scheduled to end on May 12, the conference was extended to May 13, but 
renewed differences among the delegations resulted in a failure to present a final joint 
communique. It was significant however, as being the second direct meeting, and the 
first to be publicly declared, between SWAPO and the Namibia’s administrator- 
general. Furthermore, there was an indication that South Africa was ready to stand by 
any agreement reached at the conference.
On two separate occasions, Pik Botha declared that the South Africa was ready to 
honour any agreement from Lusaka. On April 27, 1984, he said that “If the political 
parties, including SWAPO can come to some agreement with regard to the future of 
their country, South Africa will not stand in the way of implementing such an 
agreement”. 720 On May 9, he said that: "If the internal parties of the territory and 
SWAPO can come to an agreement, whether the South African government likes it or 
not, we are bound by a commitment of prime minister upon prime minister that the 
people of South West Africa can decide their own future.”721 In the light of past 
examples, the credibility of South Africa’s commitment not to disrupt the agreement is 
debatable. What is even more debatable is Botha's assertion that: “the people of South
719 New York Times, March 21,1984, p. 1.
720 Facts on File, May 18,1984, p. 349.
721 ibid.,
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West Africa cannot wait indefinitely for a breakthrough on the Cuban question. Pretoria 
would comply with a decision by Namibian parties regarding the future of the territory 
even if no agreement was reached on the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola”.722 
It was clear that the Namibian question was entering the end game, where each party 
had started to count the cost of maintaining the status quo.
It also became increasingly clear that political and military necessities were driving 
South Africa out of Namibia. In a speech on January 31 to the South African 
Parliament, Botha reiterated that South Africa lacked the financial capacity to sustain 
its control. He repeated the message during his first tour of eight European capitals. 
Botha suggested to Chancellor Kohl of West Germany and Margaret Thatcher of 
Britain that one of the Contact Group should assume responsibility for the 
administration of Namibia, which was costing Pretoria $525 million a year. Botha said, 
“South Africa would gladly withdraw from the territory within two months if a contact 
group nation would assume administrative, financial and defense responsibility for the 
territory”.723 Neither Kohl nor Thatcher was prepared to take up the offer, but Botha’s 
strategy was, if possible, to shift the burden of responsibility to one or other of the two 
states that had historical connections with Namibia.
There were two other important events on Botha’s European tour, his meeting with 
Chester Crocker in Rome in June 12, 1984, and his private visit to France. Unlike the 
other seven European nations, France’s Socialist government refused to grant Botha a 
state visit. Botha went to France to honour the 18,500 South Africans killed during the 
two wars. Like Thatcher and Kohl, SWAPO’s leader, Nujoma dismissed Botha’s
722 Md.
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proposal that either Britain or Germany should assume responsibility for Namibia. 
Speaking in Washington on June 9, he described it as “nothing more than a mere 
rhetorical farce without any political significance”. It “would add injury to insult”, by 
substituting “one form of colonialism [for] another”.724
The hope for resolving the Namibian impasse was strengthened by other events in 
American-Soviet relations. Reagan’s speech before the 39th session of the United 
Nations General Assembly not only signalled the end of a poisoned relationship, but 
was also a catalyst for the resolution of regional conflicts. In sharp contrast to his 
speech the previous years, on this occasion, Reagan’s address did not contain a single 
direct criticism of Moscow. He omitted the standard references to the Soviet military 
presence in Afghanistan and alleged Soviet human rights violations. Instead, he 
appealed to the Soviet Union to join the US in constructive negotiations on arms 
reductions and the de-militarization of space, regional conflicts and other issues of vital 
interests to both countries. The two superpowers, Reagan said, had “a particular 
responsibility to contribute to political solutions” to regional conflicts, which could “set 
off the sparks leading to world-wide conflagration”.725 He proposed “that our two 
countries agree to embark on periodic consultations at policy level about regional 
problems” and said the US would “be prepared, if the Soviets agree, to make senior 
experts available at regular intervals for in-depth exchanges of views”. He continued, 
“In this historic assembly hall, it’s clear there’s not a great distance between us. Outside 
this room, while there will still be clear differences, there is every reason why we
723 Facts on File, June 22,1984, p. 444.
724 Facts on File, June 22,1984, p. 445.
725 Facts on File, September 28,1984, p. 705.
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should do all that is possible to shorten that distance. And that’s why we’re here. Isn’t it 
what this organisation is all about?726
Reagan had not been converted to idealism. His core concern remained how to make 
the United States stronger in relation to the Soviet Union. The central question raised 
by the speech was whether the administration was embarking on an idealist path to 
achieve a realist objective, or was continuing its realist policy to achieve idealistic ends. 
The conundrum raised by this question remained unresolved throughout Reagan’s 
administration, but there was an indication that from the late 1984 onwards, the 
preference was for pursuing realist ends through idealist means.
A critical twist for the administration in embarking on this policy concerned super­
power perceptions of the emerging balance of power between them. The Soviets 
invasion of Afghanistan had over-stretched their capacity. The United States, having 
learnt the lesson of Vietnam, was in a position to exploit its advantage. Indeed, by late 
1984, the Soviet Union was a superpower only in name. It was this attainment of 
dominance, reinforced by the SDI programme, that would put the United States in a 
pivotal position in conflict resolution diplomacy in peripheral regions. It would also 
redefine the structure of the international politics with the end of the Cold War. As 
Reagan himself put it: “the United States had attained the position of strength it needed 
to negotiate with Moscow. America has repaired its strength”.727
The tone of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s speech to the 39th General Assembly 
contrasted sharply with the conciliatory stance adopted by Reagan; however, it was
726 ibid., p. 706.
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more moderate than his last speech to an international body, delivered in Stockholm in 
January 1984. More importantly, it was clear that the Soviet Union agreed to the US’s 
view that both superpowers had a particular responsibility to contribute to political 
solutions to those regional conflicts which could ‘set off the sparks leading to world­
wide conflagration. The Soviet Union did not oppose Reagan’s proposal that the two 
countries should embark on periodic consultations at policy level about regional 
problems. Indeed, with regard to Namibia, Crocker met with Soviet officials on March 
6, 1986. As important as it was for the Namibian settlement, however, the 
institutionalisation of ministerial or cabinet-level contacts, should not be overestimated. 
In the final analysis, it was American political and diplomatic resolve and patience that 
made the resolution possible.
The next two years proved to be years of activity rather than progress. Negotiations 
moved at a snail’s pace, held up by bouts of violence on the Angola-Namibia border, 
and hampered by a lack of momentum from Washington owing to domestic disquiet. In 
November 1984, in its Plataforma sent to the UN Secretary-General, the MPLA 
government accepted the reality that Namibian independence could be achieved in the 
context of a Cuban troop withdrawal from Angola. President dos Santo proposed a 
phased withdrawal of the 30,000 Cuban troops over a three-year period. Symbolically, 
the Plataforma was made on November 11 1984, to mark the ninth anniversary of 
Angola’s independence. This three-year timetable did not satisfy either Washington or 
Pretoria. Washington wanted a fast-track withdrawal with about 80 percent of the 
troops leaving within a one-year period. South Africa presented a set of counter­
proposals to Crocker. These included among other things the withdrawal of all Cuban
727 ibid., p. 706.
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troops within a period of 12 weeks after South Africa had begun the implementation of 
the UN independence plan. In addition, a joint peace commission would be set up to 
monitor and verify the Cuban withdrawal, which should be allowed to move freely 
within Angola. South Africa also specified that the Cuban troops were not to be 
replaced by another surrogate force: that East German, Soviet and other communist 
advisers should be limited in numbers, and that their presence should be made known to 
the South African government.
Anxious to bridge the gap between Pretoria and Luanda, Crocker held a further round 
of talks with the two governments separately in late March 1985. This initiative took 
the form of a compromise draft agreement, to which each side was requested to reply 
by early April 1985. In characteristic South African fashion it played a double game. 
On April 17, 1985, it informed the international community that it had unilaterally 
completed the withdrawal of its troops from Angola, without agreement with Angolans 
on any post-withdrawal monitoring arrangements. Simultaneously, it inaugurated the 
TGNU (Transitional Government of National Unity). South Africa’s withdrawal of its 
remaining 450 soldiers and 100 civilians from the border post of Santa Clara in 
southern Angola, was in compliance with the terms of the Lusaka Accord.
Yet the inauguration of the TGNU was a complete violation of any existing UN 
resolutions on Namibia. Far from being a government of national unity, the TGNU, 
composed of the DTA and five smaller parties whose support came largely from one 
ethnic group, the Herero. Accordingly, it derived legislative and executive authority 
under the State President (South Africa) Proclamation No. 101 of 1985 which was 
inconsistent with Resolution 385 (1976), Resolution 345 (1978) and the final advisory
314
opinion of the ICJ in 1971.728 All these international instruments declared that any 
government in Namibia must derive its powers and legitimacy from the people in true 
and fair election. The inauguration reaffirmed Pretoria consistent effort to bypass the 
UN and SWAPO through its ‘internal settlement option’.
The inauguration of the TGNU prompted a wave of international condemnations. No 
Western state recognised the TGNU and each of the ‘dysfunctional’ Contact Group 
states rejected any unilateral measures by the South African government to transfer 
power in Namibia as null and void.729 Yet, when Bishop Trevor Huddleston, President 
of the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Britain, led a deputation to the Foreign Office 
arguing that South Africa’s action on the TGNU was a challenge to the Security 
Council and to Britain as a member of it, the Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, 
rejected an appeal for economic sanctions to bring about implementation of the UN 
plan for Namibia.730
The inauguration of the TGNU was as damaging to the settlement of the Namibia 
conflict, as South Africa’s clandestine military operations in Cabinda, and the repealing 
of the Clark amendment by the US congress on June 15, 1985. These two actions, by 
South Africa and the United States respectively, were directed against Angola. The 
Cabinda operation involved a nine-man South African force under the command of 
Captain du Troit whose aim was to destroy six oil storage tanks in Malongo, with a 
capacity of 1,675,000 barrels. It was later revealed that United States support for UN
728 THE CHOICEi-NAMIBIA PEACE PLAN 435 OR SOCIETY UNDER SIEGE!
A publication of the Namibia Peace Plan and Contact Group (NPP 435). (Windhoek: 
1986), p. 15.
729 Europa Yearbook, 1989, p. 749-51.
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Security Council Resolution 567 that condemned the Cabinda incident, was premised 
on the view that any military action in Cabinda would posed a threat to lives of US 
citizen in that area and a danger to the property of US Gulf Oil Corporation.731 At this 
time, however, constructive engagement itself was in a serious trouble both within and 
outside the United States.
Constructive engagement was a victim of its own success. At the onset, it offered South 
Africa three incentives to co-operate: improved relations with the US, constitutional 
guarantees on the Namibian peace plans; and the Cuban connection on the Angola- 
Namibian conflict.732 It was difficult for Washington to have stress-free relations with 
South Africa given the latter’s unprovoked military attack on neighbouring states such 
as Botswana and Zambia. The decision for the withdrawal of the Cuban forces was to 
be made jointly by Havana and Luanda based on security terms, which favoured the 
MPLA government. Washington refused to talk directly with Havana. Meanwhile, the 
Americans continued to supply arms to the UNITA rebels. As the United States 
resumed armed assistance to UNITA, after a ten-year hiatus, domestic opposition to the 
efficacy of such a policy grew. The conservatives believed that the objective of 
blocking a military victory by the MPLA to be excessively modest. The liberals 
declared aid to UNITA to be immoral, as UNITA also accepted help from South 
Africa.733 For instance, South Africa’s Minister of Defense, General Magnus Malan
730 Background Brief Series: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, No. 
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said on 20 September 1985 that his country supported UNITA-a position that had not 
been previously admitted officially.734
On the issue of the deadline for Namibian independence, according to Crocker’s 
proposals, the constitutional guarantees were to be negotiated in 1981 and the details of 
withdrawal established during 1982, providing for independence in 1983. The 
constitutional guarantees were secured in late 1981, whilst, South Africa’s internal 
settlement was also on course, as noted with the inauguration of the TGNU. Although, 
South Africa knew that a unilateral solution was not a solution, its two-track solution 
organically developed as a policy on its own. To recap, it was: internal settlement 
without SWAPO if possible, with SWAPO if necessary; and a negotiated independence 
acceptable to both the international community and South Africa. After four years of 
constructive engagement, South Africa was still engaging on a strategy of immobility: 
unable to force its will on the first track, but preferring a stalemated negotiation on the 
second,735 as the internal parties remained feeble, factious and lacking international 
credibility.
At this stage, Washington thought that it ought to do more by using other levers against 
South Africa and Angola. The first warning shot was fired against Angola on June 11,
1985, with the repealing of the Clark Amendment. In response, with some encourage 
from the Soviets, the Angolan government announced the suspension of talks with the
734 Background Brief Series: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, January
1986, No. 464, p. 2. General Malan admitted that these helps have been provided for ‘a 
number of years’ and would be suspended until all foreign forces had been withdrawn 
from Angola. The support for UNITA was intended to undermine foreign interference by 
Cuban and other communist power in Africa and sought to halt Marxist infiltration and 
expansionism. See, KCA, Vol. XXXI, December 1985, p. 34028.
73 Zartman, op cit., p. 267.
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US on the Angola-Namibia issue. Washington now turned on South Africa. It believed 
that it had not pushed Pretoria beyond its strategy of making the track one parties able 
to win on track two. It had to deal with Pretoria on other fronts, because it was under 
pressures from domestic critics of its policy in Congress, and to regain the initiative on 
the grounds. No other means were available other than to respond to the call for the 
imposition of sanctions over its apartheid policies. Washington not only had to be seen 
to be acting tough but to act tough. The signing of an Executive Order (12532) on 
September 9, 1985 marked the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. 
Although, the sanctions were limited to the issue of apartheid, the signals were clear. 
This Executive Order, as it were, was a device to circumvent tougher Congress- 
imposed sanctions.
Beneath the seemingly anti-apartheid, democratic veneer of this move lay a 
Machiavellian strategy. The Executive Order allowed US to abstain from potential 
multilateral sanctions. Yet it showed that the myth of constructive engagement had 
been dispelled. Washington was ready to take another route. To drive the point home, 
Washington supported Resolution 571 (1985) of September 20, 1985, and Resolution 
574 (1985) condemning South Africa’s attack on Angola. Henceforth, it would not be 
constructive engagement as originally conceived, but a strategy reminiscent of the 
‘finesse strangulation’ favoured by the Carter administration. These votes have to be
For an insider view of the sanction debates between the Congress and the State 
Department, see, Menges, Constatine. C. “Sanctions '86-How the State Department 
Prevailed”, National Interest, No. 13, Fall 1988, p. 68.
737 For a broader criticisms of the constructive engagement, see, Thompson, Alex. 
“Incomplete Engagement: Reagan’s South African Policy Revisited”, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1,1995, p. 86; Wolpe, Howard. “Seizing Southern 
African Opportunities”, Foreign Policy, No. 73, Winter 1988-89, p. 62; and Seiler, John. 
“Crocker’s Southern African Policy: A Critical Review”, Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, Vol. 13, No. 2, July 1995, p. 197.
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put into a proper context. It is worth recalling that in 1981, the United States had cast 
the only dissenting veto on UN resolution condemning South Africa’s Operation 
Protea. Then Secretary Haig reckoned that the South African incursion into Angola 
should be understood in ‘full context’ that is along with the presence of large numbers 
of Cuban and Soviets advisers in Angola.
Luanda was relieved that Washington was taking a ‘zero-tolerance’ posture on South 
Africa’s prevarication on Namibia and ‘hot pursuit’ of SWAPO forces into Angola. In 
turn, in mid-July 1987, it decided to resume talks with Washington.739 On an optimistic 
reading, the 18 months of no serious negotiations can be seen as a cooling off period, 
which was unwittingly needed to break loose from negotiation-fatigue and re-assess 
strategies. The talks resumed, whilst, each party redoubled its efforts on the military 
side of the equation. The outcome of incremental militarism would consequently 
determine the process and substance of a final breakthrough: 1985-86 saw a dramatic 
rise in South African military expenditure while the Soviets supplied an extra $2 billion 
of military aid to the MPLA, including more MiG-23 fighter planes.740
It is tempting to suggest, with Zartman and others, that by late 1987, the Namibian 
conflict was ripe for resolution. Presumably, events on the battlefield in Angola, 
spontaneous escalation and war weariness, tilted in favour of the ‘moment is ripe’ 
argument. There were underlying currents both within and outside the negotiation 
perimeter and the ensuing military conflicts that created circumstances that favoured a 
final settlement. With a casual observation, it is possible to see them as sequential, but
738 See, footnote 660 of this study.
739 Bender, Gerald. J. “Peacemaking in Southern Africa: the Luanda-Pretoria tug-of war”, 
Third World Quarterly, Vol. 11, (1), January 1989, p. 22.
319
such an insight is devoid of rational analysis. Not all of these factors and events were 
within the ‘cause-effect’ model of the ripe for resolution paradigm. The drivers for final 
resolution are not bundled as a unit, but driven by competing interests and rationalities. 
These factors could be categorised as: (i) the re-configuration in the global balance of 
power between the United States and Soviet Union; (ii) the ‘knock on effect’ of the 
American unilateral sanctions against South Africa on its war policy; (iii) international 
pressures on SWAPO; and (iv) the TGNU’s reform and reduced-dependence on South 
Africa (v) Crocker’s own patience.
6.5. International pressures on SWAPO.
As earlier noted, SWAPO was never recognised as the sole representative of the
Namibian people by any Contact Group member, although it maintained an office in
London for its Western Europe contacts. However, by early 1987, SWAPO faced
mounting pressure from leading British members of parliaments on its human rights
records. On March 20, 1987, 50 British parliamentarians wrote a strongly worded letter
to Mr. Shapua Kaukungua, SWAPO’s Western European representative condemning
his organisation’s treatment of the SWAPO One Hundred.741 Another MP, Rev Martin
Symth attacked Resolution 435 and the UN’s recognition of SWAPO:
‘To persist in perpetuating the charade that SWAPO is the ‘sole’ 
representative of the Namibian people is not only illogical 
within the heterogeneous nature of Namibian society, but does 
lasting damage to the UN credibility and in so doing, it obstructs 
the independence process it is its function to promote. To use a
740 Africa Contemporary Record, 1985-86, p. A33.
741 See, Namibia Digest, Issue No. 5, April 1987, “Parliament Demands Information on 
SWAPO 100”, p. 8-9. The Namibia Digest is a publication of the Namibia Office, 
London. These were one hundred SWAPO dissidents who had been imprisoned by the 
SWAPO leadership.
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much quote analogy-you cannot referee a contest if you wear the 
colours of one side”. 42
Rev Smyth’s statement echoed what Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick of the United 
States had said five years earlier when the Security Council failed to listen to Mr. 
Kalangula of the DTA.743 In addition, in late 1986, Nicholas Winterton MP, Chairman 
of the British Parliamentary All Party Namibia (BARN) group declared that the 
European Economic Community saw no reason to extend sanctions imposed on South 
Africa to Namibia. Winterton claimed that apart from the EEC’s economic, defence and 
general strategic interests, the reforms being implemented by the TGNU was also a 
factor in the decision. This action itself was a blow to SWAPO, which had hoped that 
the sanctions would be extended to Namibia.744 Most of SWAPO’s misfortunes at this 
time helped the TGNU. When the TGNU repealed the infamous AG-8 in early 1986 
opening schools to all race groups, it won international support although not 
international recognition. For instance, Sir Fegus Montgomery, a British 
parliamentarian, and PPS (Private Parliamentary Secretary) to the Prime Minister, 
Margaret Thatcher spoke of a new mood in Namibia: “The move by the Legislative 
Assembly may have well produced a revaluation of the British Government’s attitude 
to Namibia, with senior British figures privately conceding that the Namibian
742 Rev. Martin Smyth MP, “Independence: Is the UN assisting or obstructing progress?”, 
Namibia Digest, Issue No. 1, March 1986, p. 1-2.
743 See footnote 644.
744 Nicholas Winterton MP, “Namibian Sanctions-EEC Says No”, Namibia Digest, Issue 
No. 3, October 1986, p. 1-2. In fact, before the imposition of sanctions on South Africa, 
the EEC had abstained on UN Special Session on Namibia, which was held between 17- 
20 September, 1986. The British Representative speaking for the 12 EC countries declared 
that ‘none of the political groupings in Namibia should be designated in advance as the 
sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people”. See, Background Brief 
Series: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, No. 501A, October 1986, p.5. Yet 
the EEC continued to reject the linkage proposals.
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experience (TGNU formula, with the exclusion of SWAPO) could amount to a new 
formula for the achievement of independence”.745
SWAPO compounded its own image problem in Britain when Nujoma failed to reply to 
an invitation by the British All Party Namibia Group to address a House of Commons 
meeting on October 26, 1987. He also failed to turn up to address a meeting at the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs on November 3, 1987. Although he cancelled 
these appointments for logistical reasons, when he learnt that SWAPO forces had been 
attacked by the South Africans in Angola and left for immediate consultation in 
Moscow, the cancellation was seen as a snub to those concerned. Nicholas Winterton 
(Chairman of BAPN) said: “It is tragic for the people of Namibia that Mr. Nujoma who 
purports to lead a ‘government in exile’ is not prepared to take part in free and open 
discussions and to exchange views with British Parliamentarians. He chose instead to 
fly to Moscow. I can only conclude that Nujoma is not willing to discuss his policies 
with audiences in the United Kingdom and that he prefers to consort with 
Communists”.746 Thus SWAPO was simultaneously facing external diplomatic pressure 
and military pressure from South Africa on the battlefield
6.6. Resource constraints on the South African military.
In 1981 article in Foreign Affairs, John de St. Jorre had described the war in Namibia 
as:
“...of low intensity, probably unwinnable but not a serious 
threat. It has admittedly choked off foreign investment, slowed 
down local business and cast a pall of uncertainty over the future
745 Sir Fergus Montgomery MP, “Action Stations in Namibia”, Namibia Digest, Issue 
No. 5. April 1987, p. 3.
746 Namibia Now, “SWAPO Leader Ignores Namibia Group”, Vol. 2, No. 5, November 
1987, p. 1-4.
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of Namibia. But South Africa can afford it in terms of cash and 
blood. It is also, in the words of one South African military 
analyst, excellent “on-the-job” training for South Africa’s 
citizen army”.747
By late 1987, this was no longer the case. There had been a reversal of fortunes. As we 
have seen, on two important occasions, Pieter Botha revealed that Pretoria could not 
longer afford the war. By 1987, the Namibia/Angola war was consuming more than 4 
billion South African Rand yearly. South Africa was not only short of cash, it was 
increasingly short of men. Many young white conscripts regarded Namibia as South 
Africa’s Vietnam. After more than 30 years, they were no longer enthusiastic to 
sacrifice their lives for a cause they did not believe in. Indeed, by April 1983, there 
were already 355 men in South African Defence Force detention for refusing to 
undergo military training.748 South Africa had committed more than 20,000 SADF 
officers as well as over 22,000 SWATF (South West African Territorial Force) into the 
conflict.
Within Namibia, the process of Namibianisation was being undermined by a deliberate 
ploy of potential black recruits. Most of them declared themselves to be card-carrying 
members of SWAPO and made legal application against conscription.749 The pool of 
recruits could not be replenished, while casualties on fronts increased as South Africa 
lost its air superiority, and on September 1987, the Soviets supplied Angola with the 
most ultra modem air defence system and Cuba increased its forces to more than
747 deSt. Jorre, John. “South Africa”, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1981, p. 119.
748 Star (Johannesburg), 2 April 1983.
749 Hackland, Brian, Murray-Hudson, Anne and Wood, Brian, “Behind the diplomacy: 
Namibia, 1983-85”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1986, p. 62.
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50,000. As the numbers of troops increased, and new weapons systems became 
available to all the parties, the military confrontation escalated.
6.7. The shift in the military balance in Angola: From Mavinga to Cuito 
Cuanavale
Having secured a Soviet radar system, the Angolan government resolved to fight. In 
August-September 1987, under the direction of Soviet General Shanovitch, the 
Angolan army, FAPLA, attacked UNITA-held Mavinga in Southern Angola. With 
South African support, UNITA successfully defended the town, but the battle showed 
that the Soviet equipment had considerably enhanced the FAPLA’s military capacity. 
South Africa’s traditional air superiority was at an end. After Mavinga, South Africa 
decided to turn its military success into a major rout of MPLA troops by attacking the 
key town of Cuito Cuanavale. This proved a fatal error. Cuito Cuanavale was the 
FAPLA’s most important strategic base in southern Angola. The area served as its main 
airfield, and has been the staging-ground for successive FAPLA attacks against 
UNITA's stronghold at Jamba. In Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF wanted to ‘finish’ and 
‘annihilate the FAPLA forces, while FAPLA had to fight for its survival. For more than 
five months, (December 1987-April 1988) Cuito Cuanavale witnessed the most heavily 
fought battle in southern Africa, with a combined 4,000 SADF and SWATF troops, 
8,000 UNITA and 10,000 FAPLA forces. Initially, South Africa thought it had Cuito 
Cuanavale in the bag; but by mid January, with an order from Castro himself to his
750 von der Ropp, Klaus. Freiherr., “Peace Initiatives in South West Africa”, Aussen 
Politik, Vol. 40., No. 2,1988, p. 187.
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troops to bolster the FAPLA’s defences; the SADF operation became more vulnerable. 
Eventually, in May 1988, the SADF withdrew its forces from the town.751
The military reverses experienced in southern Angola allowed ‘doves’ like Pik Botha to 
gain the initiative in Pretoria, and Botha used his ascendancy to win support for a 
revised strategy that favoured a less conditional settlement. The failure of the SADF to 
retake Cuito Cuanavale was a watershed on both the diplomatic and military fronts. The 
stalemate was no longer military, but diplomatic. Yet, Jaster’s warning that “in 
analysing a conflict, it is tempting to seek a ‘Picket’s charge’-that is one event that can 
be identified as the crucial moment or turning point”,752 needs heeding. The changing 
military balance altered South Africa’s posture, but each of the major players, the 
United States, Cuba, Angola and SWAPO also reassessed the cost and benefits of the 
Angolan/Namibian conflict; whilst the USSR’s ‘glasnotian constructive engagement’ 
both to South Africa and the United States, was amongst the factors that prompted a 
final breakthrough.
6.8. The Soviet Union’s gladstonian constructive engagement
Since Henry Africanus and the Contact Group’s diplomacy, the Soviet Union had been 
effectively marginalised at the negotiating table. The Soviet Union was a member of 
the Security Council in 1977, when the Contact Group was formed, yet the Carter 
administration never proposed that is should be a part of the multilateral team. It was 
not until resolution was in sight in mid-1988 that the United States offered the Soviets a 
recognisable mediating role and guarantor role in any agreement reached. Crocker
751 Bender, Gerald. J. “Peacemaking in Southern Africa: the Luanda-Pretoria tug-of- 
war”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 11.(1) January 1989, p. 27.
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started meeting with the Soviets back in December 1982, but as late as July 1987, when 
Crocker tried to sell ‘linkage’ to the Soviets, Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly 
Adamishin insisted that it would not work. By summer 1988, however, Adamishin was 
iterating Soviet interest in playing a positive role in resolving the conflict. The Soviets 
were thus only directly involved in the negotiations at the eleventh hour. When they 
met in Geneva, Anatoli Adamishin, told Crocker that the Soviet Union would seriously 
consider playing a more direct part in the four-nation talks if all the parties involved 
agreed.753 In fact, the Soviet’s acceptance came after the target date set by the United 
State for a settlement, September 29 (the tenth anniversary of Security Council 
Resolution 435 (1978) had passed, and after eight of the ten rounds of peace talks.754
The direct involvement of the Soviet Union at this stage was, arguably driven by 
historical and pragmatic factors. We saw in chapter four that the Soviet’s intervention 
in Angola was partly underpinned by its own reasoning about the utility of the 
international law of wars of national liberation, and partly by its ideological affinity 
with the MPLA. The Soviets saw the war against colonialism as a 'just war', in which 
liberation was expected to serve as a basis for transition to socialism. Initially, the 
Soviets were confident of ‘total victory’, and saw little prospect, or need for multilateral
752 Jaster, Robert. S. “The 1988 Peace Accord and the Future of South West Africa”, 
Adelphi Papers 253, Autumn 1990, p. 20.
753 Namibia Now, Vol. 2. No. 16, November 1988, p. 3.
754 For a chronology of the ten rounds of talks in 1988, see, Berridge, Geoffrey. 
“Diplomacy and the Angola/Namibia accords”, International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3. 
Summer 1989, p. 467. The rounds were as follows: 3-4 May 1988, round one, London; 13 
May, round two, Brazzaville (Angola and South Africa only); 24-5 June, round three, 
Cairo; 12-14 July, round four, New York; 20 July, ‘Principles for a peaceful settlement in 
southwest Africa’ published; late July, secret talks, Cape Verde; 2-5 August, round five, 
Geneva; 8 August, cease-fire agreement; 7-9 September, round six, Brazzaville; 26-9 
September, round seven, Brazzaville; 8-9 October, ‘informal talks’ in New York; 11-15 
November, round eight, Geneva; 3-5 December, round nine, Brazzaville; 12-13
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efforts at resolving the conflicts of southern Africa. MacFarlane pointed out that most 
Soviets were consistently critical of efforts at a negotiated settlement during the period 
leading to the Lancaster House Agreement on Rhodesia and came around to support the 
outcome only after the talks had been concluded. He also argued that ‘even where 
further advances have been registered in the process of liberation in Southern Africa, as 
in Zimbabwe case, the results were not to the Soviet liking. 755To that extent therefore, 
the belated involvement of Soviet Union in 1988 had some historical resonance. 
Meanwhile, having seen the prospect of a settlement, the Soviet Union needed to 
maintain its visibility by playing both the ‘hard ball’, and the ‘soft ball’ towards South 
Africa and Cuba respectively. Consonant with Gorbachev’s new thinking, Moscow 
wanted its share of the peace glory.
Many informed analysts have written extensively on the factors and forces that 
underpinned Gorbachev’s ‘new thinking’ on Soviet domestic and foreign policies; and 
ultimately the disintegration of the Soviet empire. The debate is polarised between 
those who believed that the changes were brought about by the West’s policy of 
containment, and those who viewed it as a consequence of internal developments. For 
the first group, containment was reinforced by a technological arms race, economic 
denial and psychological warfare, which eventually drove Gorbachev into reforming 
communism and the Soviet state itself. In essence, the conflict between the 
superpowers generated its own dynamics that made it impossible for the Soviet Union 
to act and react as an equal player.
December, round ten, Brazzaville; 13 December, ‘Brazzaville Protocol’; 22 December, 
official signing of three- and -two party accords in New York.
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For the second group, perestroka and glasnot were engendered by the internal 
contradictions within communism. These included: the inertia of the Soviet economy in 
the late 1970, which was heightened with the collapse in the oil prices in early 1980s, 
the Soviet state aspiration to achieve greatness, and the emergence of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, who amongst the gerontocratically-inclined Soviet leaders seemed like a 
deus ex machina, destined to reform. What is manifestly evident was that Reagan 
Doctrine resulted in an increase in the US Defence spending to 7% of the GDP. CIA 
Director, William Casey, was also successful in 1982 in persuading Saudi Arabia to co­
operate with the US in lowering the oil prices in a way that was designed to weaken the 
Soviet Union. If the domestic problems did sow the seed of change in the Soviet 
Union, the United States resurgence played an important role in compelling reform. 
Once launched, the reform unravelled the Soviet system and foreign policy agenda. 
Arguably, Reagan Doctrine stretched the Soviet Union beyond its sustainable limits on 
the practice of power politics.
In the wake of the new foreign policy agenda, Soviet Union blew hot and cold towards 
South Africa, not least in the context of the ending of the Angolan-Namibian conflict. 
Initially, as diplomatic contacts were too sensitive, the Russians encouraged academic 
contacts in their place; and Soviets scholars became a little less hostile to South Africa. 
In June 1986, Gleb Starushenko, a member of the Soviet Union’s African Institute 
boldly suggested the idea of “comprehensive guarantees for the white population and 
special constitutional arrangements calculated to allay white fears.757 On July 7, 1987,
755 MacFarlane, Neil.. S. “The Soviet Union and Southern African Security”,
Problems of Communism, Vol. XXXVIH, March-June 1989, p. 80.
756 Pipes, Richard. “Misinterpreting the Cold War: The Hard-Liners Had It Right”, 
Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, p. 159.
757 The Economist, May 28,1988, p. 69.
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Mr. J. Primakov, director of the influential Soviet INEMO Institute, wrote in Pravda 
that “the new philosophy’ of Soviet foreign policy favoured leaving regional conflicts 
to their own dynamics, while superpowers observed non-intervention. In early 1987, 
Radio Moscow started beaming an Afrikaans-language service to South Africa, which 
was quick to respond to these signals. On at least 10 occasions in 1987, South African 
diplomats contacted Soviet officials to explore the possibilities of a Soviet-SA 
understanding. In August 1987, Dr. Phillip Nel, Director of the Institute for Soviet 
Studies at Stellenbosch University, visited Moscow, officially to read a paper at a 
philosophy conference, but mainly to explore possibilities of rapprochement.758 Yet 
Moscow was juggling both hard and soft balls simultaneously.
Besides supporting the MPLA decision in July 1985 to suspend talks with the United 
States, the Soviet increased the amount and speed of its arms supplies to the Angolan 
government. The Kremlin ordered General Kostantin Shaganovitch, arguably the 
highest ranked Soviet officer ever signed to Africa to supervise Soviet military 
activities in Angola.759 As late as November 1987, Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman, 
Yuri Gremitskikh had depicted American policy in the region as “worthless in
n ( L ( \
promoting a peaceful settlement of the conflict in southern Africa”, and supplied 
Angola with radar and MiG 23s. Between May and July 1988, the Soviet Union 
delivered the following to Angola: Naval equipments and spares (May 6), 70 tons 
ammunition and explosives (May 23), 40 T64 tanks, 20 jeeps, 10 trucks and small
758 Front File: Southern Africa Brief, Vol. 2, No. 5, April 1988, p. 4.
ncQ Heitman, Halmond-Romer. “Angola: Crucial Confrontation Ahead”, Jane’s Defense 
Weekly, October 24,1987, p. 950.
760 Cited in Reuters, November 12,1987.
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arms; troop carrier, (May 27); 16 Scania 112 tank transporters, (June 10); and military 
vehicles-BTR 70 AT and PT 76 (June 27).761 All these were delivered after Angola 
peace talks had started in London on May 3, 1988. Clearly the Soviet policy was to 
strengthen Angola’s and Cuba’s negotiating position as a prelude to compromise.
6.9. Cuba: from a saviour to an overstayer
Cuba and Angola declared the battle of Cuito Cuanavale a great victory. However, 
South Africa’s declaration that it was extricating all of its forces from Angola put Cuba 
in a difficult position. As Pretoria wanted to turn a military predicament into a 
diplomatic victory, it became increasingly difficult for the Cubans to justify why they 
would have the only foreign troops left in Angola. Moreover, Moscow which was now 
willing to co-operate with the United States on regional disputes found it difficult to 
continue to bankroll the Cuban forces. Moscow wanted to nudge Angola into a 
negotiated settlement as early as practicable, and sent frequent signals to Havana that as 
it was contributing about £2.7 billion annually to the Cuban economy, it could no 
longer finance Cuba’s foreign adventurism as well.
There were also indications that both Cuba and Soviet Union pursued incoherent battle 
strategies. For example, after the battle of Mavinga, Castro criticised the Soviet Union. 
Speaking of the ill-fated Angolan offensive, Castro said: “History will tell what the 
mistakes were and why they were committed. I’m just going to say that Cuba had no
n c . ' i
responsibility for those mistakes”. There was also a sign that he was reading the
761 Front File: Southern Africa Brief, Vol. 12, No. 12, August 1988, p. 6.
Lunn, Jon. “Angola and Namibia: The Regional Settlement in South West Africa”, 
Background Paper No. 234: House of Commons Library, (London: House of 
Common, 1989), p. 20.
763 Front File: Southern Africa Brief, Vol. 2, No. 12, August 1988, p. 5.
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forthcoming November 1988 US presidential elections with great attention. He was 
hedging his bets in the hope that a Democrat victory would put Michael Dukakis in the 
White House.
This was not a well thoughtout move. If Dukaki's had carried out his threat to oppose 
South Africa, Pretoria would no longer have accepted the US as a mediator. In that 
event, there would have been a distinct possibility of the talks collapsing, and of a 
further confrontation between the Cubans and the SADF.764 Prospects of a peace in the 
region could have receded overnight. Meanwhile the Reagan administration had 
invested eight years in making peace in southern Africa. In all, since the days of Henry 
Africanus, the United States had sought a solution to the Namibian question for a total 
of eleven years. As the military exhaustion suffered by South Africa stimulated serious 
and genuine negotiation, the Reagan administration, and Crocker in particular wanted 
to claim success before time ran out. It was not surprising, therefore, that despite Cuban 
prevarication, the ten rounds of talks started in London on May 3-4 and ended in New 
York on December 22, 1988,765 with the signing of the Final Tripartite Agreement by 
Cuba, Angola and South Africa, with the United States and Soviet Union as the 
guarantors. The most important part of these negotiations was the emergence in New 
York of a 14-point agreement committing the three negotiating parties to implement 
UN Resolution 435 (1978) on Namibian independence and the withdrawal of Cuban 
forces from Angola.766
764 Front File: Southern Africa Brief, Vol. 2, No. 11, August 1988, p. 3.
n f . c
For a fuller account of the diplomacy leading to the December agreements, see 
Berridge, Geoffrey. International Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 3, Summer 1989, p. 463-480; and 
MacFarlane, S. Neil. “The Soviet Union and Southern African Security”, Problems of 
Communism, Vol. XXXVUI, March-June 1989, p. 71-89.
766 See Jaster, Robert. S. “The 1988 Peace Accords and Future of South-Western Africa”, 
Adelphi Paper 253, for a detailed implementation of the transition to the Namibian
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To recap: after the failure of the 1981 Geneva Conference, the UN lost its leading role 
in promoting dialogue between the parties involved in the Namibian conflict. Now with 
the New York Agreement in hand, the UN was brought back to implement the 
transition to independence. Although the UN Security Council had consistently rejected 
‘linkage’ for eight years, on January 12, 1989, it effectively endorsed it in UN Security 
Resolution 628 by giving its ‘full support’ to the New York Accords. The 
‘strengthening’ or to put it crudely but more accurately, the United States’s watering 
down of Resolution 435 (1978) produced an outcome which made all the parties better 
off. In the final analysis, it had taken the logic of the balance of power to temper 
international law into a useful policy instrument.
independence; and Cedric Thomberry, The International Development of 
Peacekeeping: LSE Centenary Lectures, (London: LSE Books, 1995) for an insider 
account on the operations of the UNTAG. Cedric Thomberry was the Assistant Secretary 
General of the UN on Political Affairs in charge of the UNTAG in Namibia.
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Conclusion
The key insight provided by balance of power theory is simple: that a stable international 
order can emerge as the unintended consequence of the actions of many states, each 
seeking its own interest. Most critiques of balance of power derive from the neglect of this 
insight, from the tendency to assume that one state can gain only at the expense of another. 
Like Adam Smith’s price system, the balance of power works so well that most of the 
time we do not appreciate it. We never realize how effective its functions are until it is 
prevented from functioning; and even then, we often assume that alternatives exist. Most 
of these alternatives however, can, and will only function under the climate of order 
generated by the balance of power. Yet balance of power alone cannot sustain the order 
which it helps to create. International law as exemplified by the UN Charter and 
resolutions complements it. As has been argued in this study, the balance of power and 
international law are underpinned by different rationales; yet both worked in tandem to 
resolve the Namibian conflict. International law made annexation impossible for South 
Africa. Balance of power made resolution possible.
The primary focus of this thesis has been upon the subtle and complex relationship 
between power and law in international society. In the main, the controversy surrounding 
the relationship focuses on the competing values of order and justice. But there is another 
issue to take into account, namely that power and law is not only complementary, but also 
symbiotic. To varying degree, each could serve as the instrumentality of the other. And 
this is the view adopted in this study. But such a proposition has not always received 
universal assent. The fact that early publicists such as Grotius, Kant, and some 
contemporary realists such as Waltz argued for the mutual exclusiveness between power 
and law, is not clearly sufficient to deny the complementarity between the two, as Gentili,
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Vattel and most recently, Oppenheim, and Bull argued. As demonstrated in chapter one, 
both balance of power and international law are concerned to restrain the excesses of a 
potential hegemon, regulate disturbances within the international system, preserve order, 
and limit wars. In tandem, each reinforces the idea that vigilance, moderation, and 
flexibility are necessary for the protection of a society of competing states.
Yet the fundamental questions concerning how they intersect and diverge remain. So 
also does the question, which is dominant. Balance of power creates the optimal 
bargain of incentives and costs necessary to affect the behaviour of states. By itself, 
international law is impotent to secure change in opposition to the realities of power 
and the interests of the great powers, but it serves as an institutional device for 
communicating the prevailing norms of the international community to a ‘deviant’ 
state. The politics of the mandate system underscored the intellectual bankruptcy of the 
approach that denies the relationship between law and power. As the Bismarck letter, 
which was discussed in Chapter two showed, even at the height of balance of power in 
Europe, Germany could not contain British expansionism willy-nilly, without twinning 
political objectives with legal assertion. Taylor’s account of Germany’s colonial claims 
was largely narrowed in the sense that it failed to appreciate Bismarck’s desire not to 
overthrow the existing European order by giving due concern to the norms of 
international law. By contrast, as shown in chapter three, on the mandate system, 
lurking behind the idea of international accountability lay the strategic and political 
interests of the Allied and Associated Power at Versailles. The Treaty of Versailles 
symbolized the international law of power, yet its idealistic object shaped and 
metamorphosed into the trusteeship and decolonisation regime that offered the prospect 
of statehood for the colonised peoples.
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Following from one of the fundamentals of Versailles, it is interesting to note that, the 
UN did attempt to secure solution to the Namibian question on the basis of legal order. 
With four advisory opinions from the International Court of Justice, and 73 resolutions, 
the UN had to ‘outsource’ its search for a solution in 1960 in the hope that Ethiopia and 
Liberia would secure a binding judgement. Yet the posturing between the United States 
and the Soviet Union along ideological and political lines, as well as the failure of the 
Western powers to recognize the competence of the UN Council for Namibia 
undermined the UN’s faith in the legal approach. The implication of the acquiescent 
attitude of the Western powers was that South Africa had the opportunity to evade its 
legal obligations. In contrast though, without deference whilst not confrontational to the 
Western powers, the newly independent African states kept Namibia on the agenda of 
the international community. While their action was done, partly to legitimised their 
participation in the international arena, yet it constantly revealed the frailty of 
international law concerning the issues of self-determination, and as well as the quest 
for fairness and justice within the international system.
A common theme runs through chapters two and four. In a move reminiscent of 
Bismarck’s attempt to contain Britain expansionism of the late 19th century, the United 
States, through Henry Kissinger discovered that securing a solution on Namibia and 
Rhodesia would pre-empt further Soviet gains in Southern Africa. Each of these 
actions, though not of the same kind, had similar objective in sight: how to limit the 
growing ascendancy of the perceived most powerful competitor. Craftily, Henry 
Africanus had to be worked out in a way that respected international law. In effect, 
power politics had to capture the essence of idealism in order to achieve its own ends. 
This dilemma about the existence (or absence) of a relationship between power and law
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remained evident in the Contact Group's diplomacy. The Contact Group sought to deny 
the symbiotic relationship between the two, by exclusively seeking to secure a solution 
within an idealistic mindset. This denial is perhaps difficult to understand, but not to 
account for.
The Contact Group in its design and composition deliberately excluded Soviet Union 
from its multilateral team, and refused to recognise SWAPO as the sole representative 
of the Namibian people. The dilemma confronting the Contact Group was how to 
succeed in creating a synthesis between the framework of power politics it inherited 
and the universalist liberal values, which it professed. Within this context, as discussed 
in Chapter five, the Contact Group diplomacy appeared to be a radical departure from 
power politics of Henry Africanus. Yet it could not extricate itself from realism of the 
shadow of Soviet Union presence in Africa. The linkage politics gives us a sense of 
what is at stake when the belief in balance of power is dignified. Allies that were 
committed to a liberal agenda felt puzzled, and foes felt a sense of injustice and 
betrayal. France ‘excused’ itself, while other three members of the group retreated to 
the background quietly. The African group, which in the broader scheme of things, was 
freeriding on the order created and guaranteed by balance of power strongly criticized 
linkage politics. There is much to say about the conceits of the critics of ‘linkage’. Yet 
through ‘linkage’ the United States moderated the South African behaviour through the 
adroit application of incentives and penalties. It secured an outcome that guaranteed 
regional stability and Namibian self-rule, and outcome that had eluded its critics, and 
international law for more than four decades.
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The account above has theoretical implications that move in two directions: towards the 
familiar and the seemingly unfamiliar. On the familiar side, it links this dissertation 
with an aspect of the ‘research programme’ of the English school, indeed one that 
distinguishes the international society research programme as a living tradition in the 
study of international relations. In contrast to its classical realist cousin, which see post­
colonial African states as primarily part of the great game, the English school, observed 
that post-colonial African states gave new territorial footholds to the idea of self- 
determination. In particular, the inclusion and participation of the African states not 
only continued on the Westphalian norms of non-interference and sovereign equality, 
but also stretched the rules of statehood and sovereignty beyond the bounds of the 
mandate system. Although they put more emphasis on ‘juridical’ and positive 
competencies of sovereignty rather than the ‘negative’ formulations, which the 
European statesmen endorsed in Westphalia, but they constantly communicated the 
emergent norm on self determination to South Africa. Consequently though, there was 
the proliferation of ‘quasi states’.
On the ‘unfamiliar’ side, study has also described new empirical evidence, which 
contributes to our knowledge of international society. In chapter two, we drew 
attention to the issue of quasi-states. In Jackson’s case, the quasi-states used 
international law, and external legitimacy to enhance their sovereign status. Chapter 
two drew attention to the issue of quasi-states. This study suggests that we need to take 
a fresh look at this debate. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the Rights and 
Duties of States summarises the major components of statehood. A state must possess a 
permanent population, a well-defined territory and a government capable of ruling its 
citizens and of managing formal diplomatic relations. Essentially, the acquisition of
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statehood depends on a political entity’s recognition as such by other states. The point 
should not go unnoticed. League membership did not guarantee international 
recognition of the Dominions’ including South Africa's sovereign independence, until 
1926 when the Balfour Declaration formally empowered South Africa to formulate and 
execute its own foreign policies. In this sense, there were Quasi-States long before the 
transfer of power to Africa in the 1960s. In effect, a distinction has to be made between 
those ‘quasi states’ that used external legitimacy to sustain their statehood after de jure 
recognition and those that used external legitimacy after de facto recognition. To a 
great extent, South Africa was dependent on the entitlement of being a Mandatory 
power to complete its international status.
Since we started this study with a paradox, perhaps, it not out of order to end with 
another. The outcome of the conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo presents a paradox of 
increasing utilisation of power to secure idealist ends, namely compliance with 
international law and/or the norms of international society. So here is the puzzle of 
post-Cold War international relations. Is power alone sufficient to solve a small 
problem such as ethnic conflict? Is international law on its own insufficient to solve a 
big problem of those peoples struggling for self-determination?
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